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A B S T R A C T
This thesis is an exercise in International Relations, and examines 
the subject of linkage diplomacy under conditions of bilateral economic 
interdependence. Emphasis is given to identifying the conditions under 
which different States will try to manipulate their interdependent 
relationships with other States by adopting linkage strategies - that 
is, by using their bargaining leverage in one economic area to obtain 
trade-offs in separate economic (or political) issue areas.
It is argued in the Introduction that the adoption of linkage 
diplomacy may not fully or adequately be explained in terms of the 
'sensitivity' or 'vulnerability' dimensions of interdependent relations. 
There is, it is suggested, another aspect of interdependence (generally 
neglected in the literature) which might help to explain why States 
adopt, or reject, trade-off strategies - namely, the complexity of 
interstate relations. The thesis embraces as its working hypothesis: 
the propensity for States to adopt linkage strategies involving 
trade-offs across issue areas is inversely related to the level of 
interdependence - where interdependence is measured in terms of the 
number and variety of issue areas and actors significantly involved 
in the relationship.
This argument is developed further in Part I; where also some 
of the terms employed in the working hypothesis are defined, and an 
analytical framework designed to test the hypothesis in the context 
of different case studies is presented.
Then follows the major body of the thesis. It was decided to 
apply the analytical framework to the study of two different coastal 
fishing states - New Zealand and Australia - which have recently 
established 20.0-nautical mile fishing (or exclusive economic) zones. 
Attention is focussed on the ways in which these two countries chose to 
exercise their increased bargaining leverage over foreign fishing 
access. It is asked whether either Wellington or Canberra decided to 
use this leverage to extract concessions in other (that is, non­
fisheries) issue areas in their fisheries access negotiations with 
Japan. Most importantly, it is determined how their decisions in 
this regard were influenced by the complexity of their respective 
bilateral economic relations with Japan. Further, the case studies 
examine the outcomes of the New Zealand-Japan and Australia-Japan 
fisheries negotiations, and assess the degree to which the trade-off
strategies - if adopted - were successful.
This section of the thesis is divided into three parts. Part II 
treats with the Global Fisheries Environment, and examines: the 
structure of the global fishing industry on the eve of the era of 
200-mile fishing zones; recent changes in the Law of the Sea; and 
Japan's sensitivity and likely vulnerability to these changes. The 
New Zealand case study is presented in Part III, and the Australian 
study in Part IV.
The concluding chapter assesses what the two case studies 
reveal about linkage diplomacy under conditions of bilateral economic 
interdependence. This chapter explores: conceivable alternative 
explanations for the adoption of linkage diplomacy; possible limitations 
of (or necessary qualifications to) the working hypothesis; and suggested 
further areas for study in this field. Finally, the practical impli­
cations of linkage diplomacy for the future development and structure 
of the global, and more specifically the New Zealand and Australian, 
fishing industries are assessed.
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A NOTE ON INTERVIEWS
During the research for this thesis, a large number of people 
in New Zealand, Australia, Japan and elsewhere were interviewed.
The majority of the interviewees were public servants who generally 
preferred the interview material not to be attributed to them by 
name. Respecting their wishes in this regard, I have - in the 
body of the thesis - referred only to the department with which 
the interviewee was associated at the time of the interview. However, 
so as to give as much information as possible about my sources for 
others conducting research in this area, I have listed at the end 
of the thesis the names of most of those interviewed, together with 
details of the positions they held when interviewed, and the time 
(in terms of the month and year) of the interview. This formula 
was chosen in preference to a confidential appendix. It should also 
be noted that where a particularly important, or controversial, piece 
of information was received in the course of one of these interviews 
every effort was made to check the accuracy of this information in 
other interviews or, where possible, with published material.
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PREFACE
The origins of this thesis can be traced back at least ten years.
In 1971, as part of the requirements for an Honours degree 
in Geography at Victoria University, Wellington, I wrote a dissertation 
on The Importation of Japanese Oil through the Malacca Strait. This 
exercise revealed that the choice of Japan’s oil supply routes was 
influenced as much by international political factors as by constraints 
of the physical environment.
The significance of the political dimensions of the trade in 
natural resources was further impressed on the author during a period 
of study as a Foreign Research Fellow in the Geography Department, 
the University of Tokyo, from early 1973 to late 1974. I was at that 
time working on the geography of Japan's oil supplies. Mid-way through 
these studies it was my good luck (from the research perspective) and 
Japan's ill fortune that the Fourth Arab-Israeli War broke out. The 
Arab oil-exporters' choice of Japan as a prime target for their 
'oil diplomacy', and subsequent American pressures^on Tokyo to join the 
International Energy Agency, revealed the international political 
constraints within which Japan had, as a major oil-importing nation, to 
formulate its energy policies. (These issues provided the focii of 
a paper by the author - Japan's Oil Import Policies in the Age of 
'Multipolar Diplomacy' - published under the auspices of the Australia- 
Japan Economic Relations Research Project, the Australian National 
University, April 1975.)
My interest in the politics of the trade in resources developed 
further in 1975-76 during a course of studies leading to an MA degree 
in International Relations at the Australian National University, when 
I wrote a dissertation on The International Politics of Offshore Oil 
Claims in East Asia: With Special Reference to China. The focus of 
my research had now shifted from the study of problems experienced 
by resource-importing nations to that of the political constraints 
operating on, and the potential bargaining leverage available to, the 
owners of natural resources. This project also introduced me to the 
complex, but fascinating, subject of the Law of the Sea.
When, in mid-1976, I was awarded a Ph.D scholarship at the 
Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, the Australian National 
University, it was suggested by an academic colleague that I might 
study the subject of marine resource ownership and development in the 
South Pacific. There were several reasons why I was attracted to this
topic. First, very broadly, it would permit me to continue my studies 
in resource politics. Second, more specifically, it would be a 
natural extension of my MA research, involving both the study of 
resource-owning countries and Law of the Sea issues. Third, the 
subject was a topical one, for many States - including those in the 
South Pacific - were then contemplating establishing 200-nautical mile 
fishing (or exclusive economic) zones. Fourth, while the focus of 
my study would be on various States in the South Pacific which were 
shortly due to establish such zones, the thesis would also allow me 
to pursue my interest in Japan - the major foreign fishing nation 
active in this part of the world. Finally, I had a strong personal 
interest in the subject of fisheries management in the South Pacific. 
During my 13-year career in the Merchant Navy (which preceded my academic 
career) I had, on several occasions, worked as a commercial fisherman 
in New Zealand waters.
Shortly before taking up my scholarship in August 1976, I visited 
New Zealand where the Prime Minister (R.D. Muldoon) had recently 
made some interesting comments on the subject of foreign fishing access. 
He had then hinted that if Japanese fishermen wanted access to New 
Zealand's proposed 200-mile zone, the Japanese Government would have 
to consider giving New Zealand's farmers increased access for their 
agricultural exports onto the Japanese market. Muldoon's statements 
in this area suggested the conceptual framework for my thesis. I decided 
to examine how New Zealand, and other countries in the South Pacific, 
intended to use their bargaining leverage over foreign access to their 
extended fishing zones - whether to promote the interests of the 
domestic fishing industry, or to seek concessions from the foreign 
fishing States in other (that is, non-fisheries related) issue areas.
Initially, I intended to include a number of case studies in the 
thesis - including such coastal fishing states as Papua New Guinea, 
the Solomons, Fiji and Tonga, as well as New Zealand and Australia. 
However, following two research trips in the region (one in mid-1977 
when I visited New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa, and another in 
mid-1978 when I visited New Zealand, Fiji, New.Caledonia, the New 
Hebrides, the Solomons, Papua New Guinea and Japan) it was obvious 
that a large number of case studies would make the thesis too unwieldy, 
and that I would be unable to cover adequately all the relevant 
issues in each country study. I decided, therefore, to limit my 
enquiry to the examination of only two coastal fishing states - New
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Zealand and Australia. My research in the South Pacific was not, however, 
a complete waste of effort, for it provided me with fresh insights into 
the problems experienced by coastal fishing states, and further infor­
mation on Japan's fisheries strategies in the era of 200-mile zones.
In a sense, this thesis topic represented something of a gamble.
In mid-1976, when I commenced my research, New Zealand and Australia 
were only contemplating introducing 200-mile offshore zones. In the 
event, New Zealand did not establish its zone until April 1978, and 
Canberra waited until October 1979 before it declared the Australian 
Fishing Zone. This necessarily entailed a prolongation of my research 
timetable. It also meant that much of my research was carried out 
during the most sensitive period of fisheries negotiations conducted 
respectively by New Zealand and Australia with Japan.
This leads to the point where I wish to acknowledge my debt to 
all those who have contributed to the completion of the thesis. First,
I wish to express my gratitude to the very large number of politicians, 
bureaucrats, commercial fishermen, farmers' representatives, academics, 
and others in New Zealand, Australia, Japan and elsewhere who granted 
me interviews. In particular, I thank those government officials - 
most, but not all, of whom appear in the List of Persons Interviewed 
at the end of the thesis - who trusted me with politically sensitive 
information. I hope I have in no way betrayed this trust.
Next, I wish to thank my academic supervisors. Most importantly,
I express my gratitude to Professor Stuart Harris of the Centre for 
Resource and Environmental Studies, whose broad knowledge of the 
international trade in natural resources and of the machinery of 
government in Canberra, was of particular assistance in the Australian 
case study. Moreover, he frequently interrupted his busy work schedule 
to discuss these issues with me. I also wish to thank Professor J.D.B. 
Miller of the International Relations Department, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, and Professor J.E. 
Richardson of the Political Science Department, School of General Studies, 
the Australian National University, for their comments on the theoretical 
dimensions of the thesis.
Professor Iwao Kobori of the Geography Department, the University 
of Tokyo, also deserves a special word of thanks. During my research 
trip to Japan in late 1978 he arranged for me a number of interviews with 
Japanese Government officials involved in fisheries matters.
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I also express my gratitude to the Australian Academy of Science 
which allowed me to participate in the Science and Industry Forum 
Meeting of 23-24 September 1977. The discussions at this Forum, and 
the task given me of editing the papers there presented (which 
appeared in Australia's Offshore Resources: Implications of the 
200 Mile Zone, Forum Report No. 11, Canberra, 1978), provided me with 
a greater appreciation of the potential problems associated with 
management of the proposed Australian Fishing Zone.
Finally, I wish to thank Margaret Turner who dedicated long and 
tedious hours to typing this thesis.
G.W.P. George 
January, 1981.
1INTRODUCTION
'It has become a platitude to say that 
the whole world is interdependent....
Yet what a tremendous platitude it is!...
If this platitude is unalterably true, its 
implications must profoundly affect the 
conditions of human life for the future; 
it must transform all our thinking about 
social organisation; it must modify all our 
programmes and policies. Clearly we ought 
to be thinking seriously about it, and 
asking ourselves what it involves.'!•
What Muir had to say almost half a century ago applies at least
equally today. But, despite a large and growing literature on the
subject of interdependence, analysts are still not agreed upon its
consequences. This confusion is particularly evident with respect
to the implications of economic interdependence for national foreign
economic policies. The literature fails, for example, to identify
clearly the conditions under which different States will try to
manipulate their interdependent relationships with other States by
adopting linkage strategies - that is, by using their bargaining
leverage in one economic area to obtain trade-offs in separate
2(economic or political) issue areas. It is this subject - linkage 
diplomacy in conditions of economic interdependence - that the 
following thesis addresses.
Most analyses of economic interdependence have adopted 
a systems approach, examining the phenomenon at the global or regional 
level. These studies have generally focussed on one, or more, 
of three major problem areas: defining the term 'interdependence';
determining whether interdependence has increased or decreased over 
time; and assessing the degree to which interdependence promotes 
systemic instability through the generation of international economic 
crises.
It can be argued that much of the confusion surrounding the 
likely consequences of interdependence may be attributed to the wide
1. From R. Muir The Interdependent World and Its Problems, Houghton 
Mifflin, Boston, 1933, quoted in Andrew M. Scott 'The Logic of 
International Interaction' International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21, 
No.3, September, 1977, p.429.
2. Definitions of some of the terms employed here - including 
'trade-offs' and 'issues' - appear in the analytical framework,
Part I of the thesis.
2range of definitions of the term. ‘ It is not our purpose here to give 
full and detailed descriptions of all these definitions, but to outline
some of those most commonly employed in the literature.
2Some writers * have tended to equate interdependence with 
the volume of transactions between societies - usually measured 
in terms of flows of money, goods, people, and messages across 
international boundaries. The greater the magnitude of these trans­
actions (absolutely or in comparison to the domestic sector) the 
higher the level of presumed interdependence.
The limitations of this approach have been noted by a number
of analysts. Cooper, for example, argues that volumes of transactions
may not necessarily indicate the extent to which units are affected
by events occurring outside. He stresses it is more enlightening to
define economic interdependence in terms of 'the sensitivity of economic
transactions between two or more nations to economic developments
3within those nations.' * Cooper goes on to argue
'this approach means that two countries with 
much mutual trade would still experience a 
low degree of interdependence if the value of 
trade were not sensitive to price and income 
developments in the two countries; on the 
other hand, two countries would be highly 
interdependent if their transactions were 
greatly sensitive to economic developments, 
even if their mutual trade were initially 
at a low level. ' ^ •
1. This problem is widely recognised: see for example, R. Rosecrance, 
A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S. Laquer, and J. Stocker 
'Whither Interdependence?' International Organisation_, Vol.31,
No.3, Summer, 1977; and Henry Winthrop 'Planned Global Interdependence 
as a Foreign Policy Goal: The Problem of Coordinating Trading Relat­
ionships' American Journal of Economics and Sociology3 Vol.37, No.2, 
April, 1978.
2. Most importantly, Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein; see their 
'National Industrialisation and the Declining Share of the Internat­
ional Economic Sector, 1890-1959' World Politics3 XIII, January, 1961.
3. Richard N. Cooper 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy
in the Seventies' World Politics3 Vol.XXIV, October, 1971 - July, 1972, 
p.159; see also his The Economics of Interdependence: Economic 
Policy in the Atlantic Community3 McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 
1968, particularly Chapter 3.
4. Cooper, 1972, op.cit.3 p.p.159-160.
3Another definition of interpendence has been suggested by 
Waltz. He argues that the sensitivity concept obscures some of 
the most important political aspects of interdependence - or, as he 
prefers to call it, mutual dependence. Waltz is more concerned with 
the vulnerability dimension of interdependent relations, which rests 
on the relative availability and costliness of different policy 
alternatives that actors face in trying to adjust to outside change. 
Unlike sensitivity, which refers to the liability to costly external 
effects before any counter strategies have been devised, vulnerability 
refers to the continued liability to costly effects even after 
attempts have been made to improve the situation.
Keohane and Nye are less concerned with the flow of transactions, 
sensitivity or vulnerability, and define interdependence in terms of
2 .the behavioural attributes in bargaining. In Power and Interdependence 
they refer to 'complex interdependence', which is characterised by: 
multiple channels of diplomatic interaction, by all types of actors; 
the absence of hierarchy on issues (namely, security issues do not 
dominate the global or bilateral agenda, and many issues arise from 
domestic sources); and the irrelevance of military force in determining 
the outcomes of bargaining and conflicts.
However, none of these analysts - nor others concerned with
3defining interdependence * - appears to have considered defining or 
measuring interdependence in terms of the number of issues and actors 
involved in interstate relations. Even Keohane and Nye, who speak 
of the multiple channels connecting societies in complex interdependence, 
are interested more in the types of channels - interstate, transgovern- 
mental, and transnational - rather than the number of channels per so.
The significance of this aspect of interdependence - namely, the 
numbers of issues and actors - will be examined in detail later.
1. See Kenneth N. Waltz 'The Myth of National Interdependence' in 
Charles P. Kindelberger (ed.), The International Corporation: A Symposium3 
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
2. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in TransitionLittle Brown and Company, Boston, 1977.
3. See, for example, Edward L. Morse 'Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, 
and the Politics of International Economic Relations' World Politics> 
Vol.XXIV, Spring Supplement, 1972; and Oran R. Young 'Interdependencies 
in World Politics' International Journal_, Vol.24, No.4, Autumn, 1969.
4The second point of focus in the literature has been on long­
term changes in international interdependence. Deutsch, Eckstein and 
Waltz'*'' have argued that interdependence between the industrial count­
ries - as measured by the ratio of intersocietal transactions to internal 
transactions - has declined during the twentieth century. On the other
hand Morse, Cooper, Rosecrance and Stein, and Katzenstein, have present-
2ed data to demonstrate that interdependence has grown dramatically;
3.while a recent study by Rosecrance and his associates suggests that 
interdependence has, in fact, followed a cyclical path over this period.
Of greatest relevance to the present study, is what these analysts 
have to say about the consequences of interdependence. Earlier treatments 
of the subject (back in the 1960s and very early 1970s) suggested that 
interdependence is a condition believed likely to improve man’s chances 
to live in peace and plenty. Brown, for example, argues that the more 
numerous and complex the links between States, the greater the likelihood 
for peace, good will, and a new international social ethic of cooperation.
In the early/mid 1970s, however, concern about 'resources diplomacy' 
and the 'threat from the Third World' following the 1973 Oil Crisis, led 
to a reappraisal of the implications of interdependence. Many analysts 
now argue that high levels of interdependence in the international 
system provokes crises among States. Scott alleges that as the amount 
of interaction increases so does the number of system problems. The 
international system, he argues, is moving into 'an entropic or 
disorder crisis.'^’ Morse notes how interdependence not only breeds
1. Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein 1961, op.Git., Kenneth N.
Waltz op.cit., and Karl W. Deutsch et.al., France, Germany and the 
Hestern Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration 
and World Politics, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1967.
2. Edward L. Morse, 'Transnational Economic Processes' International 
Organisation, Vol.25, Summer, 1971; Richard N. Cooper, 1968, op.cit.; 
Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein 'Interdependence: Myth or Reality?' 
World Politics, Vol.26, October, 1973; and Peter J. Katzenstein 
'International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and Recent Changes' 
International Organisation, Vol.29, No.4, Autumn, 1975.
3. Richard Rosecrance et al, 1977, op.cit.
4. See Lester R. Broun World without Borders, Vintage Books, New York, 
1972, especially Chapter 10 'The Growing Economic Interdependence of 
Nations' p.p.183-208.
5. Andrew M. Scott, op.cit., p.429.
5crises, but also increases the potential for
'...any single party to manipulate a crisis 
for its own domestic or foreign political ends.
With the increased number of crises in areas of 
systemic interdependence and the growing 
interrelatedness of issue areas... negotiations 
normally will involve a wide range of issues for 
the development of possible trade-offs among 
governments in their attempts to reach decisions 
or consensus. At the same time, possibilities 
for political "blackmail" are also enhanced with 
the growth in the links between different issues 
and stakes.'1•
Bergsten and his colleagues have also suggested that complex linkages
and trade-offs between issues are likely to become particularly
2.pronounced under conditions of high interdependence. * (These authors 
do not here specify how they measure interdependence, but they do speak 
in terms of the 'complexity and closeness' of interstate relations.) 
Further, it has been noted how governments - particularly those in the 
Western industrialised states - face the difficult task of satisfying 
the growing demands of a highly politicised citizenry at a time when 
their (the governments') ability to achieve domestic social and 
international goals has been reduced by increased vulnerability to 
outside pressures following the removal of trade, and other, barriers 
to international economic exchange.
A number of other observers are uncertain about the consequences
of international interdependence. Haas claims
' While neither cooperation nor conflict 
is uniquely predicted by high interdependence, 
systems change is.... It is not true that inter­
dependence means equality among nations. But 
the kinds of systems change associated with 
rising interdependence do imply a tendency toward 
strengthening weaker actors against strong states 
as the web of relationships increases perceived 
sensitivities, vulnerabilities and opportunity 
costs for the stronger.
1. Edward L. Morse Modernisation and the Transformation of Internat­
ional Relations, The Free Press, New York, 1976, p.130.
2. C. Fred Bergsten, Robert 0. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Inter­
national Economics and International Politics: -A Framework for Analysis' 
International Organisation, Vol.29, No.1, Winter, 1975, particularly
p.p.9-10. For other comments on the ways in which high levels of 
economic interdependence increase the likelihood of international 
crises see Richard N. Cooper 1972 op.oit., and his 'Trade Policy Is 
Foreign Policy' Foreign Policy, No.9, Winter, 1972-73; and Gregory 
Schmid 'Interdependence Has Its Limits' Foreign Policy, No.21, Winter, 
1975-76.
3. Ernest B. Haas 'Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology
Interdependence and the Construction of International Regimes,' 
International Organisation, Vol.29, No.3, Summer, 1975, p.860.
6Keohane and Nye are similarly cautious in predicting the conse­
quences of interdependence. The authors of Power and Interdependence 
do not suggest that international conflict disappears when interdependence 
prevails; on the contrary, they believe that conflict will'take new 
forms, and may even increase'.^' They also warn of the difficulty of 
predicting outcomes, because measurable power resources - in terms 
of asymmetrical interdependence, or vulnerabilities - are not auto­
matically translated into effective power over outcomes. 'Translation 
occurs by way of a political bargaining process in which skill, commit­
ment, and coherence can... belie predictions based on the distribution 
of power resources.'^’
Power and Interdependence reveals the limitations of an approach
to the study of interdependence where the level of analysis is the
world system. Holsti has noted how the systems perspective attributes
certain characteristics equally throughout the system, precluding
statements about specific situations. He correctly observes that
this approach tells us little about how variations in interdependence
between specific pairs of States affect bargaining between those
3particular States."’ Keohane and Nye admit that their models do not 
provide the basis for a complete study of the politics of interdepen­
dence. They note that, in common with other systems approaches, their 
work fails to explain adequately the policies of particular States.
These two authors suggest that, to analyse national policies under 
conditions of complex interdependence, one should examine both how 
external constraints limit the range of choice available to the
government concerned, and how the domestic structure and political
4 .processes condition the responses that are chosen.
It is argued here, therefore, that a systems approach provides 
an incomplete explanation of foreign economic policy formulation and 
implementation.- including the necessary conditions surrounding the 
adoption, and successful use, of linkage strategies in situations of
1. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1977, op.cit.3p.8.
My italics.
2. Ibid.3 p.225.
3. Kal J. Holsti 'A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex 
Interdependence' International Organisation, Vol.32, No.2, Spring, 1978.
4. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1977, op.cit.3 p.p.223-224. 
See also their 'Interdependence and Integration' in Fred I. Greenstein 
and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science: Vol.8 
International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 
Mass., 1975.
7bilateral economic interdependence. What is needed is an approach 
which focusses on the interplay between external constraints and 
domestic politics in the context of different case studies. But 
the student is unlikely to receive much guidance in this area from 
the existing literature. Nowhere, to the present author’s knowledge, 
do interdependency analysts employ an analytical framework which 
systematically considers both exogenous and endogenous constraints 
on national foreign economic policies.
Katzenstein is one theorist who has tried to explain foreign
economic policy by systematically including domestic factors in his
analysis. In 1976 he noted that recent writings on problems of the
international economy had focussed attention primarily on changes
in the international system. Criticising this emphasis, Katzenstein
observed that 'The consistency and the content of foreign economic
policies result as much from the constraints of domestic structures
as from the functional logic inherent in international effects.’1 23“
He continued by arguing that dissimilar policy responses among various
advanced industrial states to common external challenges can be
explained in terms of the nature of domestic policy networks which link
State and society. This theme provided the theoretical base for a
2book he edited in 1978 * dealing with the foreign economic policies 
of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, France and Japan.
Katzenstein’s work makes an important contribution to the 
literature on foreign economic policy analysis. It has, however, 
several deficiencies. First, it goes too far in explaining national 
foreign economic policies in terms of domestic forces. Obviously, in 
some important policy areas - for example, the reaction to the Oil 
Crisis - varying national sensitivities and vulnerabilities to 
international forces are at least as important as domestic structures
3in explaining the different responses of the industrialised States.
1. Peter J. Katzenstein 'International Relations and Domestic 
Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States' 
International Organisations Vo1.30, No.l, Winter, 1976, p.2.
2. See Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) Between lower and Plenty: Foreign 
Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial S t a t e s The University of 
Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1978.
3. T.J. Pempel's essay 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic 
Bases for International Behaviour' (Between Power and Plenty_, p.p.139- 
190), for example, may be criticised for giving undue emphasis to the 
role of domestic forces in the formulation of Japan's foreign economic 
policies. A large number of works, both Japanese and foreign, give 
evidence of the importance of external forces in the development of 
that country's economic strategies - see Saburo Okita 'Natural
8Second, its analysis of domestic political processes is too narrow.
By focussing on the interaction of private and public bureaucracies, 
it fails to pay sufficient attention to: intra-bureaucratic politics; 
mass or class behaviour; or the role of political culture.^’ Third, 
along with most works on interdependence, it confines its analysis 
to the advanced industrialised States. Our understanding of the 
importance of domestic forces in foreign economic policy might benefit 
from a broader analysis which includes less industrialised First World 
countries - for example, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - and some 
of the less developed countries of the Third World.
There exists in the interdependence literature a number of 
empirical studies focussing on different bilateral and multilateral 
economic relationships. These studies collectively suggest that both 
external and domestic factors are important in explaining foreign 
economic policies. The next few paragraphs will examine what some of 
these studies have to say regarding the likelihood of States adopting 
linkage strategies in their foreign economic bargaining. The suggested 
international (non-domestic) constraints affecting the adoption of 
linkage strategies will be detailed first.
Holsti and Levy observe that the subject of issue area linkage 
(and its converse, issue area isolation) has not been much studied,
but they believe that linkage is most likely to occur between States
2.in which a high level of conflict is characteristic. Further, from 
their observations of transgovernmental relations between Canada and 
the United States, they suggest that linkages are unlikely where 
relations between governments have become routinised and where there
is a tradition of easy communication and access directly between the
3.bureaucracies of the two countries. * Their work also implies that
Resources Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy’ Foreign Affairs,
Vol.52, No.4, July, 1974; Zbigniew Brzezinski The Fragile Blossom:
Crisis and Change in Japan, Harper and Row, New York, 1972; A.E. Ackermann 
Japan's Natural Resources and their Relation to Japan's Economic Future, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953; Miyoshi Shuichi ’Japan’s 
Resources Policy at a Turning Point' Japan Quarterly, Vol.XVIII, No.3, 
July- September, 1971; Yamamoto Mitzuru "'Resources Diplomacy" Runs Into 
a Stone Wall’ Japan Quarterly, Vol.XXII, No.4, Oct. - December, 1975.
1. Katzenstein admits these deficiencies, see op.cit., 1976, p .19; 
and op.cit., 1978, p.12.
2. One may question whether this is, in fact, the case. The use of 
the Arab 'oil weapon' in 1973/74 suggests that linkages might just as 
often take place in relations among 'friendly' states - for example, 
between the Arab oil exporting nations and Japan.
3. Kal J. Holsti and Thomas Allen Levy 'Bilateral Institutions and
9issue linkage is a dangerous and unattractive strategy for the 
smaller (and more dependent) party in a relationship.
This latter point - the relationship between linkage and 
asymmetrical dependence - has engaged the attention of Keohane and Nye.
In their examination of Canadian-American and Australian-American 
relations, they note how the stronger party - the United States - 
has, at various times in the past, linked extraneous issues in order 
to exert the leverage of its overall preponderance.^' But it was 
also recognised that there are times when the stronger party will 
either not wish, or be unable, to exercise its bargaining leverage.
It is noted, for example, how the postwar nonlinkage norm in Canada- 
American relations may be attributed, in part, to an awareness by 
both governments that welfare losses would result from a disruption 
of economic integration. ' Further, the two authors note that while 
States might be tempted to draw linkages among issues, such linkages 
may be unsuccessful. Their ’issue structure’ model argues that power 
resources in one issue area loses some or all of their effectiveness 
when applied to others.
Most importantly, their studies reveal that sometimes it is
the weaker party in a relationship that will initiate linkage
bargaining. The Canadian-American case study revealed that, although
the former was in a more dependent position than the latter, it was
able occasionally to play on American sensitivity dependence in
certain issues. Its ability to do so is attributed to Canada's
will to 'suffer greater pain’ than America, which in turn reflects the
asymmetrical salience of the relationship - where the relationship
3.was more important to Canada than to the United States.'
The empirical studies have also suggested a number of domestic
constraints likely to affect the adoption of linkage strategies.
Keohane and Nye allege that 'increased politicisation - particularly
in the form of greater attention to an issue by high governmental
officials - will lead to attempts by one government or the other (or
4 .by actors within governments) to link issues to one another.'
Following the same theme, Huntington (in his study of economic diplomacy
Transgovernmental Relations Between Canada and the United States' 
International Organisation3 Vol.28, No.4, Autumn, 1974, p.885.
1. See Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1977, op.cit.3 
Part III 'Regimes and Two Bilateral Relationships.'
2. Ibid. 3 p.211.
3. Ibid.j p.p.203-204.
4. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Introduction: The
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between the United States and the Soviet Union] notes that linkage 
strategies are less likely in countries which have 'a pervasive 
ideology that sanctifies the independence, rather than the subordination, 
of economic power to government.'^’
It has already been noted how Katzenstein has stressed the 
relevance of domestic political structures in the promotion of 
various foreign economic policies. Morse's brief study of French 
attempts to manipulate interdependent relationships with other 
countries appears to support this view. He observes how de Gaulle 
was able to implement a ’rational strategy' relatively free of 
domestic pressures, largely because of the existence of the
Constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic and the 'reserved
2 .powers' of the President.
A number of authors have drawn attention to the importance of
bureaucratic politics in limiting the range of economic strategies.
Holsti and Levy's study of Canadian-American relations, for example,
argues that the absence of linkages between policy sectors in Canada
may be explained in large measure by the reluctance - given their
vested interests - of officials in separate government agencies 'to
give up something dear to them so that another agency can obtain
3something dear to it.' ’ Huntington also speaks of the difficulty 
of harnessing economic power to foreign policy goals because of
4'bureaucratic pluralism and inertia.'
Many of the studies make reference to the role of private 
pressure groups in the decision-making process. Keohane and Nye's 
examination of the Canadian-American relationship and the 'oceans 
issue' area points to the fact that interdependence has different 
effects on different domestic groups, and that these groups press 
multiple concerns on their governments. They further observe that 
'by reducing the coherence of national positions, the complexity of 
actors and issues strongly affects the commitment to and credibility 
of threatened retaliation' against external threats.
Collectively, these empirical studies help to explain how 
linkage strategies are adopted, or rejected, by different States
Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence' International 
Organisation, Vol.28, No.4, Autumn, 1974, p.605.
1. Samuel P. Huntington 'Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic 
Diplomacy' Foreign Policy, No.32, Fall, 1978, p.71.
2. See Edward L. Morse, Spring, 1972, op.cit.3 p.p.140-143.
3. Holsti and Levy, op.cit.3 p.884.
4. Huntington,. op.cit.3 p.71.
5. Keohane and Nye, 1977, op.cit.3 p.226.
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under conditions of economic interdependence. But separately,
each suffers from the fact that it fails to employ an analytical
framework which systematically treats with the international and
domestic constraints on foreign economic policy formulation. It is
argued here, however, that the basis for such a framework already
exists in the literature. As a result of their work on Canadian-
American relations Keohane and Nye were prompted to argue
’ When multiple issues and actors are 
involved, linkage is often too costly 
in terms of domestic politics. No 
group wishes to see its interests traded 
away. Threats of retaliation on an 
extraneous issue involve mobilisation 
of different sets of actors and promote 
domestic politicization, which bureaucrats 
fear may get out of control.'^'
This observation suggests that there is another aspect of 
interdependence - very often overlooked in the literature - which 
deserves greater emphasis. Rather than measure interdependence 
solely in terms of volume of transactions, mutual sensitivities, or 
vulnerabilities, it might be worth measuring interdependence in 
terms of the number and variety of issue areas and actors involved. 
It is argued that such a focus has the advantage of accommodating 
in our analysis both the international and domestic forces limiting 
the adoption, and implementation, of different foreign economic 
policies.
It may be asked whether Keohane and Nye's conclusions from 
the Canadian-American case study have broader validity. Building 
upon their argument outlined above, the following working hypothesis 
has been constructed and adopted in this thesis: the propensity for 
States to adopt linkage strategies involving trade-offs across issue 
areas is inversely related to the level of interdependence - where 
interdependence is measured in terms of the number and variety of 
issue areas and actors significantly involved in the relationship.
The a priori reasoning behind the working hypothesis is 
presented in Part I of the thesis. Part I also provides definitions 
of some of the terms employed in the working hypothesis, and offers 
an analytical framework to test the hypothesis in the context of
1. Ibid.j p.214. Other commentators have suggested that linkages 
(or trade-offs) are less likely when a large number of issues 
are involved; not so much because of domestic political constraints 
but because of the technical difficulty of measuring gains and 
losses across issues in bargaining. See Holsti and Levy, 1974, 
op.cit.j and Scott, 1977, op.cit., p.453.
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d i f f e r e n t  case  s t u d i e s  i n v o lv in g  b i l a t e r a l  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
The framework p ro p e r  i s  d iv i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  The f i r s t  
c o n s id e r s  t h e  range  o f  i s s u e s  and a c t o r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  in vo lved  in  
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  This  s e c t i o n  a l s o  t r e a t s  w i th  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  
and v u l n e r a b i l i t y  d imensions  o f  each i s s u e  a r e a  conce rned .  ( I t  
should be emphasised t h a t  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y / v u l n e r a b i l i t y  dimensions 
o f  in t e rd e p e n d e n c e  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  e lements  o f  our  a n a l y s i s ,  f o r  
in  t h e  case  s t u d i e s  we w i l l  wish to  d e t e rm in e  whether  t h e y  - 
r a t h e r  than  in t e rd e p e n d e n c e  as m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  i s s u e s  and a c t o r s  - 
b e s t  e x p l a in  t h e  ad o p t io n  o r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  l i n k a g e  s t r a t e g i e s . )
The second s e c t i o n  i s  conce rned  wi th  p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n .  Here th e  
a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  a c t o r s  towards  t r a d e - o f f s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  
as  a r e  th e  r e s p e c t i v e  r o l e s  and i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e s e  a c t o r s  in  th e  
d ec i s ion -m ak ing  p r o c e s s .  Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  de te rm ines  
whether  a l i n k a g e  s t r a t e g y  was f i n a l l y  adopted  o r  n o t .  The t h i r d  
s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  framework c o n s i d e r s  p o l i c y  im p le m e n ta t io n .  Emphasis 
w i l l  be given  t o  th e  n e g o t i a t i n g  p ro c e s s  - p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t h e  
b a rg a i n  outcome and t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s  (o r  f a i l u r e )  o f  
l i n k a g e  diplomacy.
I t  remains  now t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  ca se  s t u d i e s .  S ev e ra l  f a c t o r s  
i n f l u e n c e d  our  c h o ic e .  For pu rposes  o f  compar ison we chose  t o  
examine a t  l e a s t  two d i f f e r e n t  re sou rce -o w n in g  c o u n t r i e s  where each:  
p o s s e s s e s ,  and t r a d e s  i n ,  a s i m i l a r  commodity t h a t  might  be used 
in r e s o u r c e s  b a r g a i n i n g ;  e x p o r t s  t h i s  commodity t o  t h e  same major 
i m p o r t e r ( s ) ; has  ap p ro x im a te ly  t h e  same dom es t ic  p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e s ;  i s  a t ,  o r  n e a r l y  a t ,  t h e  same s t a g e  o f  economic 
development ;  bu t  where each d i f f e r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  in  te rm s  o f  th e  
com plex i ty  o f  i t s  t o t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  t h e  same r e s o u r c e - i m p o r t i n g  
c o u n t ry .
The c h o ice  o f  commodity in  ou r  a n a l y s i s  was i m p o r t a n t ,  f o r  
o b v io u s ly  t h e  commodity had to  be one which o f f e r e d  scope f o r  
use as a b a r g a i n i n g  l e v e r .  Our knowledge o f  t h e  OAPEC o i l  b o y co t t  
and p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  o f  1973/74 s u g g e s t s  t h a t ,  o f  t h e  many f a c t o r s  
which f av o u r  t h e  a d o p t io n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e s o u r c e  'weapon'  by 
an e x p o r t i n g  n a t i o n ,  t h r e e  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t :  f i r s t ,  t h e  
r e s o u r c e  i s  one o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  impor tance  t o  t h e  ma jor  im por t ing  
S t a t e s ;  second ,  th e  g lo b a l  t r a d i n g  environment f o r  t h e  r e s o u r c e  
in  q u e s t i o n  has r e c e n t l y  ex per i enced  g r e a t  changes  f a v o u r in g  t h e  
r e s o u r c e  e x p o r t e r s ;  and,  t h i r d ,  t h e r e  i s  a h igh  l e v e l  o f  p r e - e x i s t i n g
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involvement  by th e  government o f  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t ry  in t h e  r e s o u r c e  
i n d u s t r y  and t r a d e .  We migh t ,  in deed ,  have chosen to  examine t h e  
f o r e i g n  economic p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  major  o i l - e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  ( I t  
i s  argued t h a t  v e ry  few a n a l y s e s  have com prehens ive ly  c o n s id e re d  
th e  degree  to  which c o n d i t i o n s  o f  economic - and p o l i t i c a l  - 
i n t e rd e p e n d e n c e  have i n h i b i t e d  th e  OPEC members from more a g g r e s s i v e l y  
u s in g  t h e i r  o i l  l e v e ra g e  over th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e s  s in c e  1973/74) .  
I n s t e a d ,  we have e l e c t e d  to  s tudy  a n o th e r  group o f  c o u n t r i e s  and 
an o th e r  r e s o u r c e  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  l i s t e d  above - namely,  
t h e  c o a s t a l  f i s h i n g  s t a t e s ^ *  and t h e i r  marine f i s h  r e s o u r c e s .
The g lo b a l  f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  has  reached  an im por tan t  s t a g e  in
i t s  development .  The r e c e n t  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  2 0 0 - n a u t i c a l  mi le
f i s h i n g  (or  e x c l u s i v e 1 23economic) zones in  many p a r t s  o f  th e  world
r e p r e s e n t s  a s h i f t  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  power from t h e  d i s t a n t  w a te r  f i s h i n g
s t a t e s  (DWFS) t o  t h e  c o a s t a l  f i s h i n g  s t a t e s .  This  power t r a n s f e r  most
c l e a r l y  e x i s t s  in  t h e  c o a s t a l  s t a t e s '  a b i l i t y  to  de te rm ine  which
c o u n t ry ,  i f  any,  s h a l l  have a c c e s s ,  and (w i th in  c e r t a i n  l i m i t s )  on what
te rm s ,  t o  t h e  f i s h  r e s o u r c e s  o f  l a r g e  a r e a s  fo rm er ly  d e s ig n a t e d  high
s e a s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  development may be a p p r e c i a t e d  by
2
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a v e ry  l a r g e  percen tage^*  o f  t h e  w o r l d ' s  ocean ic  f i s h
3
r e s o u r c e s  l i e s  in w a te r s  l e s s  than  200 m i le s  o f f s h o r e .
When t h e  concept  o f  200-mi le  e x c l u s i v e  economic zones was f i r s t  
s ugges ted  a t  th e  Thi rd  United  N a t ions  Conference on t h e  Law o f  t h e  Sea 
(UNCLOS I I I )  in  th e  e a r l y  1970s, i t  appeared t h a t  i t s  p roponen ts  were 
m o t iva ted  p r i m a r i l y  by a d e s i r e  t o  p r o t e c t  bo th  t h e i r  f i s h  r e s o u r c e s  
and th e  domest ic  f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  from t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
DWFS. For example,  New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a  - two c o u n t r i e s  which 
had done much t o  promote t h i s  concep t  a t  UNCLOS - c i t e d  t h e s e  f a c t o r s
1. D e ta i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  te rms ' c o a s t a l  f i s h i n g  s t a t e '  (or  
c o a s t a l  s t a t e ,  as i t  i s  commonly r e f e r r e d  to )  and ' d i s t a n t  w a te r  
f i s h i n g  s t a t e '  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  in P a r t  I I .  I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  a t  p r e s e n t ,  
t o  d e s c r i b e  a c o a s t a l  s t a t e  as one which i s  i n t e r e s t e d  p r i m a r i l y  in  
e x p l o i t i n g  th e  f i s h  s to c k s  d i r e c t l y  o f f  i t s  own c o a s t .  A DWFS i s
one which t y p i c a l l y  has  l a r g e  and mobile v e s s e l s  capab le  o f  f i s h i n g  
hundreds  o r  thousands  o f  m i le s  from t h e i r  hom e-por t s .
2. Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon, f o r  example,  p u t  t h e  f i g u r e  
a t  some 90 p e r c e n t .  See t h e i r  a r t i c l e  'The Impact o f  t h e  Law o f  th e  
Sea Conference Upon the  P a c i f i c  Ocean: P a r t  I '  P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s V ol .51 ,  
N o . l ,  S p r in g ,  1978, p .2 0 .
3. Throughout t h i s  t h e s i s ,  u n l e s s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  ment ioned o th e rw i s e ,  
a l l  r e f e r e n c e s  to  m i le s  r e f e r  to  n a u t i c a l  m i le s .
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when tabling their influential joint working paper on fisheries at the 
Seabed Committee meeting in Geneva in mid-1972.^’ But, with the 
passage of time, it became less certain that the coastal states would 
use their bargaining leverage over foreign fishing access only to 
support the interests of their local fishing industries. Referring 
again to New Zealand and Australia, these two nations were - by the 
mid-1970s - expressing an interest in using their extended fishing 
zones (once established) to promote other national interests.
It is the substance and fate of New Zealand's and Australia's 
foreign fishing access policies in the era of 200-mile exclusive 
economic zones which provides the focus of our two case studies.
Special emphasis will be given to the fisheries access agreements 
concluded respectively by New Zealand and Australia with Japan - the 
single most important foreign fishing state operating in their waters.
It will be determined whether either Wellington or Canberra did, in 
fact, adopt linkage strategies in their negotiations with Tokyo; that 
is, did either one try to engage in trade-offs, where fisheries access 
was offered in exchange for non-fisheries related concessions from the 
Japanese? The analytical framework will be applied to the two case 
studies to discover the ways in which each nation's policies were 
affected by the constraints of the interdependent economic relationship 
existing with Japan. Most importantly, an assessment will be made 
of the relative impact of 'interdependence as sensitivity/vulnerability' 
compared with 'interdependence as multiplicity of issues and actors' 
on the formulation and implementation of these countries' fisheries 
access policies.
It will be noticed that there is one part in the first section 
of the analytical framework - that concerning the global fisheries 
environment - which applies equally to both case studies. To avoid 
unnecessary duplication, this area will be given separate treatment 
in Part II of the thesis. Emphasis will there be placed on: the structure
1. Document A/AC.138/SC.II/L.11. In commending the paper to members 
of the Seabed Committee, the New Zealand delegation noted 'We [New 
Zealand] present the classic case where a small developing fishing 
industry of increasing value to the local economy confronts 
potentially overwhelming pressures from the vessels of very distant 
countries. Like most other coastal countries, we have, as a result, 
two general concerns in the negotiations that will take place in 
preparations for and at the the third Law of the Sea Conference. First, 
we want to ensure that the resources in our general area are not 
overfished and depleted ... Secondly, the exploitation of such an 
area should also be controlled in such a way that the local fishing 
industry is able to expand. The fishing industry of the coastal 
state should have a preferential position.' Quoted in New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs Review, August, 1972, p.42.
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of the global fishing industry on the eve of the era of 200-mile 
zones; recent developments in the Law of the Sea; and implications of 
the latter for both the coastal fishing states and the DWFS - with 
particular emphasis given to the increased sensitivities and vulnerab­
ilities of Japan.
The remaining - and, by far, the larger - part of the framework 
will be applied separately to each of the case studies: to New 
Zealand in Part III, and to Australia in Part IV. The final chapter 
of the thesis draws conclusions from the two case studies.
This thesis claims relevance both in a theoretical and a 
practical sense. With respect to theory, the thesis attempts to 
contribute to our understanding of interdependence. By focussing on 
the domestic - as well as the international - dimensions of economic 
interdependence in the context of different case studies, the thesis 
complements the systems approach adopted by most other students 
of interdependent relations. It may, therefore, assist towards the 
construction of a general theory of world politics under conditions 
of international interdependence. It may be pointed out that the 
analytical framework presented here might be applied to the study 
of other interdependent relationships - not only those involving 
economic trade-offs, but also those including political linkages.
In a practical sense, the thesis hopes to demonstrate the 
complexity and importance of the political dimensions of fisheries 
management. Traditionally, academic treatments of the subject of 
fisheries management have generally de-emphasised or ignored the 
poltical element, choosing instead to stress the biological and 
the economic a s p e c t s . I t  is argued that now, in the era of 200-mile
1. See, for example, Francis T. Christy, Jr., and Anthony Scott The 
Commonwealth in Ocean Fisheries: Some Problems of Growth and Economic 
Allocation, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965; Francis T. Christy,
Jr., Alternative Arrangements for Marine Fisheries: An Overview3 
Resources For the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1973; J.A. Gulland,
The Management of Marine Fisheries3 Scientechnica Ltd., Bristol, 1974; 
Albert W. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries3 
Fishing News (Books) Ltd., London, 1973; Frederick W. Bell, Food 
From the Sea: The Economics and Politics of Ocean Fisheries 3 West view 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1978 - despite the promising title of the 
latter work, it can hardly be considered an exhaustive treatment 
of the political dimensions of fisheries management. There are some 
exceptions, however. For example, some of the political dimensions 
of fisheries management at the international level are treated in 
Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon ’Two Hundred Mile Zones: The Politics 
of North Pacific Fisheries’ Pacific Affairs, Vol.49, No.l, Spring, 1976; 
and by George Kent in ’Equity in Global Fisheries Management’ Oceans3
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fishing zones, the political problems of fisheries management will 
become more pressing and must, therefore, deserve greater consideration 
in advice given to policy makers.
Further, the thesis may help in determining the future structure 
of the global fishing industry. From it we may obtain some indications 
as to whether the widespread establishment of 200-mile fishing zones 
will lead to greater coastal state - and lesser DWFS - involvement 
in the global harvesting, processing, trading and marketing of fish.
Before proceeding with the analysis, several points need to 
be stressed. First, while its subject matter is economic interdepend­
ence, the thesis is not an exercise in the discipline of Economics. The 
focus of the inquiry is on the various external and domestic constraints 
acting on decision-makers when formulating and implementing foreign 
economic policies - as seen from the perspective of a student of 
International Relations. Second, the a priori reasoning behind the 
working hypothesis is presented in Part I. A more critical assessment 
of the hypothesis is reserved for the concluding chapter. Third, at 
the end of each case study there is a summary. This section does not 
attempt to relate exhaustively the data presented in the case study 
to the working hypothesis; again this task is reserved for the 
concluding chapter where comparisons are made across the case studies. 
Finally, while this thesis is about bilateral relationships, its 
major focus is on one party in these relationships - namely, the 
country which first initiates linkage diplomacy (in the New Zealand/ 
Japan case study, New Zealand; and in the Australia/Japan case study, 
Australia).*'
Vol.10, No.5, September, 1977, and his 'Dominance in Fishing'
Journal of Peace Research3 No.1, Vol.XIII, 1976. But detailed 
analyses of the domestic political processes involved in the formul­
ation of national fisheries policies and in the negotiation of fish­
eries agreements with other countries appear to be rare.
1. As will be pointed out in the Conclusions, this thesis might 
usefully be complemented by a study of the ways' in which the target 
country in each of these bilateral relationships - Japan - reacted 
to the separate exercises of linkage diplomacy by New Zealand and 
Australia.
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PART I: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF LINKAGE DIPLOMACY
UNDER CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
It will be recalled that our working hypothesis is as follows: 
the propensity to adopt linkage strategies involving trade-offs 
across issue areas is inversely related to the level of interdependence - 
where interdependence is measured in terms of the number and variety 
of issue areas and actors significantly involved in the relationship.
The following analytical framework is designed to test this hypothesis 
in the context of different case studies involving bilateral foreign 
economic relationships. Before treating with the framework proper, 
however, there exist two tasks. The first, concerns definition 
of some of the terms employed in the working hypothesis. The second, 
relates to a more detailed consideration of the a priori reasoning 
behind the hypothesis.
There are four terms in particular which require some 
definition - namely, ’trade-off’, 'issue', ’actor’, and ’significant 
involvement’.
The dictionary defines ’trade-off as ’to acquire or dispose 
of by barter’.^ * Rather more broadly, one can consider it to mean 
’to exchange something for something else (usually) of equivalent 
value’. In the present context of linkage diplomacy under conditions 
of economic interdependence, we refer to trade-offs as the granting 
of concessions by one party in some economic area in exchange for 
concessions by another party in separate economic (or political) 
issue areas. Trade-offs can take many different forms. At their 
most spectacular they may be highly visible, as in the more extreme 
cases of resources diplomacy. (Here one might cite the use of the 
Arab oil ’weapon’ in late 1973 to extract political concessions 
from the West.) For the most part, however, trade-offs are less 
spectacular. One might even speak in terms of negative trade-offs, 
or linkages, where one party denies something to another unless the 
latter makes some concession.
The term ’issue’ is here defined as ’a point in question or 
dispute, as between contending parties in any controversy’. It should
1. The Oxford English Dictionary3 Oxford University Press, London, 1970.
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be noted that the level of disputation may vary considerably 
according to issue area. Some issues between States may generate 
considerable on-going hostility and conflict. Other issues may 
involve little friction - as for example certain foreign trade issues, 
where points in dispute are confronted at infrequent intervals and 
where the relationship for the most part remains on a relatively 
cooperative and harmonious plane. When speaking of 'significant 
issues', we refer to those issues which are of sufficient consequence 
to affect national or important sectional interests. While this 
definition does not provide a clear and sharp distinction between 
'significant' and 'insignificant', it does alert the analyst to the 
importance of distinguishing between major economic and political 
issues on the one hand, and relatively minor, inconsequential, 
matters on the other.
By 'actors' we refer to those individuals and organisations - 
both public and private - involved in the issues specified above.
Again, when speaking of actors 'significantly involved', we include 
only those individuals and organisations who are in a position to 
affect policy decisions - either directly through their role as 
decision-makers, or indirectly by way of their political influence 
on the decision-makers.
The second task involves consideration of the argument presented 
in the working hypothesis. Needless to say, it requires at least 
two issue areas before linkage diplomacy can occur. Now, if one 
takes the case of a country which has a relatively simple bilateral 
relationship with another State involving only two significant issue 
areas it may be assumed that, if linkages across these two issues 
are contemplated, one set of actors having an interest in the issue 
being traded off will be opposed to the concept, whereas the other 
set of actors standing to gain from the trade-off will be in favour.
In the case of a country having a more complex bilateral 
relationship with another - involving a larger number and variety of 
issues and actors - one may expect greater opposition to linkage 
diplomacy. In addition to the set of actors whose interests are 
being traded off, other actors identified with issues not immediately 
involved in the linkage strategy will very likely be opposed. One 
may assume that the latter will fear the 'spillover effects' of linkage 
diplomacy, where the target country retaliates by introducing 
countervailing linkages of its own which involve issues in which these
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actors are involved. As Bergsten and his colleagues have observed,
'One linkage breeds another, as the states disadvantaged by the first 
linkage seek to bring their sources of strength upon the problem at 
hand.'^‘ In order to protect their interests these other actors 
will probably try to preserve the status quo existing in the overall 
bilateral relationship, and will oppose the adoption of linkage 
diplomacy.
It is conceivable that the hypothesis will not apply in all
conditions of bilateral interdependence. For example, in crisis
situations where the national interest is vitally at stake, there
may be substantial support for linkages across issue areas from a
large number of individuals and organisations. In extreme cases,
even actors identified with the issue being used as a bargaining
lever may support trade-offs. One may also envisage a situation
where even though a majority of the actors favour issue isolation,
linkage diplomacy is still adopted. Such a situation is likely
when the political influence of the set of actors favouring trade-offs
2is greater than the combined influence of those opposing trade-offs.
These exceptions aside, it appears reasonable to assume that the 
hypothesis will apply in most other situations. By a priori reasoning 
it is argued that the hypothesis will be supported even when applied 
across a range of countries having different political structures.
In States having a pluralist society, characterised by 
decentralised policy networks and strong private bureaucracies (for 
example, the United States), one may readily envisage the manner in 
which a large number of individuals and organisations opposed to some 
exercise of linkage diplomacy will mobilise and voice their opposition. 
Given the general sensitivity in these societies of politicians and 
other major decision-makers to public opinion, widespread opposition 
to trade-offs across issues areas is likely to lead to a rejection of 
linkage diplomacy.
1. C. Fred Bergsten, Robert 0. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, op.cit,3 
p.10. See also Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye 1977, op.cit.3p.16.
2. But the greater the number of issues and actors involved, the less 
likelihood of a single set of actors having greater political influence. 
As Verba has argued 'The more people involved in defining a situation, 
formulating goals, or choosing alternatives, the more the decisions 
will reflect group and organisational values, needs, and traditions, and 
the less they will reveal the attitudes, beliefs or images of any single 
person.' See Sidney Verba 'Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality 
in Models of the International System' World Politics14, 1961,
p.p.93-117.
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This is not to suggest, however, that countries marked by a 
'weak State'and a'strong society'^‘will never be attracted to linkage 
strategies. Even the United States, which has what Huntington 
terms 'a pervasive ideology that sanctifies the independence ... of 
economic power to government', has areas of the economy where the 
government is deeply involved - areas which are occasionally used as
2bargaining levers in Washington's broader foreign policy strategies.
In such States the hypothesis holds; the propensity to adopt linkage 
strategies is inversely related to the level of interdependence 
as measured by the number and variety of issues and actors involved 
in the total bilateral (or multilateral) relationship concerned.
In more authoritarian States, characterised by highly centralised 
policy networks and strong public bureaucracies, there is, of course, 
much less scope for mass participation in, or influence on, decision­
making. It is argued, nevertheless, that the hypothesis may still 
apply under these conditions. Such countries, too, will have a set 
of actors possessing a vested interest in each of the issue areas 
existing with other States. There is little doubt that within each 
set of actors there will be some individuals - including, perhaps, 
members of the ruling elite - in positions of power and authority.
These actors will not wish to see their interests directly traded-off 
or indirectly threatened through the 'spillover effects' of linkage 
diplomacy, and will most probably use their influence to prevent the 
use of this form of bargaining strategy. Again, the greater the 
number and variety of issues and actors involved, the greater the 
likely opposition.
In introducing the analytical framework itself, several points 
need to be re-emphasised. First, while we are here concerned with 
bilateral interdependent relationships our focus is on the national 
policies of a single party in these relationships - namely, that 
country which might (perhaps by virtue of a recent increase in the 
potential bargaining leverage of some resource it possesses) be 
expected first to introduce linkage diplomacy in a bargaining 
situation.
1. As Peter Katzenstein characterises the United States; see his 
1976, op.cit.
2. One may cite the example of how America has, over the past few 
decades, used exports of food (often as aid) as a political tool . See 
Stephen S. Rosenfeld 'The Politics of Food', Foreign Policy3 No.14, 
Spring, 1974, and Donald F. McHenry and Kai Bird 'Food Bungle in 
Bangladesh' Foreign policy3 No.27, Summer, 1977.
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Second, our major task is one of examining the degree to which 
the multiplicity of issues and actors involved in an interdependent 
relationship affects the adoption, and successful implementation, 
of linkage diplomacy. In particular, we will try to determine 
whether these factors, rather than those of relative sensitivity and 
vulnerability, best explain the existence or absence of trade-offs 
across issue areas. In order to make such a comparison, it is 
necessary to include in our analysis an assessment of the respective 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities of each side, both with respect 
to the overall relationship and with respect to each separate issue 
area.
Third, as this thesis is mainly preoccupied with the study 
of economic interdependencies, the framework makes many specific 
references to linkages or trade-offs across economic issue areas. 
However, the broad outline of the framework can readily be applied to 
the study of other linkages - for example, where economic leverage 
is used to extract political concessions; and where political leverage 
is used to extract economic, or other political, concessions.
Finally, the framework may be applied in the study of 
countries of all political structures and ideologies. However, it 
will be recognised from the attention given to private pressure groups 
and their political influence on government decision-makers, that the 
framework gives greater emphasis to the decision-making and negotiating 
structures existing in more 'open' societies - as, for example,
Australia and New Zealand.
It will be recalled that the framework is divided into three 
sections: the first, concerns issues and actors; the second, considers 
policy formulation; and the third, involves policy implementation - 
including, most importantly, the bargaining process.
Issues and Actors
This section concerns itself with identifying the different 
issues and actors significantly involved in a bilateral relationship. 
These issues, and the actors associated with them, may be considered 
under three separate categories: first, that which we term the 
'primary' issue area - namely, that area which is most likely to be 
used as a bargaining lever by the country under examination (Country A); 
second, that which we term the 'secondary' issue area(s) - that is 
to say, the area(s) which is(are) most likely to be linked to the first, 
and for which concessions are likely to be sought from the target
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country (Country B); and third, 'other' issue areas - that is, those 
significant issue areas not included in the first two categories.
a. Primary Issue Area As mentioned above, this issue area is the 
one which is most likely to be used as a bargaining lever by Country A. 
It may usually be identified (when compared with other issue areas) 
in terms of the high degree of sensitivity/vulnerability dependence 
of the target country. Often the primary issue area will be one which 
has recently experienced great changes, where the sensitivity/ 
vulnerability of Country B has sharply increased. For convenience 
of description in this framework it is assumed that the primary issue 
area involves the trade in some resource. (It will be recalled that 
in the following two case studies the primary issue area has already 
been identified - namely, the trade in fish resources.) The framework 
could, of course, have considered other examples of economic issue 
areas where bargaining leverage might be applied - such as overseas 
investment or aid.
Having identified the likely primary issue area, it remains to 
assess the potential bargaining leverage accruing to the resource- 
exporter (Country A) over the resource-importer (the target country, 
or Country B), and to identify the actors significantly involved in 
this area.
When speaking of bargaining leverage we refer to the 
asymmetrical dependency - as expressed in terms of sensitivities and 
vulnerabilities^’ - existing between Country A and Country B. This 
will be a function both of factors existing in the global trading 
environment for the resource in question, and of factors existing 
in the bilateral trade in this resource between the two countries.
With respect to the global environment, special attention should 
be paid to the sensitivity of the resource-importer to any recent 
changes - say, those affecting the supply and demand situation - in 
the international trade in the resource.
1. Sensitivity is not used here in the rather narrow sense defined 
by Cooper in terms of price and income developments (see the Intro­
duction) . Instead, the broader definition by Nye is applied, namely: 
'Sensitivity means liability to costly effects [whatever these might 
be, Nye obviously implies] imposed from outside in a given situation - 
in other words, before any policies are devised to try to change the 
situation'. Nye's definition of vulnerability is also accepted, 
namely: 'Vulnerability means continued liability to costly effects 
imposed from outside, even after efforts have been made to alter or 
escape the situation'. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 'Independence and 
Interdependence' Foreign Foliey, No.22, Spring, 1976, p.133.
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The analyst should also assess the ability of the resource- 
importer to reduce its vulnerability to changes in the global 
environment. It might, for example, be necessary to examine the 
availability of alternative import sources or the suitability of 
substitute resources to the importing country.
In addition to these global factors, there are many features 
of the bilateral trade which are likely to affect critically 
Country A's bargaining leverage. Obviously, one of the most 
important of these relates to the size, quality, and other properties 
of the resource it possesses. Of particular relevance is the 
exporting country's share of the global trade in this resource.
The analyst will also need to determine the degree to which 
bargaining leverage is affected by Country A ’s dependence on Country B. 
Such dependence may exist in one or more of the following areas: 
export markets, the provision of investment capital to develop the 
resource, the transfer of technology and research data, and so on.
Having established the net bargaining leverage enjoyed by 
Country A in the primary issue area, it remains to identify the 
actors significantly involved in the bilateral trade relationship.
Those actors likely to have one of the greatest stakes in the trade 
are those private interests in Country A directly involved in the 
resource industry itself, whether as developers, processors or 
exporters. These actors will be individuals and organisations 
representing the industry - nationals of the exporting country, 
or, perhaps, foreign members of multinational corporations engaged 
in exploiting this resource.
There will also be other, non-private, actors who will have a 
vested interest in the primary issue area. Among these will be 
officials in the government agency directly responsible for the 
industry involved. (If, for example, the resource under consideration 
is coal, one would imagine the Department of Minerals and Energy - 
or some similar department - to be most concerned about policy 
decisions affecting that industry.) Further, other government 
agencies in Country A, with a less direct responsibility for the 
industry, might be significantly involved in one or more aspects 
of the resource trade - for example, the Department of Overseas 
Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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The politicians in Country A may, for various reasons - 
including their personal ambitions and responsibilities - feel they 
also have an important stake in the fate of the issue area. This 
group of actors might range from the Member of Parliament who 
represents some local constituency in which the industry is based, 
to the Cabinet Minister primarily responsible for the industry, 
and even, perhaps, to the Prime Minister himself.
Some issue areas may attract the attention of other actors 
located outside industry or government. There may, for example, 
be many private interest groups in Country A - such as conservationists, 
domestic consumers, or minority ethnic groups - who have a vested 
interest in policies involving the trade in some resource or in 
other economic issue areas.
b«. Secondary Issue Area It will be recalled that this issue is 
the one most likely to be tied to the primary issue area in linkage 
diplomacy, and the one for which concessions are likely to be sought 
from the target country. It should not be automatically assumed 
that the secondary issue area will be that where Country A suffers 
greatest vulnerability in its bilateral relationship with Country B.
As neither side is likely to allow the other to have the 'best of the 
bargain', there will normally be some rough equivalence in 'value' 
of the two issues being traded-off. In some cases, the primary 
issue area will be’worth' far less than the issue area where Country A 
is most dependent on Country B, and concessions will be sought in 
some other, less important, area. In other cases, the primary issue 
area will be 'worth' more than any single secondary issue area, and 
Country A might seek a package of concessions from Country B. However, 
much will here depend on each party's perception of the 'value' 
of the respective bargaining levers. Such assessment is particularly 
difficult when trade-offs are contemplated across two very different 
issue areas,^’ or when concessions are being sought in a package of 
issue areas. There is also the possibility that Country A might try 
to bluff or coerce Country B into making concessions worth more than 
those offered in the primary issue area.
1. As, for example, where economic issues are linked to political 
issues. See Holsti and Levy 1974, op.cit.3 p.884, for their discussion 
of this problem.
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Thus, without a detailed knowledge of the country concerned, the 
analyst will probably find it difficult to predict accurately the 
areas in which concessions will be sought by Country A. His efforts 
in this respect might be rewarded by an examination of recent - and 
not so recent - policies and statements relating to the primary 
issue area. He might, for example, discover that at some time in the 
past Country A has already used its bargaining leverage in the primary 
issue area to extract certain concessions from Country B. Or, more 
recently, policy-makers in Country A might have made explicit statements 
indicating the areas in which they intend to exploit their bargaining 
advantage in the primary issue area. In his search for likely secondary 
issue areas, the analyst should note the existence of any long­
standing areas of friction between the two sides, or the existence of any 
recent changes in the bilateral relationship - for example, in the terms 
of trade in some resource - which have increased Country A's dependence 
on Country B.
Having identified the likely secondary issue area, there remain 
two tasks. The first involves assessing the sensitivity and vulnerabil­
ity of Country A to the bargaining power of Country B in this area.
The second, concerns identification of those actors in Country A - both 
public and private - who have an important interest in the secondary 
issue area.
c. Other Issue Areas This sub-section considers those other issue 
areas not included in the previous two categories - namely, those issues 
which are unlikely to be used as a bargaining lever or to be selected 
as targets for concessions in the initial linkage strategy, and yet 
which still qualify as areas where Country A is significantly involved 
with Country B.^‘ This category may cover a large number and variety 
of issue areas, including those in the economic, diplomatic, security, 
and cultural arenas.
In each of these issue areas the respective dependencies of 
Country A and Country B will be noted. In some cases the former may 
be more dependent on the latter, whereas in other cases the reverse 
might be the situation. Again, the analyst will try to identify the
1. It might be worth re-emphasising that the analyst will have to
use his own subjective judgement in distinguishing between 'significant 
and 'non-significant' issue areas.
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actors significantly involved in each of these issue areas.
It is at this point of the analysis that a comprehensive 
assessment is made of the two most important variables considered above. 
First considered is an assessment of the level of interdependence - 
as measured in terms of the total number and variety of issues and 
actors (that is, all those issues and actors included in the three 
categories described above) significantly involved - existing in 
different bilateral relationships.
It is, perhaps, easier to conceive of levels of interdependence 
in relative rather than in absolute terms. For example, while it 
may be reasonable to claim that where only two significant issue areas 
are involved in a bilateral relationship there is a low level of 
interdependence, it is far more difficult to decide how many issue 
areas constitute a medium, or high, level of interdependence. In 
this thesis the level of interdependence is considered in relative 
terms, where the total number of issues and actors involved in the 
New Zealand - Japan relationship is compared with the total number of 
issues and actors involved in the Australia - Japan relationship.
Second, a comprehensive assessment is made of the varying degrees 
of dependence - here expressed in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability - 
existing in different areas of the bilateral relationship. Very briefly, 
we will reconsider Country B’s net dependence on Country A in the 
primary issue area, and Country A fs net dependence on Country B in the 
secondary issue area. Further, we will attempt to calculate the total 
net dependency (or dominance) of Country A on Country B, by considering 
the sensitivities and vulnerabilities existing in all the issue areas 
treated in the three categories above. It should be noted that the 
level of dependence (or dominance) in each case will be expressed 
in only crude terms - as high, medium or low.1*
Policy Formulation
This section of the framework addresses two major questions: 
namely, were trade-offs across issue areas adopted as part of Country A ’s 
foreign economic strategy towards Country B; and how was the decision
1. While it is conceivable that the level of dependence in some issue 
areas (quite often those involving economic transactions) can be 
quantified, there are other issue areas where the level of dependence - 
in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability - does not lend itself to 
precise measurement. Moreover, even where the levels of dependence
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arrived at affected by the policy preferences of the various actors 
in Country A?
Much of this section is preoccupied with identifying the views - 
where expressed - of each actor in the resource-exporting country 
concerning the most desirable use of the bargaining leverage existing 
in the primary issue area. This will involve an examination of each 
actor's public statements concerning: the goats or objectives he has 
selected for his particular issue area; his perceptions of the 
availability of effective policy instruments to obtain these objectives; 
and his assessment of the bargaining leverage in the primary issue 
area as a suitable instrument to extract concessions in his issue 
area from Country B. Further, it will be determined whether the 
actors' policy preferences resemble those outlined in the argument 
above, where it was proposed: those actors associated with the 
primary issue area will strongly oppose trade-offs across issue 
areas; those in the secondary issue area will favour trade-offs; and 
those actors in other issue areas will demonstrate some opposition 
to trade-offs.
But this section not only identifies the policy preferences of 
different actors; it also examines the factors which influence the 
actors' final choices. Such emphasis is necessary if we are to explain 
those cases where certain sets of actors - or important individuals 
within any single set of actors - adopt policy stances different from 
the ones here predicted.
A large number of works in the political science literature - 
particularly those dealing with decision-making theory - illustrate 
the various ways in which political actors will unwittingly support 
policies that do not promote their own interests. It has been noted 
how the policy-maker's delineation of objectives, choice among courses 
of action, or response to some change in the environment may be 
explained in part by his perception of r e a l i t y . T h e  degree to 
which his image of reality differs from reality itself will partly 
be a function of deficiencies in the accuracy or completeness of the
in different issue areas can be given numerical values, it is unlikely - 
given the different items being measured - that direct comparisons can 
be made across different dependencies, or any numerical value given to 
the total level of dependence existing in a bilateral relationship.
1. K.J. Holsti International Volitics: A Framework for Analysis, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972. See especially 
Chapter 12 'Explanations of Foreign Policy Outputs' p.p. 353-400.
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information available to him. Holsti has also observed how the 
policy-maker's perceptions and evaluation of a situation will be
2influenced by the actor's attitudes, values, beliefs, and doctrines.
Other observers have noted how the policies adopted by a set of actors
might best be explained in terms of the personality traits of the
3principal spokesman for this group.
There may also be times when actors consciously support policies 
which do not best promote their own group's interests. It has already 
been noted how this might be the case in times of national emergency. 
Even in less extreme circumstances, there may yet be actors who are 
prepared to act unselfishly by sacrificing their own interests for the 
national good. At times the decision-maker himself might have a 
conflict of interests and responsibilities. For example, a Minister 
of Primary Industry, who has responsibility for both agriculture and 
fisheries, may be forced into a very difficult situation should 
trade-offs be suggested linking fish and agricultural commodities.
No matter whether he supports or opposes such trade-offs, he will 
betray the interests of either the farmers or the fishermen.
In addition to identifying the policy preferences of different 
actors and the factors which constrain their choice, the analyst 
should also assess the political influence of these actors.
Inevitably, some actors will be more influential than others. The 
question is, does the influence of any single set of actors have a 
disproportionate impact (given the number of actors, or groups of 
actors, involved) on the final decision to adopt, or reject, resources 
diplomacy?
It will be recalled that actors may have an influence on policy­
making either directly through their role in various committees or 
institutions charged with the responsibility for formulating policy, 
or indirectly through their influence on the decision-makers. The 
analyst should, therefore, seek to identify both the direct and 
indirect political influence of each set of actors.
1. For more on the subject of information (or the lack of it) and its 
effects on decision-making see Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and 
Burton Sapin (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making3 The Free Press,
New York, 1962, p.65. See also Harold and Margaret Sprout 'Environ­
mental Factors in the Study of International Politics' Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, No.l, 1957, p.p. 309-28.
2. K.J. Holsti 1972, op.cit.
3. For a psychoanalytical explanation of foreign policy decision­
making see Joseph de Rivera The Psychological Dimension of Foreign 
Policy, Charles E. Merrill Books Inc., Columbus, Ohio, 1968.
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In the case of private (that is, non-government) actors, it will 
be determined whether any have been included in the formal decision­
making machinery set up to consider policy options relating to the 
primary issue area. The more indirect influence of these actors 
may be assessed in terms of: their total numbers; the degree to which 
they traditionally support the ruling political party at election 
time; the ways in which they have mobilised support for, or opposition
to, certain policy alternatives; and the responsiveness of the1politicians to pressure group interests.
Again, in the case of actors from government bureaucracies, we 
will wish to determine their role and influence in the policy-making 
body established to draft policy alternatives. Some government agencies 
may automatically assume a position of leadership in this body by
2virtue of the technical expertise they possess in the issue area.
At other times, the membership and positions of greatest influence in 
the decision-making body will be resolved largely by inter-(and intra-)
3bureaucratic rivalry and conflict.
With respect to the role of politicians in the policy-making 
process, it should be noted whether they actively participate in the 
formulation of policy options or leave this task to their bureaucratic 
advisers. Further, the political influence of different Ministers 
should be assessed at the point where the selection of policy 
alternatives is considered at Cabinet level.
This section of the framework concludes with a detailed 
examination of the final policy decision. Was linkage diplomacy 
adopted? If so, what trade-offs were envisaged - in other words, 
in what secondary issue areas were concessions sought from Country B? 
What decisions were made with respect to the implementation of 
linkage diplomacy? For example, did Country A decide to use its 
bargaining leverage in the primary issue area as an instrument
1. Several works treating with the influence of public opinion on
policy-makers involved in foreign policy in the United States may be 
cited: James Rosenau National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case
Study in the Mobilisation of Public Support, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1963; Morton A. Kaplan System and Process in International 
Politics, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1957; and Raymond
Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and L.A. Dexter American Business and Public Policy: 
The Politics of Foreign Trade, The Atherton Press, New York, 1963.
2. See Holsti and Levy op.cit., p.876.
3. As argued by Graham T. Allison is his much-quoted Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1971. See also Morton H. Halperin Bureaucratic Politics and 
Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1974; and
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of reward or as an instrument of punishment?
Most importantly, we will wish to determine whether the 
working hypothesis has been validated. Except in situations 
of national crisis (and some of the other exceptions listed above), 
we would expect to find that, where a large number of issues and 
actors are involved in a bilateral economic relationship, opposition 
to trade-offs across issues areas will be pronounced and linkage 
diplomacy rejected.
Policy Implementation
While the major focus of the present study is on the reasons 
why different countries adopt (or reject) linkage diplomacy under 
conditions of economic interdependence, the thesis also treats with 
the implementation of this form of diplomacy. This third, and final, 
section of the analytical framework, therefore, focusses on the 
bargaining process between the resource-exporting country (Country A, 
the country which first introduces linkage strategies in a particular 
bargaining situation), and the resource-importing country (Country B, 
the initial target country). The section is divided into three 
sub-sections: the first two - pre-bargaining exchange and bargaining 
exchange - present, chronologically, the background to the bargaining 
process against which all those factors which might affect the final 
outcome are examined; the third sub-section treats with the bargain 
outcome itself, and determines whether Country A's attempts at linkage 
diplomacy were successful.
First, however, a few general comments should be made about
the different factors which may affect bargain outcomes. Keohane and
Nye have observed that ’There is rarely a one-to-one relationship
between power measured by any type of resources and power measured
by effects on outcomes. Political bargaining is the usual means
of translating potential into effects, and a lot is often lost
2in the translation.’ As already noted in the Introduction, these
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin ’Bureaucratic Politics: A 
Paradigm and Some Policy Implications' in Theory and Policy in Inter­
national Relations3 Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman,(eds.),
World Politicsj Vol.24, Spring Supplement, 1972.
1. For further consideration of the various techniques that individuals 
and groups employ to influence each other see George Modelski 'Kautilya: 
Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World' 
American Political Science Review3 No.58, 1964. See also the section on 
'Techniques of Economic Reward and Punishment' in K.J. Holsti, 1972, 
op.cit.3 p.p. 245-257.
2. Keohane and Nye, 1977 op.cit.3 p.ll.
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two authors suggest that such factors as bargaining skill, commitment, 
and coherence, may have as great an impact on the bargain outcome 
as the asymmetrical interdependence - in terms of sensitivities and 
vulnerabilities - existing between the two negotiating parties. But 
the political science/international relations literature touching 
on the subjects of inter-state bargaining and negotiating suggests 
that there are many other factors (that is, other than those of 
skill, commitment, and coherence) which might affect the bargain 
outcome. Most of these factors will be identified, if very briefly, in 
the first two sub-sections. Particular emphasis will be given to 
those factors which are peculiar to (or particularly pronounced in) 
linkage diplomacy under conditions of economic interdependence - 
where, for example, the threat of countervailing linkages by 
Country B may cause some of the actors in Country A to call upon 
their government to back down.
a. Pre-Bargaining Exchange It is argued that the perceptions,
tactics, and ultimate success of some party involved in negotiations
with another will be in part determined by its experiences (if any)
in previous similar bargaining exchanges. These former exchanges
will probably have given each side the chance to assess the various
sensitivities and vulnerabilities, bargaining skills, commitment,
will, and credibility of the other. As Ikle has put it
' The way in which a government 
negotiates and the conditions under 
which it accepts or rejects an 
agreement have an important bearing 
on its bargaining strength in the future 
- its bargaining reputation. On the basis 
of its performance in past negotiations, 
others will impute to it a diplomatic style, 
certain motives and objectives, attitudes 
towards the use of force, a degree of political 
will, and other attributes of power. Bargaining 
strength depends not so much on what these 
attributes really are as on what others believe 
them to be. Hence the importance of this 
reputation.'1•
The analyst should, therefore, examine the past record of 
negotiations between the two parties (Countries A and B), especially 
in those cases where Country A has sought to exploit its bargaining 
leverage in the same primary issue area as that now under investigation.
1. Fred Charles Ikle How Nations NegotiateHarper and Row, New York, 
1964, p.76. Other authors have drawn attention to the significance 
of these variables. Klaus Knorr, for example, asserts 'The putative
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In particular, the analyst should determine: one, the credibility of 
Country A's past threats in this area - which comprises two elements, 
the capacity to carry out the threat, and a commitment actually 
to exercise this capacity unless certain demands are complied with;^' 
and, two, the outcome of these previous bargaining exchanges.
b, The Bargaining Exchange It is possible, of course, that these 
earlier experiences might not significantly affect the outcome of 
subsequent bargaining exchanges. The analyst will have to determine 
how changed circumstances, the passage of time, and different actors, 
affect each party's perceptions of the other in the new bargaining 
situation. This sub-section, therefore, emphasises these, and other, 
new or immediate factors which may influence the course of the 
bargaining exchange presently under consideration.
First, however, the analyst will need to determine the way in 
which the bargaining exchange was conducted; for in linkage diplomacy 
there may not be a single set of negotiations, but several. For 
example, there might be two separate sets of negotiations - one 
dealing with the primary issue area, and the other dealing with 
the secondary issue area - both being conducted at the same point in 
time, and where progress in one is contingent on progress in the other; 
or two sets of negotiations might be run in tandem, where, for instance, 
Country A insists on agreement being reached on matters relating 
to the secondary issue area before negotiations may begin on the 
primary issue area.
The next task will be that of identifying those actors in 
Country A most significantly involved in negotiations with Country B 
in the current exercise of linkage diplomacy. (These will rarely 
exactly correspond with those responsible for formulating the
economic power of states has four bases: "economic strength"; the will 
to use this strength for power purposes; the skill of applying this 
strength for such purposes; and the international reputation a state 
has in terms of an expected disposition to use its economic strength 
in order to exercise power', Klaus Knorr Power and Wealth: The Political 
Economy of International Power3 Macmillan, London, 1973, p.p.81-82; see 
also K.J. Holsti, 1972, op.cit.3 p.166.
1. For a detailed discussion on the subjects of threats, credibility 
and capacity, and other elements of games strategy, see T.C. Schelling 
The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963. See 
also G.O. Gutman 'Resources Diplomacy' The Australian Quarterly 
Volume 47, No.l, March, 1975, p.p.36-50.
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policies related to linkage diplomacy.) Attention should be paid 
to the personal traits and ambitions of these negotiators - particularly 
those of the chief negotiator. Lall has noted how 'the personal 
pride, anger or even the vanity' of a country's negotiators - especially 
if these include the head of state or government - may seriously 
affect attitudes in negotiation.’*’’ Ikle has also observed how the 
personal frailities, quirks, and ambitions of the negotiators may 
affect the successful conclusion of negotiations. He notes, for 
example, how the diplomat (as broadly defined) may feel constrained 
to adopt a tough posture in the negotiations to prove himself a 
hard bargainer. On the other hand, the diplomat may be more prepared 
to make concessions to the other side to prove himself a successful
bargainer - successful in the sense that he obtained some sort of
2 .agreement.
The bargain outcome may also vary according to the type of
3negotiating tactics employed. Pearson and Schelling ’ claim that 
tacit bargains may be more effective in obtaining an agreement than 
rigid negotiating proposals which might antagonise the other party 
and lead to a breakdown in the negotiations. Further, secret diplomacy 
might be preferred to open diplomacy, for governments may feel 
handicapped if domestic interest groups become involved in the 
netotiating process. However, this option does carry with it political 
risks for the negotiators. As Ikle has warned 'The discussions between 
the diplomats may not be revealed, but enough about the basic demands 
and offers may become known to stimulate domestic pressures for
4changes in the government's position.' ' There is also the risk that 
the other party in the negotiations might decide to 'leak' information 
to the media.
It is conceivable that there will be other factors limiting the 
kind of bargaining outcome which are either unique to, or particularly 
pronounced in linkage diplomacy. It is likely, for example, that this
1. Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and 
Practice3 Columbia University Press, New York, 1966, p.p.132-150.
2. As Ikle points out 'Agreement in itself, regardless of the terms, 
may become a measure of success for a diplomat', Fred Charles Ikle,, 
op.cit.; see especially Chapter 9 'Personalities' p.p. 143-163.
3. Lester B. Pearson diplomacy in the Nuclear Age3 Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p.p.51-2, and T.C. Schelling, op.cit.
4. Fred Charles Ikle, op.cit., p.143.
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form of bargaining strategy will involve the active interest of a 
larger number of domestic actors than most other strategies. If all 
actors involved in the bilateral relationship were not concerned about 
their government's decisions during the policy formulation stage, they 
are more likely to be so once the policies in this area begin to be 
implemented. They will probably then recognise that there is always 
the danger of a 'chain-reaction' effect in linkage diplomacy under 
conditions of economic interdependence - where the initial linkage 
provokes countervailing linkages across different issue-areas by 
Country B, which in turn prompts further linkages by Country A. 
Unchecked, linkage diplomacy could easily lead to the total collapse 
of cooperative bilateral relations.
The threat of this danger might mobilise considerable domestic
opposition to the continued exercise of linkage diplomacy. This
opposition may take several forms, and come from different quarters.
First, private interest groups in Country A may pressure their
government to back down in its negotiations with Country B. Second,
opposition to the linkage strategy might come from the negotiators
themselves. Frankel, and others, have noted the difficulty normally
experienced of conducting foreign policy among different government
departments where each derives different practical implications from
agreed national objectives and have conflicting domestic interests
to defend.*’ This problem is likely to be particularly acute in
linkage diplomacy where - almost by definition - the negotiators
involved will represent a larger number of domestic interests than
in most other forms of diplomacy. At this point, it is worth
quoting again from Keohane and Nye,
' If we could assume that linkage and 
policization were controlled by national 
statesmen in firm control of their governments 
and societies, then the bargaining process of 
complex interdependence could be quickly 
apprehended. But the fact that interdependence 
has different effects on different groups and 
that these groups press multiple concerns on 
their governments... greatly complicates the
1. See Joseph Frankel The Making of Foreign Policy, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1963; and Fred Charles Ikle op.cit.3 especially 
Chapter 8 'Domestic Affairs'.
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bargaining process. By reducing the 
coherence of national positions, this 
complexity of actors and issues strongly 
affects the commitment to and credibility 
of threatened retaliation.^•
Governments involved in linkage diplomacy are likely to
experience other difficulties. As Keohane and Nye have observed, the
complexity of actors and issues involved in this form of diplomacy
affects the bargaining process ’by providing transnational allies,
2hostages, and instruments of manipulation.' * It would appear, 
therefore, that linkage diplomacy provides unique scope for either 
side to exploit the domestic weaknesses and divisions of the other.
The government in Country A will - if its own nationals are either 
being 'held hostage' by, or show sympathy towards, pressure groups in 
Country B - probably recognise that this type of bargaining is a 
'two-edged sword'.
c. The Bargain Outcome This final sub-section of the analytical
framework is concerned with the bargain outcome. As Ikle observes,
negotiations may have outcomes which range from 'total disagreement
to complete agreement, with varying mixtures of ambiguity and specificity
3in the eventual settlement'. * In the context of the present study,
the outcome will be assessed in terms of the degree to which Country A
was able to persuade Country B to accept its bargaining demands with
respect to trade-offs across issue areas.
One problem facing the analyst concerns choice of the point
in time for assessing the bargain outcome. This problem is particularly
acute when the negotiations seem to have no clear-cut termination
point - as is commonly the case in trade disputes, where agreements
reached are subject to change and review on a regular on-going 
4basis. Another problem relates to the fact that there might not be 
a single bargain outcome, but two or more with linkage diplomacy. The 
analyst might also have difficulty in determining the results of the 
bargain outcome. Perhaps the terms of the agreement were kept
1. Keohane and Nye, 1977 op.cit.3 p.226.
2. Ibid., n.226.
3. Fred Charles Ikle^ op.cit.3 p.59.
4. In the following case studies we have chosen to focus on the 
initial agreements reached respectively by New Zealand and Australia 
with Japan covering fisheries access and related issues - that is, 
issues related in the context of linkage diplomacy.
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secret at the wishes of one or both parties; or the agreement was 
written in vague and ambiguous terms; or it may be the case that 
crucial areas of agreement were not made explicit in writing 
but were vocalised as a tacit understanding between the two sides.
Linkage diplomacy may be judged to have been a complete success 
when the country which first initiates this strategy - Country A - 
achieves all of its bargaining objectives in its negotiations with 
Country B; that is to say, where it extracted the originally- 
targetted concessions in the secondary issue area(s) in exchange 
for the planned concessions in the primary issue area. The outcome 
may be considered a partial success when Country A either obtains 
only some of the concessions sought in the secondary issue area, 
or obtains all of these concessions but only at the cost of making 
extra concessions to Country B in the primary issue area. Linkage 
diplomacy will be judged a complete failure when Country B refuses to 
accept any form of trade-offs across issue areas and refuses to 
negotiate, or where either side breaks off the negotiations without 
agreement. The bargain outcome is considered inconclusive when 
agreement has not been reached, but where the negotiations are 
scheduled to continue.
Our final task involves consideration of how the bargain 
outcome relates to those other major features of linkage diplomacy 
considered above, namely: the multiplicity of issues and actors 
involved in the bilateral relationship, and the net dependency 
(or dominance) of Country A on Country B.
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PART II: THE GLOBAL FISHERIES ENVIRONMENT
It will be recalled that the analytical framework outlined in 
Part I will be applied in the examination of two case studies - namely, 
the fisheries access negotiations conducted respectively by New Zealand 
and Australia with Japan in the new era of 200-mile fishing zones. For
the most part, the two case studies will be treated separately;
New Zealand in Part III and Australia in Part IV. There is, however, 
one part of the analytical framework - that concerning the global 
fisheries environment - which applies equally to both case studies.
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, this subject will be given 
separate treatment here in Part II of the thesis.
Part II is mainly concerned with identifying those areas of
recent change in the global fisheries environment which promise to
alter the traditional roles and importance, bargaining strengths and
weaknesses, of the distant-water fishing states (DWFS) on the one hand,
and of the coastal fishing states on the other. It is divided into
four different sections. The first section provides an historical
and statistical background to the structure of the global fishing
industry as it existed in the mid-1970s - the dawn of the era of
200-mile exclusive economic zones. The second section traces the history
of the Law of the Sea, particularly where it relates to fisheries.
Special emphasis in this section will be given to the draft convention
on fisheries produced by the Second Committee at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) ,  ^* and to the
increased rights and powers claimed therein by the coastal states. The
2third section examines Japan's ' sensitivity to the widespread 
adoption of extended fishing zones. The final section assesses that 
country's likely vulnerability to these zones by examining the various 
policy options available to the Japanese in the new era.
The Global Fishing Industry
Before World War II most fishing operations in different parts 
of the world were conducted in home or near-home waters. Over the last 
three decades or so, however, there has been a dramatic change in the
1. A more detailed consideration of the work of the various Committees 
at UNCLOS III appears in the second section.
2. The special emphasis given to Japan in sections three and four 
may be justified on the grounds that it is this DWFS which claims 
our attention in the two case studies.
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structure of the global fishing industry. A substantial revolution in
fisheries technology^" during this period lias permitted States with
access to the necessary knowhow and capital to operate their fishing
fleets efficiently for extended periods of time in areas far distant
from their home ports, to open up major new fishing grounds and to
exploit species formerly neglected.
This technological revolution has contributed to the development
2of a 'two-tier' structure in the world fishing industry . First, there
is the group of countries which have both the capacity and the desire
to exploit the new technology. These are the distant-water fishing
3states (DWFS). The second tier consists of the coastal states which 
fish primarily in waters off their own shores - although not necessarily 
exclusively in their own national waters. (It should be pointed out that 
all DWFS have a coastal component in their fishing industry; in other 
words, no country depends exclusively on its distant-water fishing 
fleet for all of its catch.)
Given the high levels of capital investment and technological
sophistication that go into modern fishing vessels, it is not surprising
that most DWFS are developed industrialised states - whether from the
4developed market economies (for example, Japan, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany), or from the centrally planned 
economies (for example, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland).
But not all DWFS belong to the developed world. The Republic of 
Korea, Taiwan and Cuba are examples of less developed countries 
(admittedly quite prosperous LDCs) which operate distant-water fishing 
fleets. However, as Christy has pointed out, some of these - including 
the above three - receive considerable support from more prosperous
1. The use of sonar in fish location, mechanisation of net handling, 
new types of nets, new synthetic fibres for net construction and new 
freezing and processing techniques are only a few examples of this 
technological revolution. See the section on 'Technological Factors' 
in A.W. Koers International Regulation of Marine F i s h e r i e s Fishing 
News (Books) Ltd., London, 1973.
2. It should be pointed out that this thesis refers only to marine, or 
oceanic, fisheries. It does not, therefore, consider a third possible 
category - the inland fishing states.
3. Throughout this thesis the terms 'coastal fishing state' and 
'coastal state' are considered synonymous.
4. The distant-water component of the American fishing fleet is mainly 
that of the tuna vessels operating in the Pacific.
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countries.'Cuba has been supported in its effort by the Soviet Union, 
while South Korea and Taiwan have apparently received capital and 
technology from Japan, which is taking advantage of their lower 
labour costs.'
It should also be noted that not all coastal states belong 
to the Third World. For example, Australia and New Zealand - countries 
with relatively high per capita GNPs and which are members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - do not possess 
fishing vessels with true distant-water fishing capabilities.
A distant-water fishing state and a coastal fishing state may 
usually be distinguished one from the other in terms of their different 
capabilities and performance. The following paragraphs identify these 
differences in such areas as: fleet size and composition, size of
fish catch, trade and consumption of fish, and their impact on fish 
stocks.
The DWFS generally have larger fishing fleets in terms of total
gross tonnage - comprising vessels of larger average size - than
those of the coastal fishing states. In 1977 the Soviet Union headed
the list of fishing fleet tonnages with some 6.4 million CRT, no less
2than 53 percent of the world total of 12.2 million CRT. * Japan was 
second with 1.2 million GRT. Of the top ten fishing fleets, no less 
than eight (USSR, Japan, Spain, the United States, Poland, Norway, 
the United Kingdom, and France) were DWFS from the industrial countries, 
the other two (South Korea and Panama) were DWFS from the Third World. 
(See Table 1.) At the other end of the scale, the fishing fleets 
of some of the coastal states are very small. In the South Pacific, 
for example, Australia in 1977 boasted a total fleet of 18,344 GRT;
New Zealand 4,180; Fiji 306; and Tonga a mere 101 GRT.
Again, in terms of vessel sizes, the difference between the 
DWFS and the coastal states is great. At its extreme, one may compare 
the Russian factory ship Rybak Latvii (a Polish-built B69 class vessel) 
of 13,000 tons, with a one-man outrigger canoe working the reefs of 
some South Pacific atoll. But even in terms of average size the
1. Francis T. Christy, Jr., 'Transitions in the Management and 
Distribution of International Fisheries', International Organisation, 
Vol.31, No.2, Spring, 1977, p.245.
2. All statistics in this paragraph are taken from Statistical Tables 
1977, Lloyd's Register of Shipping, London, November, 1977.
TABLE 1. MAJOR FISHING FLEETS IN 1977 (’OOP TONS GROSS)
Soviet Union 6,440 
Japan 1,159 
Spain 594 
United States 435 
Poland 353 
South Korea 294 
Norway 223 
United Kingdom 198 
France 196 
Panama 156 
Others 2,114
Total World 12,162
Source: Statistical Tables 19773 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping
London, November, 1977, p.p.10-12.
Note: Including fishing factories, carriers, trawlers, and
fishing vessels.
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF TRAWLERS AND FISHING VESSELS IN
LARGER TONNAGE DIVISIONS, BY FLAG IN 1977
Country 1,000-1,999GRT 2,000-3,999GRT 4,000+GRT
Soviet Union 140 734 29
Japan 46 45 10
Poland 29 72 0
South Korea 12 6 6
Romania 0 30 0
Spain 78 12 0
United States 40 2 0
Others 241 123 2
Total World 587 1,024 47
Source: Statistical Tables 19773 Lloyd's Register of Shipping
London, November, 1977, p.p.58-59.
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difference is striking. Some 61 per cent of the total tonnage of the
Japanese fishing fleet in 1976, for example, is made up of vessels
50 GRT or more, and no less than 27 per cent of the tonnage comprised
vessels in excess of 500 GRT.^’ By contrast, in 1975 the New Zealand
fishing industry had only 57 vessels between 50 and 150 GRT and only
2three in excess of 500 GRT. ’ A glance at Table 2 reveals that it
is the DWFS which own the very largest fishing vessels.
The DWFS* dominance in catching capacity is reflected in their
catching performance. The FAO has observed that the rapid increase in
world catches - which rose from 25 million metric tons in 1952 to
73.5 million metric tons in 1976 - has been achieved largely through
3the activities of long-range vessels. * This is reflected in the world 
fish catch returns for 1976, where a disproportionately large share 
of the total was held by DWFS. Table 3 shows how Japan maintained its 
position as the world's largest fishing nation, catching some 10.6 
million metric tons, or about one seventh of the total. The USSR,
4another major DWFS, was second with 10.1 million MT.
Of course, not all of a distant-water fishing state's catch 
comes from distant waters. But usually a large percentage of it does. 
In the case of Japan, for example, of a total marine catch of 9.6 
million MT no less than 3.5 million MT (or 36.5 per cent) came from 
within the 200-nautical mile offshore areas of other countries.^*
The FAO statistics reveal that the DWFS are generally found near 
the top of the table of fish catches by volume, while the coastal 
states tend to fill the lower places. (It may be noted that Australia 
and New Zealand occupied 60th and 72nd positions respectively
1. Fisheries Statistics of Japan3 19763 Statistics and Information 
Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Government 
of Japan, Tokyo, 1978, p.29.
2. Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Countries 19753 OECD, Paris, 1976, 
p. 156.
3. See 'Introduction' Atlas of the Living Resources of the Seas3 
FAO Department of Fisheries, Rome, 1972.
4. It should be noted that China, which holds third position in the table, 
includes the catch of Taiwan (which makes up about 10 per cent of the total) 
further, about 60 percent of China's catch comes from fresh water. It 
should also be noted that Peru, which holds fourth place, does so by virtue 
of its catch of anchoveta - a very low value fish.
5. Gyogyo Hakusho3 1977 (Fisheries Whitepaper3 1977) florin Tokei Kyokai, 
Tokyo, 1978, p.19. This figure does not include that part of the distant- 
water catch caught in areas of high seas lying outside these 200-mile 
offshore areas. This subject is treated more thoroughly later.
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TABLE 3 NOMINAL CATCHES BY COUNTRIES ARRANGED BY 1976 CATCH SIZE
(LISTING ONLY THOSE COUNTRIES WITH A CATCH OF
1976
MT
Country
500,000 METRIC TONS OR MORE)
Rank 1973 1974
MT MT
1975
MT
Japan 1 10747700 10804586 10524204 10619917
USSR 2 8618800 9235594 9935606 10133670
China 3 6880000F 6880000F 6880000F 6880000F
Peru 4 2328500 4144858 3447490 4343125
Norway 5 2987400 2644930 2550438 3435256
USA 6 2718800 2743854 2742703 3003901
Korea Rep 7 1683800 2023414 2133371 2406685
India 8 1958000 2255313 2328000 2400000
Denmark 9 1464700 1835370 1767039 1911637
Thailand 10 1678800 1515500 1552984 1640396
Spain 11 1578000 1510084 1523092 1483162F
Indonesia 12 1265200 1336267 1381614 1448000
Philippines 13 1250600 1297796 1366087 1429811
Chile 14 691000 1158240 929458 1264214
Canada 15 1157400 1036571 1028722 1135701
Vietnam 16 1013500F 1013500F 1013500F 1013500F
Iceland 17 901800 944849 994791 986137
Brazil 18 703500 765499 836000F 950000F
France 19 822900 807507 805785 805925
Korea D.P.RP. 20 800000F 800000F 800000F 800000F
Poland 21 579600 678954 800737 750072
Bangladesh 22 640000F 640000F 640000F 640000F
South Africa 23 710100 648453 6361 19 638035
Namibia 24 709700F 840426F 760875F 574179F
Mexico 25 479400 442062 499345 572285
UK EngldWal 26 557000 533822 496814 520225
UK Scotland 27 561800 537874 467783 513935
Burma 28 463400 433840 485140 501560
1976 Totals
28 countries 62,801,428 MT 
Other countries 10,665,572 MT 
World Total 73,467,000 MT
Source: FAO Yearbook of Fishing Statistics: Catches and Landings1976
Vol.42, Rome, 1977.
Notes: F = FAO estimate,
China includes Taiwan.
These catches include inland fisheries.
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on the list of 223 countries/territories in 1976.)*’
In terms of value of catches, the DWFS in general do much better
than the coastal states. Marriot has calculated the value of fish
catches for different countries in 1973. China (including Taiwan,
2.a DWFS) topped the list with a catch valued at US$3,408 million, 
but Japan was a close second with $3,372 million, and the USSR was 
third at $3,017 million. Of the 15 countries which caught in excess 
of $300 million worth of fish in 1973 no less than nine were DWFS 
from the developed world. ' (It may be noted that in terms of value 
per ton Australia easily topped the list at $979.8. This may be 
attributed to the large percentage of Australia’s total catch occupied 
by high value rock lobsters and prawns.)
The DWFS also tend to have a disproportionately large share of 
the overall global trade in fish. Much of the catch landed by fishermen 
in the less developed coastal states is destined for use in the indus­
trialised states - many of which have distant-water fishing fleets. 
Writing in 1973, Pruter observed that 'The largest market for fish meal
and frozen fish, which together now account for 51 per cent of the world
4catch, is in developed countries.' * It is noteworthy that many of the 
developed countries which have distant-water fleets are net importers 
of fish (see Table 4).
TABLE 4. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS BY
SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1975 (VALUE US $ MILLION)
Country Imports Exports
United States 1637.1 304.7
Japan 1326.0 582.0
France 464.6 96.8
United Kingdom 471.0 144.8
Italy 275.4 34.9
Source: Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Countries, 1975,
OECD, Paris, 1976, p.30.
1. FAO Yearbook of Fishing Statistics: Catches and Landings, 1976,
Vol. 42, Rome, 1977, p.ll.
2. Note, all currency values in dollars refer to dollars US unless 
otherwise stated.
3. See Alan Marriot 'The Value of Fish Catches' Fishing News International, 
Vol. 16, No.9, September, 1977, p.p.47-48.
4. A.T. Pruter 'Fisheries Uses of the Sea' in Samuel Goldberg,(ed.)
Local Impacts of the Law of the Sea, University of Washington, Seattle,
1973, p .22.
These trade figures reflect the differences in fish consumption 
patterns between the developed countries (many of which have distant- 
water fleets) and the less developed countries (most of which are 
coastal fishing states). While the developed countries produce 
somewhat more fish than the LDCs, the former group of countries consume - 
either as human food or as cattle feed - twice the amount used by the 
latter. On a per capita basis, the people in developed countries use 
about five times as much fish as people in developing countries.^*
The DWFS and the coastal states also differ greatly with respect 
to their scientific and technological investments in the industry. In 
the field of fisheries research the DWFS generally have: sophisticated 
laboratories both ashore and afloat, a large body of trained fisheries 
scientists, fisheries colleges and universities, and large budgets to 
fund these projects. In Japan, for example, a single arm of the govern­
ment bureaucracy - the Fisheries Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries - has a technical staff of 477, and an adminis­
trative staff of 1,466.^
This investment in fisheries technology by the DWFS is also
reflected in the design and equipment of their fishing vessels. A
member of the Australian Fishing Industry Mission to Japan in 1978
commented on the comprehensive and complex nature of electronic
equipment found on some larger Japanese fishing vessels.
'A typical vessel would be fitted with Omega 
or satellite navigation plotter with a computer, 
a Loran C plotter, HF radio (40 - station),
VHF 27mHz, RDF HF, 27mHz, radio marker buoys,
FAX receiver for daily weather charts, fisheries 
newsletter and fish prices, 100-mile radar, 32- 
mile radar, sonar, a selection of sounders, unit 
type wheel console, including gyro repeater,  ^
pilot log, all of which are fed to plotters.'
This section concludes with a very brief consideration of the 
different impacts these two groups have had on fish stocks and on
1. See A.T. Pruter op.cit.; Sidney Holt Food from the Oceans, Conference 
on the New International Economic Order and the Law of the Sea, February, 
1976; and Clarence P. Idyll The Sea Against Hunger: Harvesting the Oceans 
to Feed A Hungry World, Crowell, New York, 1970.
2. See Australian Fisheries, Vol.37, No.9, September, 1978, p.ll.
3. See W.M. Chapman 'The Theory and Practice of International Fishery 
Development-Management' San Diego Law Review, 1970.
4. John Fitzhardinge 'Inshore and Distant Water Fishing Vessels' 
Australian Fisheries, Vol.37, No.9, September, 1978, p.5.
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each other's operations.
The DWFS, with their large catching capacity and their great 
mobility, share major responsibility for the overexploitation of many 
of the world's important fish stocks. Unlike the coastal states, the 
DWFS are capable of moving on to other areas or species if a specific 
stock no longer yields acceptable catches. The DWFS have, in fact, 
frequently adopted pulse-fishing techniques, under which stocks were 
knowingly overfished until they were no longer profitable, at which 
point the fishermen moved on to other stocks. Some of the major 
fisheries which have declined significantly as a result include: the 
Northwest Pacific salmon, the Atlanto-Scandian herring, the Barents 
Sea cod, the Newfoundland cod, Bering Sea flatfishes, and yellowfin 
tuna in the eastern Pacific.^' The coastal fishing states, because they 
lack the mobility of the DWFS, have generally demonstrated a stronger 2interest in limiting catches to the level of maximum sustainable yield.
Needless to say, the impact of the DWFS on the operations of the
coastal fishing states has been much greater than the reverse situation.
With their fishing capabilities and mobility, and assisted (at least
until recently) by a liberal Law of the Sea regime, the DWFS have been
able to operate close to the shores of many other States. This they
have done, sometimes in competition for prime fish stocks with the
coastal fishermen. (The coastal fishing states, on the other hand,
do not have the capability to send their fishing vessels to fish the
coasts of far off DWFS.) Often, however, there is no direct competition
between the two groups. Such is the case when the DWFS are operating
in mid-ocean - far out of range of the coastal operators; or when
the distant-water vessels are fishing for fish species as yet unused
3by the coastal fishermen.
1. A very large number of works examine this problem, see for example: 
Arthur Bourne ‘The Oceans - a Conflict of Interests' Ocean Resources 
and the Ocean Environment, San Francisco, 1974; D.L. McKernan 'Inter­
national Fishery Regimes - Current and Future' in L.M. Alexander,(ed.)
The Law of the Sea: Rational Policy Recommendations, Kingston, R.I.,
1970; Ian Payne 'Crisis in World Fisheries' Alew Scientist, Vol.74,
No.1053, 26 May, 1977; and Brian J. Rothschild (ed.) World Fisheries 
Policy: Multidisciplinary Views, University of Washington Press,Seattle,1972.
2. See A.W. Koers op.cit., p.51. It should be pointed out, however, 
that examples may be given where the coastal fishing states have also 
overexploited local fish stocks.
3. There is always the danger, however, that even with unshared stocks 
the activities of one fleet may disadvantage the other - as, for example, 
when one fleet takes the main source of food for the fish harvested by 
the other fleet.
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Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea
Over the years, many of the coastal fishing states increasingly 
recognised that the activities of DWFS off their shores seriously 
impeded the successful growth of their own fishing industries. They 
came to realise that, if the worst excesses of the foreign fishermen 
were to be curbed and the domestic fishing industry be allowed to 
develop, changes would have to be made to the Law of the Sea which had 
traditionally permitted almost total freedom of fishing operations 
for all fishermen. This section traces the history of their efforts 
in this area. Emphasis will be given to the most recent developments 
in the Law of the Sea - particularly those deliberations at UNCLOS III 
touching upon the introduction of 200-mile exclusive economic zones 
and the respective legal rights and obligations of the DWFS and the 
coastal states. Emphasis will also be given to the coastal states' 
objectives in seeking extended fishing zones.
For centuries the world’s oceans were regarded as belonging to
no one. Beyond a narrow strip of territorial waters lay the high seas
wherefreedom, in theory, reigned. The principle of freedom of the seas
may be traced back to the early seventeenth century when the Dutch
lawyer,^“ Hugo Grotius, asserted that the ocean must be held free for
common use. Grotius viewed the 'boundless ocean' as indivisible, open
and intangible. He asserted
' The ocean which encompasses the 
terrestrial home of mankind with 
the ebb and flow of its tides... 
cannot be held or enclosed, being 
itself the possessor rather than the 
possessed... Most things become 
exhausted with promiscuous use.
This is not the case with the sea.
It can be exhausted neither by 
fishing nor by navigation: that is 
to say, in the two ways in which 
it can be used.'2.
The principle of the freedom of the seas remained virtually 
unchallenged until well into the present century. While many countries 
followed the American example (set in 1793) of asserting absolute 
soveignty over a narrow strip of water which acted as a buffer zone
1. Although it can be claimed that the principle of the freedom of the 
seas goes back at least to the times of ancient Rome.
2. See Chapter V of Ralph van Deman Magoffin's translation of Hugo 
Grotius' 'Mare Librum' in The Freedom of the Seas3 Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1916.
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between land and sea, the width of this zone (the territorial sea) 
was rarely more than three miles."*" Much of the world's oceans was, 
therefore, high seas where the vessels of all countries were, in law, 
free to go and do as they please subject only to a reasonable regard 
for the interests of other States in the exercise of the same freedom.
Over the past few decades, however, the assumptions on which 
the principle of freedom of the seas is based were seen to be increas­
ingly obsolescent. It had become obvious, for example, that the living 
resources of the sea are not inexhaustible and that they can be 
depleted. In an historic announcement, President Truman in 1945 
declared that the United States would in future exert jurisdiction and 
control over 'the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coast of 
the United States."1 23" While this decision was prompted primarily by a 
desire to establish claim to rich reserves of hydrocrabons lying offshore 
continental America, the President also proclaimed the establishment 
of US-controlled fish conservation zones in these same areas.
Comparable claims by other States followed. Unilateral bids 
were made by a number of countries to the living and mineral resources 
off their coasts. For example, in 1946 Chile and Peru made unilateral 
claims of 'protection and control' out to a distance of 200-nautical 
miles to reserve for their exclusive use the rich offshore anchovy 
fishery. As Traavik reminds us 'The Truman Declaration in effect 
constituted the opening of a legal Pandora's box,' ' as more and more 
countries were attracted to making unilateral claims over the living 
and mineral resources lying outside their territorial seas. This 
development raised the prospects of what Beeby has described as 'a new 
variety of colonial scramble involving international tensions and
1. There were, however, other cases where the principle of the freedom 
of the seas was breached. Brown and Fabian, for example, note how in 
the eighteenth century Britain claimed extended zones for the capture 
of smugglers, and how some coastal states in the nineteenth century 
sought extended customs and sanitary boundaries. See Seyom Brown and 
Larry L. Fabian, 'Diplomats At Sea'., Foreign Affairs^ Vo 1.52, No. 2, 
January, 1974.
2. 'Proclamation by President Truman of 28 September 1945' in Shigeru 
Oda The International Law of the Ocean Development '.Basic Documents 3 
Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972, p.341.
3. Kim Traavik 'The Conquering of Inner Space; Resources and Conflicts 
on the Seabed', Cooperation and Conflict3 Nos.2 and 3, 1974, p.9.
even the possibility of open conflict among states'.^’ Obviously the 
time had come for the nations of the world to sit down together and 
rethink the whole question of freedom and jurisdiction of the seas.
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) was held in Geneva in 1958, with 86 nations participating.
It succeeded in codifying four Conventions: the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High 
Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
With respect to the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, the Conference recognised that the sovereignty of a
State extends to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the
territorial sea. The contiguous zone was defined as an area that may
not extend beyond 12 miles from the coastline from which the width of
2the territorial sea is measured. * The Conference was unable, however, 
to agree on the breadth of the Territorial Sea. The developing 
countries generally supported a 12-mile territorial sea, as opposed to 
the 3- or 6- mile limit supported by many of the advanced maritime
3nations * at the Conference.
The Convention on the High Seas defines the high seas as all parts 
of the sea not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters 
of a State. It provides for freedom of navigation, fishing, laying 
pipelines and cables, and overflight.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources 
of the High Seas provides that all States have the right for their 
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, but States also have 
a duty to adopt measures for the conservation of the living resources 
of the high seas.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf recognised the sovereign 
rights of coastal states over the continental shelf for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
1. C.D. Beeby 'The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
A New Zealand View' Pacific Viewpoint3 Vol.16, No.2, September, 1975, p.117.
2. In the contiguous zone the coastal state could exercise the control 
necessary to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary regulations.
3. See Shigeru Oda 'Towards a New Regime for Ocean Development - Japan's 
Position' The Law of the Sea - I; New Developments 1966-1975y Publications 
on Ocean Development, Vol.3, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1977, p.232. Oda there 
observes that the developing coastal states wanted such extensions of 
their national jurisdiction in order to 'fence in' the resources of their 
broad offshore areas which were being exploited by fishermen of the 
advanced nations.
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The Second Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was held 
in 1960 to consider further the questions of the breadth of the 
territorial sea and fishery limits, which had been left unsettled by 
UNCLOS I. In this, the Second Conference was no more successful than 
the First. Oda notes that what followed was a 'proliferation of fishing 
zones, which then became a distinct concept of its own, independent of 
the territorial sea regime'.^' Many countries, including some of the 
DWFS (for example, the United States and the United Kingdom) adopted 
12-mile fishery zones in the mid-1960s.
By the late 1960s many States were pressuring for the convening 
of a Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Not only 
did they wish to resolve the vexed question of the breadth of the 
territorial sea, but they desired to address some new issues that had 
arisen during the decade. These included questions concerning: 
disputes between countries over fishing rights; increased insistence
by many nations on the economic importance of their coastal and offshore
2 .resources - including offshore oil and minerals; the hazards of using 
the seas as dumping grounds; and the desire by many newly independent 
States to have a voice in the drafting of a Law of the Sea.
In the year or two preceding the First Session of UNCLOS III (held 
in New York in late 1973), a number of coastal states had looked into 
the question of establishing much wider fishing zones than those then 
commonly in existence. Oda claims that the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) was introduced for the first time in a clearly 
defined form by the representative of Kenya at the annual meeting of the 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held in Lagos in January 1972, 
where
' A width of 200 miles from the 
coastline was explicitly mentioned 
in this regard. It soon became 
apparent that the proposal could 
command wide support from many 
of the developing nations of Asia 
and Africa.'3.
1. Ibid., p.235.
2. It was this issue which inspired the Maltese representative at the 
1967 session of UNGA - Arvid Pravo - to call for international action to 
regulate uses of the sea-bed, and which was the prime reason for the 
convening of UNCLOS III. See General Assembly Resolution 2750 C (XXV), 
adopted 17 December, 1970.
3. Shigeru Oda 1977 o p . c i t p.235.
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At this point it might he useful to determine what these, and 
other, coastal states were seeking to achieve through the establishment 
of 200-mile fishing (or exclusive economic) zones.
It will be recalled from the Introduction that New Zealand had, at 
about this time, given its reasons for supporting the establishment of 
wide fishing zones. ’ In very broad terms, New Zealand declared that 
these zones were necessary to protect both local fish stocks and the 
domestic fishing industry from the operations of DWFS. Without question 
a majority of coastal states shared these objectives. Digressing a little 
from the subject of the Law of the Sea, the next few paragraphs will 
examine these, and other, fisheries management objectives in greater 
detail and determine how the establishment of 200-mile zones might assist 
in their attainment.
A very large body of literature exists on the subject of fisheries 
2 .management. Not only do these works testify to the very wide range of 
management objectives, but they also identify several key objectives which 
are commonly found on the list of fisheries management priorities in many 
States. These include: conservation - that is the avoidance of biological 
depletion of a fish stock; taking the maximum sustainable yield (MSY); 
taking the maximum or optimum economic yield; increasing protein 
production; reducing fish imports; increasing fish exports; maximising 
employment; and improving maritime skills. * (Needless to say, some of 
these objectives contain a degree of incompatibility; and, in fact, con­
flicting aims can be distinguished in many countries' fisheries policies.)
1. See page 14 above.
2. A few of these works may be cited here: J.A. Gulland The Management 
of Marine Fisheries, Scientechnica (Publishers) Ltd., Bristol, 1974;
Francis T. Christy Jr., Alternative Arrangements for Marine Fisheries:
An OverviewResources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C., May, 1973; 
Francis T. Christy Jr., and A.D. Scott The Commonwealth in Ocean Fisheries3 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965; and Albert W. Koers International 
Regulation of Marine Fisheries, A Study of Regional Fisheries Organisations_, 
Fishing News (Books) Ltd., London, 1973.
3. In this context it might be interesting to examine the results of a 
survey conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of 25 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region in 1974 concerning their objectives 
in developing fisheries. The respondents gave as some of their major 
objectives: to produce enough fish for domestic requirements; to develop 
exports; to improve the socio-economic conditions of fishermen; to introduce 
modern equipment and develop distant-water fisheries; to create employment 
(not necessarily only of fishermen); to evaluate fish potential; and to 
conserve stocks. See Rowena M. Lawson 'Incompatibilities and Conflicts in 
Fisheries Planning in Southeast Asia' Southeast Asian Journal of Social 
Science3 Vol.6, Nos.1-2, 1978.
Many of the coastal fishing states felt that these objectives 
were being frustrated by the activities of DWFS off their shores. The 
foreign fishermen often overexploited the offshore stocks - including 
some of the prime species - well above the MSY, and contributed to 
(or were solely responsible for) the decline of some important local 
fisheries. Even where the DWFS did not overexploit the fish, they 
often adversely affected the profitability of local fishing enterprises; 
for the greater the amount of some fish stock caught by the foreigners 
the less there was available to the locals, and the lower the returns 
per unit of effort for all. By reducing the stocks of fish available 
to the local industry, the DWFS also reduced the coastal state's capacity 
to: increase its protein production; provide further employment either
directly in fishing or in ancillary and related industries;^' boost its 
balance of payments through increased fish exports and/or reduced 
fish imports; and so on. All these factors were especially important 
for the poorest coastal states.
There were other, more abstract, reasons why some coastal states
sought increased jurisdiction over their offshore areas. Not a few
countries were attracted to the concept for matters of national pride
where national'borders'would be greatly enlarged. For others, the
question of offshore sovereignty was but part of the broader debate at
that time concerning the establishment of a New International Economic
Order, which was to be based
' on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest and 
cooperation among all States, irrespective 
of their economic and social systems which 
shall correct inequalities and redress 
existing injustices, make it possible to 
eliminate the widening gap between the 
developed and developing countries and 
ensure steadily accelerating economic 
and social development and peace and justice 
for present and future generations^•
It was felt that the establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic 
(or fishery) zones would solve many of these problems, for the coastal 
states would, for the first time in history, have the legal right to
1. For a more detailed consideration of this question see Rowena M. 
Lawson ibid_, p.p.125-9; J.A. Gulland op.cit.s p.106; and Andres Von 
Brandt 'The Mini Fishermen' Fishing News InternationalVol.17, No. 3, 
March, 1978, p.48.
2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI). See also 
Robert L. Friedheim 'Case Study: The "Satisfied" and "Dissatisfied" 
States Negotiate International Law' in L.B. Miller (ed.) Dynamics of
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determine which countries - if any, and under what conditions - should be 
permitted to fish in their offshore waters.
One of the earliest and clearest statements from the coastal states
on the subject of the 200-mile EEZ appeared in the summer of 1972, at the
Geneva session of the Seabed Committee, when Australia and New Zealand
submitted a working paper in preparation for UNCLOS III.^’ The first
of the 15 principles set out in the paper declared
' The coastal state shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction, in accordance 
with the principles elaborated herein, 
over the living resources of the sea in 
an adequately wide zone of the high 
seas adjacent to its territorial sea.'
It appears that the ’adequately wide zone of the high seas' was consid­
ered by New Zealand to be a 200-nautical mile zone, and by Australia the
2 .superjacent waters of the continental shelf.
This joint working paper did not, however, represent an extreme
coastal state view, but was intended to narrow the gap between the
position of the DWFS and the coastal states with respect to the principles
for a fisheries regime. This was demonstrated in Principle 5 of the
paper, which stated
'Where the coastal state is 
unable to take 100 per cent 
of the allowable catch of a 
species as determined under 
the principles, it shall allow 
the entry of foreign fishing 
vessels with a view to 
maintaining the maximum food 
supply.'
The Australia/New Zealand working paper seems to have been 
influential, for the concept of the EEZ, as it has emerged from each 
of the major UNCLOS drafts - from the 'Trends Paper' prepared at 
Caracas in 1974, through the Informal Single Negotiating Text of 1975, 
the Revised Single Negotiating Text of 1976, and the current Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) of 1977 - bears the imprint (in
World Politics: Studies in the Resolution of C o n f l i c t Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., New Jersey, 1968.
1. A/AC 138/SC II/L.ll: Principles for a Fisheries Regime (Australia 
and New Zealand) 11 August, 1972.
2. See Shigeru Oda, 1977 op.cit. 3 p.236.
somewhat altered form) of many of its principles.
Before examining the ICNT in detail, it might be worth discussing
its present legal status. This Text, like those before it, is in effect
a draft for inclusion in a new Law of the Sea Convention. As yet no new
Law of the Sea Treaty has been approved or signed. It might be argued,
therefore, that as there is no treaty the proposals for the EEZ are not
yet part of international law. But that would be an excessively formal
statement of the situation, for there has been a simultaneous collateral
development of customary international law where many coastal states
2have unilaterally claimed 200-mile EEZs * and have made their claims
not in deliberate violation of the law but in the belief that the
3emerging law supports such claims.'' The fact that those States which 
have claimed exclusive economic zones include not only coastal fishing 
states but also most of the major DWFS and maritime States - for example, 
Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States - gives further legitimacy 
to the concept of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Those sections of the ICNT of most interest to fishermen and 
fisheries administrators are found in Part V, which deals with the 
establishment of exclusive economic zones. But the whole of Part V will 
not be examined here. As mentioned above, the main purpose of this 
section is to identify the respective legal rights and obligations of the 
DWFS and the coastal states with respect to fisheries. Only relevant 
sections of certain Articles of the ICNT will, therefore, be presented.
1. A very large number of works have examined both the historical 
background to, and the deliberations at, UNCLOS III; a few of which might 
be cited: Robert L. Friedheim 'A Law of the Sea Conference: Who Needs 
It?’ Development Digest , Vo 1.11, No. 2, April, 1973; J.K. Gamble and 
G.Pontecorvo (eds.)Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans, 
Ballinger Publishing Co., Camb. Mass., June, 1973; Evan Luard ’The Law 
of the Sea Conference’ International Affairs, Vol.50 No.2, April, 1974; 
Seyom Brown and Larry L. Fabian 1974 op.cit.‘, C.D. Beeby, op.cit•
Ann L. Hollick ’What to Expect from a Sea Treaty' Foreign Policy, No.18, 
Spring, 1975; John Temple Swing ’Who Will Own the Oceans?' Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.54, April, 1976; J. I. Charney 'Law of the Sea: Breaking 
the Ocean Deadlock' Foreign Affairs, Vol.55, 1977; Shigeru Oda, 1977 
op.cit.; Elizabeth Mann Borgese and Arvid Pardo 'Ocean Management' in 
T. Tinbergen (coordinator) Reshaping the International Order: A Report 
to the Club of Rome, Hutchison, London, 1977; E. Miles (ed.l,'Special 
Issue: Restructuring Ocean Regimes' International Organisation Vol.31, 
1977; and R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr.,1977 op.cit.
2. The following section examines this development in greater detail.
3. The international lawyer E. Lauterpacht discusses this subject at 
some length in 'International Legal and Political Factors Affecting the 
Exploitation of Australia's Offshore Resources', in G.W.P. George (ed.) 
Australia's Offshore Resources: Implications of the 200 Mile Zone, 
papers delivered at the meeting of the Science and Industry Forum of the 
Australian Academy of Science, 23-24 September, 1977, Canberra.
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Article 55 refers to the specific legal regime of the exclusive
economic zone. It is somewhat of a preamble, and reads in full:
' The exclusive economic zone is an area 
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
subject to the specific legal regime established 
in this Part, under which the rights and 
jurisdictions of the coastal State and the 
rights and freedoms of other States are governed 
by the relevant provisions of the present 
convention.'
Article 56 refers to the rights, jurisdiction and duties
of the coastal state in the EEZ. It reads in part:
’1. In the exclusive economic zone, the 
coastal State has: (a) Sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living of the sea-bed 
and subsoil and the superjacent waters ...'
This Article clearly establishes that the coastal state has sovereign -
that is, above or superior to all others - rights in the EEZ.
Article 61 concerns the conservation of living resources. The
coastal state is given the important right and duty of determining
the allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ. This Article
also charges the coastal state to ensure that the maintenance of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by
overexploitation. In Paragraph 3 it goes on to say that:
' Such measures shall also be designed to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested 
species at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors, including 
the economic needs of coastal fishing communities 
and the special requirments of developing 
countries ...’
This Article is obviously weighted in favour of the coastal state.
First, while the coastal state is obliged to take into account the 
best scientific evidence available to it - including data from D1VFS 
operating in the EEZ - in setting the level of allowable catch, the 
coastal state has final authority in deciding what this level shall 
be. Second, the qualifications in Paragraph 3 concerning the 
economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special 
requirements of developing countries, offers scope for very broad 
interpretation, and can be used by the coastal state in a discriminatory 
manner against the DWFS.
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It is Article 62 - that concerning the utilisation of the
living resources - which warrants the closest examination. It will
be treated in detail, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraph 1 states:
' The coastal state shall promote the 
objective of optimum utilisation of the 
living resources in the exclusive economic 
zone without prejudice to Article 61.'
This paragraph is more or less meaningless as neither here, nor
elsewhere, in the Text is there a definition of 'optimum utilisation.'
In fact the paper produced by the Working Group of the Australian
Fisheries Council picks up this point and comments:
' It is significant that the ICNT does not 
attempt to elaborate on the meaning of 
the objective 'optimum utilisation' and 
its definition is left to the discretion 
of the coastal state. Accordingly, the 
utilisation of fish stocks within an 
Australian 200 mile fishing zone may be 
set at a level that is compatible with any 
reasonable management objective Australia 
. wishes to pursue whilst keeping within the 
spirit of Article 61 of the ICNT'.l*
Paragraph 2 of Article 62 states in part:
' The coastal state shall determine its 
capacity to harvest the living resources 
of the exclusive economic zone. When the 
coastal state does not have the capacity to 
harvest the entire allowable catch, it 
shall ... give other States access to the 
surplus of the allowable catch.'
Again the coastal state is given final discretion, this time with 
respect to determining its capacity to harvest the fish in the EEZ. 
Obviously, the greater the coastal state judges its catching capacity 
the less surplus is available to other States.
Paragraph 3 qualifies Paragraph 2. It states in part:
' In giving access to other States to its 
exclusive economic zone ... the coastal state 
shall take into account all relevant factors, 
including ... the significance of the living 
resources of the area to the economy of the 
coastal state and its other national interests ... 
the requirements of developing countries in the 
subregion or region in harvesting part of the 
surplus and the need to minimise economic 
dislocation in States whose nationals have 
habitually fished in the zone or which have 
made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks.'
1. The 200 Mile Australian Fishing Zone3 A Report of the Working Group 
established by the Australian Fisheries Council, November, 1977, p.ll.
This Paragraph provides further opportunities for those coastal 
states which wish to prevent, or otherwise control, DWFS access to their 
EEZs. First, the so-called relevant factor 'other national interests' 
gives the coastal state considerable scope for shutting out foreign 
fishing vessels. Second, the provision to provide access to 'States 
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone' is, at best, rather 
vague. The coastal state may have a very different conception of 
'habitually' than the DWFS - with the former thinking in terms of a 
much longer time-span than the latter. It is interesting, in this 
respect, to compare the wording of the ICNT with that of Principle 7 
in the Australia/New Zealand working paper which seemed to interpret 
'habitually' as fishing carried on in the EEZ on a substantial scale 
for a period of not less than 10 years.
Neither can the DWFS be any more hopeful of obtaining access 
on the basis of having made 'substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks'. The coastal state and the DWFS might 
well disagree over what constitutes a 'substantial' effort. Further, 
the coastal state may charge that, while the DWFS had obviously 
made significant efforts in research and identification of stocks, not 
all of this information had been made available to it - the coastal 
state.
The coastal states are additionally protected in Paragraph 4, 
which emphasises
' Nationals of other States fishing in the 
exclusive economic zone shall comply with 
the conservation measures and with the other 
terms and conditions established in the 
regulations of the coastal state.'
This Paragraph goes on to outline some of these regulations, which may 
include inter alia: the licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and 
equipment - including payments of fees; determining the species which 
may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch; regulating seasons and areas 
of fishing; requiring, under the authorisation and control of the 
coastal state, the conduct of specified fisheries research programmes; 
terms and conditions relating to joint ventures; fixing the age and 
size of fish and other species that may be caught; and so on. It would 
appear, therefore, that there is no single aspect of the fishing oper­
ations themselves that is not covered under the proposed fisheries 
regulations.
Article 64 relates to the conservation and utilisation of highly
migratory species (HMS). It urges the coastal state and other States
whose nationals fish in the region for HMS to
' Cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organisations with a view 
to ensuring conservation and promoting 
the objective of optimum utilisation of 
such species throughout the region, both 
within and beyond the exclusive economic 
zone.'
It goes on to say that where no appropriate international organisation 
exists, then the coastal state and other States whose fishermen harvest 
the HMS shall cooperate to establish such an organisation and shall 
participate in its work.
Article 73 of the ICNT refers to the enforcement of laws and 
regulations of the coastal state. The coastal state is given the 
right to take 'such measures including boarding inspection, arrest and 
judicial proceedings' to ensure compliance with these laws and regul­
ations.
In summary, should the ICNT be passed into law or otherwise be 
widely accepted by the international community (as now appears very 
likely) the coastal states would enjoy important new powers governing 
the ownership and management of offshore living resources. This 
said, it would be an exaggeration to say that coastal states would 
enjoy the same rights with respect to the ownership and exploitation 
of the living resources within their EEZs as they do over the resources 
lying on and within their territories. As the above paragraphs 
indicate, the coastal states also have certain duties to fulfil - 
not least of which are their obligations concerning the 'optimum 
utilisation 'of the living resources, and the 'need to minimise 
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished 
in the zone'.
Distant-Water Fishing State Sensitivity to Extended Fishing Zones: With 
Special Reference to Japan
The DWFS have good reason to view with concern the establishment 
of extended fishing zones in different parts of the world. It has been 
variously estimated that should all littoral States^* establish such 
zones, some 35 per cent of the world's high seas, 90 per cent of its 
continental shelves, and 90-95 per cent of its marine life would come
1. The term 'littoral State' is preferred here because the term 
'coastal state' (as used in this thesis) refers to a specific type of 
fishing country - that is, one distinct from a DWFS.
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under littoral State jurisdiction. ’ The establishment of these zones 
could have a serious impact on the DWFS, for example: by reducing their 
total fish catches; creating unemployment; causing changes in the 
national diet; and reducing the profitability of fishing operations.
This section considers the sensitivity of one of the major DWFS - Japan - 
to the new era. Emphasis here will be given to Japan's sensitivity to 
global changes - particularly those affecting the major fishing grounds
of the North Pacific - in marine fisheries jurisdiction as of late
21977/early 1978. * (It will be noted that it is in the case studies 
where we specifically examine Japan's sensitivity dependence in this 
area with New Zealand and Australia.)
By 1977 the era of 200-mile exclusive economic (or fishing) zones 
was already firmly established. As of 30 September, 1977, 39 countries 
had declared and implemented such zones. (See Table 5.) They repres­
ented a cross-section of most types of littoral States: the less 
developed coastal fishing states such as India, Bangladesh and Angola; 
the developed coastal fishing states such as Canada; socialist States 
such as the USSR, Cuba and North Korea; and the developed DWFS, such as 
the USA, the United Kingdom and Japan.
Ironically, while the concept of 200-mile fishing zones was 
largely a Third World initiative, it is the developed littoral States 
(some of them DWFS) which can, and do, claim some of the largest and 
richest offshore fishing zones. The United States, with its many 
outlying possessions and its long continental coasts, has - at 
2.22 million square miles - the largest of all. Others having very 
large zones include Australia (2.04 million square miles), New Zealand
3(1.41 million square miles) and Canada (1.37 million square miles).
1. The Japanese have been particularly keen in publicising these stat­
istics. See for example, an advertisement by the Japan Fisheries 
Association titled, 'Will the 200-mile Fisheries Zone Serve Mankind'
Look Japan, March 10, 1977, pp.4-5; and Motokichi Morisawa 'The Fishery 
Ocean Development in the New Oceanic Era' Yomiuri International Economic 
Society Bulletin3 No.35, Oct.,1977. See also Barbara Johnson and Frank 
Langdon 'The Impact of the Law of the Sea Conference Upon the Pacific 
Region: Part l 'Pacific Affairs3 Vol.51, No.l, Spring, 1978, p.20, where 
essentially the same statistics are presented'.
2. This point in time was chosen as it represents the eve of Japan's 
fisheries access negotiations with New Zealand, and not long before 
Japan's negotiations with Australia.
3. All statistics taken from George Kent 'Equity in Global Fisheries' 
op.cit.3 p.60. George Kent also observes that the area gained by the 
USA alone would have an annual potential fish production equivalent to 
about 10 per cent of the total estimated world production - unmatched 
by any other country.
TABLE 5 - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONES AND FISHING 
ZONES BY COUNTRY (AS OF 30/9/77).
Country Date of 
Declaration
Date of 
Implementation
Nature of 
Zone
Nicaragua 5/ 4/65 5/ 4/65 F
Argentina 29/12/66 10/ 1/67 E
Bangladesh 13/ 2/74 13/ 4/74 E
Iceland 15/ 7/75 15/10/75 F
Costa Rica 30/ 8/75 30/ 8/75 *
Angola 1976 1976 E
Mexico 26/ 1/76 31/ 7/76 E
Senegal 1/ 4/76 1/ 4/76 E
USA 13/ 4/76 1/ 3/77 F
Guatemala 9/ 6/76 1/ 7/76 E
Comoro 15/ 6/76 15/ 6/76 E
Mozambique 19/ 8/76 N . A. E
India 25/ 8/76 15/ 1/77 E
Sri Lanka 1/ 9/76 15/ 1/77 E
EEC Countries ** Various 1976 Various 1977 E/F
Canada 1/11/76 1/ 1/77 F
Maldives 5/12/76 5/12/76 E
USSR 10/12/76 1/ 3/77 F
Norway 17/12/76 1/ 1/77 E
Pakistan 31/12/76 31/12/76 E
Cuba 24/ 2/77 26/ 2/77 E
Dominica 1/ 4/77 1/ 4/77 E
Haiti 6/ 4/77 6/ 4/77 E
Burma 9/ 4/77 1977 E
Seychelles 27/ 4/77 1/ 8/77 E
Japan 2/ 5/77 1/ 7/77 F
Vietnam 12/ 5/77 May 1977 E
Iran 22/ 5/77 22/ 5/77 F
Portugal 28/ 5/77 2/ 6/77 E
Guyana 3/ 6/77 30/ 6/77 F
Oman 15/ 6/77 15/ 6/77 F
Bahamas 16/ 6/77 16/ 6/77 F
North Korea 21/ 6/77 1/ 8/77 E
Notes: F = Fishing Zone, E = Economic Zone
* = Tuna fisheries in patrimonial sea.* * _ France declared an EZ; Denmark, 1JK, Ireland
West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium
declared a FZ.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
It is also worth noting that the world's four major fishing 
grounds - the North Pacific waters stretching east from Japan to the 
west coast of Alaska and Canada; the waters from the North Sea to the 
coastal waters of Norway and Iceland; the waters off the east coasts 
of Canada and the USA centering on Newfoundland; and the waters off 
Peru - are all bounded by States which have established 200-mile 
fishing zones.
The Japanese feel that, of all the DWFS, they are the one likely 
to suffer most from the establishment of these zones. This concern was 
early reflected in Japan's strong opposition to the concept of the 
EEZ at UNCLOS III. As Gene Gregory notes, during the Second Session 
at Caracas in mid-1974 'Japan was alone in its commitment to open 
seas'.1 2* And, as we shall see later, Japan's concern has not diminished 
over the years.
The importance of fish and fishing in Japan's national life can be 
2readily testified. * Historically, fish products have occupied a very 
important place in the Japanese diet. Fish and shellfish contribute 
about 50 per cent of total protein consumption from animal sources. 
Compared with other major industrial countries, Japan's per capita 
consumption of fish is very high, and its per capita consumption of 
meat is low.
TABLE 6 - PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF FISH AND MEAT BY COUNTRY IN 1974
(KGS PER ANNUM)
Fish Meat
Japan 35.0 22.6
France 16.8 95.0
Italy 9.9 66.3
UK 8.2 72.6
USA 7.2 107.9
West Germany 7.2 85.8
Canada 5.9 95.3
Source: 'Major Protein Source for Japanese Threatened' The
Oriental Economist3 Vol.45, No.796, February,1977,p.10.
1. Gene Gregory 'Japan and the Law of the Sea: Uncertainties of the New 
Order' Australian O u t l o o k Vol.30, No.l, April 1976, p.45. The Japanese 
had, however, shown that they were prepared to make certain concessions 
to the less developed coastal states. In Proposals for a Regime of 
Fisheries on the High Seas A/AC.138/SC.II.L.12, a paper submitted to the 
Seabed Committee in mid-1972, Japan suggested that these countries 
should be guaranteed a certain preferential fishing right in the form
of a preferential share of the coastal fish species on the basis of the 
fishing capacities of the nations concerned.
2. A number of works, both in Japanese and in English, treat with the 
history of Japan's fishing industry, for example: G. Borgstrom Japan's 
World Success in F i s h i n g Fishing News, London, 1964; and Kenzo Kawakami
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There are two main factors which account for the relatively 
high fish intake in the average Japanese diet. First, arable land 
constitutes only some 18 per cent of Japan's total land area. As much 
of this area is set aside for rice production there is little scope for 
livestock farming as a source of animal protein. Second, the Japanese 
are favoured by the fact that the seas surrounding their country abound 
in numbers and varieties of fish. Japan lies at the confluence of two 
ocean currents - the cold Oyashio from the north, and the warm Kuroshio 
from the south - which provides a variety of temperature and plankton 
environments suitable for a wide diversity of marine life.
The fishing industry is an important source of employment in Japan. 
While the number of men and women directly employed in the industry - 
that is, those classified as fishing workers - is not large (in 1976, 
it stood at 469,700 persons, about one per cent of the total national 
work force);*' the total number of those in some way dependent on this 
industry for their livelihood - in such areas as processing, packing, 
transportation, retailing, ship construction and repair - is very much 
larger. For certain parts of Japan, particularly Hokkaido, eastern 
Tohoku, and western Honshu the industry represents a much higher 
percentage of the total work force.
While no figures are available for the total amount of capital 
invested in the fisheries sector, one can imagine that the investment 
in fishing vessels (some 400,000 of them); fishing ports; fishing 
vessel construction yards; fishing gear; and other related services and 
facilities, must be very large.
When considering the sensitivity of Japan to changes in the global 
fisheries environment it is important to determine the domestic 
political influence of the Japanese fishing sector. The industry 
is organised into about 2,500 fisheries cooperatives with a total
Sengo Kokusai Gyogyo Seidoshi (A History of Postwar International 
Fisheries Institutions) Dai Nihon Suisan Kai, Tokyo, 1975. Those 
works treating specifically with Japan's situation in the new era of 
200-mile fishing zones include: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Kaiyö Nihon no 
Shumatsu (The End of Maritime Japan) Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo,
1977; Mainichi Shimbun Nihyaku Kairi Sakana Senso, (200-Mile Fish War) 
Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo, 1977; and Takao Morizane Shin Kaiyöhö Chitsujo 
to Nihon Gyogyo (The New Order of the Law of the Sea and the Japanese 
Fishing Industry), Sözo Shobo, Tokyo, 1977.
1. Fisheries Statistics of Japan, 1976, op.cit., p.28.
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membership of some 600,000.^’ These cooperatives have prefectural-level
federations which are affiliated to the National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperatives. The Japan Fisheries Association (JFA), which represents
all sectors of the fishing industry with a membership of more than
500 organisations, acts as the main lobby group on behalf of the
2Japanese fishing industry.
In terms of membership, these fisheries organisations do not begin
to compare with that of the massive agricultural lobby concentrated on
the Agricultural Cooperative Association (Nokyd) which claims five
million farm household members and 1.8 million associate members. (This
difference in political strength between the two groups is reflected
in the Diet, where the political influence of fisheries spokesmen falls
far short of the rural Dietmen.) This said, the fishermen do have some
political leverage. It seems that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) cannot afford to ignore the fishermen. Most of the fishing
communities that dot the Japanese coast have long been bastions of
LDP support; Dahlby, for example, notes how Prime Minister Fukuda's
decision in January, 1977, to expand Japan's territorial waters from
three to 12 miles was clearly intended to bolster waning support for his
party. As Dahlby puts it '... going to bat for the large number of
people dependent on the local fishing industry was a wise move to ensure
3his political longevity.'
The fishing industry also has indirect political influence in the 
form of support from public consumer groups. In this it can be 
considered far better placed than many of the agricultural lobbies (for 
example, the beef producers and citrus farmers) which do not have the 
same degree of support.
From this very brief and broad consideration of the importance of 
fisheries in Japan, the examination turns to that country's sensitivity 
to the establishment of 200-mile zones overseas as of late 1977/early 
1978. Emphasis will be given to the impact on Japan of those fishing 
zones that were among the first to be established and which were also 
zones of vital importance to the Japanese fishing industry - namely, 
those of the United States and the Soviet Union.
1. Seafoods and Fishing in Japan: Report of the Australian Fishing 
Industry Mission to Japan, July, 1978, Australian Department of Trade 
and Resources, Canberra, 1979.
2. It may be added that the JFA also acts as the Japanese negotiator in 
private fishing arrangements with foreign countries and sends members 
overseas for official fishery negotiations.
3. Tracy Dahlby 'Politics Shape Japan's New Limits' Far Eastern Economic
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The Japan Fisheries Agency has calculated the percentage of 
Japanese fish catches made from within 200-nautical miles of foreign 
nations. (See Table 7.) In 1976, this catch amounted to 3.51 million 
metric tons, or 36.5 per cent of Japan's total oceanic (or seagoing) 
c a t c h . N o  less than 74 per cent of this catch (that is, that from 
within 200 miles of foreign countries) came from the offshore waters 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries 
together accounted for the great majority (in 1976, about 1.8 million 
MT or 70 per cent) of Japan's catch of Alaska pollack. Their waters 
also provided sizeable catches of higher quality species including 
salmon and crab. Japan's catches from within 200 nautical miles of 
other foreign countries did not begin to compare (either in terms of 
quantity or total value) with those from the waters off the USA and 
the USSR. However, it is worth noting that the Japanese catch off 
New Zealand had more than doubled between 1974 and 1976, pushing that 
country into third place on the list in terms of tonnages.
Given .the importance to Japan of fish catches within 200-nautical 
miles of foreign countries, it was not surprising that the Japanese 
were, in 1977, watching with keen interest those countries which had 
established (or were about to establish) 200-mile fishing zones. They 
were anxious to learn: first, whether such countries had declared 
that there was a surplus of allowable catch available to DWFS, 
particularly Japan; and, second, the terms under which such access 
would be given - for example, with respect to license fees, quotas, 
and other regulations similar to those outlined in ICNT Article 62, 
Paragraph 4.
Japanese reservations and fears about the establishment of 
extended fishing zones overseas were early justified when in 1977 
most of the littoral States of the North Pacific declared such zones 
and entered into fisheries access agreements with Japan.
Canada was the first to establish its zone in January that year; 
the United States and the Soviet Union each implemented its extended 
fishing zone on March 1; and North Korea established its zone in 
August. Even Japan - the country most opposed to the setting up of
Review_, February 11, 1977, p.101.
1. This was considerably lower than the figures for 1975 and 1974 - 
in the latter year, for example, 4.26 million MT (about 44 per cent 
of the total catch) was caught in these areas by Japan. The lower 
figure for 1976 reflects the increased coastal and nearsea fishing 
effort off Japan, which was due in large part to the continuing effects 
of high fuel oil prices. See 'Japan: Facing Up to the Problems of 
200-mile Limits' World Fishing, Vol.27, No.1, January, 1978, p.49.
TABLE 7. - JAPANESE FISH CATCHES WITHIN 200 MILES OF FOREIGN
COUNTRIES (»000 MT)
1974 1975 1976
Total Japan Fishery Production 10,808 10,545 10,455
Japan 1's Total 'Oceanic' Catches 9,749 9,573 9,605
Japan's Catches within 200 miles 
of Foreign Countries
Percentage of 'Oceanic' catches 
from within 200 miles of 
Foreign Countries
4,256
43.7%
3,744 
39.1%
3,506 
36.5%
Catches from within 200 miles of:
United States 1,585 1,410 1,348
Canada 26 21 25
Soviet Union 1,630 1,396 1,229
People's Republic of China 180 152 118
South Korea 1> 209 111 137
North Korea 64 80
Australia 18 12 18
New Zealand 78 80 166
Mauritania 48 32
South Africa 530 115 100
Others 269 263
Inside of Japan''s 200-mile zone 5,234 5,503 5,682
Percentage of Total 'Oceanic' 
catches, made inside of Japan's 
200-mile zone
53.7% 57.5% 59.2%
'International' Waters 257 326 417
Note: 'International' Waters refers to areas not included within
the 200-mile zones of foreign countries or of Japan.
Source: Suisan Shühö (The Fishing and Food Industry Weekly) No.822,
February 15, 1978, pp. 16-17, also Gyogyö Hakusho, op.oit.s
p. 18.
EEZ's at the UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea - declared a 200- 
nautical mile fisheries zone of its own which entered into force on
I July.^' (Japan's decision was prompted by a desire to increase its
bargaining leverage in fisheries access negotiations with the Soviet
Union, and to secure further its claim to the 'northern islands'
2occupied by the Russians.) ’ As the map shows (see Fig.l), the 
establishment of 200-mile fishing zones in 1977 virtually carved the 
North Pacific into national 'fishing seas'.
The Japanese soon discovered that each of their North Pacific 
neighbours intended to use these new zones to its advantage. The United 
States, for example, has in each of its fishery access agreements with 
Japan since early 1977 reduced the Japanese catch quota. The first 
such agreement - the Interim Agreement of February 11, 1977 - covered 
the quota for 1977. The overall annual quota of 1,190,000 tons was
II per cent less than that for 1976. Japan also had to abide by catch 
quotas by area and species of fish: for example, the quota for Alaska 
pollack was set at 836,000 tons - about 20 per cent less than that for 
1976. Moreover, the Japanese had to pay about $100 million in fees to 
fish in US waters.^“
Japan's annual fish quota from American waters was reduced 
further (by about four per cent) in 1978 to 1,157,000 tons. But it was 
not just the reduction in the quota that gave cause for concern in 
Tokyo that year. The United States had made it clear that if the 
Japanese desired favourable treatment from Washington when annual 
quotas were allocated in the future, the Japanese would have to relax 
some of their barriers to fish imports. As one American official
1. The Japanese zone was only partially established. For fear of 
alienating China and South Korea, which had not established extended 
fishing zones, Japan's zone did not apply west of 135 degrees east 
longitude.
2. For more on the background to Japan's declaration of a 200-mile 
fishing zone and a 12-mile territorial sea, see Frank Langdon 'Japan - 
Soviet 200-mile Zone Confrontation' Pacific Community3 Vol.9, No.l, 
October, 1'977; Shunji Yanai and Kuniaki Asomura 'Japan and the Emerging 
Order of the Sea - Two Maritime Laws of Japan' The Japanese Annual of 
International Laws The International Law Association of Japan, No.21, 
Tokyo, 1978; and statements by Zenko Suzuki (then Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry) before the Committee of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, 
House of Representatives, 19 April, 1977, and the testimony of Prof.
Soji Yamamoto of Tohoku University before the same Committee on 
22 April, 1977.
3. For descriptions of the Interim Agreement of February 11, 1977, see 
The Oriental Economist} Vol.45, No.800, June, 1977, p.3; and Tracy Dahlby 
'Japan Pays a Price for Access' Far Eastern Economic Review3 25 February 
1977, p.47.
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visiting Tokyo put it
' If Japan does not eliminate the 
barriers to the import of marine 
products, the US will markedly reduce 
the catch quota for next year within  ^
the 200-nautical mile waters of the US!
The Japanese felt that this request was unreasonable; and the
Japan Fisheries Agency is said to have retorted 'It [the request] is
nonsense in content, for the United States is not capable of exporting 
2Alaska pollack.' * However, as the Yomiuri reporter observed
'... there is no doubt that the moves 
to "cultivate one's garden (200-nautical 
mile waters) by oneself", which is in the 
background of the United States request 
this time, will become increasingly strong 
in the future.'^•
Tokyo feared that the United States might discriminate against 
Japanese fishermen in other ways. In 1978, it was reported in Japan that 
the United States might reduce Japan's quota of Alaska pollack in the 
Bering Sea and increase the fish catch quotas of other countries by 
the same amount. (The Republic of Korea was identified as one country 
likely to be so favoured as it had already set up a joint 
fishing venture in Alaska. Mexico was considered another likely 4.candidate, as it provides the United States with tuna fishing grounds.) 
The Japanese were particularly incensed about these developments, and 
claimed that as it was Japanese fishermen who had pioneered the Alaska 
pollack fishery they should be given most favoured treatment."’*
Japan suffered even more in its negotiations for access to 
waters off the Soviet Union.^* After almost three months of hard
1. US Commerce Department Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
spokesman Frank, who visited Japan in October 1978, as a member of the 
US Export Development Mission, quoted in Aimune Toru, 'US Pushing 
"Alaska Pollack War"' YomiuriOctober 5, 1978, p.5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See 'Quota to Japan for Alaskan Pollack Fishing in Bering Sea to be 
Reduced by 10 to 20 Per Cent?' Yomiuri_, October 21, 1978, p.9.
5. For more on Japan's reaction to Washington's restrictions on DWFS 
access to America's 200-mile fishing zone in 1978 see Suisan Keizai 
Shimbun3 September 5, 1978, p.l, November 14, 1978, p.l, and November 
21, 1978, p.l; Nihon Keizai October 9, 1978, p.3, and October 13, 1978, 
p.4; and Tokyo Shimbun3 November 14, 1978, p.l.
6. A good account in the Japanese language of the background to the 
Soviet-Japanese fisheries question is to be found in Nisso Gyogyö Iinkai 
ni Tsuite3 (The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Commission) Fishery Agency, 
Tokyo, 1976.
bargaining these two countries signed an Interim Fisheries Agreement on 
24 May, 1977. The terms were very tough. The total annual catch for 
Japanese fishermen was seriously reduced. Whereas in 1975 Japanese 
fishermen had caught some 713,000 tons of fish from within 200-miles 
of the Soviet Union during the June to December period, the quota for 
the same period of 1977 was only 455,000 tons.
The Russians imposed many other forms of restrictions. The kinds 
of fish to be caught and the number of vessels permitted to enter the
Soviet extended fishing zone were spelt out by Moscow. (Formerly,
such restrictions applied only to salmon, crab and sea snail.) The
Japanese were completely excluded from the valuable salmon and herring
fisheries in the Soviet zone. The Alaska pollack quota was 100,000
tons for the June to December period of 1977, down 62 per cent on the
2catch recorded for this period in 1976. ' Further, the Japanese were
restricted to seven widely separated and circumscribed areas designated
by the Soviet Government within the 200-mile zone. Moreover, it soon
became evident that the USSR was going to be more strict in policing its
3.zone than the Americans and Canadians were in theirs.
In the early stages of the negotiations the Russians had demanded 
to fish close inshore to Japan for sardines. But, as noted above,the 
Japanese Government felt bound to protect the coastal fishing industry 
and declared a 12-mile Japanese territorial zone and 200-mile fishing 
zone from which Russian and other unlicensed foreign fishing activity 
was excluded.^' A barter arrangement was finally worked out whereby 
Moscow would exchange Russian-caught pollack for sardines caught by 
Japanese fishermen within Japan's zone.
Given the traditionally tough bargaining between the USSR and 
Japan on fisheries, and other, issues it is not surprising that the 
negotiations over extended fishing zone access had been so protracted. 
However, the Soviet Union had good economic reasons for taking a hard 
line. It also had suffered severely from the establishment of 200-mile
1. Reported in 'Fishing in the New Era" World Fishing3 Vol.26, No.8, 
August 1977, p.127.
2. See 'Japan Facing a Fish Famine' Fishing News International3 March, 
1978, p .34.
3. The article 'Severe Outlook of Fishery Talks' The Oriental Economist3 
Vol.45, No.805, November, 1977, p.3, notes that from the end of May to 
October 20, 1977, no less than 123 Japanese fishing vessels had been 
arrested and fined a total of ¥130 million (somewhat in excess of half
a million dollars) for 'offences' committed within the Soviet 200-mile 
zone.
4. It should be pointed out, however, that fishermen from the Peoples
fishing zones elsewhere.^* The operations of its distant water fishing
fleets were being disrupted especially in the northeast and northwest
Atlantic. Moscow was, therefore, determined to reduce Japanese fishing
activities within the Russian zone as much as possible, while at the
same time Moscow hoped to persuade Tokyo to increase the level of
Soviet fishing activity permitted inside the Japanese zone. In its
negotiations with Japan, the Soviet Union had promoted the concept of
'equivalence' where Russian fish quotas in the Japanese zone were to be
2increased to equal Japanese fish quotas in the Russian zone. * Natur­
ally, the Japanese were much opposed to this concept as the Soviet catch 
inside Japan's zone was (in 1976) less than half the Japanese catch 
in Russian waters.
As Japanese fish catches in Canadian waters were small, the quotas
given to DWFS by Ottawa were probably not of major concern to Tokyo.
However, the Japanese were disturbed about the way in which Canada had
followed America's example in bartering fishing access in return for
3access to overseas fish markets.
4What then were the immediate ‘effects of, and Japan's reaction to, 
the establishment of extended fishing zones in the North Pacific in 1977?
With drastic reductions of fish catches in North Pacific waters, 
a large number of Japanese fishing vessels which had traditionally 
worked this area were forced to move elsewhere. The number of Japanese 
fishing vessels working the Soviet 200-mile zone in 1977 was reduced 
to 6,300 (down from 7,400 in 1976^*), and the number of mother vessels 
reduced from 10 to six. Particularly hard hit were the so-called 
hokuten boats, which traditionally worked out of Hokkaido ports into
Republic of China and from the Republic of Korea were largely exempted 
from these regulations. See Yanai and Asomura, op.cit.3 p.p.73-76.
1. See Frank Langdon, op.cit.3 p.48.
2. See 'Japän-Russia Tug-0'-War Over Fishing Rights' The Australian 
Financial Review3 April 6, 1977; and 'Soviet Union Raps Japan's Attitude 
in Fishing Talks' Japan Times3 March 30, 1977, p.l.
3. See 'Canada Bartering Fishing Rights for Market Access' Australian 
Fisheries3 Vo 1.38, No.1, January, 1979, p.9.
4. It should be repeated that we are here concerned with Japan's 
sensitivity to changes in the global fisheries environment as of late 
1977/early 1978 - the eve of that country's access negotiations with 
New Zealand and Australia. We are not, therefore, at this point con­
cerned with developments in the global environment after 1978, nor 
with Japan's more recent assessment of the situation.
5. Reported in The Oriental Economist3 Vol.45, No.805, November, 1977, 
p.3.
North Pacific waters specialising in the netting of Alaska pollack.
One use then seen for these vessels was to take over the Soviet sardine 
catch in Japan's new 12-mile territorial sea. But Japanese coastal 
sardine fishermen were very much opposed to this idea. Another use 
envisaged for these vessels - which will be discussed more fully in 
the next section - involved the exploitation of krill in the Southern 
Ocean. As catch quotas in the American zone were reduced only moderately 
in 1977, few Japanese vessels were forced immediately to leave these 
waters.
The cutbacks in fishing activity in the North Pacific created 
immediate problems of unemployment in the fishing, and related, indus­
tries in Japan. Otani asserted in early 1978, that all of the major 
fishing companies had taken steps to 'counter anticipated difficult 
days.' He noted that these companies 'have quietly carried out 
personnel retrenchment in the past two or three years, and have 
succeeded in reducing 2,000 to 3,000 personnel.' He went on to warn 
that the companies 'are now racking their brains over what to do with 
surplus manpower in the future.'^' The unemployment problem was likely
to be particularly severe in Hokkaido where many coastal communities
2are almost totally dependent on fishing. * Also affected were those 
engaged in the fish processing industry. The cutback in pollack catches, 
in particular, had a serious impact on the large number of workers 
involved in processing pollack into kamaboko fishmeat loaves and the like.
The establishment of 200-mile fishing zones in the North Pacific 
also threatened to increase the operating costs of Japanese fishermen.
One spokesman from the Japan Fisheries Agency is quoted as saying that, 
as a result of the changed situation in North Pacific fisheries, the 
'ripple' effects on the Japanese economy in terms of employment and 
sectors of the industry like processing and marketing would amount to 
about $1,000 million.^*
1. Tetsumaru Otani 'Major Japanese Fishery Companies in the Age of 
200-mile Fishery Zones' Business Japan, January, 1978, p.68.
2. Some ports in Hokkaido, like Kushiro, depend almost exclusively 
on long-distance trawling (much of it conducted in Soviet waters), 
and have no alternative sources of employment. (See the earlier 
paragraphs in this section.)
3. Tracy Dahlby, February, 1977, o p . o i t p.49.
The threat of reduced supplies of fish due to the establishment 
of 200-mile zones overseas created a crisis atmosphere in Japan in 
early/mid-1977. This was reflected in the sharp rise in the price of 
fish and fish-based foods. In April that year, the average wholesale 
price of fish at the 66 largest fishing ports in Japan was fully 
64 per cent over what it was a year before.^'
As of late 1977/early 1978, most Japanese were generally pessi­
mistic about the global fisheries situation - particularly that exist­
ing in the North Pacific. Early in 1978, Tetsumaru Otani of Business 
Japan asserted '... the age of the 200-mile zone is threatening to
change the structure of the whole [Japanese] fishing industry drastic- 
2ally.' * Similar sentiments were expressed by Japanese officials at 
this time to a visiting New Zealand economist, when it was predicted
that 'the volume of fish being caught in Russian and American waters
3 .would be reduced to negligible amounts in the next 10-15 years.'
Further, the Japanese faced the prospect of being excluded from 200- 
mile zones elsewhere in the world.
This section concludes with a very brief consideration of what the 
establishment of extended fishing zones meant for other DWFS - partic­
ularly those which compete with Japan for the fish resources off New 
Zealand and/or Australia. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union has been 
seriously affected. Writing in 1977, Christy noted how some of the 
major fishing grounds traditionally exploited by the Russians - the 
northeast Atlantic, the west coast of Africa, and the Atlantic and
4Pacific coasts of North America - were threatened by the new zones.
The South Koreans, in 1977, predicted that their catch for that year 
would be 88 per cent less than in 1976 'as new restrictions go into 
force in the North Pacific.'^' Taiwan was likely to have unique 
problems as more and more countries declared extended fishing zones.
That country.would, somehow, have to get round the problem of negot­
iating fishing access agreements with the governments of countries 
with which it does not have diplomatic relations.
1. See 'Troubles for Japan's Fisheries' The Oriental Economist3 Vol.45, 
No.803, September, 1977, p.6.
2. Tetsumaru Otani op.cit., p.68.
3. See G.W. Kitson A Comment on Fisheries and Agricultural Trade 
Relationships Between New Zealand and Japan„ Agricultural Economics 
Research Unit, Lincoln College, Discussion Paper No.38, February, 1978, 
p.ll. Similar fears were expressed to the present author by officials
of the Japan Fisheries Agency in late 1978. See also Motokichi Morisawa, 
op.cit. 3 p.p.29-30; and 'Troubles for Japan's Fisheries', The Oriental 
Economist3 op.cit.3 p.10.4. See Francis T. Cnristy, Jr., 1977 op.cit. 3 p.p.241-3.
5. Reported in Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon, op.cit. 3 p.222.
Japan's Likely Vulnerability to Extended Fishing Zones
It can be aryued that Japan was more sensitive to the 
establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic (or fishing) zones 
than any other DWFS. The question facing Tokyo in the mid/late 
1970s was whether there were suitable policy options which would 
either avoid or offset the negative impact on the Japanese fishing 
industry and the broader Japanese community that these zones threatened. 
This section explores the range of possible counter-strategies 
available to Japan in this area with the objective of assessing that 
country's likely vulnerability dependence on the coastal fishing 
states, both in the short-term and in the medium/long-term.
Before examining the Japanese situation, however, the range
of policy options theoretically available to DWFS will be considered.
Christy has suggested that there are four major alternatives available
to the DWFS in the face of 200-mile extensions.
' They can reduce their distant-water fishing 
effort; develop deep-water fisheries for stocks 
beyond 200 miles; increase their bilateral 
arrangements with coastal states; or refuse 
to accept or abide by coastal state jurisdiction 
in a 200-mile zone.'l-
He noted that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive.
Christy’s suggestions warrant closer analysis. First, it is
doubtful whether two of his suggested alternatives are likely to
prove suitable options for many DWFS. For example, a DWFS which has
a very large investment in the fishing industry is unlikely to be
attracted to Christy's first major alternative, especially if that
alternative means a large reduction in deep-water fishing effort in
2the short/medium-term. ■' The DWFS is likely to judge that such a 
course is, more than others, likely to: undermine the position of 
the domestic fishing industry; create considerable opposition at 
home; and increase its dependence on the coastal states for fish 
supplies. Again, it is doubtful whether many DWFS would adopt the 
fourth alternative - that of refusing to accept or abide by coastal 
state jurisdiction in a 200-mile zone - for the concept of exclusive 
economic zones has now quasi-legal international status, and many 
of the DWFS have themselves established such-zones.
1. Francis T. Christy, Jr., 1977 op.cit., p.p. 242-3. Christy was here 
specifically suggesting these policy alternatives as options for the 
Soviet Union and East European countries.
2. Christy, himself, admits that a reduction in the Soviet Union's 
distant-water fishing effort 'is not likely to occur very rapidly, in 
view of the magnitude of the commitment'}ibidj p.242.
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Second, Christy might have considered other possible policy 
options for the DWFS. He might, for example, have mentioned: the 
development by each DWFS of its own offshore fishing grounds - 
including aquaculture; the consumption of alternative (non-fish) 
protein products; and the less wasteful use of present fish resources. 
Obviously, the attractiveness of any single one - or combination - 
of these strategies will vary according to each country's fisheries, 
and broader economic, priorities. At this point, the discussion turns 
to a consideration of how these different policy alternatives 
may assist in reducing Japan's vulnerability to the establishment of 
200-mile fishing zones.
Although the Japanese had long been resigned to the widespread 
establishment of 200-mile fishing zones they seemed genuinely 
shocked by moves in the United States in early 1976 to establish 
such a zone. The Japanese fishing companies were then reported to be 
'feeling panic at the problems whose true nature has not yet been 
fully ascertained', and the Japan Fisheries Agency was also believed to 
be in a state of uncertainty at this time.^" The Japan Economic Journal 
observed
' Japan's Fisheries Agency seems to be just as 
much in the dark as fishing companies themselves 
as to the future of the Japanese fishing industry 
after the inevitable debut of the new law of the 
sea. About the only concrete plan that the 
Fisheries Agency has up its sleeve for the new 
age is the one for consolidation and further 
development of the nation's coastal seas.'2.
It is possible that, at this time, the Japanese Government 
was genuinely surprised by the very large number of 200-mile zones 
being established in different parts of the world (see Table 5). On 
the other hand, Japan's early lack of a comprehensive fisheries policy 
to meet the new era might have been the result of a conscious decision 
to wait and see what the impact of these zones would be.
By early 1977, however, the broad outlines of a Japanese fisheries 
policy were beginning to emerge. The Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry * (Zenko Suzuki) then made it clear.that the Government had no 
intention of 'abandoning' the Japanese fishing industry. In voicing
1. See 'International Recognition of 200-mile Zone Will Benefit 
Government-to-Government Talks' The Japan Economic Journal3 February 
17, 1976, p.10.
2. 'Issue Is Whether to Boost Overseas Setup or Revamp Domestic Phase' 
The Japan Economic Journal3 February 24, 1976,_p.l0._
3. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Norinsho) also had charge
his concern about the possible decline in production of long-distance
fisheries ’upon starting the 200-mile zone era', he urged
' It is imperative for us to promote
an active fishery diplomacy to secure the ^
past realised catches to the extent possible.'
The Minister asserted that this objective might best be achieved by
adopting a 'multi-pronged' approach through the promotion of:
technical and economic cooperation in fisheries with the developing
countries; the development of new marine resources such as krill;
establishing new fishing grounds including deep-sea areas; further
developing Japan's coastal and offshore fisheries (that is, fisheries
within Japan's 200-mile fishing zone); the further promotion of
aquaculture; and the utilisation of cheaper fish species. He felt
constrained to add that, in line with Japan's general policy of
emphasising self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, 'it is our policy to avoid
the disorderly import of fishery products'.
The 1977 national budget reflected these priorities, for a sum
of ¥129,100 million (approximately $600 million - an increase of
28 per cent over 1976) was set aside to: provide for the payment of
license fees for access to 200-mile fishing zones overseas; develop
new fishing grounds; 'consolidate' Japan's offshore fisheries; promote
aquaculture; and to develop new fish processing technologies enabling
2the utilisation of cheaper varieties of fish.
These, and other possible policy options may be divided into 
two categories - those which are likely to reduce Japan's vulnerability 
dependence on coastal states, and those which are not. The following 
paragraphs consider these options in greater detail, with the former 
set of options being analysed first.
As noted above, some observers have argued that there is no 
reason why powerful DWFS such as Japan should agree to accept or abide 
by coastal state jurisdiction over extended fishing zones. At first 
glance it would appear that should the Japanese Government formally 
announce its intention not to recognise certain offshore zones and/or 
should individual Japanese fishermen decide to openly trespass in
of fisheries. It was not until July 1978 that there was a change of 
name to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Nörinsuis- 
anshö) , reflecting the new status of fisheries in Government priorities.
1. Zenko Suzuki 'Agriculture and Fishery Policies in Japan' Look Japan, 
Vol.21, No.251, March 20, 1977, p.2.
2. Takayoshi Miyauchi 'Fishing Industry is Hit; Protein Intake is Cut', 
The Japan Economic Journal3 Vol.15, No.740, March 8, 1977, p.19.
coastal state waters, there is very little that the smaller coastal 
states could do to stop them. It is very doubtful, however, that the 
Japanese would take such an extreme course.
First, as a major global trading nation, Japan - more than most 
other countries - has a vital interest in supporting international legal 
conventions. As discussed above, the draft convention of the Law of 
the Sea already has semi-legal status. It is difficult to imagine 
Japan taking the initiative in rejecting coastal state claims 
to 200-mile zones. If Japan were to adopt such a course of action, 
it is only likely to do so in concert with other major DWFS.^’ Further, 
the Japanese have established a 200-mile fishing zone of their own.
This would make the task of non-recognition of other States' zones 
even more difficult.
Legal considerations aside, there are other reasons why Japan
is unlikely to be attracted to this option. The Japanese have
important investments in, and trade ties with, many of the coastal
states. In line with its policy of averting major offense to anyone
2with whom it has commercial relations, ’ the Japanese Government will
probably try to protect these broader economic interests overseas
by closely monitoring the activities of its distant-water fishermen
3and making sure they do not unduly alienate the coastal states.
Further, the Japanese fishermen, themselves, might decide that the 
risks involved in trespassing in coastal states' zones are too high. 
While the chances of being detected by surveillance forces may not 
be great (in most cases coastal states have a very limited capacity 
to police adequately their zones), the penalties involved should 
they be caught might be very severe.
It is unlikely that the Japanese will be able to increase 
substantially their fisheries independence (or self-sufficiency) 
through the development of new fishing grounds overseas outside 
coastal state zones. There are few important high seas fishing
1. So far no other DWFS (to the best of the author's knowledge) has 
challenged 200-mile zones once established.
2. See Saburo Okita o p . e i t p.723, where he refers to Japan's 
diplomatic policy as being one of 'being friendly with everybody, or 
at least not making serious enemies anywhere'.
3. The case studies will demonstrate how the Japanese Government 
has, over the years?kept a close check on the activities of Japanese 
fishermen operating off New Zealand and Australia.
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grounds in the world that are not now being exploited at, or nearly
at, their full capacity. One of the major exceptions, however, are
the krill resources of the Antarctic. The FAO has extimated that
50 million tons of krill (which are at present virtually unexploited)
could be harvested every year. Japan is already conducting feasibility
fishing studies of this species and has reassigned some of the
hokuten trawlers and factory ships formerly operating in Soviet Far
East waters to Antarctica. There are, however, problems of developing
this resource. The transport and freezing costs of krill are high.
Moreover, krill are not attractive for human consumption. One solution
suggested is to use krill as livestock feedstuff, releasing anchovy for
sale to Japanese housewives. Morisawa notes how the Japan Marine
Fishery Resource Research Centre has promoted the search for Antarctic
krill and other undeveloped fish resources such as squid and cuttlefish
off New Zealand, and the development of new fisheries off southern
Argentina."*“ Japan, together with the Soviet Union, is in the forefront
of exploratory work in these fisheries. However, once the commercial
feasibility of some of these fishing operations is proven, Japan can
2expect increased competition from other DWFS.
It is even less likely that Japan can significantly increase its 
catches from within its own coastal and offshore waters. It will be 
recalled that in 1976 some 5.7 million MT (about 59 per cent of 
Japan's total 'oceanic' catch) of fish were harvested in the waters of 
what are now Japan's 200-mile fishery zone. As it has been estimated 
that the 4.5 million square kilometres of waters within the zone
1. Motokichi Morisawa, op.cit.3 p.31. He might also have mentioned 
the development of Skipjack tuna resources of the South Pacific which, 
even now, appear to be exploited well below the MSY. For more on the 
subject of the skipjack tuna potential of the South Pacific, see:
'Studies on Skipjack in the Pacific' FAO Fisheries Technical Paper3 
No .1443 FIRS/TI443 FAO, Rome, 1975; Kohei Kasahara 'Trends in Tropical 
Pacific Skipjack Fishery - A Japanese View' Australian Fisheries3 
February, 1978 (this article is a translation of a paper which first 
appeared in Suisan Sekai3 Vol. 26, No.3, March, 1977); and W.L. Klawe 
'Estimates of Catches of Tunas and Billfishes by the Japanese, Koreans 
and Taiwanese Longliners from Within the 200-Mile Economic Zone of the 
Member Countries of the South Pacific Commission', Occasional Paper No .103 
South Pacific Commission, Noumea, September, 1978. However, with the 
widespread establishment of 200-mile zones in the South Pacific even 
much of the skipjack resource will be controlled by coastal states.
2. See the Editorial 'End of Free Fishing' The Japan Economic Journal3 
February 1, 1977, p.10.
contains a fish population of about 50 million tons of which only some 
10 per cent is of commercial quality,^’ it would appear that Japan's 
offshore waters are already being exploited at, or near, their 
maximum sustainable yield.
However, Japan's expertise in one area of fisheries technology -
aquaculture - could produce greater yields (if still of low absolute
quantities) of high quality fish from Japan's coastal waters. It was
estimated that, in 1976, marine aquaculture accounted for about
213 per cent of Japan's total fish catch by value. The main marine 
fisheries products cultivated in Japan are valuable species such as 
eel, yellowtail, sea bream, oyster, scallop, pearl, laver, seaweed and 
prawn. Kitson has estimated that Japan has a potential production 
from this source of 1.2 million to 2.4 million tons, about 2-3 times
3current production levels. * Development of fish farming is not without 
its problems, however. Morisawa notes the problems of pollution
4in Japan's close inshore waters. ’ Marine aquaculture is also a very 
expensive process. (For example, one present technique of raising 
yellowtail involves the use of eight kilogrammes of sardine as 
feedstuff to produce one kilogramme of yellowtail.) Nevertheless, the 
Japanese Government is determined to push ahead with fish farming, 
and in 1975 the JFA launched an ambitious seven-year programme in the 
hope of raising annual production by 270,000 MT.
It is possible that the Japanese can reduce marginally their 
demand for 'foreign' fish by more efficient processing of the fish 
currently available. For example, the processing of Alaska pollack 
into kamaboko is very wasteful, where only about 50 per cent of the 
protein from this fish is utilised. The Japanese are fully aware of 
this problem, and are working on new processing techniques which would 
save some of the protein now lost in manufacture.
It might appear that there is another policy option available to 
Japan which would reduce that country's dependence on overseas supplies 
of fish - namely, the consumption of less fish products, with a 
parallel increase in the consumption of livestock products or plant 
protein. While this strategy might appeal to- some DWFS it is unlikely
1. According to T. Saito of the National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives, quoted in Motokichi Morisawa, op.cit., p.30.
2. Fisheries Statistics of Japan 1976, op.cit., p.14.
3. G.W. Kitson, op.cit., p.27.
4. M. Morisawa, op.cit., p.30.
to find favour with the Japanese Government. First, if this option 
involved the substantial reduction of Japan's fishing effort, there 
would be strong political opposition from the domestic fishermen.
Second, as the following paragraphs demonstrate, there are many 
other problems which make increased consumption of non-fish protein 
difficult for the Japanese.
The acquisition of protein from non-fish sources has always been 
a difficult task for Japan. Burdened with one of the world's largest 
populations per unit area of arable land, Japan is generally unsuited 
for large-scale production of livestock, animal feedstuffs and protein- 
rich plants such as soya beans and wheat. As a consequence, Japanese 
food consumption levels - particularly of meat and dairy products - have 
traditionally been low when compared with the standards of other 
industrialised countries. But with the growth of incomes in Japan over 
the past two decades or so, paralleled by a growing preference for 
Western foods, there has been an increased demand for animal protein. 
This trend has created serious problems for Japanese food policy makers.
To an outsider unfamiliar with the Japanese scene the answer 
would seem to be for Japan to import its protein requirements. There 
are, however, many problems associated with this option.
First, the Japanese - probably more than most other peoples - 
have a deep-seated feeling of insecurity concerning their dependence 
on others for the supply of basic foodstuffs and other strategically 
important commodities. Throughout much of the post-war period Japanese 
anxiety in this area remained dormant for, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
the global food supply situation was generally favourable. (The 
problem then lay with the major grain-exporting countries who had to 
regulate surplus productive capacity and had to somehow dispose of 
excess agricultural products.) The Japanese Government's policy in 
those days was one of encouraging industrial growth and to import foods 
from countries which could produce them more cheaply. The agricultural 
sector was allowed to wind down to the point where Japan was, in 1973, 
producing only about 73 per cent^’ of its food needs, compared with 
90 per cent in 1960.
1. The question of measuring food self-sufficiency levels in Japan 
is a difficult one: Kitson notes 'Self-sufficiency calculations in 
Japan are based on food balance sheets showing physical volumes of 
food used, and wholesale prices which were operative in 1965'. If one 
uses more recent prices, and measures self-sufficiency on a food value 
basis, Japan's food self-sufficiency is, in fact, much less - probably 
under 40 per cent in 1977. See G.W. Kitson, op.cit., p.5.
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Japan's latent fears over food dependency revived in 1973 when
President Nixon placed an embargo on the export of soya beans. (Japan
was then consuming over four million tons of soya beans a year, 90 per
cent of which came from the United States.) Closely following the soya
bean shokku came the Oil Crisis. The Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry felt constrained to remark:
' The situation caused the people to 
recall their memories of starvation and 
hardship experienced during and immediately 
after World War II because we Japanese 
depend heavily on food and oil imports from 
abroad.'1
More and more people in Japan swung round to the view that their
country should try to increase the level of self-sufficiency in food.
In 1975 the Japanese Government announced a plan to increase the
level of self-sufficiency in food to 75 per cent by 1985. The plan
includes an increase in domestic beef production over the 1972 level
of almost 100 per cent. As part of its overall food policy, Japan
reversed a trend of progressive agricultural trade liberalisation.
In 1974, Tokyo unilaterally suspended all beef quotas to foreign
exporters in response to a sudden downturn in domestic demand. The
2 .quotas have since been reinstated but at a reduced level.
Domestic political factors also work against increased imports 
of foodstuffs into Japan. The enormous political power of the rural 
sector and its influence through Diet lobbies and the massive farmers' 
cooperative organisation - Nökyö - has already been referred to.
It can be argued that the political survival of the LDP Government
3depends on the farm vote. * In return for rural support the 
Government has introduced price support schemes for most agricultural 
commodities and has either delayed or abandoned trade liberalisation 
for many food imports. As a result, the domestic wholesale prices 
for beef and dairy products are set substantially above world levels.
1. Zenko Suzuki, op.cit.3 p.l.
2. Other impediments to the smooth trade in beef and other agricultural 
products exist, including a six-monthly rather than annual announcements 
of beef import quotas, which allow little time for overseas beef 
producers to adjust to new market conditions. (A more detailed discussion 
of this subject appears in the case studies.)
3. For more on the political influence of the rural sector in Japan and 
its impact on that country's agricultural policies see A.D. George 
Political Factors Influencing the Beef Trade in Japan_, a paper delivered 
at the Second New Zealand Political Studies Association Conference, 
Auckland, 26-28 August, 1977.
Under the State Trading System these products are imported largely 
by the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) and the prices 
of these imported items fixed at the domestic level.
The Japanese consumer is, therefore, forced to pay very 
high prices for the beef and dairy product components of his diet.
These prices have helped to keep per capita consumption of farm-based 
animal protein at relatively low levels?' By 1976/1977, however, the 
Japanese consumer was faced with the additional problem of having to 
pay much higher prices for the more popular species of fish. If he 
(the consumer) wished to maintain his protein intake he was faced 
with the choice of: paying dearly for popular cuts of meat or fish; 
increasing his consumption of cheaper meats and fish species; or 
putting further pressures on the Government in Tokyo to relax its 
curbs on the importation of beef and dairy products.
All these factors - especially the lack of significant alternative 
(that is, non-coastal state) fishing grounds, the difficulty of 
providing non-fish protein for the national diet, and the continued 
preference of many Japanese for fish foods - has narrowed the range 
of policy options available to Japan. Further limiting the choice 
of options is the desire to maintain the viability of the Japanese 
fishing fleet without a major reduction in fleet size.
It is this last factor - together with Japan's concern not to be
too dependent on others for the supply of basic foodstuffs - which
accounts for Japan's reluctance to adopt a policy encouraging a
massive increase in fish imports. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable
that the share of imported fish in Japan's total fish consumption will
continue to increase. Even in 1976 (that is, before the widespread
establishment of 200-mile zones) Japan was one of the largest importers
of fish in the world. That year, no less than 12 per cent of the
2volume of fish consumed in Japan came from imports ‘up from about nine 
per cent in 1972. Over the decade 1967-76 the value of Japan's fish 
imports had increased sevenfold. However, it should be stressed that
1. Kitson noted in February, 1978, that 'Indications are that the 
depressing effect of prices on [livestock products] consumption is 
very high with recent price elasticities calculated by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry being greater than one,' op.cit., p.6.
2. It may be noted that in 1976 the volume of Japan's imports of 
fish (1,136 million MT) was slightly larger than the volume of its 
exports of fish (1,029 million MT).
a very large percentage of these imports (at least in terms of value) 
was taken up by high value items - such as shrimps (see Fig.2), eels, 
and salmon roe - which the domestic fleet had limited capacity of 
harvesting.
By 1977, however, following the establishment of many extended 
fishing zones overseas, Japan's imports of high priced fish either 
stabilised or decreased, whereas the imports of lower priced fish - 
such as mackerel and sardines - sharply increased.^“ The Japanese 
Government was obliged to expand its import quotas for some of these 
lower priced items.
Some of the States which have declared 200-mile fishing zones 
have expressed a desire to increase - or commence - fish exports to 
Japan. As noted in the previous section, Canada and the United States 
are two such countries which early used their bargaining leverage 
over fishing access to persuade Japan to open up its markets for 
imported fish. The United States, for example, had announced in 
1978 that it hoped to boost its exports of marine products to Japan
2from about $300 million in 1977, to $1,000 million in the near future.
Japan will probably try to avoid at all costs the extreme 
dependence of relying substantially on imports of fish from other 
fishing States. It is likely that the Japanese will prefer the 
option of lesser dependence - namely that of cooperating with the 
coastal states in the development of their offshore fisheries. This 
may take one of two forms: joint venture deals with local enterprises, 
or the payment of license fees to fish in the host country's zone.
The concept of cooperation in the field of fisheries overseas 
is not a new one for the Japanese. For some years now the Japanese have 
been trying to build up a reservoir of goodwill in this area. This 
cooperation has generally been in the form of economic and technical 
assistance to coastal states (as part of Japan's foreign aid effort), 
or as joint commercial fishing ventures with enterprises in the host 
country.
There are many agencies and institutions in Japan devoted to 
overseas fisheries cooperation. At the government level, the Japan
1. See 'Japan: Facing Up to the Problems of 200-mile Limits' World 
Fishing, Vol.27, No.l, January, 1978,
2. Announced by US Commerce Department's Frank during a visit to 
Tokyo in October, 1978. See the article by Aimune Toru op.oit. ^ p.5.
International Cooperation Agency (JICA - formerly the Overseas 
Technical Cooperation Agency) sends fisheries experts overseas and 
provides equipment to foreign countries. It also runs fisheries 
training centres in Japan where overseas trainees study Japanese 
fishing techniques. JICA also sponsors research of fish resources 
in Third World Countries, undertaken by the Japan Marine Fishery 
Resource Research Centre."*-' Further, the Overseas Fishery Cooperative 
Foundation (OFCF - established in 1973 by private Japanese fishing 
enterprises) grants loans to Japanese fishing firms operating in such 
countries as Mauritania,Australia, the Solomons, New Zealand,
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The direct recipients of these loans 
are Japanese companies, but the monies are used for investment in and 
loans to joint venture companies and local enterprises, for the 
transfer of fishing vessels and other facilities to the governments 
of the coastal state concerned, and so on. The funds lent by the OFCF 
are made available to it by the Japanese Government as subsidies.
Japan's record in the area of fisheries cooperation, however, 
has not been one of total success . Johnson and Langdon note that a
majority of joint fishing ventures entered into by the Japanese in the
2.late 1960s and 1970s recorded early losses. * Further, in common with
the record of other DWFS, Japanese involvement in these ventures was
sometimes of an exploitative nature which created suspicion and some
3bitterness in the host country. ’ Again, Japan's programme of
economic and technical assistance to coastal states has sometimes
created more friction than goodwill between Japan and the recipient 
4.country.
Despite these problems, the level of Japanese fisheries cooper­
ation continued to grow where, by early 1976, Japanese fishermen were 
participating in no less than 173 projects in 51 different countries."’ 
(See Table 8.)
1. For more on Japan's efforts at fisheries cooperation with coastal 
states see 'Developing World Fisheries Resources as Common Property 
of Mankind', Look Japan3 op.ait.
2. Barbara Johnson and Frank Langdon, op.cit.3p.222.
3. Ibid. , p.223.
4. One may, for example, cite the example where Japanese aid to Papua 
New Guinea in 1976 in the form of $2.5 million for the construction of a 
fisheries college at Kavieng led to much bitterness in Port Moresby and 
to a review of the terms of future aid donations from Japan. See 
Colleen Ryan 'Papua New Guinea Wins Generous Aid from Japan' The national 
Times3 December 19-24, 1977, p.50.
5. See Takao Morizane op.oit.3 p.182.
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TABLE 8 - JAPANESE JOINT FISHING VENTURES OVERSEAS (AS OF MARCH 1976)
Region Country Number Region Country Number
Mexico 1 New Hebrides 1
Guatemala 1 Asia Nauru 1
Bahamas 1 and Australia 8
Antilles 1 Pacific New Zealand 4
Colombia 1 Sub-total 89
Latin Venezuela 1 Morocco 2
America Guyana 1 Canaries 3
Surinam 2 Mauritania 1
Peru 5 Senegal 3
Brazil 5 Gambia 1
Argentina 1 Guinea 1
Sub-total 20 Africa Ivory Coast 1
India 2 Ghana 2
Sri Lanka 1 Nigeria 3
Maldives 1 Tanzania 1
Pakistan 1 Kenya 1
Burma 1 Madagascar 3
Asia Malaysia 7 Mauritius 2
and Singapore 1 Sub-total 24
Pacific Thailand 5 Middle Kuwait 1
Vietnam 3 East
Philippines 10 North USA 28
Indonesia 11 America Canada 8
Hong Kong 3 Sub-total 36
Taiwan 1 Portugal 1
South Korea 19 Europe Italy 1
Papua New Ireland 1
Guinea 6 Sub-total 3
Solomons 1 Total 51 countries
Fij i 2 173 ventures
Source: Takao Morizane Shin Kaiyoho Chitsujo
to Nihon Gyogyö (The New Order of the 
Law of the Sea and the Japanese Fishing 
Industry) Sözo Shobo, Tokyo, 1977, p.182
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Moreover, one might expect the number of joint fishing ventures, 
involving both the DWFS in general and the Japanese in particular, 
to increase substantially following the introduction of 200-mile zones.
It would appear that, for the short/medium-term at least, the DWFS 
and the coastal states are mutually dependent. As noted in the first 
section of Part II, in many cases the coastal fishing states lack the 
capital, technology and scientific knowledge to exploit adequately the 
fish resources of their zones - especially those resources lying in 
deep and/or distant waters. It is reasonable to assume that they 
will look to the DWFS to help them develop this capability. Japan, 
as one of the most advanced DWFS, can expect to be involved in this 
task. The Japanese will probably find, however, that they will not 
automatically be approached by every coastal state, but that they 
will have to compete with other DWFS for participation in these projects. 
The greatest problem with joint fishing ventures, however, is that, 
over the longer term, the coastal states may build up their own fishing 
capability to the point where they can dispense with the DWFS.
Another option that may be available to Japan (along with other 
DWFS) is that of paying license fees to the coastal states for the 
'privilege' of fishing in their zones. But, as noted in the section 
above treating with the ICNT, there are many uncertainties attached 
to this option.
First, the coastal states have considerable latitude concerning 
the choice of foreign fishermen to be issued fishing licenses. If the 
coastal states abide by the letter and spirit of the ICNT the 
Japanese should - given the relatively long history of their involvement 
in coastal fisheries in different parts of the world - expect to have 
priority of access on the basis of the 'habitual fishing' criterion in 
Paragraph 3, Article 62. But, as mentioned in the section above 
covering the Law of the Sea, the Japanese cannot be certain that the 
coastal states will interpret fairly the guidelines laid down in the 
ICNT.
Second, the coastal states might insist on payment of very high 
license fees that would make some DWFS operations uneconomic. The 
Japanese fishermen are likely to be very sensitive to this problem as 
many of them are finding it difficult to make a profit following the 
large increases in fuel prices in recent years. (Further, Japanese 
labour costs are higher than many of their distant-water competitors - 
the Taiwanese and Koreans, for example.)
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Third, the coastal states might try to use their bargaining 
leverage over fishing access to extract other concessions from the 
DWFS. Those concessions sought might be in the field of fisheries - 
for example, the conduct of specified fisheries research programmes, 
the training of host country fishermen, the transfer of fisheries 
technology, or access to DWFS fish markets- or might be in areas 
quite unrelated to fisheries.
In the terminology of the interdependency literature, it may 
be concluded that Japan's vulnerability dependence on the coastal 
fishing states is likely to be high. The Japanese fishermen now 
face a situation where a large - and probably increasing - percentage 
of their fish supplies is now under the control of other countries.
As it appears that Japan will continue to consume large quantities 
of fish and is equally determined not to reduce substantially its 
distant-water fishing effort (at least not in the short/medium-term), 
that country has no choice but to negotiate fisheries access agreements 
with the coastal states. These agreements will cover either joint 
fishing venture arrangements or licensed fishing operations.
PART III: THE NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY
In the following case study the analytical framework outlined 
in Part I will be used to examine how the imperatives of bilateral 
economic interdependence influence States in their decision to adopt 
or reject linkage strategies when bargaining with other countries.
It will be determined whether New Zealand - a coastal fishing state - 
decided to use its leverage over fishing access as a means of extract­
ing concessions unrelated to the fishing industry in its fisheries, 
and other, negotiations with Japan. Special attention is focussed 
on the reasons why New Zealand finally decided to adopt - or reject - 
a trade-off strategy.^' The study will also determine what Wellington 
finally gained in the way of concessions - whether in fisheries or 
in other issue areas - from its negotiations with Tokyo.
The case study is divided into three major sections: the first 
identifies the issues and actors significantly involved in the 
New Zealand-Japan relationship; the second considers the formulation 
of policies in New Zealand with respect to foreign fishing access; 
and the third examines the way in which these policies were implemented 
including^most importantly, the New Zealand-Japan fisheries and trade 
negotiations of 1977-78. The case study ends with a brief concluding 
section.
1. It should be re-emphasised that in neither the New Zealand, nor 
the Australian, case study is the information presented exhaustively 
related to the working hypothesis. This task is reserved for the 
concluding chapter of the thesis, where comparisons are made across the 
case studies. It is in the Conclusions, therefore, where it is deter­
mined whether New Zealand’s (and Australia's) decisions with respect 
to the adoption of linkage diplomacy were influenced more by the degree 
of complexity of its relationship with Japan, rather than by the specific 
sensitivity/vulnerability dimensions of this relationship.
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I. ISSUES AND ACTORS
It will be recalled from the analytical framework that this 
section considers the issues and actors significantly involved in 
the New Zealand-Japan relationship under three categories: the
primary issue area; the secondary issue area; and other issue areas.
In addition to identifying these issues and actors, Section I assesses 
the relative levels of dependence or dominance enjoyed by New Zealand 
over Japan in each issue area and in the overall bilateral relationship. 
Ia. Primary Issue Area
In the two case studies the primary issue area is given - namely 
fisheries. It is argued that a coastal state's net bargaining 
leverage over distant water fishing states in this area is the product 
of several factors, including: the quality and quantity of the living 
marine resources found within its offshore waters; other special 
properties of the offshore area of potential attraction to DWFS such 
as the seasonality of peak fishing operations and the geographic 
location of the zone; and the degree to which the coastal state itself 
depends upon assistance from foreign fishing countries for the 
development of its own domestic fishing industry. These and other, 
issues will now be examined.
First considered will be the potential attractiveness of New 
Zealand's offshore waters to Japan - and other distant water fishing 
states. This may be determined by: one, assessing the variety and 
quantity of New Zealand's marine fish stocks; and, two, examining the 
level of foreign fishing activity in these waters in the period 
preceding the establishment of New Zealand's 200-mile zone.
In common with most coastal states, New Zealand has only an 
approximate idea of the fisheries potential of its offshore 
waters. While much is known about the fish stocks found close 
inshore, much less is known about the stocks lying farther offshore. 
Several factors account for the paucity of fish resource data. First, 
the local fishing fleet has traditionally worked in relatively 
shallow waters, rarely venturing far beyond the continental shelf. 
Second, New Zealand has only a limited fisheries research capability 
which has, until recently been preoccupied with providing information 
on the stocks historically exploited by the local fishermen. Third, 
fisheries resource data received from foreign fishing fleets working 
off New Zealand, while valuable, is of very recent vintage and is 
far from complete.
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A crude estimate of New Zealand's marine fisheries potential may­
be gained by examining the physical and biotic properties of the 
offshore zone. A glance at a map (see Fig.2) might suggest that this 
country, which possesses a coastline some 9,200 kilometres in length 
and which lays claim to an extended fishing zone of about 1.25 million 
square miles, has very rich fish resources.
Closer examination will reveal, however, that New Zealand is not
blessed with an extensive continental shelf,where the richest
concentrations of marine life are usually to be found. The continental
shelf rarely extends beyond 200 nautical miles offshore, and off the
North Island lies mostly within the former 12-mile fishing zone. The
shelf extends somewhat farther offshore off the east coast of the
South Island (to about 50 miles) and to about 100 miles south of
Stewart Island. Smaller, but significant, areas of continental
shelf lie to the south and east of the South Island centred on the
Chatham Islands, Bounty Islands, Campbell Island, Auckland Islands and
the Mernoo Bank. Further, New Zealand is not a very large land mass,
with no substantial rivers which can feed large quantities of nutrients
(nitrates and phosphates - so necessary for phytoplanktonic growth)
2into the sea. ’ Again, unlike countries such as Peru and Japan, New 
Zealand has no major oceanic upswelling off its coasts, where nutrient- 
rich deep water is brought close to the surface. There is some 
upswelling, but it is localised.
Those resource surveys that have been conducted, together 
with the fish catch statistics that are available (incomplete though 
they may be), suggest that New Zealand's marine fisheries potential 
does not appear to be very large - certainly not when compared with 
some of the richer northern hemisphere fishing grounds. A more detailed 
assessment of New Zealand's fish resources now follows.
1. For our present purposes, it is sufficient to describe the 
continental shelf as being that area of seabed covered by no more 
than 200 metres of water.
2. As G. Duncan Waugh (the Director of New Zealand's Fisheries 
Research Division - FRD - of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries - 
MAF) points out 'There is one other fundamental factor - the basic 
oceanic circulation in the South Pacific and Southern Ocean is from
west to east. Most of our rivers discharge to the east so that nutrients 
discharged into the sea tend to be carried away from the land and from 
the continental shelf. Thus they will tend to be lost in the deeper 
waters to the east of New Zealand'. From an address given to the New 
Zealand Seafood Processors' Annual Conference at Gisborne, July, 1977, 
quoted in Fishing Industry Board Bulletin (hereafter referred to as 
FIBB) No.42, September, 1977, p.8.
Fig.2 NEW ZEALAND'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
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The fish resources of the waters off New Zealand (that is within 
the waters of the extended fishing zone and the territorial sea) might 
be considered under six headings: coastal demersal fish,^‘ deep-water 
demersal fish, coastal pelagic fish, highly migratory pelagic fish, 
squid and others.
Coastal demersal fish are those species - in New Zealand, snapper, 
tarakihi, barracouta, jack mackerel, red cod, trevally, and others - 
which live on or near the ocean floor down to a depth of about 200 
metres. As it is this group which has traditionally been most 
actively exploited by the New Zealand fishing industry, the resource 
information base is relatively good. Recent annual catches of coastal 
demersal stocks have averaged about 60,000 tonnes, with the local
2.industry accounting for about 40,000 tonnes and DWFS the remainder.
It appears that the commercially more attractive species - snapper 
and tarakihi - are being exploited at or near the MSY, while the catches 
of less popular species are below the sustainable yield. It has been 
estimated that this fishery could sustain an annual yield of about 
100,000 tonnes.^'
The deep-water demersal stocks are those species - silver warehou, 
southern blue whiting, hoki, sea perch, hake, and others - which are 
found in water depths of 200 metres to 1,000 metres. These stocks are 
currently being exploited almost exclusively by the DWFS. The most 
important deep-water fishing grounds are the Chatham Rise, Campbell 
Plateau, east coast South Island, Southland, and west coast South 
Is1 and.
Estimates of New Zealand's deep-water demersal fishery potential 
are largely dependent on information supplied by the DWFS. Particularly 
valuable in this respect are the results from the extensive and 
comprehensive survey conducted by the Japanese stern trawler Shinkai 
Maru from November 1975 to February 1977. From this survey (and 
from detailed Japanese commercial catch effort data) Robert Francis
1. Demersal fish are those which are found at, or near, the sea-bottom. 
Pelagic fish are those found in the upper layers of the sea.
2. Estimated by Robert Francis of the FRD, Wellington. See 'MAF 
Scientist's Calculations Point to Vast Deepwater Resource' Catch '78, 
Vol.5, No.6, June, 1978, p.22. {Catch, is a monthly magazine published 
by Information Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Wellington.)
3. See J.S. Campbell (ex-General Manager New Zealand Fishing Industry 
Board) 'Prospects and Problems of New Zealand's Demersal Fisheries' 
Australian Fisheries, January, 1979, p.30.
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o f  t h e  F i s h e r i e s  Research  D iv is io n  (FRD) has  c a l c u l a t e d  t h a t  the  
f i s h e r y  'must  be managed a t  p r e s e n t  as  i f  i t  had a maximum p o t e n t i a l  
p ro d u c t i o n  (MSY) o f  around 250,000 tonnes  a n n u a l l y ' . ' *  F r a n c i s ,  however, 
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  deep-w ate r  demersal  f i s h e r y  p o t e n t i a l  may be 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  l a r g e r  tha n  t h i s ,  r an g in g  from 600,000 tonnes  to  as much 
as  1.4 m i l l i o n  to nnes  a y e a r .  In 1976 and 1977 t h e  t o t a l  f o r e ig n  
ca t c h  o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  d eep -w a te r  demersa l  s t o c k s  was r e p o r t e d  to  be 
in  excess  o f  200,000 and 400,000 to nnes  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The s p e c ie s  o f  
g r e a t e s t  e s t im a te d  p o t e n t i a l  i s  t h e  s o u th e rn  b lu e  w h i t i n g  f o r  which 
t h e r e  i s ,  a t  p r e s e n t ,  on ly  a v e ry  l i m i t e d  marke t .
New Z e a l a n d ' s  c o a s t a l  p e l a g i c  f i s h e r y  i n c lu d e s  th o s e  s p e c ie s  -
kahawai,  j a ck  m ackere l ,  p i l c h a r d s ,  s p r a t  and anchovy, and o t h e r s  -
which l i v e  c l o s e  t o  th e  s u r f a c e  o r  in  m id -w a te r ,  ma inly  w i th in  12 m i le s
o f  t h e  c o a s t .  As t h e s e  s p e c i e s  a r e  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  low v a l u e ,  the y  have
n o t  been h e a v i l y  e x p l o i t e d .  E gg les ton  ( A s s i s t a n t  D i r e c t o r ,  FRD) i s
r e p o r t e d  to  have e s t im a te d  t h a t  t h i s  f i s h e r y  cou ld  c o n s e r v a t i v e l y
2
s u s t a i n  a y i e l d  o f  75,000 tonnes  p e r  annum.
The h i g h l y  m ig ra to ry  p e l a g i c  f i s h  found in  New Zealand w ate rs  
i n c lu d e  t h e  fo l low ing  members o f  t h e  tu n a  fam i ly  - Southern  b l u e f i n ,  
b ig e y e ,  a l b a c o r e ,  y e l l o w f i n ,  and s k i p j a c k .  George Habib,  a s p e c i a l i s t  
on tu n a  in  th e  FRD, n o te s  t h a t  l i t t l e  i s  known about  th e  abundance 
o f  a l b a c o r e  in  New Zealand ' a s  t h i s  s p e c i e s  i s  r a r e l y  seen in  s u r f a c e  
s c hoo ls  and i s  only  l i g h t l y  e x p l o i t e d . '  He d id  b e l i e v e ,  however, 
t h a t  t h e  ca tch  r a t e s  (about  1,000 tonne s  a yea r )  r e g i s t e r e d  'by  th e  
r e l a t i v e l y  u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d  New Zealand v e s s e l s  engaged in the  f i s h e r y
3
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  cou ld  be c o n s id e r a b ly  i n c r e a s e d . ' 
Somewhat more i s  known about  t h e  surface-swimming s k ip j a c k  tuna  
which v i s i t  New Zealand w a te rs  from November to  May. Habib e s t im a te d  
t h a t  t h e  s k ip j a c k  f i s h e r y  ' w i l l  y i e l d  about  10,000 tonnes  a yea r  on a
4
s u s t a i n e d  b a s i s  w i th  t h e  p r e s e n t  f l e e t ' .
1. See Catch '78, June ,  1978, o p .c i t .  3 p .2 3 .
2. Quoted in Rodney L. I n s a l l  The Management o f  Foreign Fishing in  
Few ZealaJid's Exclusive Economic Zone3 u n p u b l i sh e d  Master  o f  Sc ience  
t h e s i s ,  J o i n t  Cen t re f o r  Environmenta l  S c i e n c e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
Can te rbury  and Lincoln C o l l eg e ,  1978, p .2 7 .
3. George Habib quoted in  'The NZ Tuna F i s h e r i e s  - Sk ip jack  and Albacore 
Predomina te '  Catch '77 , November, 1977, p . 4 .
4. I b id . j p . 4 .
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New Zealand waters contain several species of squid. The species 
with greatest commercial potential is the arrow squid, closely related 
to the common Japanese squid (todarodes pacifdcus) . Japanese scientists 
have examined the results of catches from commercial and experimental 
jig-fishing vessels operating around New Zealand and estimate that the 
total arrow squid resource could be as much as 300,000 tonnes.^' The
total catch of squid from New Zealand waters (by trawling and jigging -
2.all nationalities) was about 84,000 tonnes in 1977. The Japanese have 
ranked New Zealand waters as being one of their most important squid
3fishing grounds. It seems that present catch levels are not adversely 
affecting stocks, so the sustainable yield for squid might be in the 
order of 85,000 tonnes a year.
There are other important living marine resources found within 
New Zealand’s coastal waters. Of great importance commercially are 
rock lobsters (which account for about half the value of New Zealand's 
fish exports) and shellfish - such as oysters, mussels, paua (abalone) 
and scallops. But as these resources are confined to New Zealand's 
territorial waters and are harvested only by the local fishing industry 
they are not likely to become a source of conflict with foreign 
fishermen. Further comments on these resources are not, therefore, 
required here.
It would seem, then, that the total sustainable yield for all
fish resources in New Zealand's offshore waters is somewhere between
4300,000 and 500,000 tonnes a year. * It might be useful to put these 
statistics concerning the potential yield from New Zealand waters into 
a broader context. If one accepts an upper figure of 500,000 tonnes
1. 'Squid - Future for NZ Fishery' Catch ' 7 7 May, 1977, p.12.
2. 'Squid Biological Studies' Catch '78, November, 1978, p.30.
3. See 'Japanese Prized NZ Squid' Catch '78, May, 1978, p.23.
4. Campbell, for example, notes that in 1977 the declared total catch 
of demersal fish and squid reached 475,000 tonnes, but added 'there
is no guarantee that this total production could be maintained 'due 
to the incomplete knowledge of the resource potential - J.S. Campbell, 
op.cit.j p.30. Eggleston is reported to have been even more cautious, 
saying that New Zealand's stocks may not be able to sustain a level 
of harvesting in excess of 300,000 tonnes a year. He argued that a 
'better idea of the safe yield or total allowable catch should become 
available over the next two or three years as catch information came 
in from foreign vessels licensed to fish inside the New Zealand EEZ' - 
quoted in 'Prime Concern Was Shielding Resource' Catch '78, April, 1978, 
p.3.
a year this still represents only about O.S per cent of the total 
world fish catch, is equivalent to about nine per cent of the catch 
harvested by Japan in its 200-mile fishing zone, and is about 14 per 
cent of Japan's catches within 200 miles of all foreign states. Of 
course, these figures represent only total tonnages for all fish 
species. For certain species - for example, squid - New Zealand's 
fish potential is significant even on a world scale.
Moreover, crude tonnages tell us little about the value of 
the fish. Some fish species are considered by the DWFS to be of 
high grade and others of low grade. To the Japanese, snapper, trevally, 
silver warehou, skipjack, southern kingfish, albacore, yellowfin tuna, 
and Southern bluefin tuna, are all considered top quality fish suitable 
for sashimi - a raw fish dish popular in Japan. Many other species are 
considered not so attractive by the Japanese fishermen. It was estimated 
in 1977 that the total value of Japanese catches in New Zealand's 
offshore waters was somewhere between $50 million^“ and $80 million - 
comprising the squid fishery worth about $20-30 million, tuna about 
$20-30 million, and the trawl fisheries some $10-20 million.^*
In addition to the fish resources themselves, there are other 
factors which explain why DWFS are attracted to New Zealand waters.
First, the peak fishing season for some important stocks - including 
squid and some species of tuna - is the southern summer. This season 
coincides with the 'off season for some of the northern hemisphere 
fisheries. By working New Zealand waters (and other grounds in the 
South Pacific) during this period, the DWFS can keep their fleets 
active for most of the year and thus increase the overall profitability 
of their operations. Second, unlike Australia, New Zealand has - 
over the years - permitted very free access to its ports by foreign 
fishermen.^" Third, following the Oil Crisis of 1973/74, increased 
fuel costs made the exploitation of fishing grounds in more remote 
parts of the world uneconomic for some DWFS. It is believed that it
1. All values in this case study are in terms of NZ dollars ($NZ).
2. J.S. Campbell, personal communication August, 1977.
3. The New Zealand Fishing Industry Board claimed that 'this lack 
of coordination in policy between Australia and New Zealand leads 
to a higher concentration of foreign fishing vessels on the New 
Zealand coast than there would be if Australian ports were open to 
foreign fishing vessels'. See 'Sharp Rise in Foreign Fishing Vessels 
Operating Off NZ Coast' Commercial F i s hingOctober, 1975, p.13.
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was this factor that led the Japanese in 1975 to divert some of 
their fishing vessels operating in African waters to New Zealand.
Fourth, the establishment of 200-mile fishing zones in the northern 
hemisphere had (as noted in Part II) the effect of 'pushing' the 
DWFS out into new waters in the southern hemisphere. The foreign 
fishermen appeared to be attracted to New Zealand for one or both 
of the following reasons: one, to extract as much fish out of
New Zealand waters before that country, too, declared a 200-mile 
fishing zone; and two, to establish 'traditional' fishing rights.
The attractiveness of a coastal state to DWFS may also be 
gauged by the number of foreign fishing vessels operating in its 
offshore waters. The following paragraphs provide a brief history 
of DWFS activities off New Zealand in the period leading up to the 
establishment of a 200-m.ile zone in that country.
For the first decade or so after World War II New Zealand 
fishermen had the seas, and the fish, off their coasts very 
much to themselves. However, in 1957 the Japanese began to move 
into this area when longliners chased after the deeper-living tuna 
which migrated through New Zealand waters. In the early 1960s the 
longliners were joined by other Japanese vessels fishing for snapper 
close to the New Zealand coast.
In order to protect the local fishing industry from competition 
by the Japanese snapper-liners (it will be recalled that snapper is 
the single most important fish species to the New Zealand fishermen), 
the New Zealand Government in 1965 passed the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zone Act which provided for the exclusion of all foreign 
fishing vessels from a 12-mile zone. An agreement on fisheries was 
also concluded with Japan^‘, in which it was agreed that all Japanese 
fishing activities in New Zealand's 12-mile zone would be phased out 
over a three year period. As from 31 December, 1970, no foreign fishing 
would be permitted within the zone.
However, the establishment of the 12-mile limit had little 
impact on the number of foreign fishing vessels. From the late 
1960s there was a steady build up in foreign fishing off New Zealand.
1. See Agreement on Fisheries Between Flew Zealand and Japan (with 
Related Documents), Department of External Affairs, Wellington,
12 July, 1967.
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In 1967, Japanese trawlers arrived to fish the continental shelf
outside the new limit. Soon the Japanese were joined by other DWFS.
In 1970, Taiwanese and Korean tuna longliners based in Pago Pago
arrived. The following year the first Soviet trawlers (including the
large 5,000 GRT Atlantik-class trawlers) arrived to work the
demersal stocks of the Campbell Plateau. In 1972, Japanese squid
boats began commercial operations in New Zealand's offshore waters.
Taiwanese and Soviet squid fishermen followed two to three years
later. Korean and Taiwanese trawlers joined the Japanese working
the fish stocks of the continental shelf. More recently, Japanese
and Korean longline vessels have been fishing for demersal fish
on the Chatham Rise and Mernoo Bank.
By 1977, the year in which New Zealand declared its EEZ, there
were upwards of 400 different foreign fishing vessels operating
at a single time offshore. The Japanese continued to have the largest
fishing presence. For example, it was estimated that of the 393
vessels believed to be off New Zealand in early March, 1977, some
330 were Japanese - 180 tuna longliners, 126 squid boats, 18
deepwater trawlers, and 6 bottom-liners.^' There were also 53 Soviet
2trawlers included in the total.' A map which appeared in Catch '77
that month (March 1977) showed the areas in which these different
fleets were operating - see Figure 3.
This does not, however, represent the full range of overseas
interest in the fisheries of New Zealand. There were also foreign
vessels involved in joint fishing ventures with New Zealand enter-
3prises. As of 1977 there were only four such ventures. (The small 
number may be attributed, in large part, to the New Zealand Government's 
reluctance to permit the establishment of many joint venture - JV - 
enterprises involving foreign fishermen.) But, as will be noted 
later, by 1977 a very large number of foreign fishing companies were 
calling upon Wellington for permission to enter into partnership with 
New Zealand firms.
1. Reported by Val Hinds of MAF at the Symposium on Fisheries in New 
Zealand and Japan held in Wellington, 4-5 May, 1977. See also 'Fleets 
Gather As New Zealand Waits to Claim 200 Miles' Fishing News Internat­
ional 3 April, 1977.
2. Catch '77 > March, 1977, p.14. Note, the total numbers of fishing 
vessels shown on this map (385) and the national components (Japanese 
335, Soviet 48 and Taiwanese 2) vary slightly from those given for
7 March, 1977.
3. The four ventures were: Taimoana Fisheries established between
Taiyo Fishing Company and a New Zealand company; Nichimo Company in
Fig. 3 FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS IN NEW ZEALAND WATERS ON 5 MARCH, 1977
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Snares
Antipodes,
A u c k l a n d  Is
C ampbe11 I
LEGEND: J-Japanese, S-Soviet, T-Taiwanese.
NOTE: The original map was prepared front sightings
by RNZAF Orion aircraft.
SOURCE: Catch '77, March, 1977, p.14.
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From what has been said above, it appears that New Zealand's 
offshore waters were in the mid/late 1970s (the dawn of the era of 
200-mile Zones) at least moderately attractive to the DWFS. It 
might, therefore, be reasonably concluded that Wellington would 
wield considerable bargaining leverage over foreign fishermen in 
any future negotiations involving fisheries access. However, it 
should be emphasised that New Zealand’s potential leverage in the 
fisheries area was likely to be reduced somewhat by the local fishing 
industry's dependence on the DWFS. This dependence existed in 
almost all branches of the fishing industry: research, catching, 
processing and marketing. The following paragraphs will describe 
briefly the structure of the New Zealand fishing industry as it existed 
in the mid-1970s, and will explore the areas in which that industry 
was most dependent on the DWFS - particularly Japan.
It has already been noted how New Zealand has only an approximate 
idea of the fish resources contained within its offshore waters. Most 
of the research conducted by the Fisheries Research Division has 
focussed on living marine resources commonly exploited by the local 
fishing industry - notably the demersal stocks of the continental 
shelf, and the molluscs and Crustacea located close inshore. Limits 
of staff and funding inhibited detailed research into the fish resources - 
both demersal and pelagic - found further offshore. What little that 
was known about these deepwater resources was largely the result of 
catch returns provided by DWFS operating off New Zealand, and of the 
extensive survey conducted by the Shinkai Maru, 1975-7. It was obvious 
that if New Zealand were to establish a 200-mile fishing zone, it 
would - in order to fulfill its obligations under the ICNT^' - increas­
ingly depend upon the services of the DWFS in the research area.
It was also likely that the establishment of a 200-mile zone would 
increase the level of dependence on the DWFS of the catching sector 
of the domestic fishing industry. The following paragraphs will 
demonstrate that if the local fishermen wished to expand their share
association with Jaybell Nichimo Ltd. of Auckland; Hokuyo Suisan and 
C. Itoh in association with Sealord Products Ltd. of Nelson; and 
Starkist Corporation of California in association with three local 
companies which formed the New Zealand Pelagic Fisheries Development 
Company.
1. Where, it will be recalled, the coastal state was obliged to take 
into account 'the best scientific evidence available to it’ in ensuring 
that proper fisheries conservation and management measures were adopted.
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of the fish caught within 200 miles of New Zealand's coasts, they 
would need higher levels of assistance from the foreign fishing nations.
In common with most other coastal fishing states, the catching 
sector of the New Zealand fishing industry comprises a large number 
of small vessels fishing, for the most part, relatively close inshore. 
Historically, the New Zealand industry has been firmly based on small 
boat trawling in near-coastal waters for a limited range of demersal 
fish species for the local market, and the harvesting of rock lobster 
for the export market. In early 1976, it was estimated that the New 
Zealand fishing fleet comprised some 3,906 vessels - no less than 
2,150 of which were 6 metres or less in length, while only 3 were 
33 metres or more in length.^’ (In terms of tonnages, only 3 vessels 
exceeded 500 GRT in displacement while 57 ranged between 50 and 
150 GRT.) These larger vessels were the mainstay of the local fin fish 
trawling and oyster dredging industries. The numerous very small craft 
were most active in such areas as line fishing and small net operating, 
scallop dredging and rock lobstering.
Obviously, this fleet was incapable of harvesting more than a
small percentage of the total available fish resources within any
200 mile zone which Wellington might declare. New Zealand's limited 
2fishing capacity ' applied not only to the deepwater demersal fisheries, 
but also to the coastal and near-coastal fisheries. For example, it 
was estimated in 1976 that if the DWFS were excluded from the latter 
(namely, the coastal and near-coastal demersal fishing grounds) 
some extra 50,000 tonnes of fish would become available for utilisation 
by New Zealand commercial fishermen, 'which would require an additional
320 to 30 modern craft, ranging from 20 metres up to 35 metres'.
There were serious doubts whether the local fishing industry 
could (or would) procure the necessary number of vessels. The high
1. Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Countries 1975_, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1976.
2. The total New Zealand fishing industry catch for 1977 - fin fish 
and squid - was 60,624 tonnes. In terms of weight snapper remained 
the most important wet fish landed, followed by trevally and skipjack. 
Other important components of the catch included: tarakihi, gurnard, 
mackerel, shark, kahawai, and barracouta. See Alan Kerr '1977 Landings 
Up' Catch '783 November, 1978.
3. See 'Review of the New Zealand Fishing Industry' Catch *76} 
September Supplement, 1976, p.10.
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cost of locally built boats together with the difficulty of raising
finance had, in recent years, created a situation where local fishermen
were reluctant to invest in additional or replacement vessels.^' (This
situation was aggravated by the Government's ban on the duty-free
2importation of new and near-new foreign built fishing vessels.) ’ Some 
sections of the local fishing industry believed that a short-cut method 
of expanding 'domestic' catching capacity lay in the development of 
joint ventures and charter arrangements with foreign fishing interests. 
It was also recognised that the DWFS might further enhance the harvest­
ing capabilities of the local fishermen by providing assistance in 
new fishing techniques, especially for stocks hitherto unexploited 
by the New Zealanders - such as squid, and certain species of tuna.
It was also possible that assistance from the DWFS could help 
overcome some of the problems existing in the processing sector of 
the New Zealand fishing industry. There are more than 100 registered 
fish processing plants, varying greatly in size, scattered throughout 
the country. Many of these plants suffer from the problem - one 
that is not unique to New Zealand - where processing capacity is in 
excess of the local availability of fish supplies. Most processing 
companies are trying to find larger and more productive vessels 
to obtain greater quantities of, and more evenly spread, fish supplies. 
The foreign fishermen could ease the supply-shortage by sending all (or 
part) of their catches to these plants either as partners under joint 
ventures or other contractual arrangements, or as a result of New 
Zealand Government pressure - where licences to fish within the New 
Zealand zone are issued only to foreign vessels that permit their 
catch to be processed ashore.
But it was probably in the marketing sector of the industry 
where DWFS (particularly Japanese) cooperation was considered most 
desirable in New Zealand.
This sector was beset with a wide range of problems. First, the 
domestic demand for fish is low. New Zealand has only a small popul­
ation of about three million. Moreover, New Zealanders are predomin­
antly a meat eating people - mainly lamb, mutton, beef, pork and 
poultry. Per capita consumption of fish is low, at some 5.5 kilo­
grammes a year. The New Zealand housewife has the reputation of being
1. For example, the number of new fishing vessels completed in 1975 
was the lowest - only five vessels over nine metres in length - since 
1968, when the Fishing Industry Board (FIB) began collecting construct­
ion statistics. Ibid., p.7.
2- This ban was relaxed in late 1976.
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very conservative in her fish preferences, and despite the fact that 
some 50-60 species of fish are caught in New Zealand waters only some 
seven species are readily sold in the shops. Further, the New Zealand 
fishing industry has to compete with fish imports from overseas which 
enter the local market either free of duty or with very low levels 
of duty. In 1976 these imports totalled some four thousand tonnes 
worth about $10.6 million and included: fish fingers, canned tuna, 
herrings, pilchards, salmon, mackerel, crustaceans and molluscs. These 
factors have led to a situation where supplies of locally-caught fish 
far exceed domestic demand. The New Zealand industry has, therefore, 
a strong incentive to export. This incentive is strengthened further 
by the Government-imposed Price Freeze Regulations on many species 
of fish, which have increased the gap between export prices and 
domestic prices.
The future growth of the New Zealand fishing industry is, 
therefore, closely linked to the industry’s ability to sell its 
catches in overseas markets. At first glance it would appear that 
the industry had little cause for concern in this area. Over the ten- 
year period 1967-77, New Zealand's fish exports had increased four 
times by weight and eight times by value. In 1977, New Zealand exported 
a record 26,056 tonnes valued at $50.4 million - rock lobster accounting 
for $23.7 million, and fin fish $21.5 million of the total. Some 
80 per cent (by value) of these exports went to three markets - the 
United States, Japan and Australia.
But there were doubts in New Zealand about the future of the 
export trade in fish, particularly for those resources - such as 
squid and certain species of tuna - that the local fishermen might 
wish to exploit (either by themselves or in partnership with foreign 
interests) in the near future.
Probably the greatest single problem faced by New Zealand fish 
exporters was that of market access. Some of the important markets 
overseas had placed tariffs and quotas on imports of New Zealand 
fish products; in some cases to protect their own catching sector, in 
other cases to protect their processing industry. In 1977, for example, 
Japan had an import duty of 10 per cent for squid and mackerel, and the 
United States a duty of 35 per cent for canned tuna in oil. These trade 
barriers were particularly galling to the New Zealand industry. First, 
New Zealand permitted the entry, generally free from duty and not
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s u b j e c t  to  impor t  c o n t r o l s ,  o f  f i s h  p ro d u c t s  from o v e r s e a s .  ' (To make
m a t t e r s  worse,  t h e s e  im por ts  were sometimes made up o f  f i s h  t h a t  were
caught  in  New Zealand w a t e r s . )  Second,  t h e s e  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s
o v e r s e a s  d id  not  always app ly  to  DWFS f ishe rm en .  The Ja p a n e s e  squid
f i she rm en ,  f o r  example,  were a b l e  t o  import  squid  ( a g a in ,  some o f
2
which i s  caught  in  New Zealand w a te rs )  i n t o  Japan  f r e e  o f  d u ty .
There was a l s o  th e  problem o f  ’Thi rd  Country T r a d i n g ’ . Local f i s h  
e x p o r t e r s  were d i s t u r b e d  by t h e  way in  which some DWFS o p e r a t i n g  in 
New Z ea lan d ’ s o f f s h o r e  w a te rs  were s e l l i n g  t h e  f i s h  thus  caught  in  
o v e r s eas  marke ts  in  d i r e c t  c o m p e t i t io n  wi th New Zealand e x p o r t e r s .
The South Koreans,  f o r  example,  were s a id  to  s e l l  f i s h  caught  o f f  
New Zealand on t h e  J apanese  marke t ,  t h e  Japanese  so ld  New Zealand 
f i s h  on th e  A u s t r a l i a n  marke t ,  and t h e  Russ ians  l i k e w i s e  on t h e
3
A u s t r a l i a n  market  th rough  a p r o c e s s i n g  company based  in  S ingapore .
I t  was f e l t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no way t h e  New Zealand f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  
cou ld  compete with  t h e s e  o p e r a t o r s ,  f o r  the  Koreans had a much lower 
c o s t  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  J apanese  f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  was h e a v i l y  s u b s i d i s e d  
(which th e  New Zealand i n d u s t r y  was n o t ) , and th e  Russ ians  had 
economic p r i o r i t i e s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from th o s e  o f  New Zea land.
Obvious ly ,  i f  New Zealand hoped t o  c o n t in u e  to  expand i t s  
e x p o r t s  o f  f i s h  (so n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  growth o f  th e  domest ic  
f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y )  i t  would have to  seek  t h e  c o o p e ra t io n  o f  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s  - in c lu d in g  Japan  - in  removing t h e s e  b a r r i e r s  t o  t r a d e .
This s u b - s e c t i o n  conc ludes  by i d e n t i f y i n g  th o s e  a c t o r s  in  New 
Zealand most s i g n i f i c a n t l y  invo lved  in  t h e  p r im ary  i s s u e  a r e a .  F i r s t ,  
t h e r e  a r e  t h e  f ishermen th e m s e lv e s ,  numbering some 7,000 in 1977 - 
a mere 0 .6  p e r  cen t  o f  th e  t o t a l  work f o r c e .  ( In  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  were 
t h o s e  o t h e r s  employed in  f i s h  p r o c e s s i n g ,  s h i p b u i l d i n g  and r e p a i r ,  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and r e t a i l i n g . )  The f ishermen  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
th e  New Zealand F e d e ra t io n  o f  Commercial Fishermen,  and th e  New
1. See R eport o f  th e  F ish in g  In d u s try  Board f o r  th e  Year Ended 31 
Marchj 1976, W el l ing ton ,  p . 17 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as R eport o f  FIB.)', 
and ’P r e s i d e n t  C a l l s  f o r  Growth and Unity  in t h e  I n d u s t r y ’ Commercial 
F ish in g 3 J u l y ,  1977, p . l l .
2. G.W. Kit son  p ro v id e s  a d e t a i l e d  l i s t  o f  th e  v a r io u s  marine p ro d u c t s  
s u b j e c t  to  import  quo tas  and impor t  d u t i e s  in Japan .  See G.W. Ki tson ,  
o p . c i t . y  p .4 5 .
3. See ’ Foreign  F is h in g  V entu res  Show Roundabout Way to  M a rk e t ’ FIBB3 
No.40, March, 1977, p . 5 ;  and Max Avery ’Government Must P r o t e c t  NZ from 
3rd-Country  F i s h i n g ’ Commercial F i s h i n g March, 1978, p .1 5 .
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Zealand Seafood Processors Association. The fishermen also have 
representatives on the Fishing Industry Board.^ ’ The bureaucrats 
having major responsibility for fisheries include those employed in 
the Fisheries Management and Fisheries Research Divisions of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Until March, 1977, Duncan 
MacIntyre had dual responsibility for the farming and fishing sectors 
as Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. In that month, however,
a new portfolio was established with J.B. Bolger assuming the position
2 .of Minister of Fisheries.
Ib. Secondary Issue Area
This sub-section identifies the secondary issue area - that is, 
that issue (or group of issues) unrelated to fisheries which, if any, 
Wellington was most likely to link to the question of fishing access 
in any future negotiations with Japan concerning the EEZ. Sub-section 
Ib. also identifies those actors in New Zealand most closely associated 
with the secondary issue area.
The New Zealand Government very early indicated that it might
use its bargaining leverage over fishing access to extract concessions
from Japan in areas unrelated to fisheries. In April, 1976 - some
two years before New Zealand fully established its 200-mile zone and
entered into formal fisheries negotiations with Japan - Prime Minister
Muldoon made a visit to Tokyo. During that visit he warned senior
Japanese Ministers that if Japan wanted to continue to fish in waters
controlled by New Zealand, they (the Japanese) would have to grant
New Zealand more liberal access to the Japanese market for agricultural 
3.products. ‘ It should be noted, however, that at this early date 
Muldoon did not envisage any specific linkages or trade-offs. Where 
linkages were made, they were in very broad and general terms. It 
was not until early/mid-1977 that the Prime Minister toughened his 
stand and made clear and specific linkages between the fisheries 
access and agricultural trade issue areas. As will be noted later,
1. The Fishing Industry Board is a statutory body, established under 
the Fishing Industry Board Act of 1963, and t-asked with promoting the 
development of the fishing industry. It can hardly be claimed to be 
truly representative of the industry as four of its eight members are 
appointed by Government; three other members separately represent the 
fishermen (the catching sector, the wholesalers/processors, and the 
fish retailers); and the eighth member is the nominee of the Director 
General of Agriculture and Fisheries.
2. It should be noted that there was to be no separate Ministry of 
Fisheries.3. See the editorial 'Mr. Muldoon's Style in Tokyo' Christchurch. Press,30 April, 1976. 7 ^
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Muldoon was then (in mid-1977) seeking concessions from Japan in the 
beef, dairy and timber trade areas - as well as seeking concessions 
for New Zealand's fish exports.
But it is not our purpose in this sub-section to explore the 
evolution of New Zealand's policies with respect to linkage diplomacy 
in this area. Such analysis is reserved for Section II of the case 
study. Instead, the following paragraphs will explore the problems 
existing in New Zealand's agricultural trade with Japan in order to 
determine why it was this issue (or group of issues) which was likely 
to be included in any future negotiations over fishing access.
At this point it might be useful to outline briefly the economic 
problems facing New Zealand when the Muldoon Government came to 
office in late 1975.
More than most other countries, New Zealand is dependent on 
overseas trade for its development and progress. The value of New 
Zealand's overseas trade as a proportion of gross national product is 
among the highest in the world. As will be noted in the next sub­
section, New Zealand relies on a relatively small range of commodities 
to generate export income. Among the principal export earners are the 
products of its rural-based economy - meat, wool, dairy products and 
forest products. It is, therefore, a matter of serious concern to 
New Zealand that many industrialised countries give a high degree of 
protection to the production of foodstuffs. In various international 
forums - such as the GATT and FAO - New Zealand has argued for the 
liberalisation of global trade and has condemned agricultural 
protectionism.
New Zealand's concern in this area increased sharply as it 
suffered from the impact of the worldwide decline in economic activity 
following the Oil Crisis of 1973-74, which particularly affected sales 
of the primary products and raw materials which are New Zealand's 
major exports. New Zealand's visible balance of trade, which was 
normally in surplus, registered an unfavourable balance of $249.5 
million for the FY1973-74, and deteriorated further to a negative 
$1,141.6 million for the year ending June, 1975.*’ Nor were there 
prospects that New Zealand's trade balance would soon return to 
surplus. The terms of trade had shifted against many of the goods
1. New Zealand Official Yearbook 1978, Department of Statistics, 
Wellington, 1978, p.552.
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New Zealand exported, and there were signs of increasing agricultural 
protectionism in the industrialised countries.
New Zealand’s trade with Japan - it third largest trading 
partner behind the United Kingdom and Australia - reflected the overall 
trend. As demonstrated in Table 9, for much of the period since 1962 
(when full most favoured nation - MFN - relations were established 
between the two countries) the two-way trade was fairly evenly balanced, 
although generally in New Zealand's favour. By 1975, however, the 
balance of this trade had swung sharply against New Zealand.
TABLE 9 NEW ZEALAND ’S TRADE WITH JAPAN
Year Ended June Imports Exports
(NZ$M CDV) (NZ$M FOB)
1963 28.0 25.5
1967 48.9 63.3
1971 110.2 102.6
1972 128.6 130.2
1973 166.7 230.2
1974 248.0 248.2
1975 335.6 185.9
1976 401.9 308.6
1977 472.9 402.9
Source: Department of Statistics, Wellington.
Naturally, the New Zealand Government was seriously concerned 
about this development for Japan was a major market for many of its 
exports.^' Particularly hard hit by the trade slump were New Zealand's 
exports of beef and dairy products. For example, Japan's imports 
of New Zealand butter fell from 24,857 tonnes in 1974 to 2,202 tonnes 
in 1975, and its imports of beef decreased from 5,917 tonnes to 
3,042 tonnes over the same period.
The question of agricultural exports to Japan has long been a 
sensitive subject in New Zealand. Ever since the early 1960s, Welling­
ton had prevailed upon Tokyo to take greater account of New Zealand's
1. For example, Japan was in FY 1976-77: New Zealand's largest 
customer for forest products, animal feedstuffs, unwrought aluminium, 
and iron ore; its second largest customer for mutton, casein, hides 
and tallow; the third largest customer for cheese and fish; and an 
important purchaser of beef, wool, lamb, butter and milk. Overall, 
Japan was New Zealand's second largest export market.
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p o s i t i o n  as a s t a b l e ,  e f f i c i e n t  long - te rm  s u p p l i e r  o f  h igh q u a l i t y ,
r e a s o n a b ly  p r i c e d  farm p ro d u c t s .  Back in  1962, t h e  J o i n t  Communique
r e l e a s e d  by New Zealand and Japan  f o l l o w in g  th e  agreement on the
p r o t o c o l  e s t a b l i s h i n g  f u l l  MFN r e l a t i o n s  s t a t e d
' In many r e s p e c t s  th e  economies o f  t h e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  were complementary and i t  would 
be t o  the  advantage  o f  bo th  i f  t h e  goods 
which each could produce most e f f i c i e n t l y  
and econom ica l ly  were a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  o t h e r  
w ith  t h e  minimum o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  each c o u n t r y ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s . '
D es p i te  t h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  t h e  Government o f  Japan  has  p laced  
a number o f  o b s t a c l e s  in  t h e  way o f  a c c e s s  to  t h e  Japanese  market .  The 
r ea s o n s  why Japan  co n s id e re d  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  impose t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  
t o  th e  t r a d e  in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t s  have a l r e a d y  been r e f e r r e d  t o .
In P a r t  I I  above i t  was no ted  t h a t :  one,  t h e  Japanese  Government was 
de termined  to  m a in ta in  an ' a d e q u a t e '  deg ree  o f  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  f o r  
many o f  i t s  food s u p p l i e s ;  and, two, t h e  LDP Government was v i t a l l y  
dependent  on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s u ppo r t  o f  t h e  J apanese  farmers  and was 
p r e p a re d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to p r o t e c t  t h e  l a t t e r  from f o r e ig n  c o m p e t i t io n  
in many a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodit ies .  Th is  l a t t e r  p o i n t  needs to  be 
emphasised,  f o r  t h e r e  was (as  ev idenced  in  th e  1962 J o i n t  Communique 
and e lsew here)  a m is taken  n o t i o n  in  New Zealand  t h a t  t h e  two economies 
were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  complementary.  While i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  Japan  p ro v id es  
New Zealand with  many manufac tu red  i tems no t  produced by New Zea lande rs ,  
th e  r e v e r s e  s i t u a t i o n  does no t  always ap p ly .  Many o f  th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
i tems so ld  by New Zealand on t h e  J a p an es e  market  a r e  a l s o  produced 
in Japan ( i f  uneconom ica l ly  by New Zealand s t a n d a r d s ) . In f a c t  th e  
Japanese  Government h a s ,  over  t h e  y e a r s ,  t r e a t e d  f o r e i g n  s u p p l i e s  
o f  b e e f ,  b u t t e r ,  skim milk  powder and o t h e r  commodit ies  as r e s i d u a l  - 
to  be impor ted  o r  kept  out  acc o rd in g  to  t h e  needs o f  J a p a n ' s  domestic  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  p o l i c i e s .
The major problem a r e a s  in  New Z e a l a n d ' s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  t r a d e  
wi th  Japan w i l l  now be examined, commodity by commodity.
The p r i n c i p a l  item o f  conce rn  f o r  New Zealand in t h e  meat 
t r a d e  with  Japan  in v o lv e s  t h a t  o f  b e e f  e x p o r t s .  As one can t e l l  
from th e  fo l low ing  Tab le ,  t h e  b e e f  t r a d e  wi th  Japan  i s  a h ig h l y  
i r r e g u l a r  one.
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TABLE 10 NEW ZEALAND''S BEEF EXPORTS TO JAPAN
Year Ended June Tonnes NZ$M FOB
1972 4,038 4.0
1973 7,913 8.5
1974 5,917 8.6
1975 3,042 3.6
1976 5,221 7.2
1977 5,195 8.5
Source: Department of Statistics, Wellington.
There are several reasons for this irregularity. It will be 
recalled from Part II that Japan's stabilisation policies are designed 
to maintain income levels for its domestic producers. This has involved 
the maintenance of high consumer prices - often substantially above 
world levels - with imports allowed only as a means to prevent consumer 
prices reaching unacceptable limits. Access for foreign beef to the 
Japanese market suffers from this limitation, and is further restricted 
by the unsatisfactory system administered by the LIPC which makes 
announcements of the estimated need for imports at irregular intervals 
within each of the six-month quota periods. New Zealand beef exporters 
find it difficult under this system to plan production, storage and 
shipping programmes, not only for supply to Japan but also to other 
beef markets. New Zealand’s concern about Japan's 'stop-go' buying 
policies reached new heights during the 16-month period from February 
1974 until June 197S when Japan banned almost all imports of beef.
The New Zealand Government has made many respresentations to 
Japan urging the need for long-term trading arrangements, particularly 
with respect to beef. In July 1977, for example, New Zealand asked 
Japan to introduce a minimum annual global quota of beef for general 
use of 100,000 tonnes, with a year's delivery schedule when the quota 
is announced.^'
Many of the problems experienced in the beef trade also apply 
to the trade in dairy products. Butter exports, in particular, have 
been hard hit by severe fluctuations in demand by the Japanese (that
1. See Press Statement: Pew Zealand/Japan - Economic Relations3 New 
Zealand Embassy, Tokyo, released 30 March, 1978, p.3. It may also be 
noted that during his visit to Tokyo in April, 1976, Muldoon complained 
that under Japan's current import regime for beef, only a short period 
of prior notice of tenders is given and this restricts the ability 
of New Zealand importers to compete and supply. He observed that 
livestock production requires considerable investment and time. He
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i s  by th e  LIPC). In 1971, Japan imported  924 tonnes  o f  b u t t e r  from 
New Zea land .  Impor ts  r o s e  s h a r p ly  over  t h e  nex t  few y e a r s  - to  
12,354 tonnes  in  1972 and to  24,857 tonnes  in  1974. However, in 
1975 b u t t e r  im por ts  plummeted to  2,202 t o n n e s .  Again,  as in t h e  
b e e f  t r a d e ,  im por ts  o f  b u t t e r  (and o f  most o f  t h e  skimmilk powder f o r  
human consumption) remain t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by th e  LIPC. The r e s u l t  
i s  t h a t  b u t t e r  p r i c e s  to  th e  Jap an ese  consumer a r e  kep t  a t  a l e v e l  
which i s  th e  h i g h e s t  in  t h e  world .  Impor ts  have,  t h e r e f o r e ,  l i t t l e  
e f f e c t  on r e d u c in g  t h i s  p r i c e  l e v e l  and expanding demand.
Cheese im por ts  to  Japan  a r e  no t  s u b j e c t  to  q u a n t a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  
b u t ,  as  no ted  by Talboys  ( t h e  Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r  and M i n i s t e r  o f  
Overseas  Trade) t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  t a r i f f  on t h i s  p roduc t  ' i s  s t i l l  
an o b s t a c l e  t o  t h e  f u l l  development o f  t h e  m a r k e t . ' ^ '
New Z e a l a n d ' s  expor t  t r a d e  in  sawn t i m b e r  to  Japan  f a c e s  a 
number o f  o b s t a c l e s .  Under p r e s s u r e  from t h e  Japanese  s a w m i l l e r s ,  
Tokyo has imposed a 10 pe r  cen t  du ty  on sawn p inus  r a d i a t a  t im b e r  
o f  l e s s  than  160 mm t h i c k n e s s .  F u r t h e r ,  J a p a n ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  code 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  sawn t im b e r  have c l a s s i f i e d  t h i s  t im be r  as  be ing  
u n s u i t a b l e  f o r  u se  in c o n s t r u c t i o n .  The J a p a n e s e  argue  t h a t  New 
Zealand r a d i a t a  i s  too f a s t  growing and has  i t s  growth r i n g s  too  
w ell  sp read  t o  be a c c e p ta b l e  under  t h e i r  s t r e n g t h  c r i t e r i a .  The New 
Zea landers  argue  in r e p l y  t h a t  r a d i a t a  i s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  used in  t h e  
house c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  in t h e i r  c o u n t ry ,  and no te  t h a t  t h e  wide 
growth r i n g s  in  r a d i a t a  a re  more tha n  compensated f o r  by th e  f i b r e  
l e n g th  o f  t h i s  t im b e r .
Severa l  o t h e r  im por tan t  commodit ies  expo r te d  by New Zealand
face  s e v e re  o b s t a c l e s  in r e a c h in g  t h e  J a p a n e s e  market .  The Jap an ese
f r u i t  fa rm ers  a r e  p r o t e c t e d  from f o r e i g n  im por ts  by - what appea r
2
to  o u t s i d e r s  - o v e r - s t r i c t  q u a r a n t i n e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  * New Zealand
went on t o  say 'you c a n ' t  a l t e r  p ro d u c t i o n  a c c o rd in g  to  market c o n d i t i o n s  
from y ea r  to  y e a r  as  you can with  crops  by v a ry in g  t h e  a r e a  sown. Assur­
ance  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  s t a b i l i t y  in  marke ts  f o r  p a s t o r a l  p r o d u c t s  i s  e s s e n t ­
i a l '  . See 'New Prime M i n i s t e r  o f  New Zealand S p e l l s  Out P o l i c i e s '
A sia  P a c i f i c  Forum, W e l l ing ton ,  No .12, F eb rua ry ,  1976, p . 5 .
1. B.E. Talboys 'New Z e a l a n d ' s  Case f o r  Improvements in  t h e  Economic 
R e l a t i o n s  With J a p a n '  A sia  P a c i f i c  Forum, W e l l in g to n ,  N o .12, February ,  
1975, p . 9.
2. See,  f o r  example,  th e  ' c o d l i n g  moth prob lem '  in  t h e  composi te  paper  
p r e s e n t e d  by J . J .  Kneebone Group B -  F o o d s tu f fs  a t  th e  Second Meeting 
o f  t h e  NZ/Japan Bus inessmen 's  Conference ,  Ro to rua ,  8-9 September,  1975.
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wool growers have been angered about the Japanese buying behaviour that 
in the space of a year pushes prices first to all time highs, then drops 
these prices to nearly all time lows.
The question facing the Muldoon Government in 1976 was how to 
persuade the Japanese to remove these barriers to the trade in 
agricultural products. Given the record of the previous 14 years, 
it was apparent that diplomatic representations to the Japanese 
Government were unlikely to have much effect on Japan's restrictive 
trading practices.^’
Some New Zealanders argued that the trading problems would
never be solved by working through the Japanese Government. Paul
Knight (a New Zealand academic specialising in Japanese affairs)
was one of these, and argued that there is another pressure group in
Japan which could offset the influence of the farmers and their
political allies. He noted how there is a 'sleeping giant on the
2Japanese scene ... the consumer'. * Knight observed how groups of 
consumers - particularly the League of Housewives (Shufuren) - have 
occasionally been aroused to considerable effect in the past. Perhaps, 
he argued, the Japanese consumers could bring pressure on their own 
behalf on the Japanese Government for a change in the system governing 
agricultural imports.
Writing some time later, Philip Ashenden - a marketing consultant 
with experience of the business scene in Japan - also so merit in 
allying the Japanese consumers to New Zealand's cause. However, 
he believed that the consumers would not, by themselves, be able 
to exert sufficient pressure on their Government to bring about the 
desired changes. He observed that an effective lobby group in Japan
3also had to include 'strong agricultural figures.' * Ashenden asserted
1. It may be pointed out that these representations were generally 
couched in moderate language. New Zealand had gone to great lengths 
to assure the Japanese that: it had no intention of interfering in 
Japan's internal agricultural affairs; that New Zealand did not want 
to put Japanese farmers out of business; and that New Zealand was 
anxious to remain a stable and reliable suppl-ier of foodstuffs and 
other commodities to Japan.
2. P.S. Knight 'New Zealand Beef Exports to Japan' Asia Pacific Forum, 
Vol.3, No.12, December, 1977, p.16.
3. See Philip Ashenden The NZ/Japan Stalemate - Fresh Ideas and Renewed 
Effort Required3 an address given to the Japan Society of Auckland 
Businessmen's Group, 9 May, 1978, p.8.
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that this 'backdoor diplomacy' - that is, working through agricultural 
economists, agricultural lobbies, politicians from rural areas, and 
officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - could comple­
ment the 'front door' approach conducted by the New Zealand Government.
But, as will be detailed later in Section II, there were other 
New Zealanders - including, most importantly, the Prime Minister - 
who believed that the best tactic for bringing fast results lay in 
rejecting the moderate diplomatic approach adopted hitherto.^' They 
believed that by bringing sufficient pressure directly on the Japanese 
Government the latter might be forced to change its agricultural 
import policies. It was noted how Tokyo had, in the past, been
persuaded to change its import policies by countries which had suffic-
2ient economic and/or political leverage. ’ While it was recognised
that New Zealand did not possess the economic or political 'muscle'
3that some of Japan's other trading partners could bring to bear, ’ it 
was believed that now at last New Zealand did have a bargaining lever 
which could be used effectively against the Japanese - namely, New 
Zealand's control over foreign fishing access to the proposed 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone.
It remains to identify those actors in New Zealand significantly 
involved in the secondary issue area (or, more precisely, group of 
issue areas). First considered will be the farmers. It has been 
estimated that in 1976 the total farming population was 143,035 -
1. See A. Haas 'Dispute Over Access to Japan' Asia Pacific Forum3 Vo1.4, 
No.2, February, 1978.
2. Kitson, for example, has observed how in the early 1970s the United 
States successfully negotiated entry for grapefruit against the opposit­
ion of Japanese mandarin producers. G.W. Kitson 'Perspective on New 
Zealand-Japan Trade and Economic Relations' Asia Pacific F o r u m Vol.3, 
No. 12, December, 1977, p.10. See also his paper A Comment on Fisheries 
and Agricultural Trade Relationships Between New Zealand and Japan_, 
op.cit.j p.8, where he gives further examples of Japan making trade 
concessions under duress.
3. It was widely recognised in New Zealand that Japan is far more 
important to the New Zealand economy, than is New Zealand to Japan.
In FY 1976-77, New Zealand supplied only one per cent of Japan's imports 
and ranked as Japan's 20th supplier; while as.a market for Japanese 
exports New Zealand ranked only 30th taking 0.7 per cent of Japan's total 
exports. That year, however, Japan was New Zealand's second largest 
export market (taking 11 per cent of total exports), and its third 
largest supplier (accounting for 13 per cent of total imports).
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about 11 per cent of the total New Zealand work force. Given the fact 
that a large percentage of these farmers engage in more than one activity 
(for example, sheep farming with beef or sheep farming with cropping), 
it is reasonable to assume that most New Zealand farmers have - in one 
way or another - a vital interest in the export trade with Japan. In 
addition to the farmers, there is a very large number of other workers 
in the private sector associated with the agricultural export trade 
engaged in processing plants, packaging, transportation, and so on.
New Zealand's major agricultural representative group is Federated 
Farmers of New Zealand.
The bureaucrats with major responsibility for agricultural matters 
are officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and those 
in the Department of Trade and Industry who are concerned with the 
promotion of New Zealand's export trade in rural commodities.
Given the importance of agriculture in the New Zealand economy
it can be argued that almost all politicians - particularly those
from rural electorates - have an interest in the agricultural export
trade. However, those Ministers having greatest interest in this
area - and having direct responsibility for agricultural trade matters -
are the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries^* D. MacIntyre, and the
2Minister of Overseas Trade, B.E. Talboys. * The Prime Minister,
R.D. Muldoon, should also be included in this group of actors for, 
as leader of the ruling National Party, he was vitally dependent on 
the political support of New Zealand's farmers. (In this he had an 
affinity with his Prime Ministerial counterpart in Japan, and with 
Doug Anthony the leader of the 'junior' coalition party - the National 
Country Party - in Australia.)
Ic. Other Issue Areas
This sub-section identifies those other issue areas in the New 
Zealand-Japan economic relationship - and those actors in New Zealand 
most significantly involved in them - not included in the primary and 
secondary issue areas examined above.
It is readily apparent that the bilateral economic relationship
1. It will be recalled that in early 1977 a new portfolio - Minister 
of Fisheries - was created. As from that date, MacIntyre was Minister 
of Agriculture.
2. Also Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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is a relatively simple one, especially when measured in terms of the 
range of items traded between the two countries. New Zealand, for 
the most part, exports to Japan the products of its rural-based 
economy, and imports from Japan manufactured items.
The major commodities exported by New Zealand to Japan in the 
year ended June 1977 are listed in Table 11. The dominant place 
occupied by agricultural items in this list will be noted - most of 
which belonged to that group of commodities in the secondary issue 
area described above. In fact, it is assumed here that all these 
agricultural commodities belong to that category. As implied above - 
and as will be explained more fully later - in addition to seeking 
concessions from Japan with respect to specific trade items in 
the agricultural area, Wellington also sought a broader liberalisation 
of trade for all its rural exports to Japan.
There are only four export items listed which do not emanate 
from New Zealand's farming sector - aluminium, forest products, iron 
ore, and fish products. One of these - forest products ’ - belongs 
to the secondary issue area; and another - fish products - belongs to 
the primary issue area category. This leaves only two items listed 
in Table 11 which clearly do not belong to either the primary or 
secondary issue areas - namely, unwrought aluminium and iron ore. The 
major features of these two industries will now be briefly examined.
Unwrought aluminium is, in terms of value, by far the most 
important single commodity exported by New Zealand to Japan. In
1. It should be noted that some difficulty was experienced in deciding 
whether to include forest products under the secondary issue area 
category or the 'other issue areas' category. New Zealand exports a 
range of forest products to Japan including wood pulp, sawn timber, 
and logs. It was implied in sub-section lb. that Wellington only had 
problems with respect to the trade to Japan in sawn pinus radiata and, 
in fact, it will be noted later that it was this forest product for 
which New Zealand sought specific concessions from Japan. It could be 
argued, therefore, that only sawn pinus radiata, and the actors 
associated with its production and trade, should be included in the 
secondary issue area. However, the problem arises where the same 
exporter in New Zealand usually produces both sawn pinus radiata for 
the trade with Japan and those other forest products - namely, wood 
pulp and logs - which more fittingly belong in the 'other issue areas' 
category. Thus it was decided that it was best to include all forest 
products under the secondary issue area category. It may also be 
noted that this situation often exists in the agricultural sector.
Given the fact that a relatively high percentage of New Zealand 
farmers engage in mixed farming, it is not uncommon to find the same 
farmer producing items which face severe trade restrictions in Japan 
as well as producing items which face no such restrictions. (This 
provides an added reason for putting all agricultural items under the secondary issue area category.)
TABLE 11. MAJOR COMMODITIES EXPORTED BY NEW ZEALAND TO 
JAPAN IN YEAR ENDED JUNE 1977 - RANKED BY 
VALUE ($ MILLION)___________________________
Unwrought aluminium 102.4
Forest products 61.2
Wool 44.1
Animal feedstuffs 24.5
Cheese 18.3
Mutton 14.1
Iron Ore 13.9
Lamb 13.3
Casein 13.0
Hides and skins 9.3
Beef and veal 8.5
Butter 7.5
Milk and cream 7.4
Fish and fish preparations 6.6
Fruit and vegetables 6.4
Inedible tallow 3.6
Total value of these, and other, exports to Japan $402.9 million.
Source: Department of Statistics, Wellington
113
t h e  y e a r  ended June  1977 i t  accounted  f o r  more than  one q u a r t e r  o f  
th e  t o t a l  expo r t  t r a d e  to  Japan .  Al l  o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  aluminium i s  
produced a t  t h e  s m e l t e r  a t  Tiwai P o in t  n e a r  B lu f f  in t h e  South 
I s l a n d .  This  s m e l t e r  i s  owned by New Zealand  Aluminium S m el te rs  
L t d . ,  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  which a r e  Comalco I n d u s t r i e s  P ty .  Ltd. 
o f  A u s t r a l i a  (50 p e r  c e n t ) ;  Showa Denko K.K. and Sumitomo Aluminium 
Smel t ing  Co. Ltd.  o f  J apan  (25 p e r  c e n t  eac h ) .  The New Zealand 
Government i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  invo lved  in t h i s  e n t e r p r i s e ,  f o r  i t  
p ro v id e s  t h e  e l e c t r i c  power f o r  t h e  s m e l t e r  th rough  the  Manapouri 
h y d r o - e l e c t r i c  p r o j e c t .
I ron  ore r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  seven th  most im por tan t  expo r t  item 
sh ipped  t o  Japan  in  1976-77 - amounting to  some $13.9 m i l l i o n ,  or  
about  3.5 p e r  cen t  o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  t o  Japan  t h a t  y ea r .  
The i r o n  o re  comes from b la c k  sands found on th e  w es te rn  beaches  o f  
t h e  North I s l a n d .  In common w i th  t h e  aluminium i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  New 
Zealand Government has  an im por tan t  i n t e r e s t  in t h i s  t r a d e .  There 
a r e  two s e p a r a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  e x p o r t i n g  i r o n  o re  t o  Japan .  The f i r s t  
i s  t h e  S ta te-owned  New Zealand S t e e l  Ltd.  which o p e r a t e s  an ironsands  
mining u n i t  and o f f - s h o r e  b u l k - l o a d i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  Taharoa.  The 
o t h e r  i s  a p r iv a t e ly -o w n e d  e n t e r p r i s e  i n v o lv in g  New Zealand and 
o v e r s e a s  i n t e r e s t s  o p e r a t i n g  n e a r  Wanganui. ( I t  may be no ted  t h a t  
th e  Government m a in t a i n s  s t r i c t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  t h i s  
commodity. Export  l i c e n c e s  f o r  i ro n s an d s  a r e  i s s u e d  f o r  on ly  a 
l i m i t e d  p e r io d  as t h e r e  i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  domest ic  demand f o r  
i r o n  o re  might  i n c r e a s e  in  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e . )
There i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a n o t h e r  group o f  a c t o r s  in New Zealand who 
a r e  d eep ly  invo lved  in th e  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  - namely,  th e  
very  l a r g e  number o f  im p o r te r s  o f  Japanese  p r o d u c t s .  I t  has  a l r e a d y  
been no ted  t h a t  in  te rms o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  t o t a l  import t r a d e ,  Japan 
was in  1976-77 t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  s u p p l i e r  (beh ind A u s t r a l i a  
and t h e  United  Kingdom). The major i t ems expo r ted  by Japan  in c lu d ed :  
motor c a r s ,  e l e c t r i c a l  m achinery ,  s t e e l ,  p l a s t i c s ,  r u b b e r ,  paper  
and pape rb o a rd ,  s y n t h e t i c  t e x t i l e s ,  o rg a n ic  chem ica ls  and manufac tu red  
f e r t i l i s e r s .  New Zealand im p o r te r s  o f  t h e s e  p ro d u c t s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  
( t o g e t h e r  w i th  bus inessmen who expor t  t o  Japan)  in th e  New Zea land/  
Japan  Bus inessmen 's  A s s o c i a t i o n .
There remains one o t h e r  s e t  o f  a c t o r s  hav ing  a c l o s e  i n t e r e s t  
in t h e  New Zea land-Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p  who have no t  ye t  been i d e n t i f i e d .  
These a r e  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  in  t h e  M in i s t r y  o f  Fore ign  A f f a i r s  who a r e
involved in almost all important aspects of the bilateral relationship.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs - B.E. Talboys - was, it will be recalled, 
also Minister of Overseas Trade.
Section I concludes with a very brief summary of the degree of 
dependence or dominance experienced by New Zealand in 1977 in its 
relations with Japan in each of the issue areas described above, and 
in its total economic relationship with that country. In the primary 
issue area it can be argued that New Zealand was more important to 
Japan than was Japan to New Zealand. While New Zealand fishermen valued 
the technical and scientific help they received from Japan, such 
assistance could be obtained from other DWFS eager to fish in New 
Zealand’s offshore waters. The Japanese fishermen, for their part, 
were anxious to maintain or increase their already substantial fishing 
presence off New Zealand. In the secondary issue area (or group of 
areas) the situation was reversed. The share of New Zealand's 
agricultural exports going to Japan had sharply increased following 
Britain's entry into the European Economic Community. New Zealand's 
dependence on the Japanese market was revealed during the world economic 
downturn following the 1973-74 Oil Crisis, when the introduction of 
import restrictions in various parts of the industrialised world 
made it very much of a buyer's market for many of the agricultural 
items exported by New Zealand. In the 'other issue areas' the balance 
of dependence was more even. While New Zealand probably welcomed 
Japanese investment in the aluminium smelter at Bluff, the Japanese 
must have been conscious of the fact that it was generally a sellers' 
market for this commodity. With respect to the relative levels of 
dependence in the overall bilateral economic relationship, the trade 
figures reveal that - without question - New Zealand was far more 
dependent on Japan than the reverse case.
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II. POLICY FORMULATION
This section examines the process of policy formulation in New 
Zealand with respect to the establishment and implementation of a 
200-nautical mile fishing (or exclusive economic) zone. Emphasis 
will be given to determining what the various actors identified in 
the previous section hoped to gain from New Zealand's increased 
bargaining leverage over foreign fishing access. Particular attention 
is focussed on the attitude of the different actors towards the 
desirability of using this leverage to gain concessions from DWFS 
in areas unrelated to fisheries. Section IT also examines the political 
influence of each of these actors (or group of actors), the policy­
making network in which decisions concerning the establishment of the 
EEZ were made, and the final policy choice. With respect to the 
latter, it will be determined whether fishing rights were ultimately 
chosen as a 'lever' to advance New Zealand's broader economic interests 
in its relations with Japan.
Ila. Primary Issue Area
First considered will be the policy objectives and political 
influence of those actors in New Zealand most closely associated with 
the primary issue area - the commercial fishermen, the officials in 
the Fisheries Management and Fisheries Research Divisions, and the 
Minister of Fisheries.
Most of New Zealand's commercial fishermen appeared very much 
in favour of the establishment of a 200-mile offshore zone. It seems 
that they believed such a zone could (and should) be used both to 
curb the worst excesses of the foreign fishermen operating off their 
coasts and to extract concessions from the DWFS of benefit to the 
local fishing industry.
The local fishermen had for some time been considering the 
optimum fisheries management policies needed in the new era of 
200-mile zones. Encouraged by developments overseas - where other 
States were contemplating unilaterally declaring extended fishing 
zones - the New Zealand fishermen began, in 1975, to call upon 
the Government to evolve policies for the management of such a zone 
off their country. ’ The fishermen were naturally anxious to see 
that Wellington adopted policies which promoted the interests of their 
industry.
1. See, for example, J.S. Campbell 'Fishing: the 200 Mile Limit' New 
Zealand International Review, July/August, 1976,p.p.5-6; Report of FIB, 
1975, p.4; Report of FIB, 1976, p.p.5-10; and 'Delegation Seeks Zone
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The most comprehensive statement of industry views on this 
subject appeared in September 1977 - shortly before the passage of 
New Zealand’s Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Bill. The 
Fishing Industry Board had, some months before, sent a questionnaire 
to leading members of the fishing industry asking for their opinions 
on the conditions which should be attached to licences granted to 
foreign fishermen permitted to operate inside New Zealand’s 200-mile 
zone. The answers to the questionnaire were written up in the form 
of a paper titled Summary of Industry V i e w s ' It was hoped that the 
paper would provide those who would be negotiating with the DWFS on 
New Zealand's behalf an accurate assessment of what the industry 
expected to gain from the 200-mile zone and how these objectives might 
be secured.
Uppermost in the respondents' list of priorities was the need for 
protection from the foreign fishermen, who both competed with the 
local industry and overexploited some fish stocks. There was general 
agreement that all 'popular' species currently being taken by the 
New Zealand industry should be reserved solely for them. In connection 
with this, it was urged that no trawling should be permitted by 
foreign vessels over the continental shelf, within the 12-mile territorial 
sea, or in depths of less than 300 meters. (This applied also to 
trawling for squid in these areas.) There was also general agreement 
that no foreign vessels should be licensed for access to highly 
migratory species.^“
Turning briefly from the FIB paper, the next few paragraphs 
explore in greater detail the local fishermen's grievances concerning 
the activities of foreign fishing vessels off New Zealand.
It will be recalled from sub-section la. that in the early 1960s 
Japanese snapper-liners had arrived off New Zealand, competing with 
local fishermen for this prime resource. By the mid-1960s the 
situation had got out of hand, with several clashes reported between
3local trawlermen and Japanese snapper fishermen. ’ The establishment 
Policy' Commercial Fishing3 June, 1976, p.10.'
1. Fishing Industry Board Summary of Industry Viewsy Wellington,
14 September, 1977.
2. It was recognised, however, that the position with respect to the 
catching of HMS was somewhat unclear, as the industry did not know 
whether this would be controlled by New Zealand or by some international 
commission yet to be set up. See ibid, paragraph 1.
3. See 'Wanganui Fishermen Angered by Alleged Japanese Action' Commerc­
ial Fishing3 October, 1966, p.29; 'Protest at Japanese Action' Commerc­
ial FishingNovember, 1966, p.24; and 'Japanese Accused of Intimidation
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of a 12-mile fishing zone in 1965 and the signing of a Fisheries 
Agreement with Japan in 1967 only partially alleviated this problem. 
Soon many other foreign fishermen (Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean and 
Russian) came to work New Zealand waters. Some of these new arrivals 
began operating over the continental shelf, outside - and sometimes 
inside - the 12-mile limit. By 1977, it will be remembered, there 
were upwards of 400 foreign fishing vessels operating off New Zealand 
at any one time.
The New Zealand fishermen continued to voice their concern
about the activities of the foreign fishing vessels. They claimed,
for example, that the latter were overexploiting some of the valuable
demersal fish stocks of the continental shelf. B.J. Kenton (President
of the Federation of Commercial Fishermen) echoed the general feelings
of the local fishermen when - at the Symposium on Fisheries in New
Zealand and Japan held in Wellington 4-5 May, 1977 - he drew the
attention of the Japanese present to the plight of the fisheries off
the east coast of the South Island.
'We have figures for some of the 
species of fish taken from this 
area prior to any foreign fishing.
They show us that the catches 
by New Zealand fishermen of 
some of the popular species of 
this area (mainly the Canterbury 
Bight), that is, tarakihi, mackerel 
and gurnard were greater than the 
amount of fish now being taken 
from that area by the combined efforts 
of foreign fishing fleets and our 
boats... Some matters that have 
greatly concerned us have been 
the use [by DWFS] of small mesh 
nets in this area and the taking of 
small and by our standards undersized 
fish. It is not economical for 
us to fish the area because the 
fish have not reached the legal 
size but foreign fleets are fishing 
and taking these very small fish.'l-
The Japanese fishermen were not considered to be the only 
culprits in this area. Many New Zealanders believed that the over­
fishing that had taken place in the Canterbury Bight and elsewhere
Inside Limits: Series of Incidents Arouses Men's Fury' Commercial
Fishing3 March, 1967, p.13.
1. From notes taken at the symposium and held at the Japanese Embassy, 
Wellington.
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was due in part to Soviet activities.*' Again, with respect to 
pelagic fisheries, Eggleston noted that the local skipjack purse-
seine fishery was under threat from American superseiners based in
„ 2.Pago Pago.
The local fishing industry's attitude to foreign fishing off
New Zealand was summarised by the FIB in mid-1977 in a submission
to the Chairman and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It
was there noted how the lack of sovereignty over that area of the
continental shelf lying outside the 12-mile limit
'... has resulted in a marked 
reduction in catch rates and in amount 
caught by New Zealand fishermen in many 
areas because the resource has been subject 
to uncontrolled exploitation by foreign 
fleets. The absence of any legal means 
of control has raised the spectre of the 
ultimate decimation of many of New 
Zealand's most popular and valuable 
wet fish species if this pressure was 
to continue unchecked.'3.
Returning now to the FIB paper of September 1977, it was
strongly argued that when the Minister (of Fisheries) sets total
substainable yields he should 'err very much on the side of safety 
4and conservatism'. The industry further believed that there should 
be consultation between the Ministry (MAF) and the industry with 
regard to any species which foreign vessels might be granted to 
catch.
From what has been said above it should not be concluded that 
all the local fishermen were totally opposed to the presence of foreign 
fishing vessels off New Zealand. It was widely recognised that, if 
the foreign fishermen were strictly controlled, they might bring 
considerable benefits to the domestic industry.This was reflected
1. The subject of Soviet fishing on New Zealand's continental shelf 
was treated in 'Exclusive Area for NZ Within 200-Mile Zone is Necessary' 
Commercial Fishing3 November, 1976, p.8.
2. In the summer of 1976-77 several incidents were reported involving 
American seiners and local boats. See Roy Vaughan 'Problem With Seiners' 
New Zealand Herald3 9 September, 1977.
3. Submissions by the FIB on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Billy to the Chairman and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
House of RepresentativesWellington, July, 1977.
4. Fishing Industry Board Summary of Industry Views, op.cit.3 para.5.
5. There were, however, a few New Zealand fishermen who remained uncon­
vinced that the foreign fishermen (no matter what nationality) could 
benefit the local industry. One who seemed to hold this view was the 
prominent fisheries personality N.L. Mills of Sanford Ltd., Auckland - 
the wholesalers/processors representative on the FIB.
in the paragraphs devoted in the FIB paper to such issues as: statistical 
and other information to be given by foreign craft to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries; the training of New Zealand fishermen by 
DWFS; and the transfer of fisheries technology.
The respondents also addressed the question of joint fishing
ventures involving foreign enterprises. In the words of the paper
'Almost without exception, the industry is highly suspicious of
joint ventures.'"^' The industry was of the view that JVs were not
a necessary, nor the most suitable, method of gaining access to DWFS
2markets and technical skills. ' It was, however, accepted that there 
could be some areas where JVs might be of benefit to the local fishing 
industry: for example, in exploratory fishing or assisting in 
developing a particular industry - such as squid jigging.
The industry believed that JVs should be tightly controlled. 
Suggested restrictions included: JVs must be only for a short period 
of time and on a defined phase-out basis; JV vessels should, in 
general, be manned by New Zealand crews; any fish caught by a JV 
company should be included as part of the foreign quota; JV vessels 
should comply with New Zealand survey and manning requirements; and 
that JV catches should be landed and processed in New Zealand.
A substantial portion of the paper was devoted to seeking ways 
in which a 200-mile zone might enhance the competitiveness of the 
New Zealand industry vis-a-vis the DWFS. In this regard, attention was 
focussed on the licence fees to be charged. It was argued that such 
fees should vary according to the amount of direct fishing competition 
between the foreign vessels and New Zealand craft - where a resource 
was shared the licence fee should be higher than where the 
resource was not being utilised by New Zealand. Some industry 
members obviously hoped that the licence fees levied on foreign 
fishing vessels would not go into general revenues, but would be set 
aside for the benefit of the industry. Paragraph 19 of the paper
1. Ibid., paragraph 20.
2. Critical comments about joint fishing ventures are to be found in 
Des Stace 'Joint Ventures: A Marriage of Convenience - But For Whom? 
Catch '78, July, 1978, p.6; Max Avery 'Don't Enter Into Any More Joint 
Ventures Says Pallot' Commercial Fishing, July, 1977, p.19; and J.S. 
Campbell The Role of Joint Ventures in the Development of Trade and Fish 
Between New Zealand and Japan, a paper presented at the Japan/New 
Zealand Businessmen's Conference, Rotorua, September, 1975.
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said in part
' . . . any fees paid should be set by 
the industry and administered by the 
Fishing Industry Board, and that some 
or all of the fees received should be 
made available to the industry and the 
Board to further the development of the 
New Zealand industry.'!•
The respondents had much to say on the important subject of
marketing. There was a broad statement noting
' . . . the importance of taking every 
opportunity to develop markets for 
New Zealand's fish. The future of 
the New Zealand fishing industry is 
tied up with this, as the industry 
cannot expand unless overseas markets 
are developed in parallel with 
developments in the catching and 
processing sectors.'^*
Several more specific recommendations were made with respect to
marketing. -It was suggested that fishing access rights be withheld
from countries not prepared to permit free access on their market
to the same fish caught by New Zealand fishermen. Alternatively, it
was suggested that where tariff barriers existed 'then an equivalent
3extra fee should be added to the licence fee.' * On the subject of 
import quotas on specific fish species set by countries seeking access, 
the respondents felt access should not be granted until such countries 
removed the quotas. Further, the industry noted that the New Zealand 
Government should insist that no country given access should involve 
itself in Third Country.Trading.
Towards the end of the paper, the broad policy objectives of
the New Zealand fishermen with respect to the establishment of a
200-mile zone were spelt out. It was noted that 'the underlying need
to ensure the livelihood of the New Zealand fishermen and the
4economics of the New Zealand industry must come first'. * In connection
with this, it was observed.
'However important meat, wool and dairy 
product marketing is to the New Zealand 
economy, the development of fish-markets 
is essential for the development of the 
New Zealand fishing industry.'5*
1. The New Zealand fishermen might have been influenced here by a 
decision of the Canadian Government which had made such an allocation 
to its fishing industry. See Catch '78, August, 1978, p.9.
2. Summary of Industry Views 3 op,ait., paragraph 25.
3. Ibid.3 paragraph 23.4. Ibid. 3 paragraph 25.
5. Ibid. 3 paragraph 26.
121
This statement revealed a long-held suspicion by many members
of the industry that the Government was not totally committed to
assisting the local industry and was, perhaps, prepared to 'sell
New Zealand's fishing interests short' in exchange for trade
concessions from the DWFS. In mid-1976 several fishermen's
representatives had warned of the danger that some politicians
might be tempted to trade access rights in return for sales of New
Zealand agricultural products. In his letter to the Minister of
Agriculture and Fisheries in July 1976, the Secretary of the New
Zealand Seafood Processors' Association (I.R. Hamilton) had stated
' We remain wary ... that the New 
New Zealand fishing industry, in general 
terms, could be considered a useful 
piece of property by some people to 
be traded off in international 
negotiations with other countries in 
an endeavour to secure a foothold for 
more traditional forms of New Zealand 
. produce.'^•
A year later, Kenton took up this issue and noted 'I become 
very concerned when I read about using the fishing industry and 
fishing rights as a bargaining point in negotiations on agricultural 
products, etc.' Interestingly he added that, while he did not object 
to the broad strategy of seeking trade-offs for fishing access3 he 
wondered
' Why is it that every member of 
Parliament who uses this approach in 
his speeches (and this includes the 
Prime Minister himself) seems to leave 
our fish exports off the list? It is 
fair to say that if our fisheries are to 
increase, we are going to rely heavily on 
countries presently fishing our waters to 
take our increased catch and it is 
imperative that fish exports is included on 
the list of export goods when fishing rights 
are discussed.'^•
1. Other fishermen had expressed similar concern at this time. See, 
for example, the article by P.J. Stevens (President of the Wellington 
Trawlermen's Association) 'A Fisherman's View' New Zealand International 
Review3 July/August, 1976, p.7.
2. President's Report to 19th Annual Conference of the New Zealand 
Federation of Commercial Fishermen, Christchurch, 1-3 June, 1977.
3. Ibid.
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These statements reflected divisions within the fishing industry 
with respect to the question of trade-offs involving foreign fishing 
access. Some fishermen were strongly opposed to any form of linkage 
diplomacy, fearing that their industry might suffer in consequence.
Others - like Kenton and N. Jarman (Chairman of the FIB) - were less 
opposed to trade-offs and appeared to appreciate the serious problems 
facing the New Zealand economy in general, and the particular difficulties 
of selling agricultural products onto the Japanese market. The latter 
seemed prepared to support the Government in its overall strategy of 
linking fishing access to the agricultural trade issue so long as 
the Government also included New Zealand's fish exports on the list 
of items for which concessions were to be sought from Japan.
It is difficult to determine whether the attitudes of Kenton 
and Jarman (and others like them,) towards trade-offs were prompted 
by unselfish considerations, or were rather a realistic appreciation 
that there was little they could do to influence the Government's 
decisions in this area. As mentioned above, the fishermen were few 
in number and possessed very little political influence - certainly 
so when compared with the agricultural lobby in New Zealand.
The analysis now turns to an examination of those officials in 
the Fisheries Management and Fisheries Research Divisions (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries), to determine what their attitudes 
towards linkage diplomacy involving fishing rights might have been.
The bureaucrats responsible for fisheries were publicly silent 
on the question of trade-offs. There are at least two possible 
explanations for this silence. First, within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries these two Divisions were very much the junior partners.
If ever there was a clash of interests between fisheries and agricultural 
matters, they were almost certain to be 'outgunned' by the Agricultural 
Divisions. Second - as will be noted shortly - their own Minister 
(J.B. Bolger) was generally supportive of the Prime Minister's 
strategy of linking fishing access to broader trade issues.
It is interesting to note how the bureaucrats in MAF had failed, 
over the years, to take strong action against the foreign fishermen 
despite urgent calls from the domestic fishing industry. For example, 
in 1975 the FIB claimed that the Government's liberal port access 
policies - which had contributed to the build-up in foreign fishing 
activities - may have been linked with trade agreements negotiated 
with the DWFS. The FIB had stressed
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’...if port access to foreign vessels 
was included in previous trade agreements, 
there is an obvious need to revise such 
agreements in the light of the build-up 
of foreign fishing activity, and that the 
Board would hope to be consulted in regard 
to any proposed concession to foreign nations 
in future trade agreements.'^*
It was then implied that the MAF's concern to maintain harmonious
relations with the Japanese (and Russians) - who were important
customers for New Zealand's agricultural exports - accounted for
the way in which the Fisheries Divisions have, at times, tended to
2de-emphasise the adverse effects of foreign fishing.
In early 1977, an article in Fishing News International noted 
how the FIB and the New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen had
made frequent requests to their Government to approach the Japanese 
and Russian authorities concerning fisheries violations by their 
nationals. The article continued
• 'They [the FIB and the NZ Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen] have recently 
been critical of the lack of action in 
this regard attributing the five year 
delay in approaching the Japanese to a 
conflict of interests in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries.'^*
Kenton made similar claims that year. In referring to the rapid 
build-up in foreign fishing activity, he implied that there was a 
connection between the failure of the Fisheries Management Division 
to inform the public of this build-up, and the so-called 'fish-for- 
beef' strategy against Japan. In Kenton's words
'A question we must keep asking 
ourselves is why our own Fisheries 
Management Division has not brought 
to the notice of Government and the 
public in general what is happening. 
Perhaps there is some other motive 
behind all this. I become very 
concerned when I read about using the 
fishing industry and fishing rights as 
a bargaining point in negotiations 
on agricultural products etc.'^*
1. Quoted in 'Sharp Rise in Foreign Vessels Off NZ Coast' Commercial 
Fishing3 October, 1975, p.13.
2. See, for example, D. Eggleston's comments in 'Japanese Fishing Boats 
Effects Exaggerated' Commercial Fishing3 February, 1976.
3. 'Fleets Gather As New Zealand Waits to Claim 200 Miles' Fishing 
News International3 April, 1977, p.23.
4. From his address to the 19th Annual General Meeting of the New 
Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen, 1-3 June, 1977.
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It was evident that, in the period leading up to the establishment 
of New Zealand's 200-mile zone, the MAF was unlikely to oppose strongly 
(if at all) Muldoon's linkage diplomacy. The Ministry appeared to 
conceive its role narrowly as one of giving expert advice concerning 
the technical aspects of fisheries management. The Fisheries Research 
Division and the Fisheries Management Division busied themselves by 
drawing up a detailed report of the fish resources within the 200-mile 
zone. This involved making an inventory of fish stocks, including 
assessing the age and growth rates of certain fish species; presenting 
recommendations regarding permissable annual catch rates; estimating 
the capacity of the New Zealand fishing industry to harvest these 
fish; and calculating the surplus available to DIVFS.
There is little doubt that the Fisheries Divisions actively 
supported the establishment of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
off New Zealand. In fact, the officials in MAF saw the era of extended 
fishing zones as one which would provide new opportunities for the 
further development of the New Zealand fishing industry (and, perhaps, 
the further expansion of the Fisheries Management Division?). These 
bureaucrats encouraged the commercial fishermen to 'think big' and 
won Government support for a number of incentives^- to enable greater 
domestic participation in offshore fisheries exploitation.
Somewhat paradoxically, Muldoon's trade-off strategy against 
Japan (where fishing rights were to be linked to agricultural trade 
issues) received strong support from J.B. Bolger - the new Minister 
of Fisheries.
For some years certain sectors of the New Zealand fishing 
industry had urged Government to create a separate ministerial 
portfolio covering fisheries. These demands increased in 1975 and 
1976 when it became obvious that New Zealand would soon have a 200-mile 
fishing limit, and it was recognised that the burden of work on the 
existing Minister (Duncan MacIntyre, who was responsible for both 
Agriculture and Fisheries) was becoming more onerous. V/hen the new 
portfolio was established in March, 1977, many fishermen must have 
believed that their industry would receive stronger support at the 
higher levels of decision-making.
But is was soon apparent that Bolger (probably no less than 
MacIntyre before him) had divided loyalties between fisheries and
1. These incentives will be detailed in sub-section lie.
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agriculture. First, in addition to his fisheries responsibilities, 
he also had charge of certain rural industries as Associate Minister 
of Agriculture. Second, he was considered a 'rising star' within 
the National Party. Possessed of at least average political ambition, 
it was obvious that Bolger (who was also an ex-farmer) would not wish 
to endanger his political career by alienating the most important sector 
of National Party support - the agricultural lobbyists. Third, he was 
hand-picked for his post by Muldoon. He was unlikely, therefore, to 
attack his mentor's policy towards the Japanese.
It is a tribute to Bolger's political skills that he was able
to support the 'Muldoon diplomacy' without seriously undermining
his credibility with the New Zealand fishermen. In all his public
statements he tried to convince the industry that their interests would
not be sacrificed by bargaining access to the zone in exchange for broad
trade concessions. For example, in April 1977, he noted how New Zealand
could not, under the ICNT, totally exclude foreign activity in the
expanded zone. But, he added, such access will be 'on New Zealand's
terms and will be for the benefit of New Zealand as a whole'. He
continued by noting that when access to DWFS is being considered
'New Zealand shall take into 
account all relevant factors, 
including our total trading relat­
ionships with the countries con­
cerned, including access to markets 
for New Zealand's increased catch.
This does not mean "selling out" our 
New Zealand fishermen - when we are 
discussing foreign fishing countries' 
involvement we are talking of fish 
surplus to New Zealand catching 
capacity.'1•
Many times over the next few months the Minister spoke up on
this issue, trying to allay industry suspicions. In his address to
the New Zealand Seafood Processors' Association he observed
'Government has been criticised 
by some members of the fishing 
industry for using possible third 
nation access to our 200-mile zone 
to gain a better deal for our primary 
exports. It would be nice if we did 
not have to do this but it would be 
patently naive if we gave access to
1. J.B. Bolger, address to South Auckland National Club, Auckland, 
13 April, 1977.
126
the zone on terms less beneficial 
to us than they might otherwise be.
There is some hard bargaining in front 
of us on this matter and our aim, as 
I have said many times, is to get the 
best possible deal for New Zealand and 
by that I include the New Zealand 
fishing industry. When we get down 
to the face-to-face negotiations I am 
sure that one of the questions raised 
will be access to these other nations' 
markets for our own fish products.’1*
Bolger went to great lengths to demonstrate that he - and the 
Government - was deeply committed to expansion of the industry. He 
noted how: the Government had introduced into Parliament the Territorial 
Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Bill, with all that implied for the 
control of foreign fishing; planning for management and policing of 
the zone was well under way; studies into New Zealand's fishing boat 
building capacity and personnel training were being completed; financial 
assistance to the industry was being stepped up; careful consideration 
was being given to the role joint ventures might play in the develop­
ment of the industry; and surveys were being conducted on the size 
of the resources and New Zealand's catching and processing capacity.
Despite his support for the negotiating strategy towards Japan, 
the Minister of Fisheries was not singled out for personal attack by 
the fishermen - in fact, he appeared to retain their respect. Bolger 
appeared as a dynamic, well informed, Minister, and compared more 
than favourably with the Opposition spokesman for fisheries - M. Courtenay 
As will be noted later, Bolger was fortunate in that the Labour Party 
had as yet - that is, in mid-1977 - not developed a well defined fish­
eries policy of its own. It was only later, in mid-1978, when Muldoon's 
'fish-for-beef' strategy seemed to be failing, that Labour advocated 
the adoption of 'fish-for-fish' diplomacy. 
lib. Secondary Issue Area
Next considered are the policy objectives and political influence 
of those actors in New Zealand most intimately associated with the 
secondary issue area: the farmers and their representatives (particul­
arly in the beef and dairy areas); the bureaucrats primarily responsible 
for the trade in agricultural products; the Ministers of Agriculture
1. J.B. Bolger, address to the New Zealand Seafood Processors 
Association, Gisborne, 1 July, 1977.
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and of Overseas Trade (D. MacIntyre and B.E. Talboys); and the Prime 
Minister (R.D. Muldoon). In particular, it will be determined whether 
these actors supported trade-offs between fishing access and other 
economic issue areas.
Not long after Muldoon first raised the prospect of adopting a 
linkage strategy against Japan, the major agricultural interest groups 
in New Zealand made clear their support for such a strategy. Most, if 
not all, the agricultural sector would probably have agreed with the 
sentiments expressed by A.L. Friis (the Chairman of the Dairy Board'*“ ) 
when he addressed the New Zealand Dairy Conference in June, 1976. It 
is worth quoting Frii s at length for his observations were widely 
reported in the media and created much anxiety within the fishing 
industry.
'Mr. Minister, [D. MacIntyre was in the 
audience] I note that amongst your port­
folios you include fisheries. Is it not 
. ironic that we allow countries to come to 
New Zealand to fish for protein near our 
shores, while at the same time some fail 
to purchase our meat and dairy produce 
which could supply their protein needs?
With an extension to a 200-mile limit 
imminent may I suggest that you could 
redress some of the balance in this trad­
ing climate.
If a country needs to fish our protein let 
it take a reasonable quantity, proportionate 
to its purchases of our meat and dairy protein.
If it does not purchase from us I think it 
is fair to say that they must be near to 
self-sufficiency and should not look for 
our natural resources on a free basis. I 
seriously suggest that those who keep us 
out of their markets by restrictive import 
policies should be kept out of the exploit­
ation of our waters until there is a reaslistic 
quid pro quo'.
John Kncebone - President of Federated Farmers, undoubtedly New 
Zealand's most powerful private interest group - made similar comments 
in August, 1976,when he observed that his Federation favoured such
1. The New Zealand Dairy Board is a statutory authority acting as the 
administrative body for the industry and as its export marketing agency. 
Of the board's members, 11 are elected by the dairy cooperative compan­
ies and two are appointed by the Government.
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trade-offs. According to Kneebone ’the idea of bartering fishing and 
our other sought-after resources is not a new one. Discussions along 
these lines are in their third year of development within the Japan/
New Zealand Businessmen's Association.'*‘
As far as can be ascertained, neither the bureaucrats responsible 
for agriculture within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries nor 
their Minister (D. MacIntyre) made any public comments on the question 
of trade-offs linking fishing rights with trade concessions from Japan 
in the agricultural area. There are several possible explanations 
for their silence. Assuming that these actors supported the concept 
of linkage diplomacy (which, from what has been written above seems 
a reasonable assumption) they need not have broadcasted this publicly 
for they could communicate their position in this area privately to 
the farmers' representatives. ( Such a course would have saved them 
from needlessly alienating the domestic fishermen.) Further, there 
was no apparent need for them to respond to the farmers' requests, 
for the Prime Minister himself had made plain his intention to use 
New Zealand's bargaining leverage over fishing access to promote the 
farmers' interests.
The analysis now turns to a closer examination of Muldoon's 
policy priorities with respect to the establishment and operation 
of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. It will be recalled from 
sub-section lb. that Muldoon had: one, favoured the adoption of a 
trade-off strategy against Japan; two, had initially made the linkage 
between fishing access and agricultural trade in only broad terms, 
but later made the linkage in more specific terms; and, three, had 
been motivated in large part by political considerations where, as 
leader of the National Party, he felt bound to respond to the demands 
of the farmers. The following paragraphs will explain in greater 
detail the evolution of Muldoon's trade-off strategy, and list those 
other factors which may have motivated him to pursue such a course.
When Muldoon came to power in late 1975 it was clear that he 
would involve himself deeply in the management of his country's 
economic affairs. Not only was he Prime Minister, but he had
1. Quoted in 'Fish Stocks - A Resource or a Bargaining Point?'
Catch '76, August, 1976, p.3. It will be noted later, however, that 
not all members of the Japan/New Zealand Businessmen's Association 
(JNZBA) were in favour of such trade-offs.
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a l l o c a t e d  t o  h i m s e l f  t h e  F inance p o r t f o l i o .  He had,  moreover,  b u i l t  
up a r e p u t a t i o n  - and,  in f a c t ,  owed h i s  e l e c t i o n  success  in  no small 
p a r t  - as  an e f f i c i e n t ,  tough ,  and s u c c e s s f u l  economic manager.
C e n t r a l  t o  th e  new Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  economic s t r a t e g y  was t h e  promot ion 
o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t s .  In l i n e  with  t h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  
Muldoon e a r l y  d e c l a r e d  h i s  i n t e n t i o n ^ '  t o  p r e s s  f o r  t h e  l i f t i n g  o f  
t a r i f f  and n o n - t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  which many o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  
c o u n t r i e s  a p p l i e d  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t s .
Given t h e  im por tance  o f  t h e  Jap an ese  marke t ,  Muldoon made a p o in t  
o f  v i s i t i n g  Tokyo - in  A p r i l  1976 - d u r ing  th e  f i r s t  o f  t h i s  t r i p s  
o v e r s e a s  as Prime M i n i s t e r .  In h i s  d i s c u s s i o n s  with  t h e  Japanese  
Prime M i n i s t e r  ( M i k i ) , t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  Trade and I n d u s t r y  (Kumoto), 
and t h e  Fore ign  M i n i s t e r  (Miyazawa), Muldoon t r i e d  to  o b t a i n  g u a ran tee s  
o f  lon g - te rm ,  r e g u l a r ,  a cc es s  t o  t h e  Japanese  market  f o r  s e t  amounts 
o f  New Zealand farm produce .
I t  has  been no te d  t h a t  Muldoon had then  i n d i c a t e d  to  t h e  Japanese
t h a t  t h e  f i s h i n g  a c c e s s  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  acces s  i s s u e s  were i n t e r e l a t e d .
Again i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  Muldoon made no t h r e a t s  o f  s p e c i f i c
l i n k a g e s  a t  t h i s  t im e .  The Prime M i n i s t e r  had spoken in r a t h e r  genera l
terms n o t i n g  t h a t  j u s t  as New Zealand should  c o n s i d e r  J a p a n ' s  n a t u r a l
i n t e r e s t  in  a c c e s s  t o  New Z e a l a n d ' s  f i s h  r e s o u r c e s ,  then  t h e  Japanese
should  a l s o  r e c o g n i s e  New Z e a l a n d ' s  concern  about  f a i r  a cc es s  f o r  i t s
e x p o r t s  to  Japan .  New Z e a l a n d ' s  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  i t  was too  e a r l y
to  make any f i rm  commitments t o  t h e  Jap an ese  (o r  to  o t h e r  DWFS) on
t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  f i s h e r i e s  a c c e s s .  W el l ing ton  had not  ye t  f i x e d  a d a t e
f o r  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a 200-mi le  zone,  and had,  in f a c t ,  announced
t h a t  i t  was p r e p a re d  t o  g iv e  UNCLOS f u r t h e r  t ime b e f o r e  New Zealand
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u n i l a t e r a l l y  d e c l a r e d  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  i t s  f i s h i n g  l i m i t s .
What th e  Prime M i n i s t e r  had t r i e d  t o  s t r e s s  was th e  importance  
o f  a to ta l  economic r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  Japan ,  where t h e r e  was to  be 
a b a lan ce  o f  i n t e r e s t s  between t h e  two c o u n t r i e s .  He e x p la in ed  on h i s  
r e t u r n  to  W el l ing ton
1. See 'New Prime M i n i s t e r  o f  New Zealand S p e l l s  Out P o l i c i e s '  Asia  
P a c ific  Forims N o .12, F ebruary ,  1976.
2. See t h e  s ta t em en t  by Muldoon on t h i s  s u b j e c t  made on th e  eve o f  
h i s  d e p a r t u r e  f o r  J a p a n ,  ib id . 3 p . 6 .
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'I told my Japanese hosts that our 
trade relations had to be viewed in 
the round. The same principles of 
stability and permanence should be 
applied to every part of the exchange 
between us. No one part could be 
excluded without damage to the 
relationship as a whole.'
Muldoon appeared generally satisfied with his discussions in 
Tokyo. As he put it 'My message was attentively received. I was 
assured by Japanese Ministers that as Japan's economic recovery
2 .proceeds her purchases of meat and dairy products will also pick up.'
Despite these assurances, the Japanese made no moves to improve 
the trading situation with New Zealand. In early 1977, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry in Japan announced that the next six- 
monthly beef allocation would be 35,000 tonnes - 10,000 tonnes less 
than for the same period in 1976. At the same time, Japanese 
officials gave no indication of increasing their imports of New 
Zealand butter and skimmilk powder.
Muldoon became increasingly impatient with the Japanese. In
February, 1977, the Prime Minister - in an address to a group of
Japanese businessmen visiting Wellington - stated that he had less
than complete sympathy for the Japanese Government's argument that,
given the delicate political situation in Japan, it could not be
expected to make major changes in its agricultural import policies.
Muldoon added that there was a 'need for politicians to solve political 
3problems.'
It was in Muldoon's speech to the Pacific Basin Economic Council
(PBEC) luncheon of 10 May, 1977, where a clear and direct linkage
was made between the fisheries access and agricultural trade issues.
The Prime Minister observed
'Within the next two months or so, a 
Bill will be introduced into the New Zealand 
Parliament establishing a 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone around our shores. We are 
already in negotiation with some countries 
who wish to fish inside that zone with the 
cooperation of the New Zealand Government.
The Japanese fishing effort off the shores 
of New Zealand, and inside that zone at the
1. A. Haas 'Muldoon Assesses His Official Visit to Japan' Asia Pacific 
Forum, Vo'1.2, No.3, 1976, p.15.
2. Press statement by the Prime Minister, R.D. Muldoon, 6 May, 1976, 
on returning from his overseas tour.
3. Muldoon's address to Japanese businessmen at James Cook Hotel,
Wellington, 7 February, 1977.
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present time, is quite heavy. The New 
Zealand Government has come to the 
conclusion that, in the light of our 
failure to get an adequate response on 
the question of farm products, no 
agreements will be signed with any 
Japanese fishing organisation until 
we can get an assurance of regular 
access for our farm products on to 
the Japanese market. '1•
In passing, it may be noted how Muldoon had introduced the
subject of other foreign countries wanting to fish off New Zealand. He
had obviously decided that the Soviet Union and South Korea - whose
trading records with New Zealand were, in some areas, no better than
Japan’s - could be used as pawns in his game to force the Japanese
2to agree to his terms. By offering access to other DWFS, the Prime 
Minister hoped to demonstrate to Tokyo that Mew Zealand could, if 
necessary, dispense with Japanese fishing skills, technology and 
markets for fish exports.
From mid-1977 onwards, Muldoon lost no opportunity in trying to 
convince the Japanese that his threats of linkage should be taken 
seriously. For example, in his meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda 
in Kuala Lumpur in August that year, he made reference to the linkage
of fisheries access and agricultural trade issues (which by now had
. 3been clearly identified in specific areas).
It should be emphasised that Muldoon had a very strong personality 
which did not easily tolerate opposition to his policies - whether on 
the international or domestic stage. It was likely, therefore, that 
Muldoon would be able to persuade his Cabinet colleagues and his 
bureaucratic advisers to support the linkage strategy against Japan.
With respect to the latter, several New Zealanders and Japanese 
intimately involved in the fisheries negotiations of 1977-78 indicated 
to the author that some of the strongest support for the 'Muldoon dip­
lomacy' came from senior officials in the Prime Minister's Department.
Finally, this sub-section examines the attitude of the Minister 
of Overseas Trade (B.E. Talboys) and of officials in the Department 
of Trade and Industry to Muldoon's policy initiative towards Japan.
1. Address to PBFC luncheon by R.D. Muldoon, Christchurch, 10 May, 1977.
2. This bargaining strategy will be examined in greater detail in 
Section III.
3. The specific agricultural concessions sought from Japan at this time 
will be spelt out in sub-section lie.
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At the outset, it should be mentioned that Talboys has always 
been a 'loyal lieutenant' to the Prime Minister.^' While it will be 
noted later that Talboys, in his capacity as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, had some reservations about the style of Muldoon's policy 
stance against Japan, he was generally very supportive of the broad 
strategy. This was demonstrated in many of the speeches he made 
on this subject, one example of which follows. In an address to the 
Business Group of the Japan Society of Auckland in early 1977, he 
observed
'The Prime Minister has spoken about 
the concept of the total economic 
relationship. For its part the New 
Zealand Government is very conscious of 
Japan's predicament - its needs for 
natural resources and food supplies, 
particularly fish...We remain ready to 
respond in a forward looking way to 
approaches from the Japanese authorities, 
not least because of our recognition of 
the importance to us of our overall 
relations with Japan. However, it is 
of the utmost importance that the Japanese 
Government should equally show understand­
ing of New Zealand's situation...If there 
are no signs of progress towards meeting 
our reasonable concerns and modest 
objectives particularly for butter, milk 
powder, beef and sawn timber, then it is 
hardly to be expected of us that we give 
straightforward and positive responses 
when we come to talking about areas of 
economic concern to the Japanese 
Government.'2•
Several New Zealand and Japanese officials involved in the 
negotiations of 1977-78 suggested to the present writer that the New 
Zealand Prime Minister received very strong support for his linkage 
concept from 'the most senior levels' of the Department of Trade and 
Industry.
lie. Other Issue Areas
The analysis now considers how those actors in the 'other issue 
areas' category listed in sub-section Ic. viewed the proposed linkage 
strategy against Japan.
1. Talboys' loyalty to the Prime Minister was most recently demonstrated 
during the leadership crisis of October, 1980. See 'Discontent "Erupts 
Like a Geyser" in NZ'. The Canberra Times3 24 October, 1980.
2. B.E. Talboys' address to the Business Group of the Japan Society 
of Auckland, Auckland, 15 March, 1977.
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It does not appear that either the aluminium exporters or the 
iron ore exporters made any public comments on the so-called 'fish- 
for-beef' diplomacy. There are at least two possible explanations 
for this. First, it would have been difficult for either group to 
have opposed policies strongly promoted by the New Zealand Government; 
for each depended in some way on the goodwill and cooperation of 
Wellington for the continued success of their enterprises. As noted 
above, New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd. relied on the State-run 
Manapouri hydro-electric scheme for the supply of electric power, 
and the iron ore developers were constrained by Government export 
controls. Second, it is likely that both groups had assessed that 
there was little risk that Japan would - in response to the Muldoon 
linkage strategy - retaliate against their industries. In the global 
aluminium trade it was generally a sellers' market. Further, there 
was considerable Japanese investment in the project at Tiwai Point, 
Bluff. Neither were the Japanese likely to hit back at the iron ore 
exporters. The ironsands exported by New Zealand had special chemical 
properties which made them particularly attractive to the Japanese 
steel industry.
It is possible, however, that some New Zealand businessmen 
involved in the trade with Japan - including importers of Japanese 
products - had voiced their opposition to the 'Muldoon diplomacy'. As 
will be noted in sub-section Illb., in early 1978 - during the most 
delicate period of the negotiations between Tokyo and Wellington 
on trade and fisheries matters - representatives from the Japan/New 
Zealand Businessmen's Association warned the Prime Minister of the 
dangers attached to his trade-off strategy. However, even if one 
assumes that these businessmen had communicated similar concern to 
Wellington^' earlier when the Government was developing its negotiating 
position towards Japan, it was obvious that they would have little 
chance of influencing the final policy choice. First, the representat­
ion to the Prime Minister in early 1978 revealed that not all members 
of the JNZBA were agreed about the dangers of the 'Muldoon diplomacy' 
and, second, no private interest group in New Zealand had the political
1. The present writer discovered no evidence suggesting that such 
concern had been voiced by members of the JNZBA before the negotiations 
with Japan began in late 1977.
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influence of the rural lobby who strongly favoured linking fishing 
access with concessions in the agricultural trade area.
It was noted in sub-section Ic. that there is a set of bureau­
cratic actors deeply involved in the relationship with Japan not 
included in the primary and secondary issue areas - namely those 
employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following paragraphs 
determine how these officials viewed the proposed trade-off strategy.
In the course of a number of interviews conducted with officers 
in New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from mid-1976 until late 
1978 it was revealed that there was a strong division of opinion 
within the Ministry concerning the wisdom of a trade-off strategy.
On the one hand there were those who opposed resources bargaining. 
While this group recognised that serious problems existed in the trade 
relationship with Japan and that strong action was demanded, they 
believed that such action should be conducted within the more 'normal' 
bounds of diplomacy. They put forward several arguments for keeping 
separate fisheries and trade matters in negotiations with Japan. One, 
they claimed it was doubtful whether a coastal state like New Zealand 
could - under the guidelines of the ICNT - discriminate against a 
foreign fishing country such as Japan which had been operating off 
New Zealand for some years and which had cooperated in the provision 
of fisheries research data. Two, they believed that a linkage strategy 
against Japan could lead to an allout trade war and the breakdown of 
friendly bilateral relations. Three, it was claimed that a linkage 
strategy was not only unwise but was also unnecessary. Arguing much 
along the same lines as Philip Ashenden (see sub-section Ic.), these 
officials believed the Government-to-Government discussions on trade 
matters could be supplemented by a vigorous 'propaganda' campaign by 
the Embassy in Tokyo, where appeals would be made to Japanese 
consumer groups and others in Japan to pressure their Government into 
making the necessary concessions on agricultural commodity access.
On the other hand, there were some in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs who strongly supported the linkage strategy advocated by the 
Prime Minister. They argued, for example, that the ICNT had - under 
Article 62, paragraph 3^‘ - made provision for the adoption of such 
a strategy towards foreign fishing countries. They further agreed with
1. Where, it will be recalled, the wording was 'In giving access to 
other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the 
coastal state shall take into account all relevant factors, including 
...its other national interests'.
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the Prime Minister that New Zealand's economic situation was sufficiently 
serious to justify strong measures. Fifteen years of patient and polite 
diplomacy with Japan had failed to achieve anything of substance in 
the matter of freer agricultural market access.
There was, however, one area where both groups within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were agreed. This was with respect to 
the style of New Zealand's diplomatic approach to Japan. Neither 
group favoured what they considered to be the needlessly abrasive 
and rude manner of the Prime Minister. (Just how abrasive and rude 
Muldoon was in his approach will be revealed in Section III.) The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talboys, had demonstrated that it was 
possible to be both tough and polite when dealing with the Japanese.
The last group of actors considered here is the Labour Party.
Very briefly we will examine what the Opposition spokesmen had to 
say with respect to fisheries management in the era of 200-mile exclus­
ive economic zones and with respect to the 'Muldoon diplomacy'.
During the important period 1976 to 1977 - when New Zealand's 
200-mile zone policies were being discussed, and when Muldoon's 
strategy towards Japanese fishing access was evolving - the Labour 
Party appeared confused, with no well defined policy positions of its 
own. It is true that Labour gave positive support to some broad policy 
areas, such as: the establishment of a 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone; controls on foreign fishing activities; and greater investment 
in the local fishing industry. But the Opposition failed to produce 
any new policy initiatives in specific problem areas, such as: market 
access for New Zealand's fish exports, or Third Country Trading.^’
Nowhere was the lack of direction in Labour's policies more 
apparent than its attitude to the 'Muldoon diplomacy'. Early in the 
National administration, the Opposition urged Government to adopt a 
tough negotiating stance vis-a-vis Japan on the agricultural trade 
question. When Muldoon first started to link the fisheries access 
issue with that of trade concessions from Japan, the Labour Party 
voiced no opposition. It was only later, from late 1977 on - when 
the Muldoon strategy appeared to be failing - that Labour went on 
to the attack. As will be noted in sub-section Illb., Labour spokesmen 
condemned the Prime Minister: first, for exaggerating the degree to
1. For example, Bill Rowling (Leader of the Opposition), in his 
address to the Annual Conference of the Federation of Commercial 
Fishermen in mid-1976, barely touched upon these issues.
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which New Zealand could expect to use its leverage over fisheries 
access to win trade concessions from the Japanese; and, second, for 
adopting brash, ’bullying', tactics against Japan which (it was felt) 
would only lead to a further deterioration in New Zealand-Japanese 
relations.
Labour's counter-proposal of seeking 'fish-for-fish'^* deals
with the Japanese took a long time to emerge. Colin Moyle (Labour's
former Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries) had suggested such
2a policy in November 1977, ’ but it was not until July 1978 that the 
Labour Party fully embraced this strategy.
It is not surprising that many in the fishing industry viewed 
Labour's policies on fisheries access with cynicism. Even when 
Labour politicians did, at last, advocate 'fish-for-fish' deals with 
Japan, it appeared that their motive was more to embarass Muldoon 
politically than from a sincere desire to support fishing industry 
interests. .
A brief summary is now given of the attitudes of the different 
actors described above towards linkage diplomacy involving New Zealand's 
proposed exclusive economic zone and its fish resources. It will be 
noted that most - but certainly not all - the actors had policy 
preferences somewhat similar to those predicted in the analytical 
framework. In the primary issue area the fishermen were generally 
strongly opposed to trade-offs across different issue areas. (However, 
it was also noted that: some prominent fisheries personalities gave 
at least qualified support for the trade-off strategy; the Minister 
of Fisheries - who also had certain responsibilities in the secondary 
issue area - supported the Prime Minister's diplomatic initiative 
against Japan; and the Fisheries Divisions in the Ministry of Agricul­
ture and Fisheries did not publicly oppose the linkage diplomacy.) In 
the secondary issue area, all actors were very much in favour of the 
linkage concept. In the 'other issue areas' category, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs - probably the most influential set of actors in 
this category - was divided on this subject, with some officers 
supporting the 'Muldoon diplomacy' and others against it. There is 
no question that the political influence of those favouring the 
trade-off strategy far outweighed that of those opposed.
1. Labour's 'fish-for-fish' strategy will be explained later.
2. See 'Moyle Supports Japan Venture' The Dominion10 November, 1977, 
and sub-section Illb.
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l i d .  Decis ion-Making Network
This  s u b - s e c t i o n  examines v e ry  b r i e f l y  t h e  d ec i s ion -m ak ing  
machinery  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  New Zealand to  fo rm u la te  p o l i c i e s  bo th  with  
r e s p e c t  to  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  and im plem en ta t ion  o f  a 200-mi le e x c l u s i v e  
economic zone,  and with  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  b r o a d e r  q u e s t i o n  o f  l i n k a g e  
diplomacy in v o l v in g  New Z e a l a n d ' s  l e v e ra g e  over  f o r e i g n  f i s h i n g  a c c e s s .
The fo l lo w in g  a n a l y s i s  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  d iv i d e d  i n t o  two p a r t s :  th e  
f i r s t  w i l l  examine th o s e  bod ie s  w i th  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  f o rm u la t in g  
p o l i c i e s  r e l a t e d  most s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  f i s h e r i e s  management i s s u e s ;  w hile  
t h e  second examines t h o s e  bod ie s  p r i m a r i l y  concerned  with  t h e  b roade r  
economic dimensions  o f  New Z e a l a n d ' s  f i s h e r i e s  acc e s s  p o l i c i e s .
New Zea land ,  in  common with  many o t h e r  c o a s t a l  f i s h i n g  s t a t e s ,  
seemed i l l - p r e p a r e d  to  meet t h e  e ra  o f  200-mi le  e x c l u s i v e  economic 
zones .  In t h e  mid-1970s ,  when New Zealand was c o n tem p la t in g  i n t r o d u c in g  
a 200-mile zone,  t h e r e  was no comprehensive f i s h e r i e s  p la n n in g  in  t h a t  
c o u n t ry .  No s i n g l e  pe r so n  o r  group had been ap p o in ted  f o r  t h i s  pu rpose ,  
o r  was capab le  o f  g e t t i n g  an overview o f  t h e  e n t i r e  i n d u s t r y  and i t s  
f u t u r e .  There were a t  l e a s t  20 Government a g e n c ie s  o r  o t h e r  bod ies  
which had r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r ,  or  cou ld  e x e r c i s e  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e  ove r ,  
f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  development.  Among t h e s e  groups t h e r e  was g e n e r a l l y  
a low l e v e l  o f  c o o r d i n a t i o n  and c o o p e r a t i o n .  Var ious  a s p e c t s  o f  f i s h e r i e s  
management were p la c e d  in  t h e  hands o f  d i f f e r e n t  committees - f o r  example,  
t h e  F i s h e r i e s  Review Committee,  t h e  S h ip b u i l d in g  Committee and th e  F i s h ­
ing I n d u s t r y  F inance Committee - which,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and F i s h e r i e s  t o  r e p o r t  on 
t h e s e  m a t t e r s  t o  C ab ine t .  Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from th e  
F i s h e r i e s  Management and F i s h e r i e s  Research D i v i s io n s  g e n e r a l l y  p layed  
key r o l e s  in  t h e  work o f  t h e s e  commit tees .  The commercial f i s h i n g  
i n d u s t r y ' s  i n t e r e s t s  were most commonly r e p r e s e n t e d  on th e  committees 
( i f  a t  a l l )  by o f f i c i a l s  from t h e  FIB^‘ . The most im por tan t  channel  
o f  communication between government and t h e  l o c a l  f ishermen  was th rough  
t h e  F is h in g  I n d u s t r y  Board L ia i s o n  Committee.
1. The f i sherm en  f r e q u e n t l y  complained t h a t  t h e y  were r a r e l y  c o n s u l t e d  
on im por tan t  m a t t e r s  o f  p o l i c y  in v o lv in g  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y .  Some f ishermen 
argued  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  FIB was not  p r o p e r l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e i r  
i n d u s t r y  and t h a t  th e  P r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  Commercial 
Fishermen and th e  Seafood P r o c e s s o r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n  should  be c o n s u l t e d  
more by Government.
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In commenting on the lack of preparedness for the new era, the
FIB in 1976 observed
'no single fisheries development plan 
or policy exists nor can it exist 
until bodies exercising great influence 
on fisheries development collectively 
prepare such a plan'.**
It was about this time, however, that the policy-making machinery 
for the establishment and management of a 200-nautical mile EEZ off 
New Zealand began to be set up. The Ministries of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and of Foreign Affairs were given the largest roles, with 
important inputs also expected from the Prime Minister's Department, 
the Department of Trade and Industry, the Defence Department, and 
Treasury.
The Legal Affairs' Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
had the major task of drafting the Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Bill. This they did after consultation with other 
Government departments. The fishing industry was able to participate 
in some small measure by passing recommendations on this Bill when the 
Government invited submissions to a Parliamentary Select Committee in 
July, 1977.1 2 3*
The task of devising a system of controls for managing the 200- 
mile EEZ fell largely on the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
Late in 1977, a three-man task force - the Exclusive Economic Zone 
Planning Group, EEZPG, all of whom were members of either the Fisheries 
Management Division or the Fisheries Research Division - was formed.
3The EEZPG ' held discussions with representatives from Foreign Affairs, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Defence, Trade and Industry, and Treasury, 
and drew up a draft of regulations which it handed over to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs who had final responsibility for administering 
legislation related to the EEZ. (It will be recalled that the fishing 
industry had been able to voice its opinions on conditions to be 
attached to licences for foreign fishing vessels permitted access to 
the zone at a meeting of the FIB Liaison Committee in September, 1977.)
The formulation of policies related to j.oint fishing ventures 
involved a number of bodies. The Cabinet Economic Committee and its 
Officials Advisory Group reviewed the broad criteria governing the
1. Report of FIB, 1976, p.6.
2. Submissions received included those from the FIB, the Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen and the Seafood Processors' Association.
3. It may be noted that once the EEZ became fully operational in April, 
1978, the EEZPG was disbanded.
139
acceptance of joint venture proposals. Early in 1978, an Officials 
Committee was set up under the Chairmanship of B.T. Cunningham (Director 
of the Fisheries Management Division) to examine proposals for foreign 
involvement in the domestic fishing industry, and to recommend to the 
Minister of Fisheries those which promised the maximum benefit to New 
Zealand. Some five or six Government departments were represented on 
this Committee.
Prime responsibility for drawing up policies related to policing 
the EEZ was jointly shared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
and the Defence Department. These two Departments worked closely 
together to define those sectors of New Zealand’s offshore area in 
which foreign fishing activity could be expected at various times of 
the year.
It will be noted that the task of drawing up policies with 
respect to the policing of the EEZ, the control of joint fishing 
ventures, the licensing of foreign fishing vessels, and those other 
aspects of fisheries management listed above, was left largely to 
the technical experts within the bureaucracy. By contrast, the formul­
ation of policies involving the broader application of New Zealand’s 
leverage over foreign fishing access - that is in areas outside fisheries 
- were made at the highest levels of Government.
It is no exaggeration to say that the linkage strategy whereby 
fishing access was to be exchanged for concessions from Japan in the 
agricultural trade area was largely the personal initiative of the 
New Zealand Prime Minister, R.D. Muldoon. From early 1976 (when the 
first public declaration of some kind of trade-off strategy involving 
the proposed 200-mile zone was made) to mid-1978 (when the Fisheries 
Agreement with Japan was signed) Muldoon was intimately involved in 
the decision-making process.
While the Prime Minister had a dominant role in this process, 
other senior Government officials also played a part in formulating 
the broad negotiating strategy towards Japan. Through their particip­
ation in the Cabinet Economic Committee, Muldoon's Ministerial colleag­
ues had the chance to put forward their views on the proposed linkage 
diplomacy. Senior bureaucrats were also brought into the policy 
process, for they were given the task of drawing up policy recommendat­
ions which were submitted to the Cabinet Economic Committee. (The 
separate Government Ministries and Departments also gave advice in 
this area to their respective Ministers.) Those Departments most
involved in putting 'flesh* on the Prime Minister's policy initiative 
were those of Trade and Industry and Foreign Affairs, with the Prime 
Minister's Department, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Treasury also 
making important contributions. The fishing industry played only a 
very minor role in these deliberations; with Jarman (the General 
Manager of the FIB) being permitted to attend some of the politically 
less sensitive meetings of the Cabinet Economic Committee, 
lie. Policy Choice
Section II of the case study concludes with an examination of 
the various policy choices made by Wellington with respect to the 
establishment and use of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. A number 
of questions will be addressed, including: did the New Zealand Govern­
ment eventually decide to establish a 200-mile zone; if so, for what 
policy objectives did the Government seek to exercise its bargaining 
leverage over the DWFS - to promote the interests of the domestic 
fishing industry and/or to promote other economic interests; and, most 
specifically, did Wellington decide to use its leverage over foreign 
fishing access as a lever to gain trade-offs in the secondary issue 
area described above? Sub-section lie. is divided into two parts: 
the first examines those policy choices made concerning fisheries 
management; and the second identifies those policy decisions which 
might have been made with respect to trade-offs across different 
issue areas.
It will be recalled that New Zealand (together with Australia) 
was one of the earliest advocates within the UNCLOS for the establish­
ment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones. New Zealand was not, however, 
one of the first States to establish such a zone. Shortly after taking 
office as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talboys noted
'While large and middle-ranking 
powers may achieve a measure of success 
in protecting unilateral extensions of 
their fishing limits, a country of New 
Zealand’s size and with New Zealand's 
resources is not well placed to do so.
We need the protection of a widely  ^
accepted treaty on the law of the sea. '
A little over a year later, however, New Zealand decided to push
1. Press statement, 11 March, 1976, reported in New Zealand Foreign 
Affairs Review3 Vol.26, No.3, March, 1976, p.40.
ahead with the unilateral declaration of an exclusive economic zone.
It had become apparent that, even if a major breakthrough were to be 
achieved at the sixth session of UNCLOS III which resumed in New York 
on 23 May, 1977 , it would take at least one more session to conclude 
a Law of the Sea Treaty. It was felt that New Zealand need not - 
indeed should not - delay any longer. First, foreign fishing fleets 
continued to put pressure on fish resources also exploited by New 
Zealand fishermen. Extension of New Zealand fishing limits had 
become a matter of urgency to ensure proper conservation and management 
of fish stocks. Second, until late 1976 there had been a fear by some 
Foreign Affairs officials that an assertion of 200-mile jurisdiction 
would not be internationally accepted - particularly by the major 
distant water fishing states (Japan and the Soviet Union). Since then 
many countries - including Japan and the Soviet Union - had made 200- 
mile zone claims. It was, therefore, felt that the establishment of 
such a zone was well-founded in international law and in the practice 
of States.
The decision having been made to establish a 200-mile zone off 
New Zealand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 May, 1977, introduced 
into the House of Representatives the Territorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Bill. This Bill was finally passed into law four months 
later - on 26 September. On that day was also promulgated the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (Interim Measures for Foreign Fishing Craft) 
Regulations 1977. These two pieces of legislation, which together 
provided for the establishment of a 200-mile EEZ and for the regulation 
of foreign fishing craft within the zone, will now be examined in 
detail.
The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 
(hereafter referred to as the Act) closely resembles certain parts of 
the ICNT.
Section 3 of the Act provides for the establishment of a 
territorial sea 12 nautical miles in width, and Section 9 establishes 
the exclusive economic zone which extends 188 nautical miles beyond 
the territorial sea.
1. Except in cases where less than 400 nautical miles separates New 
Zealand from another country, where the median line principle deter­
mines the outer limits of the zone.
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Sections 11 to 13 concern allocation of catches. The Minister 
of Fisheries is given the power to determine: the total allowable 
catch; the portion that New Zealand fishing craft have the capacity 
to harvest; the portion of the catch available for foreign fishing 
craft; and the quotas available to fishing craft of different 
nationalities. In apportioning the catch among the DWFS the Minister 
may take into account:^' the interests of foreign fishing craft that 
have habitually fished in the zone; whether a foreign country has 
cooperated with New Zealand in fisheries research and identification 
of stocks; whether a foreign country has cooperated with New Zealand 
in managing the resources of the zone; the terms of any relevant 
international agreements; and other matters that the Minister, after 
consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, determines to be 
relevant.
Sections 14 to 20 of the Act refer to the licensing of foreign 
craft. A foreign fishing craft may not fish in the FEZ unless it 
has a licence to do so. In granting a licence the Minister of 
Fisheries may attach to it certain conditions. These conditions - 
many of which are similar to those outline.l in the ICNT, Article 62, 
paragraph 4 - include: the areas within the EEZ in which fishing 
is authorised; the seasons, times, and particular voyages during which 
fishing is authorised; the species, size, age, and quantities of 
fish that may be taken; the methods by which fish may be taken; the 
types, size, and amount of fishing gear that may be used or carried 
by a foreign fishing craft; the use, transfer, transhipment, landing, 
and processing of fish taken; entry by the foreign fishing craft to 
New Zealand ports; statistical and other information required to be 
given by the foreign fishing craft to the MAF; fisheries research; 
training of New Zealand personnel in methods of fishing employed by 
the foreign fishing craft; and so on.
The Act goes on to note (see Section 18) that to obtain a 
licence, foreign fishermen must pay a fee. The fee varies according
1. It may be noted that the drafting of the Minister's powers in this 
area in permissive terms ('the Minister may take into account') varies 
from that detailed in the ICNT. Under New Zealand's Territorial Sea 
and Exclusive Economic Zone Act the Minister's discretion appears 
unrestricted - that is, he is permitted to refuse to take the factors 
listed above into account. It will be recalled that the ICNT implies 
that the coastal state has an obligation to give foreign States 
access to its surplus fish by using the word 'shall' in this context. 
(See ICNT Article 62, paragraphs 2 and 3.)
to the type of fishing craft and may reflect the costs incurred in 
managing the resources of the EEZ.
The Act provides for stiff penalties against foreign fishing 
craft operating in the EEZ without a licence (fines of up to $100,000), 
or operating in contravention of any condition attached to their 
licences (fines of up to $25,000). The Minister of Fisheries is also 
empowered to cancel or suspend licences when he is satisfied that a 
foreign fishing craft has violated a condition of its licence.
Section 29 deals with interim and transitional measures which 
may, from time to time, be introduced by Order in Council for the 
conservation and management of fisheries resources beyond the territor­
ial sea but within the EEZ.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (Interim Measures for Foreign Fishing 
Craft) Regulations - hereafter referred to as Interim Measures - were 
the first of the measures specified in Section 29 of the Act. These 
regulations set minimum mesh sizes for trawl nets used by foreign 
fishing craft in the EEZ and prohibited foreign trawling in certain 
areas of the zone. Foreign trawling was prohibited indefinitely in 
five areas and was prohibited in two further areas from 1 October,
1977, to 31 December, 1977.*'
The Interim Measures were to come into force on 1 October, 1977, 
as were those provisions in the Act referring to the Territorial Sea. 
However, those provisions covering the establishment and operation of 
the EEZ were not to come into force until 1 April, 1978.
The local fishermen could take satisfaction from the fact that
under the Act and the Interim Measures they would be given substantial
protection from foreign fishing competition. Shortly after the
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Bill was introduced into
Parliament, Bolger explained to the New Zealand fishermen how the
2total allowable catch would be classified into three groupings:
1. Later - on 25 November, 1977 - a further, sixth, area was declared 
off limits to foreign trawlers.
2. As Bolger explained in his address to the Annual Conference of the 
New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen, Christchurch, 1 June,
1977 ’The species making up this allowable catch figure have tentat­
ively been classified into three groupings to indicate recommended 
future fishing effort. Class "A" species are those reserved for local 
exploitation only. Snapper and tarakihi are two species that, logically, 
fall within this category. These so-called "prime fish" will, as I
have said, be wholly reserved for the New Zealand fishing industry 
so that our local fleet will catch the lot. Put another way it means 
that foreign vessels will not be allowed to take any of these species.
Class 'A' species - involving prime fish - which would be reserved
for local fishermen; Class 1B* species which could be shared with
other nations; and Class 'C species which would be largely licensed
out to foreign nations. The Interim Measures announced on 26 September
revealed that the Government was committed to conserving the prime
coastal demersal stocks and to eliminating the worst excesses of
foreign fishing competition. On the day that these new regulations
were announced, Talboys noted
'The principal effect of these 
regulations is to prohibit all 
trawling by foreign fishing 
vessels in five main areas where 
the prime species of major concern 
to the New Zealand industry, partic­
ularly snapper and tarakihi, are 
concentrated. The New Zealand 
industry already takes the entire 
allowable catch of these species 
and accordingly the continuation 
• of foreign fishing efforts in 
those areas would result in over 
exploitation!*•'
But neither the Act nor the Interim Measures addressed in 
detail (for they were not designed to do so) many of the other areas 
in which the local fishermen sought concessions related to fisheries 
from the DWFS. For example, with respect to the training of New 
Zealand personnel by DWFS, the provision of fisheries research data, 
and the local processing of fish caught by foreign fishermen, the 
Act spoke only in general terms noting that the Minister of Fisheries 
may attach such conditions when granting licences to foreign fishing 
craft. However, it should be emphasised that the granting of licences 
would only take place after New Zealand had negotiated fishing 
agreements with the DWFS. It appeared, therefore, that the local 
fishermen would have to wait until after these fishing agreements 
with other countries had been signed before they could determine 
whether Wellington intended to push strongly for the concessions listed 
above.
Class "B" species are those which could ... be shared with other nations 
without having detrimental effects on our fishing industry ... Category 
"C" species are those which are unlikely to be taken by New Zealand 
fishermen, certainly in the short term and probably in the medium-to-long 
term too, and which could be largely licensed out to foreign nations 
without affecting development opportunities for New Zealand. Squid is 
the obvious example!
1. Press statement from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister,
B.E. Talboys, 26 September, 1977.
Neither were these two pieces of legislation designed to address 
the important subject of overseas marketing of fish caught within the 
EEZ. But it appears that the New Zealand Government failed elsewhere 
to place sufficient emphasis to this vital element of fisheries 
development policies. Wellington had, for example, claimed that it 
could do little to control the sale of fish caught by licensed foreign 
fishing vessels operating in the EEZ - the so-called Third Country Trad­
ing problem. (See sub-section la.) The Minister of Fisheries pointed 
out that no other country in the world, when licensing foreign vessels 
to fish in its zone, had imposed restrictions on the use of the 
fish product. Bolger also noted that
'To forbid third country trading 
would be a difficult requirement to 
police because once fish goes into 
the international marketing chain it 
would be difficult to determine which 
market was supplied with which fish 
from what source. Furthermore, if we 
could enforce the provision that fish 
caught by foreign nations should be 
consumed in that country it must be 
assumed that countries with fish 
surplus to their own requirements 
would then place some of the fish 
caught within their own waters on 
the world market. Clearly this could 
not be stopped.'1•
Neither had the Government demonstrated that it was prepared to
take the strong action demanded by the domestic fishermen to break
down barriers to the trade in fish existing in overseas markets -
namely, if a foreign nation refused to remove these trade restrictions
then its vessels should not be permitted access to New Zealand's EEZ.
The Government had merely indicated that
'When we get down to the face-to- 
face negotiations I am sure one of 
the questions raised will be access 
to these other nations' markets for 
our own fish products' 2«
As will be detailed later, Wellington had decided to include the
1. J.B. Bolger's address to the 39th Annual General Meeting of the New 
Zealand Seafood Processors' Association, Christchurch, 30 June, 1978.
2. J.B. Bolger's address to the New Zealand Seafood Processors' 
Association, Gisborne, 1 July, 1977. Present author's emphasis.
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subject of fish market access within the broader context of the 
total bilateral trade relationship in its forthcoming negotiations 
with Japan. From the local fisherman's point of view there were 
several dangers involved in discussing the fish market access issue 
together with that concerning agricultural commodities' access. On 
the one hand, there was the risk that these two issues might be 
considered as part of a total package deal. If the DWFS decided to 
reject this package because of objections to the agricultural trade 
proposals contained therein, then there would be no agreement on the 
fish market access issue. Conversely, there was a risk that the 
New Zealand Government would be so anxious to win concessions for 
its agricultural exports that it would be 'soft' in its demands for 
concessions for New Zealand's fish exports.
By late 1977, Wellington had also announced its policies with
respect to joint fishing ventures involving foreign enterprises.
After prolonged and careful consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of joint ventures, the Government announced that it
favoured such projects so long as they were very carefully controlled.^
The Government drew up a set of guidelines to assist New Zealand
fishing (and other] companies thinking of entering into cooperative
ventures with overseas interests. These guidelines were announced
in October 1977 - subsequently appearing in a paper produced by the
2Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ’ - and listed the major criteria 
by which submitted proposals would be ranked. These criteria expected 
the venture as far as possible to: ultilise stocks not commonly being 
fished by existing New Zealand interests (or likely to be in the near 
future); develop a fishery which is capable of significant expansion 
but requires resources or technology beyond the present capacity of 
New Zealand to provide; incorporate a reasonable degree of New Zealand 
participation including equity management, labour, materials, and 
finance; be export oriented; provide for the maximum economic degree 
of processing in New Zealand; provide assured export marketing
1. For a detailed explanation of why the Government had decided in 
favour of joint fishing ventures see Bolger's address to the 39th 
Annual General Meeting of the New Zealand Seafood Processors' Associat­
ion, Christchurch, 30 June, 19.78.
2. See Proposals for Fishing Industry Co-operation Between New Zealand 
and Overseas Interests: General Information for Applicants} Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, 17 April, 1978.
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arrangements and remunerative prices to New Zealand; otherwise contri­
bute significantly to the economic expansion and/or development of the 
New Zealand fishing industry; fully comply with relevant New Zealand 
legal provisions including those relating to the management of the 
200 mile EEZ; and so on. It was decided to set up a Committee of 
Officials which would consider joint venture proposals when foreign 
participation was in excess of 24.9 per cent to ensure that all joint 
ventures agreed to provide tangible benefits for New Zealand and 
the local fishing industry.
It was evident that the New Zealand Government hoped that the 
establishment of a 200-mile EEZ would help promote the further expansion 
of the domestic fishing industry. From 1976 on, the Government 
introduced a series of policy initiatives to facilitate the industry’s 
growth. In late 1976, for example, Wellington relaxed its restrictions 
against duty-free imports of new and near-new foreign built fishing 
vessels. The Government also moved to provide greater financial 
assistance to the industry through such measures as: suspensory loans
for approved costs of construction and equipment of vessels at least 
15 metres (formerly 21 metres) in length; loan schemes to assist young, 
well qualified, fishermen to obtain their first fishing vessel; Rural 
Bank assistance for vessel re-engineering and other improvements; a 
fishing boat ownership savings scheme; training incentives; grants to 
the FIB; and (in the 1977 Budget) a sum of $200,000 for the establish­
ment of a Fisheries Development Grant Fund.
But it was also evident that the Government did not intend to 
use its bargaining leverage over foreign fishing access only to promote 
the interests of the New Zealand fishing industry. As noted in 
sub-sections lb. and lib., the Prime Minister had - by early/mid-1977 - 
plainly decided to use New Zealand's leverage in this area to gain 
concessions from Japan in the agricultural commodities' trade. It will 
be recalled that at the PBEC luncheon of 10 May, 1977, Muldoon had 
warned 'no agreements will be signed with any Japanese fishing organ­
isation until we can get an assurance of regular access for our farm 
products on to the Japanese market ' .
By mid-1977 the New Zealand Government had clearly defined those 
specific areas in which it expected the Japanese to give way. In 
July that year Wellington handed over to Tokyo a statement (in the form 
of an aide memoire) summarising what New Zealand was seeking by way of 
improved access for its key agricultural products. These demands in
effect amounted to part of the price * that New Zealand expected Japan
to pay for access to the EEZ.
2The aide memoire ' referred to three areas - dairy products 
(butter and skimmilk powder), beef and sawn timber. With respect to 
butter and skimmilk powder (SMP), New Zealand requested the Japanese 
Government to take measures to encourage the consumption of these 
products, and expressed the hope that a reasonable part of any 
increased consumption would be met by increased imports. Wellington 
further requested that annual global import quotas be established for 
butter and SMP for general use.
New Zealand also asked for a minimum annual global quota of beef 
for general use of 100,000 tonnes, with a year's delivery schedule to 
be established when the quota is announced. Wellington further sought 
from Japan a larger allocation within the quota for chilled beef.
With respect to sawn timber, New Zealand requested the removal 
of the 10 per cent duty on sawn pinus radiata timber of less than 160mm 
thickness, and the classification of this timber as suitable for 
use in construction.
It will be noted that no mention was made in the aide memoire 
of concessions with respect to the trade in fish products. However, 
later in 1977 Wellington added to the list of demands from Japan 
removal of the 10 per cent duty on squid.
This sub-section concludes by summarising very briefly the 
proposed schedule (as it existed in late 1977) for the introduction of 
New Zealand's extended maritime jurisdiction, and for the negotiation 
of access rights with the DWFS. It was decided that the 12-mile 
territorial sea and the Interim Measures governing foreign fishing 
in certain offshore areas would be introduced on 1 October, 1977. The 
200-mile EEZ itself would be fully established on 1 April, 1978. All 
overseas fishing nations which wanted to fish in the zone would first 
have to conclude fisheries access agreements with the New Zealand 
Government. Unlike other DWFS, however, the Japanese were expected 
to make certain concessions with respect to agricultural trade items 
before they could even begin to negotiate with New Zealand over
1. In addition, of course, to the payment of licence fees and other 
concessions in the fisheries area.
2. The contents of the aide memoire appeared in the Press Statement: 
New Zealand/Japan:Economic Relations_, New Zealand Embassy, Tokyo,
30 March, 1978.
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fishing access!" In other words, if Tokyo did not agree to make the 
necessary concessions before 1 April, 1978, it faced the prospect 
of Japanese fishermen being excluded from New Zealand's new offshore 
limits.
1. It should be stressed that it was not env-isaged that the linkage 
concept meant that the two issues - namely, fisheries access and 
agricultural commodities access - would be the subject of 'horse-trad­
ing' at the same negotiating session. The two issues would, instead, 
be treated in tandem - with the agricultural access issue negotiated 
first.
III. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The final section of the New Zealand case study examines the 
implementation stage of the policy process following Wellington’s 
decision to establish a 200-mile EEZ and to enter into fisheries 
negotiations with the DWFS. Special emphasis will be given to the 
fisheries access, and related, negotiations between New Zealand and 
Japan from late 1977 to mid/late 1978. Section III is divided into 
three sub-sections: Pre-Bargaining Exchange, Bargaining Exchange,
and Bargain Outcome. It will be recalled from the analytical frame­
work that the first two sub-sections present, chronologically, the 
background to the bargaining process against which those factors 
which might affect the final outcome are analysed. The third sub­
section presents the bargain outcome itself, and determines what New 
Zealand actually obtained in the way of concessions from Japan in 
these negotiations. Two major questions will be addressed: first, 
to what extent were New Zealand’s efforts at linkage diplomacy in 
this area successful; and, second, to what degree did the respective 
roles and attitudes of the various actors in the three different 
issue area categories listed in Section I affect the final outcome?
Ilia. Pre-Bargaining Exchange
Sub-section Ilia, examines the previous history of bilateral 
negotiations and of less formal contacts - particularly with respect 
to fisheries, but also in other areas - between New Zealand and Japan 
prior to 1 October, 1977.*' This examination of former bargaining 
exchanges may reveal how each side assessed the various sensitivities 
and vulnerabilities, bargaining skills, commitment, credibility and 
will of the other. Such analysis may be relevant in explaining the 
course of the present round of negotiations; for it was argued in the 
analytical framework that the perceptions, tactics, and final success 
of some party involved in negotiations with another will be in part 
determined by its experiences in previous similar exchanges.
New Zealand and Japan have had, over the years, many opportunities 
to measure each other’s strengths (and weaknesses) in bargaining 
situations, both in fisheries and in the wider economic arena.
1. For analytical convenience it was necessary to find a date which 
separated the period of Pre-Bargaining Exchange from that of the 
Bargaining Exchange proper. The 1st October, 1977 - the day on which 
New Zealand's 12-mile territorial sea was established and when the 
Interim Measures came into force - was considered most suitable in 
this regard for it was then that the fisheries access, and related, 
discussions between New Zealand and Japan took on an air of urgency.
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The history of Government-to-Government contact in the fisheries 
area went back more than a decade. Sub-section la. above noted how 
in 1965 New Zealand passed the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, 
establishing a 12-mile fishing zone. The Japanese had then strongly 
objected to this move and had threatened to take international legal 
action against Japan. However, Tokyo eventually backed down. It will 
further be remembered that in 1967 the two countries negotiated an 
agreement on fisheries, where it was agreed that all Japanese fishing 
activities in New Zealand's 12-mile zone would be phased out over a 
three year period. Inter-Governmental contacts over fisheries matters 
continued, particularly with respect to the disciplining of Japanese 
vessels caught trespassing in New Zealand's territorial waters. When, 
in the mid-1970s, it became evident that New Zealand would before 
long be declaring a 200-mile EEZ the subject of fisheries access rose 
to new levels of prominence in discussions between Ministers and 
officials from both sides.
Contacts between New Zealand and Japan over fisheries issues 
were also made at the semi-Governmental and private business levels.
For example, from time to time, representatives from the FIB and Japan's 
commercial fishing organisations exchanged visits. The annual Japan/
New Zealand Businessmen's Conference also provided a forum for debating 
fisheries problems. (In fact, it has been reported that the liveliest 
discussions at these conferences usually centred on the sub-committee 
responsible for fisheries.^')
Obviously, fisheries questions only represented a relatively small 
(if rapidly growing) percentage of the subject matter discussed on a 
regular basis between the two countries. Other economic issues - 
including, most importantly, agricultural trade issues - were usually 
at the top of the agenda in discussions between Wellington and Tokyo.
It was these issues which gave each side the opportunity to assess the 
other's overall bargaining strengths and weaknesses.
The following paragraphs will attempt to determine how both the 
New Zealand and Japanese Governments assessed their respective
1. See, for example 'A Step In A Right Direction: Third Japan-New Zealand 
Businessmen's Conference' Asia Pacific Forum, Vol.2, No.7, October,
1976, p.p.21-22.
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bargaining strengths on the eve of the fisheries, and related, negot­
iations in late 1977. The problem exists, however, that there exist 
few public assessments in this area either by Wellington or Tokyo. The 
present analysis, therefore, represents a personal appraisal by the 
author following a number of interviews with officials (both in New 
Zealand and in Japan) who had been involved in previous rounds of 
negotiations between the two countries. First considered will be the 
way in which New Zealanders may have perceived their country's bargain­
ing leverage over Japan.
There is little doubt that the New Zealand Government had come 
to realise just how tough and skillful the Japanese were at negotiating. 
As a great trading nation and as a major DWFS, Japan had developed its 
bargaining skills to a high level in the course of a large number of 
negotiating exchanges with such tough negotiators as the Russians, 
the Americans, and the Europeans. Fifteen years of patient diplomacy 
by New Zealand had failed to achieve much in the way of concessions in 
the agricultural trade area from Japan. In the area of fisheries, too, 
Japan's bargaining strengths had been revealed - as evidenced in the 
protracted negotiations which preceded the signing of the 1967 New 
Zealand-Japan Fisheries Agreement.
It is probably true to say, however, that as Wellington prepared 
to enter into fisheries access negotiations with Japan in late 1977, it 
believed it's bargaining leverage in the fisheries area was greater 
than ever before. It was recognised, of course, that Japan had certain 
factors in its favour. These included Japan's superior knowledge of 
fisheries in general and also, perhaps, of the stocks within New 
Zealand's offshore waters. The Japanese also had previous experience 
in negotiating access to other countries' exclusive economic zones, 
having earlier that year concluded agreements with the United States 
and the Soviet Union. (New Zealand had as yet no experience in 
negotiating access agreements to its 200-mile zone with other countries.) 
But it appears that Wellington had calculated that Japan's advantage 
in these areas was more than offset by Japan's increased dependence on 
New Zealand's fish resources.
In fact, it seems that some New Zealanders may have greatly 
exaggerated the size of the fish stocks in New Zealand's EEZ, and in 
consequence had overemphasised the attraction of these waters to the 
DWFS. An article which appeared in the May issue of Catch '763 and 
which was widely quoted, referred to a claim by a Ministry of
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Agriculture and Fisheries spokesman that New Zealand possessed the 
fourth largest fishery in the w o r l d . W h a t  this official had 
obviously meant was that New Zealand had the fourth largest fishery 
in terms of area, in the world. But some senior politicians appeared
to interpret the statement as meaning that New Zealand had the
2.fourth largest fishery in terms of fish stocks, in the world.
It is possible that Muldoon (a politician who did not know the
details of fishing) was unaware that New Zealand's fisheries potential
was not as great as the Catch article seemed to claim. (It may be
pointed out that in New Zealand - as in other coastal states - there
were many extravagant claims about the level of fish resources
existing in the EEZ. Bolger, in fact, found it frequently necessary
to warn New Zealanders against expecting a fishing bonanza after
3establishment of the EEZ.) * An exaggerated sense of the importance
of New Zealand's EEZ may have encouraged Muldoon and others in the
belief that New Zealand had considerable bargaining leverage over
Japan. What may have further strengthened this belief was the
conviction, in some quarters, that the Japanese fishing industry was
being almost totally excluded from northern hemisphere fishing grounds
and had few options other than to make 'panic deals' with coastal
states in the southern hemisphere.
The New Zealand Government had also probably calculated that
its bargaining leverage in the agricultural trade area with Japan
4.had increased in late 1977. A book recently published in Japan 
highly critical of the beef trading system operating in that country 
received wide coverage in the Japanese media and was reported also 
in the New Zealand press. Some New Zealanders expressed optimism that, 
at long last, the Japanese consumers might be able to pressure the 
Government in Tokyo to relax some of its restrictions on the importation 
of foreign agricultural products. (Other New Zealanders such as
1. See 'Managing a 200-mile Zone - Some Possibilities' Catch '76,
May, 1976.
2. Personal communication by J.S. Campbell.
3. See 'Minister Sounds Warning Against Fishing Industry Bonanza 
Belief' Commercial Fishing, August, 1977, p.7.
4. Tetsuji Yokota Gyuniku Wa Naze Takai Ka (Why Is Beef Expensive?), 
Simul Press, Tokyo, 1977.
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Ashenden, ‘however, suggested that consumer pressures would not be 
enough to force the Japanese Government to relax these trade barriers.)
It remains now to determine how the Japanese may have assessed 
their bargaining leverage over New Zealand in the areas of fisheries 
and agricultural trade.
Given the relatively long history of their operations in New 
Zealand waters, the Japanese fishermen must have formed quite a clear 
picture of that country's fisheries potential. Obviously New Zealand 
did not compare with some of the richest fishing grounds elsewhere 
in the world. However, for some Japanese operators - particularly 
the squid fishermen - New Zealand ranked highly even by world standards. 
Moreover, as noted in Part II above, given the pressures on them by 
the Soviet Union, the United States and other northern hemisphere 
States, the waters of the southern hemisphere assumed new importance 
to the Japanese fishermen from 1977. There is no doubt that by October 
1977 some sections of Japan's fishing industry viewed very seriously 
New Zealand's threat to exclude them from its EEZ.
The question arises whether the Japanese believed that New 
Zealand had the political will to carry out this threat. In the past - 
back in the mid-1960s - New Zealand had demonstrated when it declared 
the 12-mile fishing zone and negotiated the Fisheries Agreement with 
Japan that it could, in its turn, be a determined negotiator. But 
that was more than ten years ago, and it was doubtful whether that 
previous experience had much relevance to the present situation.
It appears that in October 1977 some Japanese officials were 
convinced that the New Zealand Prime Minister was not really serious 
in threatening to shut Japanese fishing vessels out of New Zealand's 
EEZ if Japan did not make concessions in the agricultural commodities 
trade. These officials believed that Muldoon was playing a dangerous 
game of bluff. As one Japanese Embassy official in Wellington 
argued,^’'If New Zealand shuts out the Japanese fishermen there would 
be a risk of damaging the total New Zealand-Japanese trading 
relationship.' He further pointed out, that as Japan is far more
1. See Philip Ashenden, op.cit.3 p.8. Over the short term, at least, 
it appears that Ashenden's assessment of the situation was correct, 
for it appears that the Japanese consumers alone have not been very 
successful in changing their Government's agricultural import policies.
2. Toshio Kanai, First Secretary (Agriculture and Commercial), Embassy 
of Japan, Wellington, in personal communication to the author, 
September, 1977.
important to the New Zealand economy than the reverse situation, New
Zealand would suffer much greater damage than Japan from a breakdown
in bilateral relations. The same official noted how the 'Muldoon
diplomacy' did not have universal support in New Zealand, observing
that certain sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the
local fishing industry were not happy with the Prime Minister's stand.
The New Zealand political journalist, Ian Templeton, believed that
the Japanese Government had, in fact, underestimated the seriousness
of Muldoon's threats. He suggests that the Japanese may have been
too busy with other international economic matters to have carefully
analysed Muldoon's negotiating position on the fisheries access and
agricultural trade issues. As he put it
'Japan, perhaps preoccupied with 
far larger trading problems with 
the US and Europe, has been 
slow to realise that New Zealand's 
populist leader is deadly serious 
in his campaign.'
It appeared, therefore, that both New Zealand and Japan had -
in late 1977 - somewhat false images of its own, and/or of the other's,
bargaining position. On the one hand, the New Zealand Government 
seemed to have overestimated: one, the attraction of its EEZ to DWFS; 
and, two, the degree to which domestic political pressures in Japan 
would force the Japanese Government to make concessions with respect
to agricultural commodities access. On the other hand, the Japanese
Government seemed to have misjudged Muldoon's commitment to the linkage 
strategy involving fisheries access and agricultural trade issues.
Illb. Bargaining Exchange
This sub-section examines the fisheries access, and related, 
negotiations held between New Zealand and Japan over the 11-months 
period, October 1977 to September 1978. It is divided into two parts. 
The first part traces, chronologically, the course of the negotiations. 
Emphasis will be given to the various concessions which Wellington 
sought to extract from Tokyo in exchange for fisheries access, and 
Tokyo's response to these demands. It will be noted that the terms 
of the final settlement(s) are not detailed here, but are listed in 
the next sub-section. The second part examines how the different 
actors in New Zealand, identified in Section I above, participated in 
the formal negotiating process, or otherwise affected the course of 
the negotiations. Particular attention will be drawn to the degree 
of support given by these actors to the New Zealand Government's
exercise of linkage diplomacy.
It can be argued that the period of serious negotiations between 
New Zealand and the DWFS over fisheries access dates from 26 September, 
1977 - the day that the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 
was passed into law. At last a firm date had been fixed for the 
establishment of the 200-mile EEZ (1 April, 1978), and notice was given 
under Section 14 of the Act to the effect that 'no foreign fishing 
craft shall be used for fishing within the exclusive economic zone 
except in accordance with a licence issued by the Minister'. This meant 
that the DWFS had six months in which to conclude fisheries access 
agreements with Wellington if they wished to operate in New Zealand 
waters after 31 March, 1978.
As noted in the previous sub-section, Japan - unlike the other 
DWFS seeking access to New Zealand's offshore waters - was faced with 
the prospect of negotiating with New Zealand over agricultural trading 
problems before the latter would permit formal negotiations on fisheries 
access. The Japanese Government was faced with a difficult choice.
On the one hand, Japanese fishermen were particularly keen to have 
access to the fisheries inside New Zealand's EEZ. On the other, it 
was very difficult for Tokyo to make the concessions demanded by 
Wellington. First, there were (as noted in Part II) powerful domestic 
political factors which made it difficult for the Japanese Government 
to liberalise the trade in agricultural commodities. Second, the 
linkage concept was anathema to the Japanese. Tokyo feared that 
acceptance of such a bargaining framework with New Zealand would set 
a precedent which might be repeated in future fisheries access 
negotiations with other coastal states.*' As the following paragraphs 
demonstrate, at every opportunity the Japanese advised the New Zealand 
Government that there could be no linkage. Tokyo's position was that 
the two issues should be treated separately, with settlement of the 
fisheries access question having first priority. It will also be 
demonstrated that New Zealand was as equally determined that the 
agricultural trading problems should be settled first.
There were many contacts at Ministerial- level between the two 
sides from October 1977 to April 1978. In an effort to resolve
1. The Mainichi_, for example, warned that Japan had yet to conclude 
a fisheries agreement with Australia. This Japanese newspaper questioned 
whether it would be possible to accord preferential tariffs for agric­
ultural products from New Zealand without offering similar concessions 
to Australia. See the Editorial 'Fish-Livestock Deal' Mainichi,
4 March, 1978.
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the long-standing trade differences, Talboys visited Japan in late
October, 1977. After lengthy discussions with Norinsho Minister
Suzuki, Prime Minister Fukuda, and Foreign Minister Hatoyama, Talboys
failed to extract anything but minor concessions from Japan. ' On his
departure from Tokyo, the Deputy Prime Minister stated
'I leave Japan today with a 
feeling of disappointment ...
I came to Japan with certain 
specific proposals. They have 
been rej ected. ' 2 •
There was good reason for Talboys' disappointment at this time. 
Shortly before his visit, Yokota's book on the Japanese 'beef Mafia' 
had been released, giving rise to optimistic forecasts in some quarters 
that consumer pressures in Japan would force the Government in Tokyo 
to back down on the agricultural access issue. The general mood 
of optimism was further fuelled by the ample (and generally sympathetic) 
coverage of Talboys' visit in the Japanese media.
Muldoon reacted in predictable fashion to this latest Japanese 
rebuff. Just as Talboys was on the point of departing Tokyo, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister was addressing the Fourth Japan/New Zealand 
Businessmen's Conference in Nelson. Muldoon repeated his warning that 
if Japan failed to make meaningful concessions on the agricultural 
trade issue, then Japanese fishing vessels would not be permitted
3access to New Zealand's FEZ after 31 March 1978.
The Prime Minister tried to put further pressure on the Japanese 
by offering fisheries access to other DWFS. Muldoon claimed that 
Japan's trading record with New Zealand compared most unfavourably with 
that of the Soviet Union (the latter had recently stepped up its 
purchases of New Zealand meat), and further noted that the Russians 
had made a 'very tempting' offer to fish New Zealand's zone on a 
joint venture basis. He added
1. These concessions included Japanese offers to: increase the imports 
of skimmilk powder (SMP) for feeding farm animals; to buy butter and 
SMP as part of a food aid programme for Third World countries; hold 
the beef quota for July - December 1977 at not less than 35,000 tonnes; 
to negotiate the entry of pinus radiata at the next round of GATT talks; 
and to eliminate the tariff on squid caught by joint venture companies 
with Japanese involvement.
2. From Talboys' press statement, 25 October 1977, just prior to his 
departure from Tokyo.
3. See the Prime Minister's address to the Fourth Japan/New Zealand 
Businessmen's Conference, Nelson, 25 October 1977.
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'It makes good economic sense 
for us to say to the Soviet Union 
"Yes, we'll cooperate with you and 
we will exclude the Japanese who 
are not prepared to be reasonable 
in their trading relationship with 
us".'1•
On 31 October, the Prime Minister announced that invitations were
to be issued to the USSR and to the Republic of Korea to enter into
2.negotiations with New Zealand over access to New Zealand's EEZ. No 
such invitation was extended to Japan.
It appears that Muldoon also tried to ally the United States
to his cause against Japan. In November - during a three-week tour
of that country - the Prime Minister warned Americans
'There has got to come a time when Japan 
becomes a good international citizen 
in trade terms. Japan has got to be 
dragged, kicking and screaming, into 
the international community.'3•
The next major attempt at breaking the stalemate occurred in 
February, 1978, when Suzuki - who was now no longer Norinsho Minister 
but had been promoted Deputy Secretary General of the Liberal 
Democratic Party - was invited by the New Zealand Government to 
visit Wellington to continue discussions on New Zealand's requests 
for improved conditions of access for agricultural products to the 
Japanese market. These discussions proved no more successful than 
those held in October, 1977. Suzuki had nothing new to offer in 
specific concessions, his agenda being almost identical to that 
offered in Tokyo four months before. In fact, it appeared that Suzuki 
had come to New Zealand more to discuss the fisheries access issue 
than to discuss agricultural trade. When the New Zealand Government 
informed him that Japan's terms were still unacceptable, Suzuki 
complained
'We made the greatest effort to 
meet New Zealand's request for 
better access for New Zealand farm 
products. It was very regrettable
1. Ibid.
2. As will be noted later, the negotiations with the USSR and the 
Republic of Korea commenced in December, 1977, and were eventually 
concluded to the general satisfaction of New Zealand.
3. Quoted in 'Drag Japan Screaming Into The World, Says Mr. Muldoon' 
The Evening Post3 23 November, 1977.
not to see appreciation of 
that effort by the New Zealand 
Government and to be unable even 
to begin talks on fisheries 
negotiations. ' 1 •
Even as 1 April approached - the date on which New Zealand's 
EEZ was to be fully established - there were no signs of Japan backing 
down. On 10 March, the New Zealand Ambassador to Japan was advised by
the Japanese Government that Japan 'could offer no more’ in the way
2of concessions. ’ No doubt it was a bitter sense of frustration and
failure that prompted Muldoon to remark in a speech delivered to a
National Party luncheon
’There has been a considerable 
element of commercial imperialism 
in Japanese activities in the 
Pacific Basin since the Second 
World War and to some extent 
Japan has achieved, by peaceful 
means, what it failed to do during 
that war.'^ •
There was no way out of the impasse, and at midnight 31 March, 
1978, all Japanese fishing vessels were ordered out of New Zealand’s 
200-mile EEZ. The Japanese fishermen complied; and for the first 
time in over two decades no Japanese fishing vessels - other than the 
joint venture craft - were operating in New Zealand's offshore waters.
But it was obvious that neither party was happy with the 
stalemate. On the Japanese side, the squid (and other) fishermen 
appealed to their Government to reach an accommodation with Wellington 
before the start of the next southern squid fishing season in October. 
Meanwhile, the New Zealand Government announced that it was keeping 
'for a while’ a quota of the fish stocks which it had anticipated 
it would allocate to Japan, in reserve. This was intended to be seen 
as a token of New Zealand's sincerity and hope that Japan would make 
some concessions.
Muldoon - who, as will be noted later, was under considerable 
domestic political pressure at this time - appears to have adopted 
a more conciliatory approach to Japan in April/May, 1978. This was 
evidenced during a meeting he had with Suzuki' at the end of May in
1. Quoted in Bruce Wallace 'What Now Brown Cow? The Impasse in New 
Zealand - Japan Trade Relations' New Zealand International Reviews 
May/June, 1978, p.p.12-13.
2. See 'Japan Firm on Trade' The Evening Post3 11 March, 1978.
3. Quoted in 'Mr. Muldoon Hits Out at Blind Self-Interest of the 
Japanese' The Evening Post3 11 March, 1978.4. The Russians and' South Koreans, nowever, remained - for they had concluded fisheries access agreements with New Zealand.
Melbourne at the funeral of former Australian Prime Minister Menzies. 
Following this meeting, Muldoon claimed that Japan had made concessions 
in three of the four outstanding trade problem areas.These latest 
proposals, he argued, went a considerable way to meeting his wishes, 
and represented a 'major breakthrough'. The Leader of the Opposition, 
Rowling, and large sections of the New Zealand media, however, quest­
ioned whether the Japanese proposals (especially those related to beef 
and dairy products) were in fact new, and further claimed that the
2proposals were still a long way short of the Government's targets.
To Muldoon's embarassment, Talboys was reported as saying he saw only
3signs of 'limited progress' in the trade negotiations with Japan.
It appears that much of the criticism directed against Muldoon 
was justified, for - with the exception of the proposals related to 
squid - the Japanese had offered little new in the way of concessions. 
Despite this criticism, Muldoon continued to speak of a 'major break­
through' and expressed the view that a settlement was near.
The way was now open for a more serious and formal round of
negotiations. Following another flurry of diplomatic contact between
_ _4the two countries, Norinsuisansho ‘Minister Nakagawa came to New 
Zealand towards the end of June at Wellington's invitation. The 
importance that Japan attached to this round of negotiations was 
reflected in the size and composition of the party accompanying the 
Minister - namely, three members of the LDP; 12 officials from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries; and seven Japanese newsmen, representing major Japanese 
agencies, newspapers and broadcasting groups. The New Zealand 
delegation comprised the Prime Minister, D. MacIntyre (Minister of 
Agriculture), L.R. Adams-Schneider (Acting Minister of Overseas Trade),
1. According to Muldoon, Suzuki had told him the Japanese Government 
was prepared to: hold the basic price of beef and improve the distrib­
ution system to expand the import quota; spend over $6 million on 
butter oil and SMP from New Zealand to put into countries which did 
not take New Zealand dairy products at the present time; and to reduce 
the 10 per cent tariff on New Zealand-caught squid to five per cent. 
Prime Minister's Press Conference, 22 May, 1978.
2. See press statement by W.E. Rowling, 23 May, 1978; and the article 
'PM Calls Suzuki Talks "Breakthrough"' which appeared in The Dominion, 
23 May, 1978.
3. B.E. Talboys' address to the Wellington Chamber of Commerce and 
Australia/New Zealand Association, 24 May, 1978.
4. The Ministry had changed its title to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries.
R.M. Miller (New Zealand’s Ambassador to Japan), and officials from 
Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Department, Trade and Industry, 
Treasury, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the New Zealand 
Forest Service, and the Customs Department.
The composition of the New Zealand delegation reflected 
Wellington's concern to restrict the negotiations to broad trade 
issues. (Significantly, Bolger - the Minister of Fisheries - was not 
a member of the New Zealand negotiating team.) It is reported that 
Nakagawa had, on the other hand, in the early stages of the negotiations 
requested that the questions of Japanese fishing access to New Zealand's 
zone and New Zealand's access to the Japanese market should be dealt 
with together.*’ But at New Zealand's insistence Nakagawa was forced 
to accept the view that trade matters needed to be discussed before 
fishing zone access. There was, however, no question in anyone's mind 
that the negotiations involved far more than 'merely' matters of trade. 
What, in fact, was being negotiated was part of the price Japan would 
have to pay'in return for fisheries access to New Zealand's 200-mile EEZ.
After two days of negotiations an agreement was reached. This is
not the place to make a detailed assessment of the results of these
negotiations - such assessment appears in the next sub-section. It
is sufficient here to say that the Japanese appeared to have got the
best of the bargaining exchange. Muldoon, himself, admitted that
'The Japanese Government has 
not met all the requests we 
have submitted to it. These 
[Japanese] proposals still fall 
well short of the assured and 
stable access arrangements we 
have been seeking for our exports 
to Japan of butter, skimmilk powder 
and sawn timber.'2-
The Japanese, on the other hand, could show more tangible results 
from the negotiations. They had extracted from New Zealand a 
commitment 'to embark on negotiations with Japan leading to an agree­
ment on Japan's access to the fisheries resources in New Zealand's 
200-mile exclusive economic zone ... at the earliest possible date in 
July 1978.'1 23*
1. See 'Clash with Japan on Trade-For-Fish Deal' The Dominion, 30 June, 
1978.
2. From a statement made by the Prime Minister to the press in Welling­
ton, 30 June, 1978.
3. From the Agreed Press Statement issued by the Prime Minister at the 
conclusion of his meetings with the Japanese Minister of Agriculture,
30 June, 1978.
The long-postponed fisheries negotiations with Japan began at 
last in Wellington on 20 July. There followed two weeks of hard 
bargaining. Several issues prevented faster progress. One of these 
was Japan's demand to discuss fish quotas during this round of negot­
iations. New Zealand insisted that quotas would only be allocated 
after the fisheries agreement was concluded. Another difficult problem 
area involved that of the two enclaves of 'high seas' located within 
New Zealand's 200-mile EEZ.1 23* But it was the typically cautious Japanese 
approach to negotiating - where the negotiators carefully examined every 
facet of the proposed agreement - which made for slow progress. Article 
IV of the agreement * is reported to have been particularly difficult 
to negotiate, with the Japanese painstakingly querying every word.
Finally, on 4 August, the leaders of the respective negotiating
teams (Ian Stewart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Umeo Kagei
the Japanese Ambassador to New Zealand) announced that settlement had
been reached on the text of the agreement, and that they would be
recommending it to their Governments. But, even at this late stage,
there were problems. Muldoon had decided that the agreement was not
acceptable in its present form. The Prime Minister argued that its
'diplomatic language' did not spell out clearly enough the link between
Japan's right to fish in New Zealand's 200-mile zone and guarantees
about New Zealand's access for its agricultural products to the
Japanese market. He argued that before he could permit initialling
of the agreement, the Japanese would have to accept an addendum to the
3.agreement spelling out this link 'in plain English'.
The Japanese refused to accept the inclusion of this extra 
clause. Instead, they offered a compromise proposal of a separate 
statement which would allow Muldoon to 'save face at home' while 
not committing them (the Japanese) to a formal admission that the 
issues of trade and fishing were directly related. This was the
1. These enclaves, which exist on the Chatham Rise and Campbell Plateau 
(see Fig.2) had also created problems in New Zealand's fisheries negot­
iations with the Soviet Union.
2. Article IV referred, in part, to measures that the Government of Japan 
should take to ensure that: non-licensed Japanese vessels should not fish 
within New Zealand's zone; that licensed Japanese fishing vessels should 
comply with the relevant laws and regulations of New Zealand in respect
of fisheries and the terms and conditions established in their licences; 
Japanese fishing vessels permit and assist boarding by competent New 
Zealand officials for the purposes of inspection or enforcement; and so on.
3. See 'Government Reels In On Fishing Agreement with Japan' The New 
Zealand Herald, 11 August, 1978.
formula that was finally adopted. Muldoon released what amounted 
to a 'unilateral' statement which was not formally accepted by the 
Japanese.^ *
The Agreement on Fisheries Between the Government of Japan and 
the Government of New Zealand was signed in Wellington on 1 September, 
1978. (The terms of the Agreement will be detailed in sub-section 
IIIc.)
The analysis now turns to a consideration of how those different 
actors in New Zealand identified in Section I affected the course of 
the negotiations. Emphasis will here be given to the attitude of 
these actors to the New Zealand Government's exercise of linkage 
diplomacy.
First considered will be the commercial fishermen. It will be 
recalled that there had been considerable opposition expressed by 
some among this group of actors to the linkage diplomacy in the period 
leading up to the negotiations. Their major concern was that by linking 
fisheries access with other economic issues, Wellington was prepared 
to 'sell off' or otherwise neglect the interests of their industry. Such 
concern continued to be expressed by various industry spokesmen 
throughout the period of bargaining with Japan from October 1977 to 
September 1978. Many of the local fishermen were also unhappy about the 
way in which the Japanese fishermen were selected for discriminatory 
treatment by the New Zealand Government. The FIB, for example, noted
that it 'must reveal some disquiet at the exclusion of Japan [from the
3.EEZ], and the inclusion of the Republic of South Korea and the USSR.'
Many New Zealand fishermen believed that if any DWFS were to be given 
privileged access to the zone it should be Japan; for not only had the 
Japanese been generally more cooperative than other DWFS in providing 
New Zealand with fisheries research data, but Japan also offered a 
potentially more attractive market for New Zealand's fish exports than
1. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in the next sub­
section .
2. It should be stressed again that not all the local fishermen were 
against the so-called 'fish-for-beef' strategy. Some such as N.Jarman 
(General Manager of the FIB) supported the 'Muldoon diplomacy', noting 
that 'HoweVer profitable our fishing industry is, it will do us no good 
if the rest of the economy is failing.' Quoted by J.B. Bolger in House 
of Representatives, H a n sard20 June, 1978, p.1001.
3. See Report of FIB3 19783 p.14. In giving support for Japanese - 
as opposed to Korean or Russian - access, the FIB noted that there had 
been much cooperation in the fisheries area by Japanese organisations, 
including the squid fishing organisations and the Overseas Fisheries 
Foundation.
did the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea.
But as noted in Section II, the fishermen had very little political
influence. It appears that the views of the local fishing industry were
rarely solicited by the New Zealand Government during the various
bargaining exchanges with Japan. Even in the fisheries negotiations
of July/August 1978, the fishermen and their representatives had only
a minimal input - unlike their Japanese counterparts who (while not
sitting in on the formal talks) were in close and intimate contact
2with the Japanese negotiating team throughout the negotiations.
The author found no evidence to suggest that those other actors
in the primary issue area - the officials in the Fisheries Management
and Fisheries Research Divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries, and the Minister of Fisheries, J.B. Bolger - at any time
during the negotiations with Japan opposed the linkage strategy adopted
3by the Government.
Neither does it appear that the New Zealand farmers or their 
representatives (Federated Farmers) - numerically the most important 
set of actors in the secondary issue area - expressed any opinion on 
the linkage strategy against Japan between October 1977 and September 
1978. In fact, there was no reason for them to do so. They had 
previously (back in 1976) voiced their support for a trade-off strategy 
linking fisheries access with agricultural trade issues; and now the 
Prime Minister was strongly pushing for such a trade-off in the current 
negotiations with Japan. But there can be little doubt that if Muldoon 
had threatened to abandon the linkage strategy against Japan, the 
farmers would not have remained silent.
The analysis now considers the role of the Prime Minister in the 
fisheries, and related, negotiations with Japan. Given the importance 
of this actor, several paragraphs are devoted to this subject.
1. See ’New Zealand Looks to Her 200-Mile Limits' Fishing News Inter­
national, January, 1978, p.15.
2. The Japanese fishing industry had sent a team of 12 'technical 
advisers' to give advice to the Norinsuisansho officials on the Japanese 
negotiating team.
3. It is possible, of course, that such opposition might have been 
expressed privately by these actors. But given their apparent acquies­
cence to - if not active support for - the 'Muldoon diplomacy' during 
the months preceding the negotiations with Japan, it is unlikely that 
they would have opposed it later.
At the outset, it should be stressed that it is difficult to 
over-exaggerate the influence of Muldoon in these negotiations. At 
almost every stage of the bargaining process he was a key participant.
The question might be asked why the New Zealand Prime Minister had 
chosen to involve himself so deeply in this area. First, as noted in 
sub-sections lb. and lib., Muldoon had from the very start (back in 
early 1976) been intimately involved in the development of the linkage 
strategy - in fact, it may be claimed to be a creature of his own creation. 
He had, therefore, a strong personal interest in the success of this 
strategy. Second, Muldoon prided himself on being a strong politician.^’
It is likely that Muldoon wished to project this image on the wider 
international stage by being a tough bargainer against the Japanese - 
who had, themselves, a considerable reputation as tough negotiators.
Third, it is possible that Muldoon was also motivated by anti-Japanese 
sentiments. His very colourful statements about Japanese ’commercial 
imperialism' and the need to drag Japan 'kicking and screaming into the 
international community' seem to suggest that. Fourth, the Prime 
Minister appears to have had a strong distrust of bureaucrats in 
general, and of diplomats in particular. For example, in his address 
to Japanese businessmen in Wellington in February 1977 he had observed 
that there was a 'need for politicians to solve political problems'.
Again in August 1978, during the fisheries negotiations he demonstrated 
his impatience with the diplomats when he insisted upon an addendum to 
the Agreement which should be spelt out 'in plain English' (in contrast 
with the 'diplomatic language' used in the Agreement proper).
But tough and powerful though he was, Muldoon was still vulnerable 
to political pressures. These pressures from both domestic and foreign 
sources were enough to induce the Prime Minister to moderate - if only 
slightly - his policy stance against Japan in April/May 1978.
Muldoon's abrasive and bullying political style had, over the 
years, won him a large number of enemies. There were many within the 
National Party who could not forgive Muldoon for the way in which he 
had ousted his predecessor - Sir John Marshall - from the post of 
Party leader. Muldoon’s personal attacks on political opponents -
1. The political historian Keith Sinclair, for example, has argued 
that Muldoon acts in a very assertive, aggressive and rough manner 
in part because he (Muldoon) believes that New Zealand voters admire 
and want a tough leader. See his 'The Red Hand of Tamaki' New Zealand 
Listener3 7 January, 1978, p.12.
especially that against Colin Moyle * - had attracted much criticism
from a broad sector of the New Zealand community. By early 1978, there
was growing concern within the National Party that Muldoon's style of
leadership might lead to electoral disaster. (The national elections
were due before the end of the year.) Early that year the Party 
2president's * support for Muldoon had been increasingly marked by 
3reservations.'" In late March, the generally conservative Christchurch 
Star ran a series of Editorials titled 'Why Not Get Rid of Muldoon?'
This newspaper noted that 'At times his [Muldoon's] inability to cure 
his impetuosity and his wilfulness as a one-man band have been harmful', 
and 'He can bully, he can hector, but he cannot, because of his very 
nature, inspire the people of this country, and unify them'. The 
Editorials further claimed that despite (or because of) his tough 
manner, Muldoon's economic policies had not been particularly successful. 
It seemed, therefore, that if Muldoon wished to retain the post of Party 
leader he would have to consider changing his image from that of 
a tough and ruthless leader, to that of a successful leader.
These very criticisms were also levelled against Muldoon with 
respect to his handling of the fisheries and trade negotiations with 
Japan. It will be noted shortly how various actors in New Zealand 
argued that despite (or because of) his tough approach towards Japan, 
the Prime Minister had been remarkably unsuccessful.
The 'Muldoon diplomacy' also drew criticism from overseas. The 
Australian Prime Minister, Fraser, is reported to have written a letter 
to United States' President Carter in which he expressed concern that 
while Japan was being excluded from the New Zealand zone, Wellington - 
a partner in ANZUS - was encouraging the Russians to come in.'’" Again 
in March, when Muldoon had said there was a considerable element of 
'commercial imperialism' in Japan's approach to trade matters, the 
Australians were anxious to be dissociated from these remarks. Doug
1. Where Muldoon had accused Moyle - a former Labour Minister and then 
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party - of 'certain sexual activities'.
2. George Chapman.
3. See David Mitchell's article 'A Storm Around Muldoon's Head' The Age, 
10 May, 1978, in which Chapman is quoted as saying that Muldoon was 'the 
most controversial politician of our time'.
4. See 'Why Muldoon Must Go - 3' Christchurch Star, 29 March, 1978.
5. Robert Haupt 'Fraser Criticises NZ Fish Diplomacy' The Australian 
Financial R e v i e w 14 November, 1977.
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Anthony, who was on the point of leaving for a visit to Japan, observed
'I don't think his remarks are relevant to my visit. I think we've made
very good progress in our trade relations with Japan.
The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Overseas Trade, Brian
Talboys, played a significant role in the negotiations with Japan -
at least in their initial stages. It was he who led the New Zealand
delegation to Tokyo for the important discussions of October, 1977.
However, from about May 1978 onwards, Talboys' participation in the
negotiations was much reduced. First, he was overseas for much of
the period leading up to the fisheries negotiations which began in July.
Second, the Prime Minister had demonstrated that he wished to take
command of New Zealand's diplomatic effort in this area. Throughout,
Talboys gave full support publicly to the exercise of linkage diplomacy.
But there were times when the Minister revealed his private concern
about the 'Muldoon diplomacy'. It has been noted above how in May (in
his address to the Wellington Chamber of Commerce), he was reported as
saying he had detected signs of only 'limited progress' in the trade
negotiations with Japan. Talboys, however, moved quickly to repair the
damage caused by this statement, and told New Zealand journalists that
there were no differences existing between Muldoon and himself with
2respect to the negotiations with Japan.
It was noted above how Muldoon was subjected to criticism by a 
number of actors in New Zealand for, what was claimed to be, his 
mishandling of the fisheries and trade negotiations. In addition to 
the expected criticism from sections of the local fishing industry, 
there was also criticism from actors within the 'other issue areas' 
category - namely, the Japan/New Zealand Businessmen's Association, 
certain officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Labour 
Party, and others.
It appears that sometime between the Suzuki visit to Wellington
in February 1977 and Muldoon's meeting with Suzuki in May that year,
the Prime Minister received a delegation from the Japan/New Zealand
Businessmen's Association. According to a number of interviewees
2questioned by the author, * the businessmen had then warned the Prime
1. 'Remarks By Muldoon "Not Relevant"' The Canberra Times3 14 March, 
1978.
2. See 'Limited Change Alters Speech' The Dominion3 26 May, 1978.
3. There appears to be no public record of the results of this meeting 
between the Prime Minister and the delegation from the JNZBA.
Minister of the dangers attached to his diplomatic offensive against 
Japan. They believed^' there was a risk that the Japanese might 
retaliate by taking action against New Zealand in some other trade 
area. Muldoon was, therefore, strongly urged to moderate his negotiat­
ing position.
Recent statements by both Japanese and New Zealand Government
spokesmen gave grounds for concern of a widening of the trade dispute.
At the end of his February visit, Suzuki was asked whether New Zealand
would find a 'less helpful’ attitude from Tokyo if the fishing ban went
ahead. Suzuki replied ’we don't really know how the Japanese people
will react to that act'. Pressed further on whether he could rule out
the prospect of trade reprisals, he countered 'That is not something
2we can really assess at this stage'.
There was also a risk that the New Zealand Government might
decide to escalate the trade dispute. In March, 1978, Muldoon is
reported as saying
'The Government is not at 
this stage considering action 
to curb Japanese exports to 
New Zealand in retaliation 
for Japan's refusal to buy 
more New Zealand farm products.
But there were circumstances 
where action against Japanese 
products could be appropriate in 
selected areas.'3.
Spokesmen from the Labour Party took every opportunity to 
embarass the Prime Minister over his so-called 'fish-for-beef' diplomacy. 
For example, in November, 1977, Colin Moyle (Labour's former Agriculture 
and Fisheries Minister) dismissed as 'hopeless' the Government's policy 
of attempting to force the Japanese to the negotiating table over farm 
exports in return for access to the EEZ. He is quoted as saying
1. It was suggested to the author that the JNZBA was divided between 
'hard-liners' (headed by John Mowbray, Chairman of the JNZBA) who gener­
ally supported the 'Muldoon diplomacy', and 'soft-1iners' (headed by 
Brian Tolley) who were opposed to the trade-off strategy.
2. Quoted in the article 'Japanese Envoy Reticent On Trade Reprisal 
Question' The Dominion3 23 February, 1978.
3. From the article 'Ambassador Disowns Trade Remarks' The Dominion 
14 March, 1978» When Muldoon was asked at a press conference if he was 
considering action in these 'selected areas', he replied 'Not at the 
moment'.
'Foreign Affairs must have 
advised the Government that this 
approach was destined to fail 
and would possibly result in 
retaliatory action that would 
not benefit New Zealand.' -*•
Moyle went on to conjecture that the indefinite postponement 
in the Auckland-Tokyo Air New Zealand route proposal might have been 
one such reaction by Japan. He maintained that there was 'too much
at stake in the Japanese market for the Government to continue its
2.policy of excluding the Japanese from the 200-mile zone.' Moyle 
argued that
'We could get very useful 
and attractive fish-for-fish 
deals with Japan, rather than 
beef-for-fish deals.
Another Opposition frontbencher poured scorn on the Prime
Minister's foreign policy initiative. Shortly before Nakagawa's visit,
W. Freer taunted the Prime Minister by observing
'The Prime Minister said that 
he was going to drag Japan 
screaming and kicking into 
the modern commercial world.
But who is squealing now?
When he returned from Melbourne, 
the Prime Minister told us how 
successful his talks had been, 
and that he made a breakthrough.
It is now obvious that the only 
breakthrough made is the Prime 
Minister's realisation that one 
does not get anywhere with Japan 
by beating the big drum - which 
is what the Opposition said 
last year.'4•
The last set of actors considered here are those officials employed 
in New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Attention was drawn in 
sub-section lie. to the way in which these officials were, in the period 
leading up to the negotiations with Japan, divided in their attitude 
towards the trade-off strategy proposed by the Prime Minister. These 
divisions remained throughout the 11 months of negotiations - with
1. See ’Moyle Supports Japan Venture' The Dominion_, 10 November, 1977..
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. The so-called 'fish-for-fish' deals involved the granting of 
fisheries access to Japan in exchange for Japanese cooperation in the 
fisheries area - such as concessions with respect to fish market access.
4. W.W. Freer in the House of Representatives, Hansards 20 June, 1978, 
p.999.
some officials favouring the linkage diplomacy, and others opposed to 
it. The latter were convinced that the costs associated with the 
'Muldoon diplomacy' outweighed any likely benefits. Their arguments 
that the linkage strategy could lead to an escalating trade war 
and to the undermining of the bilateral relationship were aired both 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at various inter-Departmental 
committee meetings. It does not appear, however, that the most senior 
diplomats involved in the negotiations - including Ambassador Miller in 
Tokyo and Ian Stewart, who headed the New Zealand team in the fisheries 
negotiations with Japan - were anything but supportive of the linkage 
strategy.
IIIc. Bargain Outcome
The analysis now turns to the outcome of the New Zealand-Japan 
fisheries, and related, negotiations of 1977-78. This involves a 
detailed examination of: one, the terms of the fisheries agreement 
signed on 1 September, 1978; and two, the terms of the Muldoon/Nakagawa 
trade agreement concluded on 30 June, 1978. Emphasis is given, on the 
one hand, to the concessions made by New Zealand with respect to Japan­
ese fishing access to the EEZ and, on the other, to the 'price' paid 
by Japan for these concessions. The concluding paragraphs of this 
sub-section assess the degree to which New Zealand's exercise of 
linkage diplomacy was successful. It should be stressed, however, 
that this assessment is based on the immediate outcome of the initial 
round of negotiations involving Japanese fishing access to New Zealand's 
EEZ. For a more reliable estimate of the bargain outcome the analyst 
would have to make further assessments over a period of months or years.
The Agreement on Fisheries Between the Government of Japan and the 
Government of New Zealand - hereafter referred to as the Fishing Agree­
ment, or the Agreement - provided the basis for New Zealand's future 
fisheries relations with Japan in the context of New Zealand's extended 
maritime jurisdiction.
The preamble to the Agreement recognised that
'in accordance with relevant 
principles of international law,, 
the Government of New Zealand 
has established a zone of 200 
nautical miles within which 
it exercises sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the living 
resources.'
The Japanese Government recognised that New Zealand, in the 
exercise of these sovereign rights, would determine annually: the 
total allowable catch for individual fishery resources; the New 
Zealand harvesting capacity in respect of such fishery resources; and 
the allocation for fishing vessels of Japan of parts of surpluses of 
fishery resources.
The Japanese also agreed, among other things, to take measures 
to ensure that: nationals and fishing vessels of Japan refrain from 
fishing within the New Zealand zone unless licensed to do so: that all 
fishing vessels of Japan licensed to fish within the zone comply with 
the relevant laws and regulations of New Zealand in respect of fisheries, 
the provisions of the Agreement and the terms and conditions established 
in their licences; and that all Japanese fishing vessels allow and 
assist boarding by competent New Zealand officials for the purposes of 
inspection and enforcement.
Under Article VIII, Japan also agreed to cooperate with the 
Government of New Zealand in the planning and conduct of scientific 
research for the purposes of managing and conserving the living resources 
within the zone, and to make available such statistical and biological 
information as may be required by New Zealand for the purposes of 
managing and conserving these resources.
Further, the Government of Japan asserted that it would in future 
periodic bilateral consultations examine the possibility of developing 
further cooperation in the field of fisheries, including in particular: 
exchanges of technical information and personnel; the expansion of 
markets, including improved market access for fish and fish products 
originating in New Zealand; and the facilitation of cooperative 
arrangements between Japanese and New Zealand enterprises for the
catching of living resources from the New Zealand zone and for the
3 .utilisation, processing and marketing of catches from the zone.
Most significantly,^* Tokyo recognised, under Article X paragraph 
3, that
1. See Article III, paragraph 1.
2. See Article IV, paragraph 1.
3. See Article X, paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. The significance of Article X, paragraph 3 will be explained later.
'The Government of New Zealand, 
in the exercise of its sovereign 
rights under Article III, will 
take into consideration all 
relevant factors including, inter 
alia3 New Zealand interests, the 
development of cooperation between 
the two Governments pursuant to 
this Agreement and the record 
of Japanese fishing for living 
resources off the coast of New 
Zealand prior to signature of this 
Agreement.'
The New Zealand Government, for its part, provided certain
assurances to the Japanese. For example, in the preamble to the
Agreement, Wellington recognised that
'nationals and fishing vessels 
of Japan have been engaged, for 
a considerable period of time, 
in the utilisation of the living 
resources off the coast of New 
Zealand and have also contributed 
to the development of and research 
into such resources [and recognised 
further] the desire of the Govern­
ment of Japan that fishing vessels 
of Japan continue to pursue their 
interest in the utilisation of these 
resources.'
Under Article II the Government of New Zealand undertook to 
permit Japanese fishing vessels to fish within the zone, subject to 
the provisions of the Agreement, for allocations of parts of total 
allowable catches surplus to the domestic fishing industry's harvesting 
capacity.
The Agreement entered into force on the date of signature - that 
is, 1 September, 1978 - and was to remain in force until 30 June 1982, 
unless terminated by either Government by giving notification of such 
termination 12 months in advance.
On 4 September, 1978, the New Zealand Government announced the fish
1 2 quotas allocated to Japan. * These were: 65,000 tonnes of fin fish * for
the period 1 September, 1978 to 31 March, 1979; 33,000 tonnes of squid
1. It will be recalled that fish quotas were not negotiated between 
Wellington and Japan, but were determined unilaterally by the New 
Zealand Government. The exact manner in which the fish quotas for 
DWFS were arrived at has not been made public. However, it seems that 
the Fisheries Research Division first calculated a TAC figure based on 
two-thirds of the maximum sustainable yield. From this figure was 
deducted the tonnage capable of being harvested by New Zealand fishing 
vessels and by joint venture craft. The remainder represented the
surplus available to the DWFS. .2. Of which 56,000 tonnes were to be by trawl, and 9,000 tonnes by 
bottom-1ine.
for the year 1 September, 1978, to 31 August, 1979; and an unspecified 
amount of Southern bluefin tuna - but which was estimated to be about 
7,000 tonnes. It was also announced that Japan was to be charged 
$5.6 million in licence fees.^'
It does not appear that the Fisheries Agreement with Japan brought
any substantial new and immediate benefits to the New Zealand fishing
industry. The Interim Measures introduced on 1 October, 1977, and the
establishment of the EEZ on 1 April, 1978, had already assured the local
fishermen of a reasonable degree of protection from the DWFS in the
harvesting of prime fish stocks off New Zealand. The licence fees paid2by Japan (and by the Russians and Koreans) ' were unlikely to be of 
much direct benefit to the domestic industry, for they were expected to 
be only a little more than the costs involved in policing the 200-mile 
zone. Neither had any firm guarantees been given by Japan concerning 
improved market access for New Zealand's fish exports, the exchange of 
technical information and personnel, or for the local processing of fish 
caught in the zone. It is true that the Japanese had - under Article VIII- 
agreed to cooperate in the planning and conduct of scientific research in 
the zone, and to make available certain statistical and biological infor­
mation. But the Japanese had, for some time, been cooperating in these 
areas.
The Fisheries Agreement with Japan (and those with the Soviet Union 
and the Republic of Korea) did, however, promise substantial future . 
benefits to the local fishing industry. Through the annual granting of 
fishing quotas, New Zealand had a powerful weapon to guarantee the 
continued 'good behaviour' of the DWFS. If the foreign fishermen 
refused to cooperate in any of the areas listed above, Wellington could - 
under Article X paragraph 3 - reduce, or even totally refuse, quotas to 
offenders.
1. Wellington had set the fees for catcher vessels (of any nationality) 
at five per cent of the average international value of a tonne of fish 
allocated as of 1 April each year. The fees announced in mid-1978 were: 
for fish caught by trawl $17/t; fish caught by bottomline $25/t; trawl 
squid (up to August 1978) $80/t; trawl squid .(September 1978 to August 
1979) $55/t; jig squid $80/t; tuna vessels (albacore and yellowtail)
$1,500/vessel; tuna vessels (Southern bluefin) $9,000/vessel; support 
craft fees $1 of its gross tonnage for each voyage into the zone; and 
fish carriers $2/1 of its capacity for each voyage into the zone.
2. The total licence fees to be paid by the Japanese, Russians and 
South Koreans for 1978-79 were estimated to be some $9.4 million. From 
estimates quoted in Catch *783 October, 1978, p.13.
The Japanese fishermen should have been reasonably satisfied with
the settlement. It is true that they were not very happy about the
level of licence fees - claiming that they were considerably higher than
those charged by the United States and some other countries.^* But the
Japanese fared no differently in this area than the Russians and the
Koreans. The Japanese also complained about the ’severe' fish quota,
noting that it amounted to well under half their total catches in New
2Zealand's offshore waters in 1977-78 ’. But the Japanese had, in fact,
been accorded better treatment than either of the other DWFS. The
Soviet Union had been allocated 60,000 tonnes of fin fish and 4,000
tonnes of squid for the year ending 31 March 1979; and the South
Koreans 32,500 tonnes of fin fish for the same period. (It will be
recalled that Japan's quota for fin fish of 65,000 tonnes was for only
a seven-month period.) C. Spiers - President of the Federation of
Commercial Fishermen - claimed that Japan had received preferential
treatment with respect to quotas in part because it had been fishing in
New Zealand waters far longer than had the other two countries. But,
most importantly in the context of this thesis, he also argued that
'As New Zealand hoped for 
better access to the Japanese 
meat market, it had diplomatic 
reasons for giving Japan the 
maj or share.'3*
Such comments were only to be expected for New Zealand had, in 
the Fisheries Agreement with Japan, been successful in linking the 
question of fishing access with broader (that is, non-fisheries 
related) economic issues. It will be recalled that in Article X 
paragraph 3 the Japanese had recognised that, in allocated fishing 
quotas to foreign fishermen, the New Zealand Government had the right 
to 'take into consideration all relevant factors' - one of these being 
'New Zealand interests'. In its overall relationship with Japan the 
most significant issue affecting New Zealand's national interest was,
1. Reported in 'Japan, New Zealand Ink 4-Year Fishery Accord in 
Wellington' The Japan Times, 2 September, 1978.
2. See 'NZ Limits Fish Quota for Japan to 98-,000 Tonnes' The Japan 
Times3 5 September, 1978.
3. Reported in 'Japanese Get Preference in Fish Quotas' The Press3 
5 September, 1978.
without doubt, the trade in agricultural commodities. The inclusion 
of this paragraph in the Agreement amounted to a major concession by the 
Japanese, and one which they were to regret later when they entered into 
fisheries access negotiations with Australia. It will further be recalled 
that Wellington had also made a separate statement in which the link 
between Japan's right to fish in New Zealand's EEZ and guarantees about 
New Zealand's access for its agricultural products to the Japanese market 
were spelt out 'in plain English'.
In brief, the New Zealand Government had sought (and obtained) 
in the fisheries negotiations of July/August, 1978, 'only' a broad 
statement from Japan recognising the linkage between fishing access and 
other issue areas. It was in the trade discussions held in late June 
that year where Wellington sought specific concessions from Tokyo in 
exchange for fisheries access.^’ The analyst must, therefore, examine 
the terms of the agreement reached at the conclusion of this set of 
negotiations (the so-called Muldoon/Nakagawa talks) to determine the
degree to which New Zealand's exercise in linkage diplomacy was successful.
2In what may well be a distinctive feature of linkage diplomacy, 
the detailed terms of the June agreement were not made public by either 
the New Zealand Government or by the Japanese Government. The agreement 
was, in fact, commonly referred to as a secret agreement.
The first question to be asked is, at whose insistence was the
agreement supposed to be kept secret? It is reasonable to assume that
that side which insisted on secrecy was the party which fared worst in
the negotiations. After the Muldoon/Nakagawa talks both sides argued
that it was the other which wanted secrecy. Nakagawa claimed that the
results of the negotiations were being kept secret at Wellington's 
3.request - thus implying that it was New Zealand which had made major 
concessions in the discussions. New Zealand, however, argued that precise
1. As noted in the previous sub-section, in one sense it can be argued 
that there was no linkage in the Muldoon/Nakagawa talks of June 1978, for 
only bilateral trade problems were discussed. However, there was no doubt 
in anyone's mind that far more than trade problems were then being negot­
iated. What was being discussed was the 'price' which Japan was expected 
to pay in exchange for fisheries access.
2. This aspect of linkage diplomacy will be explored further in the final 
chapter of the thesis.
3. At the conclusion of the negotiations Nakagawa is quoted as saying 'I 
don't think they [the details of the agreement] are to be called secret. 
There are some items that you [New Zealand] would make public and some 
that you wouldn't choose to do so ... I would also say that there are no 
particular things that we [Japan] have agreed to keep secret'. Quoted in 
Tony Gamier ' Fish-for-Trade Breakthrough - a Post-Election Pandora's 
Box?' The Evening Post, 18 July, 1978.
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details of the agreement were to remain secret at the insistence of the 
Japanese, who allegedly feared that concessions they had made to New 
Zealand could affect Japan's trading relationships with Australia, the 
Common Market and the United States.
Many New Zealanders appeared prepared to accept the Japanese version 
of why the terms of the agreement were kept secret. An Editorial in The 
Dominion observed that 'The curious decision to keep the details of the 
agreement secret invites endless, not to say politically dangerous 
(for the Prime Minister), speculation!^’ Tony Gamier of The Evening
Post suggested that there were strong indications that New Zealand
2 .'had been hoodwinked by Japan on the fish-for-trade issue'. ’ Richard
3.Long of The Dominion bluntly argued that 'Rob Muldoon got Nakagawaed'.
The Opposition leader, Bill Rowling, asserted 'we now have an agreement 
which gives the Japanese fishing rights in exchange for so little it has
4to remain secret'. ’ He added 'The argument that details must be kept 
secret to protect Japan's relations with other nations won't wash. It 
will take the diplomatic world no time at all to discover exactly what 
this agreement involves.'
The latter observation leads to the second question - namely, just 
how secret was the agreement? It may have been the original intention 
of both Wellington and Tokyo to make the terms of the agreement unavailable 
to the public. If so, it did not work out that way. Ministers on both 
sides felt compelled to make statements clarifying what had been promised 
in the agreement. There were also leaks to the press in New Zealand and 
Japan.^’
The reader will recall that Muldoon had admitted that the Japanese 
proposals in the agreement still fell 'well short of the assured and 
stable access arrangements we have been seeking for our exports to Japan 
of butter, skimmilk powder and sawn timber.' ’ The following paragraphs
1. 'Going Soft On Japan' The Dominion5 July, 1978.
2. Tony Gamier oip. ait.
3. Richard Long 'Even Staying Alive A Breakthrough' The Dominion3 
10 July, 1978.
4. W.E. Rowling, press statement, 2 July, 1978.
5. It may be added that the accuracy of these various statements was 
checked by the present author in the course of a number of interviews 
conducted in Tokyo and Wellington with some of those officials privy 
to the agreement.
6. From Muldoon's press statement, 30 June, 1978.
outline what is known of the details of the Muldoon/Nakagawa agreement
in the four main trade areas of dairy products, beef, timber and fish.'*'
2It was widely reported in the New Zealand media ' that Muldoon 
believed that the 'most important movements' made by the Japanese lay 
in the area of greater access for New Zealand dairy produce. The Prime 
Minister noted
'Mr. Nakagawa confirmed that the 
Japanese Government recognises the 
importance to New Zealand of its 
dairy exports and its position in 
world trade as an efficient dairy 
producer. Mr. Nakagawa took note 
of the fact that New Zealand's 
dairy exports are not subsidised 
and expressed his view that New 
Zealand is the most important and 
most reliable supplier of dairy 
products; and that when the LIPC, 
as a State trading organisation, 
needs to import butter and/or 
skimmilk powder, it will take  ^
account of these considerations.'
Much was made of the formula of words by which Tokyo recognised
New Zealand as 'the most important and most reliable supplier of dairy
products.' It appeared that Japan had placed New Zealand ahead of all
other countries as a source for any increase in imports Japan might
make. Nakagawa apparently gave a detailed explanation in his talks
with Muldoon on what 'reliable supplier' meant to Japan. According to
one source, 'it places New Zealand inside the framework of Japan's
goal of food self-sufficiency, so that there will be a permanent place4
for New Zealand's dairy industry in supplying the Japanese market.'
Apart from this broad commitment, there were several specific 
proposals made by Japan with respect to the trade in dairy products.
1. It will be recalled from the previous sub-section that Wellington 
had added fish to the list of trade items for which it sought concess­
ions .
2. See, for example, 'Dairy Goods for Fishing Deal Likely' Auckland 
Starj 2 July, 1978, and 'NZ Hasn't Got All It Wanted From Japan, Says 
PM' New Zealand Herald, 2 July, 1978.
3. Agreed Press Statement by the Prime Minister, 30 June, 1978.
4. Quoted by Ian Templeton 'Weighing Up Gains - with Caution' Auckland 
Star3 1 July, 1978. The name of the source was not revealed.
One of these was a promise that Japan would consult New Zealand in 
advance on tenders for butter and skimmilk powder. Further, the Jap­
anese offered to purchase some $6 million worth of milk powder and 
other dairy products as part of Japan's overseas aid programme to 
Third World countries, and for its domestic welfare programmes. (This 
concession by Japan differed little from that offered to - and 
rejected by - Talboys in October, 1977; although this time it appears 
the Japanese made a statement of intent that such purchases would not 
be on a 'one-off'basis.)
There is no evidence publicly available to suggest that the 
Japanese made any significant concessions with respect to the trade 
in beef. We do know that Nakagawa had made a relatively bland statement 
to the effect that his Government was 'making a serious effort to 
increase the consumption of beef in Japan and this effort was beginning 
to show results.'*' He expected that imports of beef would increase 
in the future as market demand in Japan expanded. The Minister did, 
however, agree that officials of both countries would meet regularly to 
exchange information on the beef supply and demand situation.
It appears that the Japanese were even less forthcoming on the 
timber trade issue. There were no signs that the Japanese were yet 
prepared to reclassify New Zealand pinus radiata as a timber suitable 
for construction purposes. The Japanese insisted that they required 
further technical information before they could complete their assess­
ment. It was agreed that a team of Japanese experts would visit New 
Zealand at an early date to collect this information.
Some confusion surrounds the concessions believed to have been
extended by Japan with respect to the importation of New Zealand fish
products. In the Agreed Press Statement of 30 June, Muldoon claimed
that Nakagawa had assured him 'that Japan would give a positive
response in the MTN to some of the requests that New Zealand had
put to Japan on fish.' It was then generally believed - both in
2 .New Zealand and Japan - that the Japanese negotiators had agreed to 
reduce the tariff on squid from 10 per cent to 5 per cent, and to
1. From the Agreed Press Statement, 30 June, 1978.
2. For New Zealand comments see, for example, Richard Long op.ait. 
In Japan, the Suisan Keizai Shimbun (4 July, 1978) noted that as a 
result of the trade negotiations with New Zealand 'the Japanese side 
promised that it will make efforts at the MTN to reduce the tariff 
on cuttlefish (squid) from the present 10 per cent to 5 per cent and 
also reduce tariffs on sea bream and Spanish mackerel'.
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make reductions in the tariffs on other fish products exported by 
New Zealand.
Barely a month later, however, the visit of Nobuhiko Ushiba
(Japan's Minister of External Economic Affairs) raised doubts whether
Japan had made such a commitment. At a news conference in Wellington
the Minister revealed that any reduction in duty on New Zealand
exports of squid would take place gradually over an eight-year period,
and would not apply to New Zealand alone but to all GATT members.
(This was subsequently confirmed at the multilateral trade negotiations
in Geneva where Japan agreed to a number of tariff reductions including
that on squid.) Ushiba's statements apparently came as a surprise to
2New Zealand's Minister of Fisheries, Bolger.
In mid-1978, it was evident to most New Zealanders that it would 
likely be a long time before the full range of concessions (such as 
they were) offered by Japan at the Muldoon/Nakagawa talks were known. 
There was a chance that some details of these concessions might be 
revealed after the conclusion of the GATT talks, which were then in 
progress in Geneva. But, other than this, the New Zealand public would 
have to wait for Japanese moves over the next year or so to lower 
import restrictions on the trade in dairy products, beef, timber and
3 .fish, for further evidence that Nakagawa had offered much to Muldoon.
In summary, New Zealand's exercise of linkage diplomacy can be 
considered a partial success. While Tokyo failed to make all the 
concessions sought by Wellington in the dairy products, beef, timber 
and fish products trade areas, it did make some concessions. Further, 
in the Fisheries Agreement the Japanese recognised New Zealand's right 
to link fishing access with broader economic issues. At the very least, 
the diplomatic offensive against Japan had advertised - as never before - 
the seriousness with which New Zealand viewed its trading problems with 
that country.
Finally, it might be asked whether the interests of the New
1. See the article by Mike Nicolaidi 'Trade Talks Result Is Obscure'
The Evening Post, 4 August, 1978.
2. Reported in 'Japan Would Cut Duty on Squid Over Eight Years' New 
Zealand Herald_, 4 August, 1978.
3. See the article by Mike Nicolaidi 'Benefits from Deal with Japan 
May Be Slow to Come Through' The Evening Post, 4 July, 1978, where he 
argues that Japan's response on the crucial issue involved in the access 
question - dairy products, particularly butter - may not become clear 
for two years or more.
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Zealand fishing industry had suffered as a result of the 'Muldoon 
diplomacy'. Without question the local fishermen had made substantial 
gains from the establishment of a 200-nautical mile EHZ, particularly 
with regard to the limits placed on foreign fishing competition for 
prime fish stocks. But in other areas - for example, access for New 
Zealand fish exports into Japan's fish markets, the local processing 
of fish caught in New Zealand's zone, and the exchange of technical 
information and personnel - the commercial fishermen had considerably 
less cause for satisfaction. It can be argued that Japan might have 
been more generous in these areas had New Zealand decided to use its 
bargaining leverage in the negotiations to extract concessions related 
only to fisheries (in other words to seek 'fish-for-fish' deals) rather 
than seeking broader economic concessions from Japan. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that any permanent damage had been done to 
the local fishing industry. 'Fish-for-fish' deals could be negotiated
in the future when Wellington announces its annual fish quotas to the 
DWFS.
IV Summary
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the major 
features of the New Zealand case study.
It will be recalled that Section I involved identification of 
the major issue areas in the economic relationship between New Zealand 
and Japan, and a description of the actors in New Zealand significantly 
involved in these issue areas. This section also assessed the relative 
levels of dependence (or dominance) experienced by New Zealand in each 
issue area and in the overall bilateral relationship with Japan.
In the primary issue area (namely fisheries) it was argued that 
Wellington had a net potential bargaining leverage over Tokyo. While 
New Zealand's EEZ is not rich in living resources when compared with 
some other coastal states it does contain a quantity of fish, including 
valuable species such as certain varieties of tuna and squid, attractive 
to the Japanese. This bargaining leverage is somewhat offset by New 
Zealand's dependence on Japan in such areas as access to the Japanese 
fish market, the provision of fisheries research data, and technical 
assistance to the local fishing industry. It is possible, however, 
that a number of other DWFS (including the Soviet Union, South Korea 
and some European countries) wanting to fish in New Zealand's zone 
could rake the place of Japan in some of these areas. Those actors 
in New Zealand most intimately involved in the primary issue area
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include the 7,00M commercial fishermen and their representatives, offic­
ials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the Minister of 
Fisheries.
Sub-section lb. was concerned with identifying the secondary issue 
area - namely, that issue (or group of issues) unrelated to fisheries 
which, if any, Wellington was most likely to link to the question of 
fishing access in its fisheries negotiations with Japan. It was noted 
how the New Zealand Prime Minister, Muldoon, had early (in 1976) 
indicated that he would use his country’s bargaining leverage in 
fishing to obtain concessions from Japan in the agricultural trade 
area. This sub-section detailed New Zealand's dependence on the 
Japanese market for the sale of its dairy products, beef, timber and 
fruit, and the problems facing New Zealand in these trades both with 
Japan and in other markets. The secondary issue area actors included 
New Zealand's farmers, bureaucrats with major responsibility for 
agricultural .affairs in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and 
in the Department of Trade and Industry, and various Government Ministers 
- including the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Overseas Trade, 
and the Prime Minister.
Sub-section Ic. identified those other issues in the New Zealand- 
Japan relationship - and those actors in New Zealand significantly 
involved in them - not included in the primary and secondary issue 
areas. The relatively simple nature of the bilateral economic relation­
ship was there revealed. Those actors in the 'other issue areas' 
category included the aluminium and iron ore exporters, New Zealand 
businessmen involved in importing from Japan, officials in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and Brian Talboys (the Minister of Foreign Affairs).
Section I concluded by noting that, with respect to the relative 
levels of dependence in the overall bilateral economic relationship,
New Zealand was far more dependent on Japan than the reverse case.
Section II examined the process of policy formulation in New 
Zealand with respect to the establishment and implementation of a 200- 
nautical mile exclusive economic zone. Emphasis was given to deter­
mining what the various actors (or groups of actors) identified in 
Section I wished to gain from New Zealand's bargaining leverage over 
foreign fishing access.
It was discovered that the commercial fishermen were unanimously 
in favour of the establishment of a 200-mile EEZ. Most were prepared 
to tolerate a certain level of foreign fishing activity in the zone,
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so long as this activity was very carefully regulated - especially 
with respect to the harvesting of prime fish stocks of the continental 
shelf. The fishermen were generally agreed that the New Zealand 
Government should use its leverage over foreign fishing access to 
extract concessions from the DWFS likely to be of direct benefit to 
their industry, such as: improved market access overseas for New
Zealand fish exports; the local processing of fish caught in New 
Zealand's zone; higher levels of scientific research into the 
living resources of the zone; the training of New Zealand fishermen in 
new fishing techniques; and so on. It was noted, however, that some 
New Zealand fishermen supported the 'Muldoon diplomacy', recognising 
that their country's economic situation was sufficiently serious to 
justify a 'fish-for-trade' strategy in the coming negotiations with 
Japan. Bolger, the Minister of Fisheries, also appeared to support 
the linkage concept; while officials in the Fisheries Management and 
Fisheries Research Divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
were publicly silent on this issue.
Most of the actors in the secondary issue area were strongly in 
favour of linkage diplomacy. As early as mid-1976 the major farmers' 
representatives urged the Prime Minister to embrace such a strategy 
against Japan. Sub-section lib. noted that the farmers had in 
Muldoon - the leader of a political party much dependent on the rural 
vote - a strong champion of a trade-off strategy. The evolution of 
Muldoon's policies in this area were there outlined. In early 1976 
the Prime Minister had spoken in rather general terms noting that 
just as New Zealand should consider Japan's natural interest in 
access to New Zealand's fish resources, so the Japanese should also 
recognise New Zealand's concern about fair access for its agricultural 
exports to Japan. A year later, however, Muldoon was making a clear 
and direct linkage between the two issues. He warned the Japanese 
that no access agreements would be signed with any Japanese fishing 
organisation until New Zealand received an assurance of regular access 
to its farm products on the Japanese market. It was further noted 
that the Minister of Overseas Trade (Brian Talboys) generally supported 
the trade-off strategy, as did the bureaucrats in the Department of 
Trade and Industry and the Prime Minister's Department.
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Sub-section lie. considered how those actors in the 'other issue 
areas' category viewed the proposed negotiating approach towards Japan. 
There is no evidence to suggest that either the aluminium or iron 
ore exporters voiced their opposition to the 'Muldoon diplomacy'.
Neither was it revealed that other members of the New Zealand business 
community had warned of the dangers attached to the trade-off strategy. 
(Although given the statements of some members of the Japan/New Zealand 
Businessmen's Association later - during the negotiations with Japan - 
it is possible that such warnings were communicated in private to the 
Prime Minister or other Government representatives.) Officials in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were divided on this issue, with some 
favouring the linkage diplomacy and others against. This sub-section 
concluded by noting that the Labour Opposition had no coherent policy 
position in this area. At first Labour supported a hard line against 
Japan (that is, they supported the Prime Minister's policy initiative) 
but later - when the negotiations with Japan were at an impasse - 
urged the abandonment of 'fish-for-trade' deals in favour of a'fish- 
for-fish' strategy.
In summary, the attitudes of different actors in New Zealand 
towards the linkage concept very roughly equated with those suggested 
in the analytical framework. The strongest support for trade-offs 
(where fisheries access was to be exchanged for concessions from Japan 
in the agricultural trade area) came from actors in the secondary 
issue category. The greatest opposition to such trade-offs came 
from actors in the primary issue area, with somewhat less opposition 
from the 'other issue areas' category. There was no question that the 
political influence of those in favour of the 'Muldoon diplomacy' far 
outweighed that of those against.
Sub-section lid. examined the decision-making machinery established 
in New Zealand to formulate policies with respect to the introduction 
and implementation of the EEZ, and with respect to the broader question 
of linkage diplomacy. The Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries and 
of Foreign Affairs were primarily responsible for the former task; 
although a number of other Government Departments (including the Prime 
Minister's Department, Trade and Industry, Defence, and Treasury) also 
made policy inputs. The fishing industry was consulted from time to 
time, and was able to propose some policy recommendations. By contrast, 
the formulation of policies involving the broader application of New 
Zealand's leverage over foreign fishing access was made at the highest
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levels of Government. It was noted how the Prime Minister played a 
leading role in this process. However, other senior Government officials - 
including members of the Cabinet Economic Committee and some senior 
bureaucrats - also helped in refining the diplomatic approach to Japan.
Section II concluded by listing the various policy choices made 
by Wellington concerning the establishment and use of a 200-mile EEZ.
At the end of September, 1977, two pieces of legislation - the Territor­
ial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Bill and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (Interim Measures for Foreign Fishing Craft) Regulations 1977 - 
were passed into law. The first of these provided, among other things, 
for: the establishment of a 12-mile territorial and of a 200-mile EEZ;
New Zealand’s right to set the total allowable catch, the portion 
available to local fishermen, and the surplus fish available for foreign 
fishermen; the licensing of foreign fishing craft, and New Zealand's 
right to attach conditions to these licences; and so on. The Interim 
Measures prohibited foreign fishing in certain areas of the zone.
The territorial sea was to be established, and the Interim Measures 
were to come into force, on 1 October, 1977. The EEZ itself was to be 
fully established on 1 April, 1978. All foreign fishing states wanting 
to fish inside New Zealand's zone would first have to negotiate access 
agreements with Wellington.
New Zealand's fishing industry was given substantial protection 
from foreign fishing competition by these measures. It was less certain, 
however, that some of the other concessions sought by the fishermen 
from the DWFS would be achieved. This was especially so with respect 
to the marketing of New Zealand's fish overseas.
The Minister of Fisheries had revealed that fish market access 
would be but one of the questions raised in the forthcoming negotiations 
with Japan. The New Zealand Government had, by mid-1977, decided that 
before Japan could negotiate a fisheries access agreement it would first 
have to give ground on agricultural trade issues.
In July 1977, Wellington handed over to Tokyo a statement summarising 
what New Zealand was seeking by way of improved access for certain key 
items - which included dairy products, beef and timber. In other words, 
the New Zealand Government had adopted a trade-off strategy, where its 
leverage over foreign fishing access would be used to promote broader 
economic objectives as well as promoting the interests of the local fish­
ing industry.
18b
The final section of the case study - Section III - focussed on the 
implementation stage of the policy process following New Zealand's 
decision to establish a 200-mile EEZ and to enter into fisheries 
negotiations with the foreign fishermen.
Sub-section Ilia, examined the past record of bilateral negotiations 
between New Zealand and Japan in order to determine how these previous 
exchanges had influenced the perceptions and tactics of each party in 
the present round of negotiations. The Japanese had, over the years, 
revealed themselves to be tough and experienced bargainers - both with 
respect to fisheries negotiations and in the wider economic arena. New 
Zealand had, in the past (back in the mid-1960s), demonstrated that it 
had the political will to take strong action concerning foreign fishing 
access. It appears that, by late 1977, both New Zealand and Japan had 
somewhat false impressions of its own, and/or of the other's, bargaining 
leverage with respect to fisheries and broader trade matters. Some 
New Zealanders seemed to believe that their EEZ was much richer in fish 
resources (and was thus more attractive to the DWFS) than was actually 
the case. Again there was a belief in some quarters in New Zealand 
that consumer unrest in Japan had reached the point where the Japanese 
Government might be forced to give way on the agricultural import 
question. The Japanese, for their part, seemed to have misjudged 
Muldoon - believing that the Prime Minister was bluffing when he 
threatened to exclude Japanese fishermen from New Zealand's EEZ if 
Tokyo refused to open up further the Japanese market to farm imports.
The next sub-section (Illb.) traced the course of the fisheries, 
and related, negotiations between New Zealand and Japan from October 
1977 to September 1978. Despite a number of high level contacts 
between both sides - including Talboys' visit to Tokyo in October 1977 
and Suzuki's visit to Wellington in February 1978 - no major breakthrough 
was made on the agricultural trade problems. On 31 March*, 1978, Welling­
ton carried out its threat and ordered all Japanese fishing vessels out 
of the New Zealand zone.
Muldoon appears to have adopted a slightly more conciliatory 
approach towards Japan in April/May 1978. Following a meeting with 
Suzuki at the end of May in Melbourne, Muldoon claimed that Japan had 
made concessions in three of the four outstanding trade problem areas. 
This 'major breakthrough' opened the way for a more serious and formal 
round of negotiations. At the end of June the Japanese Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Nakagawa) visited New Zealand, and
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after two days of negotiations an agreement on trade was reached 
between the two sides. The fisheries negotiations began some three 
weeks later, and the Agreement on Fisheries Between the Government 
of Japan and the Government of New Zealand was finally signed in the 
New Zealand capital on 1 September, 1978.
The analysis then turned to a consideration of how those different 
actors in New Zealand identified in Section I affected the course of 
the negotiations. The central role played by Muldoon in the negotiat­
ions and his strong championship of the linkage diplomacy was emphasised. 
It was noted how the attitudes of those other actors having an interest 
in the New Zealand-Japan relationship had not changed appreciably from 
the period preceding the present round of negotiations. For example, 
the local fishermen generally opposed the trade-off strategy towards 
Japan, although some were prepared to give qualified support to the 
'Muldoon diplomacy'; and New Zealand's farming sector, it seems, 
continued to-favour the diplomatic initiative. Attention was drawn 
to the way in which a delegation from the Japan/New Zealand Businessmen's 
Association, sometime in early 1978, warned the Prime Minister of the 
dangers attached to his diplomatic offensive against Japan.
The final sub-section examined the outcome of the New Zealand- 
Japan fisheries, and related, negotiations of 1977-78.
Under the terms of the Fisheries Agreement of 1 September, 1978, 
the Japanese were permitted to fish within New Zealand's FEZ for 
parts of the total allowable catch surplus to the local fishing 
industry's harvesting capacity. The Japanese, on their part, 
recognised that the New Zealand Government exercised certain sovereign 
rights, including that of being able to determine the annual fish quotas 
available to fishing vessels of Japan. Tokyo also agreed to take 
measures to ensure that Japanese fishing vessels refrained from fishing 
inside the zone unless licensed to do so, and to ensure that all 
fishing vessels of Japan licensed to fish in the zone should comply 
with the relevant laws and regulations of New Zealand. Tokyo further 
agreed to cooperate with New Zealand in the area of scientific research, 
and gave somewhat vaguer assurances to cooperate in other areas such 
as: improved market access for fish, exchange of technical information 
and personnel, and so on. Immediately the Agreement was signed, the 
Japanese fishermen were allocated a fish quota for 1978-79 of 65,000 
tonnes of fin fish, 33,000 tonnes of squid, and an unspecified amount 
of Southern bluefin tuna - for which they were expected to pay
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$5.6 million in licence fees.
One of the most distinctive features of the Fisheries Agreement 
(particularly in the context of this thesis) was Article X, paragraph 
3. It was there that the Japanese recognised the New Zealand's 
Government's right, when allocating fishing quotas to foreign fishermen, 
to 'take into account all relevant factors' including 'New Zealand 
interests'. Tokyo had, therefore, been forced to admit the linkage 
between fisheries access and broader economic issues.
But Article X of the Fisheries Agreement did not represent the 
full range of success for New Zealand's exercise in linkage diplomacy. 
The agreement reached at the end of the so-called Muldoon/Nakagawa 
talks of June, 1978 - from what we know about it, for the terms of the 
agreement were supposed to be secret - also registered some slight 
victory for the trade-off strategy. While the Japanese failed to 
make the full range of concessions sought by New Zealand in four 
specific trade areas, they did make some small concessions.
Finally, it can be argued that the narrow sectoral interests of 
the New Zealand fishing industry would have been best promoted had 
Muldoon rejected the linkage concept. It is possible that if the 
Prime Minister had used New Zealand's bargaining leverage over foreign 
fishing access to promote 'fish-for-fish' deals, the Japanese might 
have been more generous, for example, with respect to market access 
for New Zealand's fish exports. It was concluded, however, that the 
local fishing industry had not necessarily suffered any lasting damage 
from the linkage diplomacy.
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PART IV: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY
The Australian case study follows the same format as that presented 
in the New Zealand study. Again, the analytical framework outlined in 
Part I will be used to examine how the logic inherent in bilateral 
economic interdependent relationships influences States in their 
decision to adopt or reject linkage strategies when negotiating with 
other countries. As in the New Zealand case study, it will be 
determined whether Australia - another coastal fishing state - decided 
to use its bargaining leverage over foreign fishing access to extract 
concessions unrelated to fisheries in its fisheries, and other, 
negotiations with Japan. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
degree to which Australia's decisions concerning trade-offs in this 
area were influenced by the complexity of its economic relations with 
Japan rather than by the more specific sensitivity/vulnerability 
dimensions of the bilateral relationship. The case study will also 
assess what.Canberra finally gained in the way of concessions from its 
negotiations with Tokyo - whether in fisheries or in other issue areas.
At the outset it should be emphasised that the Australia-Japan 
fisheries negotiations differed from the New Zealand-Japan fisheries 
negotiations in one important respect. In the case of the latter, the 
negotiations were very much a 'high profile' exercise for the New 
Zealand Government. It was a vital element of Wellington's negotiating 
strategy to give full publicity to its policy of linking the fisheries 
access issue with that of agricultural commodities' access into Japan. 
Australia's negotiations with Japan were, by contrast, a 'low profile' 
exercise. The reasons for this are explained more fully in the 
following pages. It is sufficient here to note briefly that not 
only did the Australian Government make less specific linkages 
between fisheries access and other issues, but even where such linkages 
did exist in the negotiations (as indeed they did) the Fraser Govern­
ment was anxious not to be identified publicly with a bargaining 
strategy that might be labelled as a form of 'resources diplomacy'.
This point has been raised now to explain why some of the discuss­
ions in Australia covering important aspects of fisheries access, and 
related, policies were - in contrast generally with New Zealand - 
conducted in strictest confidence by the politicians and bureaucrats 
concerned, and have not been reported publicly. The relatively 
closed nature of the debates, together with the fact that Australia's 
governmental system - particularly with respect to the release of
documents and other information to the public - is traditionally not
1as open as some others ', has made the task of the present writer 
a challenging one.
These difficulties notwithstanding, it has proved possible to 
present what is believed to be a reasonably accurate account of even 
the more politically sensitive areas of the Australia-Japan fisheries 
access negotiations and of the associated decision-making process in 
Australia. First, some of the details relating to Australia's attempts 
at linking fisheries access with other issue areas were leaked to the 
press. Second, the accuracy of these reports was checked by the author 
in the course of numerous interviews both in Japan and Australia with 
officials involved either directly or indirectly in the negotiations. 
For obvious reasons these officials cannot be quoted here either by 
name or, in most cases, even by government department. However, the 
information obtained from these interviews has been used extensively 
in the following analysis. Third, there is a wide range of 
circumstantial evidence which has been used to support the conclusions 
presented in this study.
Following the New Zealand example, this case study is divided into 
three major sections; the first identifies the issues and actors 
significantly involved in the Australia-Japan relationship; the second 
considers the formulation of policies in Australia with respect to 
foreign fishing access; and the third examines the way in which these 
policies were implemented including most importantly, the Australia- 
Japan fisheries negotiations of 1978-79. The case study ends with a 
very short concluding section.
1. In the author's experience, Australia's governmental system is 
certainly less open than New Zealand's, and perhaps less open than 
Japan's.
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I. ISSUES AND ACTORS
It will be recalled both from the analytical framework and from the 
New Zealand case study that this section considers the issues and 
actors significantly involved in the Australia-Japan relationship 
under three categories; the primary issue area; the secondary issue 
area; and other issue areas. In addition to identifying these issues 
and actors, Section I assesses the relative levels of dependence or 
dominance enjoyed by Australia over Japan in each issue area and in the 
overall bilateral relationship.
Ia. Primary Issue Area
As in the New Zealand case study, the primary issue area is given - 
namely fisheries. It was noted in the analytical framework that a 
coastal state's net bargaining leverage over DWFS in this area is the 
product of several factors, including: the quantity and quality of 
the fish resources located in its offshore waters; other special 
properties of the offshore zone of potential attraction to DWFS such 
as its geographic location and the seasonality of peak fishing operat­
ions; and the degree to which the coastal state depends upon assistance 
from DWFS for the development of its own domestic fishing industry.
These, and other, factors will be examined in the following paragraphs.
It was noted in the New Zealand study that - at least with respect 
to fish - the value of a coastal state's offshore zone is not necessarily 
related to its size. This observation applies equally in the case of 
Australia.
With a coastline some 20,000 kilometres long and with numerous 
offlying islands, Australia has one of the largest 200-mile zones in the 
world - some 7.7 million square kilometres, approximately the same as 
Australia's land surface area. In common with New Zealand, however, 
much of this area (more than two-thirds) comprises deep ocean waters 
beyond the continental shelf.** The only extensive areas of 
continental shelf lie off the northwest and northern parts of the 
island continent, between Northwest Cape and the Torres Strait. (See 
Figure 4.) Again like New Zealand, Australia has none of the major
1. Radway-Allen, ex-chief of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation's (CSIRO) Division of Fisheries and Oceanography, 
estimated in 1977 that only some 30 per cent of Australia's 200-mile 
zone would be within the 200-metre isobath. See K. Radway-Allen 
'Extended Fishing Zone Calls for Major Increase in Research Efforts and 
Budget'Australian Fisheries3 (a monthly journal published by the 
Fisheries Division, Department of Primary Industry - DPI - Canberra),
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currents or upswells ’ which are important sources of nutrients in 
other, more fortunate, parts of the world; nor does this dry continent 
have the rivers that provide ideal grounds for salmon and other fish.
This combination of factors suggests that Australia’s fish
resources are likely to be relatively modest. Indeed, the conclusions
of the Working Group of the Australian Fisheries Council (which
presented an authoritative report on Australia's fisheries in November
1977) were that 'the resource base of fish around Australia is not
2spectacular by world standards.' * The Report went on to add that even 
Australia's shelf areas are not particularly productive. Similarly
3cautious statements have been made by other authoritative sources.
But it should be noted that estimates of Australia's fish resources 
are likely to be hazardous, to say the least. Radway-Allen goes so far 
as to say that
'At present we probably do not have 
a single satisfactory assessment of 
the optimum yield of any fish ... 
resource in Australian waters. At 
best, we know from experience that 
certain levels of yield can be taken 
from some stocks on a continuing basis 
without adverse effects. The nearest 
we can come to a real estimate of 
yield is probably for the Southern 
Bluefin tuna.'4.
Vol.36, No.12, December, 1977, p.4.
1. Although a weak upswelling of waters does occur in the Northwest 
Shelf area. The West Australia Department of Fisheries and Wildlife 
is reported as saying that the nutrients provided by this upswelling 
are capable of supporting 'quite an active fishery'. See 'The Sea 
Around Us' Ecos> August, 1976, p.p.3-9.
2. The 200-Mite Australian Fishing Zone3 a report of the Working Group 
established by the Australian Fisheries Council, Canberra, November, 
1977, p.19; henceforth referred to as the Working Group Report. A more 
detailed description of the origins and work of this group appears 
later.
3. See, for example, T. Curtin (of the Fisheries Division, DPI) The 
Australian 200-Mile Zone - Fisheries Aspects3 a paper given to the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, NSW Branch, Sydney,
1 September, 1979; and the statement by Peter Nixon (Federal Minister 
for Primary Industry) when addressing the ninth meeting of the 
Australian Fisheries Council, 2 November, 1979.
4. K. Radway-Allen op.cit.3 p.3. Presumably Radway-Allen was not 
here including estimates of rock lobsters and prawns, where the data 
base is much better given the fact that a majority of Australia's one 
hundred or so fisheries research scientists are working on these 
valuable inshore species.
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The Working Group Report makes a similar warning when introducing
its estimates of Australia's fish resource base
'It must be emphasised that the 
data on which resource estimates 
have been based are limited, and 
in many instances insufficient to 
enable industry to make sound 
business decisions in relation to 
the expenditure of large sums of 
money on exploitation.'^•
Following these words of caution, the Report provides a very 
useful summary of Australia's fisheries potential - particularly with 
respect to those species 'thought to offer significant opportunities 
and/or interactions with other countries.' The following paragraphs 
which examine Australia's fish resource base will draw heavily - but 
not exclusively - from the Report's estimates.. As in the Report, the 
present assessment does not include those marine resources - such as 
the important rock lobster and prawn fisheries - which are unlikely 
to involve DWFS participation. The resources will be considered under 
three categories; demersal trawl resources, pelagic, and others.
In common with New Zealand, and in fact with most other coastal
fishing states, it is the demersal fish stocks which are among the
most developed of Australia's fin fisheries. Fleets of trawlers
based on the east and southern coasts of Australia - close to the
major centres of population - provide some of the most desirable
table fish, including flathead and morwong. While it appears that
2these resources are not being fully utilised at present, ’ it is very
doubtful that there will be room for foreign participation in these
fisheries. The same situation seems to apply in the case of demersal
resources along the south coast of Australia. These stocks are not
heavily utilised at present, but is is in this region that the domestic
3fishing industry is expanding rapidly. * This suggests that opportun­
ities for DWFS fishing are limited.
1. Op.ait., p.19.
2. See, for example, 'NSW Meeting Development Challenge' Professional 
Fisherman, August, 1979.
3. The expansion of trawl fishing off the south coast of Australia has 
been marked in recent years by the development of new fisheries such as 
blue grendier. See 'Big Catches of Blue Grendier Cause Excitement in 
South Australia' Australian Fisheries, March, 1979, p.24.
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The Working Group Report notes that it is the Northwest Shelf of 
Australia around to the northern tip of Cape York that presents the 
most interesting possibilities both for Australian and foreign fisher­
men. A Taiwanese fisheries scientist - Hsi-Chiang Liu - has estimated 
the total demersal stock of this region to be capable of sustaining
an annual harvest of about one million tonnes.*' Australian scientists
2cannot agree upon an annual sustainable yield for this fishery,' but 
they generally believe that it is less than that suggested by Liu. It 
is difficult to determine how attractive this fishery might be to 
Australian fishermen. Liu's research revealed that the species of 
the area are very diverse, with none really dominant. It would 
appear, therefore, that many of the fish taken in the area can only 
be sold in rather specialised markets such as Taiwan.
The waters off Australia contain a number of pelagic fish species, 
including: Southern bluefin tuna, Northern bluefin tuna, skipjack tuna,
Yellowfin tuna, and jack mackerel. The important Southern bluefin tuna
3stocks attract the attention of both Australian and Japanese fishermen. 
The main Australian fisheries occur off South Australia and New South 
Wales, where pole and live bait (and some purse-seine) vessels catch 
mainly pre-adult fish which occur over the continental shelf. (See 
Figure 5.) The average annual Australian catch is some 10,000 tonnes
1. See H.C. Liu 'The Demersal Fish Stocks of the Waters of North and 
Northwest Australia' Acta Ooeanographioa Taiwanica Scientifica,
Science Reports of National Taiwan University, No.6, December 1976, 
p.p.128-134, where he estimated annual sustainable yields from these 
stocks could be slightly in excess of one million tonnes. He 
subsequently revised this figure downwards to 750,000 tonnes per 
year - reported in 'New F:st.imate for Northwest of Australia Fish 
Yield - 750,000 Tonnes' Australian Fisheries, January, 1979, p.ll.
2. Garth Murphy (a fisheries scientist with the CSIRO) noted in 1976 
that 'along the west coast of Australia there appears to be a resource 
capable of yielding between 500,000 and 1 million tonnes of high value 
demersal fish per year ... This is surely one of the great resources 
for the future of Australian fisheries', Garth I. Murphy A Biological 
View of the Future of Marine Food Resource3 a paper delivered to the 
47th ANZAAS Conference, May, 1976. Radway-Allen believes a sustainable 
yield of 120,000 tonnes 'to be the maximum which should be acceptable 
at present', for this fishery, op.cit. , p.p.7-9. Keith T. Sainsbury of 
CSIRO asserts that this demersal resource 'is large, although smaller 
than was previously thought and apparently fully utilised by the 
existing operations' [some 80,000 tonnes a year caught by the Taiwan­
ese]. Keith T. Sainsbury 'CSIRO Defining Fish Stocks on NW Shelf' 
Australian Fisheries, March, 1979, p.p.4-12.
3. For more detailed information on this fishery see the Working Group 
Report3 p.p.25-26; and also C.I. Murphy 'Southern Bluefin Tuna'
Fishery Situation Report 1_, South Eastern Fisheries Committee, 1979.
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a year. As will be discussed more fully later, Japanese longliners
Ofocus on the adult fish in the Southern Ocean between latitudes 30 S
and 50 S and in the Tasman Sea. The Japanese take about 10,000 tonnes
of Southern bluefin tuna a year from waters within 200 miles of
Australia’s shores, and some 50,000 to 60,000 tonnes per year in a
somewhat broader area centred on Australia. Murphy claims
'All evidence points to the fact 
that the stock is fully exploited.
Any increase in catch by Australian 
fishermen would reduce the Japanese 
catch. Any significant increase in 
the Japanese catches might reduce 
the Australian catch, especially if 
they fish in zones in which small 
fish are available.'1•
The Northern bluefin tuna is an inshore species located mostly 
over the continental shelf to the north of Australia. While knowledge 
of this species is limited, it is believed that the annual potential 
is unlikely.to exceed 5,000 tonnes. The Working Group Report doubts 
whether other nationals will display interest in fishing for this 
resource.
Skipjack tuna occur along the coasts of Australia, and are taken
in small quantities (at most about 2,000 tonnes a year) by Australian
pole and line fishermen. It has been estimated that the skipjack
tuna represents the best opportunity for expansion of the tuna fishery
2 .with possible annual catches of between 25,000 to 50,000 tonnes.
The Working Group Report questions whether there will be room for 
foreign participation in this fishery except in association with 
Australian interests.
The jack mackerel resource is found in the more temperate waters 
off Australia. The Working Group Report claims that jack mackerel 
'remains one of the outstanding unutilised species in our waters'. 
Conservative estimates of the annual potential yield is some 50,000 
tonnes. It is believed that the Australian industry will need some 
assistance from foreign fishermen to develop this resource.
There are other living marine resources in Australian waters
1. Garth I. Murphy, ibid. 3 p.5.
2. Working Group Report3 p.28. See also R.E. Kearney and R.D. Gillet 
'Interim Report of the Activities of the Skipjack Survey and Assessment 
Programme in the Waters of Australia 1 April - 13 May 1979' Skipjack 
Survey and Assessment Programme Preliminary Report No .173 South Pacific 
Commission, Noumea, 1979.
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which could attract increasing attention from DWFS. In 1977 the 
Working Group Report assessed that while squid resources were widely- 
distributed off Australia they did not appear to be in sufficiently 
large concentrations to permit commercial exploitation. However, a 
number of feasibility fishing ventures since then have revealed 
that Australia's squid resources might support important new fisheries 
in West Australia and in southeastern waters.*’ Again, it seems likely 
that the Australian industry will need some help from DWFS to develop 
this resource.
Other Australian fish resources of present, or potential,
interest to foreign fishing fleets include: lantern fish and light
fish (which the Working Group Report believes to be very abundant
" 2off southeast Australia, * and which are being advanced as one of the 
significant resources within the Australian Fishing Zone); octopus; 
and sharks.
Even allowing for the imperfect knowledge of Australia's fish 
resource potential, it is evident that this country does not rank 
among the world's great fisheries. At most, Australia's annual 
fish harvest will amount to a few hundred thousand tonnes a year - 
modest, perhaps, even when compared with New Zealand. Further, as 
will be discussed in greater detail later, there is great uncertainty 
surrounding the capability and/or interest of the Australian industry 
in developing these resources. The answers to these questions will 
determine, in large part, the amount of fish in Australian waters 
available to foreign fishermen.
In addition to the fish resources themselves, there exist 
other special qualities attached to Australia's zone of interest to 
DWFS. In common with New Zealand, the peak catching season for some 
of Australia's fisheries - including tuna and squid - coincides with 
the offpeak season for many of the northern hemisphere fisheries. The 
DWFS fishermen are, therefore, attracted to these southern waters to 
maintain fishing activity through otherwise 'slack' periods; thereby 
increasing the economic efficiency of their year-round operations.
1. See, for example, '22M. Squid Catch?' Professional Fisherman3 
October, 1979 ; 'Promising Start for Squid Feasibility Ventures' 
Australian Fisheries_, April, 1979, p.2; and 'Squid Feasibility Fishing 
Begins in WA' Australian FisheriesOctober, 1979, p.14.
2. Op.cit.3 p.45.
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It can be argued that the greatest single attraction of Australia
to foreign fishermen is its geographic location. For the Taiwanese,
the voyage to northern Australia is not a very long one. This is a
particularly important consideration in an era of rising fuel costs.
Australia’s geographic position is also of great significance
to the Japanese longliners fishing for Southern bluefin tuna. The
economics of their operations in the Southern Ocean and Tasman Sea
vitally depend on access to Australian ports. As Sinclair (Minister
for Primary Industry) noted in 1976 when referring to the activities
of these longliners
'Their objective in coming to 
Australia is to stay on the 
grounds longer, to obtain fuel, 
bait and supplies and to overcome 
some of their labour problems.'
One of the important concessions by Australia to the Japanese
longliners in the Australia-Japan Fisheries Agreement of 27 November
1968, was the granting of access for these vessels to the ports of
2Brisbane, Fremantle, Hobart and Sydney. * This was a special 
concession to the Japanese, for Australia has otherwise maintained a 
policy of excluding foreign fishing vessels from its ports, except 
where the vessel is allowed under a joint venture agreement or in an 
emergency. While this concession was initially granted for only a 
seven-year period, since 1975 port access has been renewed annually.
There is no question that the Japanese value very highly their 
access to Australian ports. Over the eight-year period 1968-76, an
3average of 762 port calls were made annually by the longliners. The 
Japanese economist Hemmi has noted how ideally located are Hobart and 
Fremantle for present Japanese Southern bluefin tuna fishing operations
4in the Southern Oceans * and for likely future krill fishing activity 
in Antarctica. There are few suitable alternative ports for the 
longliners operating in high latitudes to the south of the Indian 
Ocean and south of Australia. Ports in New Zealand, the Pacific Island
1. Ian Sinclair, Question without Notice, House of Representatives, 
Hansard, 16 November, 1976, p.2682.
2. See Article VI Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Australia and 
Japan on Fisheries3 Canberra, 27 November, 1968.
3. Ian Sinclair op.cit. p.2682.
4. Kenzo Hemmi Japan-Australia Relations in Fisheries 3 naper presented 
to the Australia-Japan Economic Relations Research Project, the Aust­
ralian National University, Canberra, 21 March 1980.
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States, and Singapore are many days steaming time from some of the 
important Southern bluefin tuna grounds.^’ Throughout this case study 
the importance of port access to the Japanese will be demonstrated.
There is, of course, a more direct method of assessing the degree 
to which DWFS are attracted to a coastal state's fishing zone - namely, 
by examining the number of foreign fishing vessels which have, in 
recent years, been operating in the waters concerned. A brief history 
of foreign fishing activity in the waters off Australia follows.
For the most part, the Australian fisherman has been able to 
operate free from the pressure of foreign fishing competition. Until 
recently, Australian waters have (with occasional exceptions) attracted 
fishermen from only three countries - Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan.
One may almost discount the Indonesian fishing presence. These
fishermen use relatively primitive craft, and operate around Australian-
owned reefs and offshore islands in the Indian Ocean. In 1975 it was
estimated that the maximum number of such vessels operating at any 
2one time was 36. ‘ These fishermen pose more of a problem for the 
Australian quarantine and immigration authorities than for the local 
fishing industry.
Taiwanese trawlers and gill netters first began fishing in 
north and northwestern Australian waters in 1971. The Working Group 
Report noted that in 1976 about 300 individual Taiwanese vessels were 
operating in the area, taking a total catch of some 75,000 tonnes. The 
Taiwanese have also been operating in the Torres Strait and Great 
Barrier Reef area - mainly for clams, turtles and reef fish.
As noted above, the Japanese tuna longliners have been fishing 
in the waters off Australia for some years. In 1968, Australia 
concluded a Fisheries Agreement with Japan to regulate the operations 
of these craft, and offered the longliners port access in exchange 
for fisheries assistance to the local industry. (In that year,
Australia also extended its exclusive fishing limits to 12 nautical 
miles, in part as a response to the presence of the Soviet exploratory 
fishing trawler, Van Gogh, in the Gulf of Carpentaria.) The Working
1. For detailed statistical evidence demonstrating the importance of 
the Australian region for Japanese Southern bluefin tuna operations, see 
the charts giving seasonal hooking rates in the Annual Report of Effort 
and Catch Statistics by Area of the Japanese Tuna Longlfoie Fishing 1978, 
Research Department of Fisheries Agency of Japan, Tokyo, March, 1980,
p .p .216-220.
2. See 'Surveillance off WA Stepped Up' Australian Fisheries, July, 1976, 
p.323.
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Group Report estimates that the Japanese longline fleet numbers about 
350 vessels, catching about 10,000 tonnes of Southern bluefin tuna 
within 200-miles of Australian shores each year. Occasionally these 
longliners also catch Yellowfin tuna and related species such as 
marlin and sail-fish off Queensland. It has been calculated that 
each vessel catches an average of 157 tonnes of tuna, much of which 
sells for about $2,000 a tonne on the Japanese sashimi market. The 
total annual tuna catch taken by the Japanese in the Australian region 
of some 50,000 tonnes has been estimated to be worth $150 million.*'
If one measures the attraction of a coastal state to DWFS merely 
in terms of the number of foreign fishing vessels operating in its 
offshore waters, then Australia ranks somewhat ahead of New Zealand.
In 1976 - the eve of the era of 200-mile zones - it was estimated 
from sighting reports and other information that a total of about
2 .550 large foreign fishing vessels fished commercially round Australia.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that if Australia had had (like
New Zealand) a more open port access policy, many more foreign fishing
3vessels would have been active in these waters.
As noted both in Part II and in the New Zealand case study, 
the establishment of 200-mile zones in the northern hemisphere has 
forced DWFS to seek work for their surplus fishing units in the 
Southern hemisphere. Australia has felt the impact of this development. 
In September, 1979, Curtin noted that 'over 40 applications have been 
received from various foreign interests in about 10 countries, proposing
4to fish in the AFZ'. ’ It will be noted later how the Australian 
Government has adopted a policy of encouraging foreign fishing vessels 
to engage in feasibility fishing operations in cooperation with 
Australian enterprises. In May 1980 it was claimed that over the 
previous year 94 different foreign vessels - most of which were 
Japanese and Taiwanese squid jigging craft - had been licensed for 
feasibility fishing.^'
1. See 'Foreign Fishing Vessel Sightings off Australia' Australian 
Fisheries3 January, 1977, p.22. All values in this case study are 
expressed in terms of dollars Australian.
2. Ibid. p.22.
3. Purnell-Webb (head of Fisheries Division, DPI) has noted that 'so 
long as foreign fishing vessels were denied use of our ports, it was 
uneconomic for them to fish in the vicinity of our coasts.' See E.A. 
Purnell-Webb 'The 200-Mile AFZ - A Government View' Australian Fisheries3 
September, 1979, p.4.
4. Op.eit.j p.3.
5. 'Feasibility Fishing Projects Winding Down' Australian Fisheries3 
May, 1980, p.p.4-5.
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In summary, therefore, Australia is not without some bargaining 
leverage, at least, with respect to its extended fishing zone. While 
its fish resources do not appear to be large compared with some 
countries, it does have a quantity of fish - including some valuable 
species such as Southern bluefin tuna and squid - which are surplus to 
the local industry's present catching capacity. Further, its geographic 
location and long coastline provides many potentially useful bases for 
Japanese and other foreign fishermen operating in the Arafura, Coral 
and Tasman Seas, and in the Indian and Southern Oceans.
It has been noted in the New Zealand case study, however, that 
bargaining leverage in the primary issue area might not be the complete 
monopoly of the coastal state. It was there demonstrated how the New 
Zealand fishermen depended upon the DFWS - particularly Japan - in 
certain areas for the successful development of their industry, includ­
ing: the provision of technical assistance, training of local fishermen, 
the transfer of fisheries research data, and access to DWFS markets for 
fish exports. These, and other areas, will be examined in the context 
of the Australian fishing industry in order to determine Australia's 
net bargaining leverage in the primary issue area.
In common with New Zealand, the Australian fishing industry is 
ill prepared for the era of extended fishing zones. Not only does the 
industry have insufficient knowledge of the resources within the zone, 
but it also suffers from serious weaknesses within the catching, 
processing and marketing sectors which make it difficult for Australian 
fishermen to exploit more fully the offshore fisheries without 
substantial assistance from the DWFS.
Typical of most coastal fishing states, the Australian fishing 
fleet comprises a large percentage of owner-operator craft of small 
size. In FY 1977-78 it was estimated that there were some 10,920 
fishing vessels employed in Australia, over half of which were under 
6 metres in length^' (while only 25 were over 30 metres long). The 
total value of these boats and their equipment was somewhat in 
excess of $250 million. The industry employs about 18,000 fishermen.
Not surprisingly, most of these boats work close inshore within 
a relatively short distance of their home port. Few Australian
1. All statistics in this, and the following, paragraph taken from 
Fisheries 1977-78, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 29 March, 
1979.
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fishing vessels work for days at a time in deeper, offshore, waters.
Very broadly, one may divide the catching sector into two categories -
one which is largely geared to the harvesting of high value crustaceans
(rock lobsters and prawns) and molluscs (oysters, scallops and abolone)
destined for the export market, and the other which is involved in the
catching of fin fish largely for the domestic market. In FY 1977-78
the Australian fishing industry landed a total of 153,893 tonnes -
some 56,000 tonnes of which were fish, 63,000 tonnes were crustaceans
and 35,000 tonnes were molluscs. While this catch was small by world
standards, its total value was not insignificant - some $219 million.*'
Several reasons may be given to explain why Australia has not
developed a larger deep-water fishing capability. Radway-Allen has
noted how there has been little incentive for the vigorous development
of a fishing industry in a country which has an abundant rural-based
food supply, including very large stocks of good quality protein in 
2the form of meat. ‘ Radway-Allen also claims that Australia has
failed to attract many migrants from fishing communities overseas.
Further, most Australian fishermen do not possess the necessary skills
to develop some of the fish resources of the AFZ. Another factor
inhibiting Australian fishermen from exploiting offshore fisheries
is the high capital cost of larger vessels capable of exploiting
these fisheries, and the difficulty of raising the necessary finance.
But probably the single ^ost important reason for the relatively
small effort in developing Australia's deeper water fisheries is the
lack of information concerning the extent of these resources. As E.
Adermam (Acting Minister for Primary Industry) noted in late 1978
'There are many questions which 
need to be answered before real 
progress in developing the new 
fishing zone can be made. What 
species are out there and in 
what quantities; what types 
of vessels can most efficiently 
catch those species; are new 
vessels needed; can the catch be 
processed, are new or expanded
1. As noted above, in terms of value per ton Australia's fish catch 
outranks that o^ any other country. See Alan Harriot op.cit.,
p.p.47-48.
2. See K. Radway-Allen Fisheries Management and Research in Australia, 
a paper delivered at the 47th ANZAAS Congress, May, 1976.
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processing facilities needed; can 
the catch be marketed, will Australians 
eat it, can it be exported; will Australian 
fishermen need to learn new skills?'
Some of these questions concern the processing and marketing
sectors of the Australian fishing industry and will be addressed in
later paragraphs.
With respect to problems existing in the catching sector, 
many can be overcome (or reduced) by Australia seeking assistance 
from distant-water fishing states. It has already been noted how 
the Australian Government has decided that the cheapest, quickest, 
and most efficient method of obtaining information on many of the 
resources within the AFZ is from the DWFS - either by way of feasibility 
fishing operations or more directly in the form of 'pure' research 
programmes.
The value of this approach has already been demonstrated in the
squid fishery. Australia had - at least until the past year or so -
neither any. interest nor any capability in developing this resource.
Further, it will be recalled that the Working Group Report had assessed
that 'there are no significant squid resources in the waters surround- 
2ing Australia.' * Since this Report, however, a large number of
Japanese and Korean squid-jigging vessels have, in the process of
feasibility fishing operations, revealed that Australia might have
an important squid fishery. In addition to these feasibility fishing
projects, a vessel of Japan's Marine Fishery Resource Research Centre -
the Hoyo Maru No.63 - has conducted a six-month survey of squid
3resources in southeast Australian waters. ' (The survey was part of 
a programme of Japanese assistance to the Australian fishing industry 
agreed by the Australian and Japanese governments in early 1977.)
Not all feasibility projects have been designed solely to 
provide information on the fish resources off Australia. Others have 
attempted to assess Australia's capability of adopting different 
fishing techniques. In late 1976, Sinclair noted that Japanese 
feasibility studies concerning the possibility of Australian particip­
ation in the tuna longlining industry had revealed that such particip-
1. E. Adermamspeaking to Australian Fishing Industry Council's (AFIC) 
annual meeting, October, 1978; quoted in 'Industry and Government Must 
Develop 200-Mile Zone Together' Australian Fisheries3 December, 1978, 
p.p.14-15.
2. Op.eit. p.41.
3. See 'Japanese boat Begins Survey of Squid Resources' Australian 
Fisheries 3 November 1977, p.20.
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ation would not be economically viable.
Australia has also benefitted greatly from foreign assistance
in other areas. For some years now, the Japanese have been training
Australian fishermen by teaching them new fish harvesting methods.
2For example, in part return for renewed port access, ’ the Japanese 
agreed in 1977 to: continue to study and develop the octopus fishery 
in West Australia; experiment with the mechanisation of skipjack 
operations off New South Wales; refine trawling techniques for 
southeastern fisheries; and continue to receive Australian biologists 
in Japanese institutions to study the breeding and propogation of
3prawns, oysters and abalone. * Continued assistance of this kind 
from the DWFS is essential if Australian fishermen are to develop 
the capability of exploiting a wider range of resources in the AFZ.
Again in common with New Zealand, there are many problems in 
Australia’s fish processing industry. There are just over 150 
registered land-based processing plants, most of which are small -
4.80 per cent having an annual throughput of less than 1,000 tonnes. 
Fowler, the general manager of SAFCOL (South Australian Fishermen's 
Cooperative Ltd - Australia's largest fishing company) has commented 
on the problems associated with low throughputs in his company. He 
noted how SAFCOL’s processing facilities are fully utilised only 
approximately three to four per cent of the time. As a consequence, 
it has not been possible to introduce more sophisticated mechanical 
processing equipment.^’
It appears that the profitability of this sector of the 
Australian fishing industry, no less than that of the catching sector, 
is dependent on the DWFS. First, the possibility of increasing 
throughput is closely related to the development of new fisheries 
based on new species; and as noted above, the DWFS have an important 
role to play in such development. Second, as will be detailed in the 
following paragraphs, the Australian market has only a limited
1. See Sinclair's opening speech to the Seventh Meeting of the 
Australian Fisheries Council 29 October, 1976, quoted in Commonwealth 
Record, 4-7 November, 1976, p.1159.
2. This subject will be treated in greater detail in the next section.
3. See Japanese Tuna Long-line Vessels to Continue Using Australian 
Ports Primary Industry Press Release, 17 January, 1977.
4. Quoted in Patrick Ryan 'Economic Aspects of Managing and Developing 
the 200-mile Fishing Zone - A Personal View’ Australian Fisheries, 
December, 1977, p.10.
5. Quoted in R.N. Fowler ’Australian Seafood Processing and Marketing’ 
in G.W.P. George op.cit., p.132. See also the findings of the Industry
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capacity for absorbing an increased supply of new fish products. The 
surplus above the Australian demand will have to be exported - often 
to markets in the DWFS.
Ultimately, of course, the successful development of Australia's 
domestic fishing industry hinges upon the industry's ability to sell 
its products. It appears, however, that even this - the marketing - 
sector faces many problems.
The industry has traditionally found it difficult to sell on 
the domestic market. Australians are not big fish eaters, consuming 
only some seven kilogrammes per person a year. Moreover, they (like 
the New Zealanders) are reputed to be very conservative in their fish 
tastes, often preferring imported fish products to the local varieties. 
(About half of the fish consumed in Australia comes from imports.)
There appears, however, to be some scope for increasing local sales 
through import substitution. The Working Group Report suggests that 
likely price increases for imported fish following the establishment 
of 200-mile zones overseas, will make some Australian fish products - 
particularly smoked fish and frozen finfish - competitive. The 
Report estimates that 'by 1982 some 42 per cent of the weight of 
edible fish imports could be substituted by Australian caught product'}*
Even if this import substitution target is met, Australia will 
find that much of the extra fish likely to be caught by local fisher­
men (and by joint venture operators) in the future will have to be 
sold in markets overseas. (This is particularly likely in the case of 
certain species - such as squid and octopus - for which there is 
very limited domestic demand.) But problems exist here, too. It was 
noted in the New Zealand case study the problems of fish market access 
in countries such as Japan. The same trade barriers exist for 
Australian fish exporters. Several of the marine food items that 
Australia currently exports (or is likely soon to export) to Japan are 
subject to quota restrictions - among these are Yellowtail tuna, 
mackerel, scallops, and squid; and/or tariff barriers - including 
prawns, whole cooked lobster, most species of fresh and frozen fish 
of the type currently exported from Australia to Japan, abalone, and
Assistance Commission Inquiry Re: Australian Fisheries and Fish 
Processing Industry3 Official Transcript of Proceedings, Melbourne, 
May 1976.
1. See 'Appendix 5: Potential for Import Replacement’ The Working 
Group Report.
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squid.* Australia’s success in selling on the Japanese market is 
likely to be related to Japan's willingness to remove these trade 
impediments.
In summary, therefore, it appears that Australia's bargaining 
leverage in the primary issue area is offset to some degree at least 
by Australia's dependence on the DWFS - especially Japan - in the 
research, catching, processing and marketing sectors of the fishing 
industry. Even with respect to port access, the leverage is not 
completely a one-way affair. Some Australians are as eager to have 
the Japanese (or any other) fishermen visit their ports, as are the 
foreign fishermen themselves. For a relatively small city like Hobart, 
the arrival of several hundred foreign vessels and their crews each 
year makes a substantial contribution to the local economy.
It remains to identify the actors in Australia either involved,
or having an interest in the primary issue area. In the private
sector the fishermen themselves, the processors, and those engaged
in marketing the fish, are most directly involved. There are also
those employed in boat-building and repair, in ports and harbours,
transport, retail shops, and restaurants who have varying degrees of
involvement in the industry. Collectively, they do not add up to
a very large number of people - the fishermen themselves are estimated
2 .to be only 0.4 per cent of the total Australian work force.
In Government those with direct responsibility for fisheries are 
the Fisheries Divisions (Commonwealth and State) and their respective 
Ministers. There are also other government departments in Australia 
charged with responsibility for one, or more, specific aspects of 
Australia's fishing industry and/or Australia's maritime jurisdiction, 
for example: the Department of Foreign Affairs, which is concerned with 
the international legal aspects of Australia's fishing zone and is 
involved in fisheries negotiations with foreign countries; the Attorney 
General's Department, which is primarily responsible for drafting 
fishing zone legislation; the Department of Trade and Resources, which 
is most directly involved in the foreign trade in fish products; the 
Treasury and Finance Departments, which have -an interest in licence
1. See the article by A.J. Best 'Few Restrictions for Australian Fish 
on Japanese Markets' Australian Fisheries3 December 1979, p.p.46-7. It 
should be emphasised that the title of this article is very misleading, 
for the statistical evidence there presented suggests that there are 
many restrictions for Australian fish exports on Japanese markets.
2. K. Radway-Allen, December 1977 o p . e i t p.3.
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fees and other charges made against foreign fishermen; the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, which has a broad interest in most 
of the above issues; the Departments of Transport, Customs, Defence 
and Immigration; and the CSIRO.
Ib. Secondary Issue Area
As will be noted in greater detail in the next sub-section, 
Australia has a much more complex economic relationship with Japan 
than does New Zealand. Not only does Australia export to Japan the 
agricultural commodities exported by New Zealand (for example, beef, 
dairy products, fruit and wool) but also exports sugar, a wide range 
of minerals and energy resources. From time to time, serious areas 
of difference have arisen between Australia and Japan over trade - 
including those involving iron ore, coal, sugar, beef and other rural 
products.^* By 1978, however, when Australia was about to enter into 
fisheries access negotiations with Japan, the bilateral trading 
relationship was generally free of major disputes. This said, there 
remained one issue area which continued to provide an irritant in the 
relationship - namely, that concerning access onto the Japanese market 
of Australian beef (and to a lesser extent, also dairy products and 
fruit). The following paragraphs will explain why it was this issue 
(or group of issues) which - if any - Australia was most likely to 
link to the question of fishing access in the Australia-Japan 
fisheries negotiations of 1978-79.
Over the last ten years Japan has developed into one of Australia's
2most important outlets for beef exports. Anthony (Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources) has noted how many 
sections of the Australian beef industry have come to depend on 
regular and stable access to the Japanese beef market, 'particularly 
our chilled beef sector which was developed during the early 1970s, 
with Japanese encouragement specifically to service Japanese require-
1. For more on these problems in the Australian-Japan economic relation­
ship, see Stuart Harris Some Sensitive Areas in the Japan/'Australia 
Resource and Trade Relationship, a paper given at the Japanese Economic 
Research Centre, Tokyo, 26 March, 1976; Australia, Japan and the West­
ern Pacific Economic Relations; a Report to the Governments of Australia 
and Japan Presented by Sir John Crawford and Dr. Saburo Okita, Aust­
ralian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976; and Ben Smith 'The 
Japanese Connection, Negotiating a Two-way Street' in Peter Hastings
and Andrew Farran (eds.) Australia's Resources Future3 Threats Myths 
and Realities in the 1980s, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
Nelson, 1978.
2. Japan was, in 1978, Australia's second largest market for beef - 
behind the II. S. A.
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merits for higher quality beef.'^' It is the very nature of this close
relationship that makes Australia's beef producers extremely vulnerable
to short-term changes in Japanese import policy. Australian farmers
(whether cattlemen, dairy farmers, horticulturalists, or others) face
many of the uncertainties and frustrations experienced by New Zealand
farmers when selling to Japan - including import quotas set by Tokyo;
six-monthly, rather than longer-term, demand forecasts; and other
problem areas touched upon in the New Zealand case study. Referring
again to the beef trade with Japan, Anthony noted
'One of the prime objectives of 
my Government has ... been to place 
our trade on a more stable and reliable 
footing and to try to remove the uncertainty 
and unpredictability which exists in the 
present import arrangements.'2•
Australia's impatience with Japan over the beef issue may 
readily be appreciated by a brief consideration of the recent history 
of this trade. It was noted in the New Zealand case study how Japan 
unilaterally closed the beef market to foreign imports in 1974. The 
Australian beef producers, who traditionally supplied some 80 per cent 
of Japan's foreign beef quota, suffered even more than their New 
Zealand counterparts.
Again, in late 1976, the Japanese Government announced that it 
would be 'severely reducing' its beef import quota for the first six 
months of 1977. Australia's beef producers, who were then said
3'already to be in a dismal plight', ‘were faced with the prospect of 
selling less than half the beef originally forecast for that period by 
Japan. The Australian beef exporters turned to the Federal Government 
for help. The Australian Cattlemen's Council is reported to have 
warned that a beef quota reduction would be a disaster for Australian 
producers and called on the Government to begin 'a fierce policy of 
resources diplomacy'.^*
1. J.D. Anthony's address to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and Keidanren, Tokyo, 15 March, 1978. In FY 1977-78, no 
less than 80 per cent of Australia's total exports of chilled beef 
went to Japan.
2. Ibid.
3. See the article by Stephen Nisbet 'Threat on Meat Cuts: Japanese 
May be Denied Fishing Rights' The Age3 17 November, 1976.
4. See Max Hollingworth 'Retaliation Threat on Japanese Meat Cuts' 
The Australian, 17 November, 1976.
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The Australian Government felt constrained to treat this issue
very seriously, and quickly made it known it was prepared to take a
'hard line' against Japan. In answer to a question in the House of
Representatives concerning whether there was 'any pressure that the
Australian Government can bring to bear on the Japanese Government
to ensure reasonable access for Australian beef producers to the
Japanese market',^’ the Minister for Primary Industry indicated that
there was. Sinclair noted
'... it so happens that the Australia- 
Japan Fisheries Agreement is due to be 
re-negotiated on 27 November next. The 
Japanese have been anxious that this 
agreement should be extended ... The 
circumstances of renegotiation of that 
agreement will very much depend on 
relations between our two countries and 
opportunities available in other areas 
... it would be difficult for us not to 
have regard to the action taken by the 
Japanese with respect of beef access when 
we are considering any extension which 
might be negotiated in respect of the 
Australia-Japan Fisheries Agreement.'^*
In summary, Canberra served notice on Tokyo that if the Japanese 
tuna longliners wished to have continued access to Australian ports 
the Japanese Government would have to make concessions on beef quotas.
The Australian Government's exercise of linkage diplomacy met 
with some success. On 17 November, the Japanese announced that they 
would reconsider the beef quota issue after the December elections in 
Japan. (Canberra replied to this gesture by granting a short-term - 
two-month - extension of the Australia-Japan Fisheries Agreement.)
It was not, however, until mid-January 1977, that this episode 
in the bilateral trade relationship was concluded. At the Fourth 
Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee Meeting in Tokyo, Japan agreed 
to increase its beef import quota for the six-months period ending 
31 March, 1977, by a small amount. (The Japanese also agreed to provide 
the Australian fishing industry with technical assistance and to 
continue to experiment with the possibility of developing Australia's 
exports of Southern bluefin tuna for the Japanese sashimi trade.) In 
return, Sinclair stated that Australia would extend the port access
1. S . Lusher, Question Without Notice, House of Representatives, 
Hansard^ 16 November, 1976, p.2682.
2. Ian Sinclair, in answer to Question Without Notice, ibid., p.2682.
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concession to the Japanese longline fleet for another two years (as 
from 1 February, 1977).
The Australian media made much of the Government's so-called
'fish-for-beef' trade-off with Japan. The Financial Review's Simson
noted how 'with full Government backing Primary Industry Minister
Mr. Sinclair, ... launched Australia into the area of resources
diplomacy with our largest trading partner J a p a n . A t  the conclusion
of the January talks in Japan, Toohey claimed that 'Sinclair in the
past week has restored its [resources diplomacy] place in Australia's
external relations without resort to bluster or indeed, proclaiming 
2its virtues.' * These, and other, journalists noted how the Fraser 
Government was prepared to engage in trade-offs, despite the fact 
that: one, the Government had publicly disowned resources diplomacy
3as something belonging to the former Whit lam era; ‘ and, two, the 
Australian Government had (under the Basic Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, commonly known as the NARA Treaty, signed in June 1976) 
agreed to act as a stable and reliable supplier to, and market for,
4Japan - and had further agreed not to adopt policies harmful to Japan.
The question was, would Australia make the linkage between beef 
and fish in the future? It appears that some journalists at that time 
believed that the 'fish-for-beef' trade-off was a once-only affair - 
where it was purely fortuitous that the renegotiation of the Fisheries 
Agreement coincided with the Japanese beef quota cutbacks.'*' Other 
journalists believed differently. Toohey claimed that 'Sinclair 
realised that the fishing-beef trade-off will need to be kept up his 
sleeve as new negotiations come up on import quotas into Japan.
1. Stuart Simson 'Trade War Threat - Sinclair: "Cut Beef ... Lose Fish'" 
The Australian Financial Reviewp 17 November, 1976.
2. Brian Toohey "'Resources Diplomacy" Lives On - But Without the 
Name' The Australian Financial Review3 21 January, 1977.
3. A more detailed treatment of the Fraser Government's attitude to 
resources diplomacy will be presented in Section II of this case study.
4. See Article V of the Treaty, where Japan gave a similar undertaking 
to Australia. See also T.B. Millar 'Japan and Australia: Partners in 
the Pacific' Pacific CommunityVol.8, No.l, October, 1976, p.p.28-38.
5. See the Editorial 'It Cuts Both Ways' The Australian3 18 November, 
1976.
6. Brian Toohey, op.cit.
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The concessions made by Japan in January 1977 with respect to 
beef were only minor, and went nowhere towards solving the broader 
historical problems existing in the beef trade. Over the next year 
and a half, the Australian Government continued to appeal to Japan 
to inject some longer-term stability and reliability into the trade. 
These appeals were interspersed with comments by Sinclair and others 
in Australia to the effect that, should Japan not make the necessary 
concessions, then Australia might again decide to employ the fisheries 
’weapon'. The next few paragraphs trace these developments until the 
eve of the Australia-Japan fisheries negotiations in late 1978.
Only some three months after the January 1977 Ministerial talks
in Tokyo, the Deputy Prime Minister (Anthony) was quoted as saying that
the future of the bilateral relationship depended upon Japan accepting
more of Australia's agricultural products.
’Our two countries have achieved a very 
high degree of interdependence. Naturally, 
the magnitude of our trade, and its potential, 
throws up problem areas. We are seeking 
greater access for those agricultural products 
where this is still extremely limited. Beef 
is clearly an issue of prominence, fruit and 
dairy products are others.'!•
The beef issue surfaced again in September that year when,
following unsuccessful talks between Australian and Japanese officials
regarding the question of access for Australian beef onto the Japanese
market, Prime Minister Fraser was prompted to send a strongly worded
letter to Prime Minister Fukuda. In the letter, Fraser noted how
disappointed he was that no progress had been made in establishing a
move ’at least from the present six-monthly quotas to annual quotas'.
He went on to warn that 'The beef issue is one which is infecting our
2.trading relationship and indeed our total relationship.'
As will be noted more fully in Section II, Sinclair was under 
continuous pressure from the Australian cattlemen to force concessions 
from the Japanese Government by linking the beef access issue with 
that of access to the 200-mile fishing zone - which was due to be 
declared in the near future. No doubt, it was in response to this 
lobbying that Sinclair declared in October 1977
1. Quoted in 'Hard Line on Japan' The Age, 26 May, 1977.
2. Letter from Prime Minister Fraser to Prime Minister Fukuda sent 
in September, 1977, quoted in Backgrounder, No.108, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 30 September, 1977, p.6.
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'The extension of our fishing zone 
to 200 miles does give Australia a 
very worthwhile opportunity to discuss 
rights and terms of entry with countries 
such as Japan after the conclusion of 
satisfactory arrangements for the import 
of Australian meats.'
Only two weeks later, the Financial Review reported that the 
Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had informed Australia's 
Secretary of Overseas Trade to the effect that Japan would be increas­
ing its worldwide quota of beef imports by 10,000 tonnes in the six 
months October 1977 to March 1978 'in expectation of fishing concessions 
by Australia and New Zealand.'^' The cattlemen in Australia responded 
by saying that they were not completely happy with the quota, and 
called for greater use of resources diplomacy by Canberra to ensure 
a better deal for the beef producers.
This was the pattern right through until mid-1978: the Australian
Government continued to plead with Japan for greater access to the
2Japanese beef market; ’ the cattlemen continued to put pressure on
3.Sinclair to link the beef issue with fishing access; 'and in response,
the Minister continued to make statements referring to possible
trade-offs involving Japanese access to Australia's impending 200-mile 
4zone and the beef question.
By mid/late 1978, Australia's overall beef export situation had 
improved considerably, with increased purchases from the United States. 
No longer was the Australian Government subjected to the same kind of 
pressures from the cattlemen to take a 'hard line' against Japan
1. See the article 'Japan Will Increase Imports of Beef', The Austral­
ian Financial Review3 31 October, 1977.
2. See, for example: the speech by J.D. Anthony to the Japanese Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry and Keidanren, Tokyo, 15 March, 1978; the 
statement by Australia's Ambassador to Japan (John Menadue) where
he spoke of the beef issue being a 'major irritant' in Australian- 
Japanese relations in Graeme Atherton's article 'The Japanese Market:
New Challenge to Australia' The Australian_, 3 March, 1978; and Fraser's 
attempts in April, 1978, to get Fukuda to open up the Japanese beef 
market, recorded in John Short 'Japanese Wary on Australian Trade 
Pitch' The Australian Financial R e v i e w 26 June, 1978.
3. In March, 1978, the Cattlemen's Union again called upon the Govern­
ment to promote 'fish-for-beef' trade-offs with Japan, see The Austral­
ian3 10 March, 1978. Once more, in June 1978, the National Cattlemen's 
Council supported the use of fishing rights in the AFZ to negotiate 
access to overseas beef markets.
4. On 1 March, 1978, Sinclair told the National Rural Press Club in 
Canberra that the AFZ 'would be one of Australia's most important 
trading weapons in the next few years'. Again on 28 June, 1978,
Sinclair made reference to the advantages of linking fishing rights
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regarding the beef quota issue. This said, Canberra was still 
concerned about the broader problems of access onto the Japanese 
market for beef (and for fruit and dairy products). In June 1978, 
at the Fifth Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee meeting in Canberra, 
the Australians reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sonoda, of 
the importance Australia attached to the beef trade with Japan. The 
Japanese were asked to remove the 25 per cent tariff on imported 
beef; to increase their global beef quota from about 100,000 tonnes 
annually to 130,000 tonnes by 1980; and to agree to include agricultural 
products in the forthcoming round of the MTN. Sonoda was not very 
accommodating, and said that 'while Japan fully appreciated the points 
Australia had made, we have many internal problems.' He added 'of the 
major Australian request, for greater access for beef, it is not 
possible to accept all that Australia is asking.'^’
In late 1978, it seemed reasonable to expect that Australia 
might, in its forthcoming fisheries negotiations with Japan, try to 
trade off fishing access in return for agricultural - particularly 
beef - access concessions from the Japanese. As noted above, Australia 
still experienced problems with respect to the beef trade with Japan; 
had once before linked the beef and fish issues; and the Minister for 
Primary Industry had frequently, since that previous exercise of 
linkage diplomacy, threatened to do so again.
It remains to identify those actors most closely involved in the 
secondary issue area in Australia. First, there were the beef producers 
(some 100,000 of them) and their representatives - the Australian 
Cattlemen's Council. Second, one might include the dairy farmers, 
fruit farmers and other rural producers who also experienced 
difficulties selling onto the Japanese market, and who probably expected 
to gain something from a linkage strategy against Japan. Third, there 
were the politicians representing the rural electorate - particularly 
Doug Anthony (the leader of the National Country Party, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources) and Ian Sinclair (Deputy 
Leader of the NCP, and Minister for Primary Industry). Fourth, there 
were the bureaucrats charged with major responsibility for agricultural 
affairs - principally those in the Department of Primary Industry, but
to beef access - from an interview conducted between Sinclair and the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission's Geoff Duncan on 'A.M.', 28 June, 
1978.
1. Quoted in Gay Davidson 'Japan Against Trade Bars' The Canberra 
Times3 28 June, 1978.
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a l s o  in c lu d in g  th o s e  in th e  Commodity P o l i c y  D iv i s io n  o f  t h e  Department 
o f  Trade and I n d u s t r y  who had charge o f  th e  t r a d e  in  b e e f  and o th e r  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s .
I c .  Other  I s s u e  Areas
This  s u b - s e c t i o n  i d e n t i f i e s  th o s e  o t h e r  i s s u e s  in t h e  A u s t r a l i a -  
Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p  - and th e  a c t o r s  in A u s t r a l i a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  involved  
in them - no t  inc luded  in t h e  pr im ary  and secondary  i s s u e  a r e a s .
I t  w i l l  be r e a d i l y  a p p a re n t  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ' s  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p  
with  Japan i s  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  o f  New Zealand.  F i r s t ,  th e  
A u s t r a l i a - J a p a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  much more complex than  i s  t h e  New 
Zea land-Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  In t h e  t r a d e  a r e a ,  f o r  example,  A u s t r a l i a  
e x p o r t s  t o  Japan  a f a r  w ider  range  o f  commodit ies  - e s p e c i a l l y  non- 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  i t ems - than  does New Zealand.  Second,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a -  
Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  marked by a much g r e a t e r  degree  o f  com plementa r i ty  
- where each,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  s u p p l i e s  commodit ies  no t  produced in  
t h e  o t h e r  co u n t ry .  T h i r d ,  u n l i k e  t h e  New Zea land-Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
(where Japan  i s  o b v io u s ly  very  much more im por tan t  t o  New Zealand than  
th e  r e v e r s e  s i t u a t i o n )  A u s t r a l i a ' s  co n n ec t io n  with  Japan  more c l o s e l y  
approx im ate s  one o f  mutual  dependence.
The c h a r a c t e r  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  t r a d e  with  Japan  has  changed g r e a t l y  
over t h e  p a s t  few decades .  During t h e  1950s,  wool accounted  f o r  over  
h a l f  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  e x p o r t s  to  Japan .  Over th e  nex t  decade,  however, 
m i n e r a l s  assumed a p l a c e  o f  g r e a t e r  im por tance  in th e  t r a d e .  J a p a n ' s  
in c r e a s e d  demand f o r  m i n e ra l -b a s e d  raw m a t e r i a l s  (prompted by t h a t  
c o u n t r y ' s  r a p i d  i n d u s t r i a l  development in t h e  1960s) was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
met by th e  p r o d u c t s  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  new m i n e r a l s  deve lopments.  By 1978, 
on ly  some 35 p e r  c e n t  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  e x p o r t s  t o  Japan  were farm p ro d u c ts  
( i n c l u d i n g  wool and s u g a r ) ,  w h i le  almost  60 p e r  cen t  were m i n e r a l s ,  
coa l  and wood.
Table  12 r e v e a l s  t h e  d i v e r s i f i e d  n a t u r e  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  expor t  
t r a d e  with  Japan  as i t  e x i s t e d  in  f i s c a l  yea r  1977-78.  In terms o f  
v a l u e ,  coking coa l  was A u s t r a l i a ' s  s i n g l e  most im por tan t  expor t  to  
Japan  - acc oun t ing  f o r  more th a n  o n e - q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  t o t a l .  Next in  
impor tance  was i r o n  o r e ,  a t  some 18.9 p e r  c e n t .  T h i rd ,  was a l a rg e  
group o f  n o n - f e r r o u s  m e ta l s  ( i n c l u d i n g  copper ,  l e a d ,  z i n c ,  alumina,  
aluminium, go ld ,  manganese,  n i c k e l  and b a u x i t e )  which amounted to
1. Tt. was noted  in th e  Nevj Zealand c a s e  s tudy t h a t  t h a t  c o u n t r y ' s  
e x p o r t s  to  Japan  a r e  l a r g e l y  t h o s e  from th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r ,  
some o f  t h e  im por tan t  i t ems o f  which a r e  a l s o  produced in Japan .  I t  
i s  n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s t r i c t l y  a c c u r a t e  t o  say t h a t  New Zealand and Japan  
have a complementary t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
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TABLE 12. SOME OF AUSTRALIA'S MAJOR EXPORTS TO 
JAPAN IN 1977-78* RANKED BY VALUE
Commodity $ Million Share of Aust­
ralia's total 
exports to Japan
Japan's share of 
Australia's total 
exports of commod­
ity
Coking Coal 1,072.3 27.7 78.6
Iron Ore 733.0 18.9 79.6
Non-ferrous
Minerals** 477.4 c.11.0
Wool 341.1 8.8 30.0
Cereal Grains 262.1 6.7 19.4
Sugar 217.7 5.6 41.3
Meat 207.3 5.3 18.5
Wood 82.5 2.1 85.6
Fish 71.1 1.8 49.0
Dairy Products
and Eggs ■ 39.2 1.0 19.7
Total value of these, and o t h e r , exports to Japan $3,877 million.
* Value of all commodities given for FY1977-78, except for non-ferrous 
minerals which refer to calendar year 1977.
** Non-ferrous minerals include: copper, lead, zinc, alumina, aluminium, 
gold, manganese, nickel and bauxite.
Sources: Values for non-ferrous minerals from Bureau of Mineral
Resources, Geology and Geophysics Australian Mineral Industry 
Annual Review 1977, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1979; others from Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Overseas Trade Bulletin, Canberra, 1979 issue, and Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Year Book Australia, No.63, Canberra, 
1979.
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approximately 11 per cent.1 23456' Then followed a succession of non-minerals 
commodities: wool (8.8 per cent), cereal grains (6.7 per cent), sugar 
(5.6 per cent), meat (5.3 per cent), wood (2.1 per cent), fish (1.8 
per cent), and dairy products and eggs (1.0 per cent). These, and 
other, Australian exports to Japan were in total valued at $3,877 
million.
In return, Japan supplied Australia with a wide variety of
manufactured, and other, items - including motor cars, machinery
and electrical goods. The total value of Australia's imports from
Japan in 1977-78 was $2,112 million - giving Australia a favourable
balance of trade of $1,765 million. (Australia traditionally enjoys
a very favourable balance of trade with Japan.)
The importance of this bilateral trade flow - which is said to
2be the seventh largest in the world * - is well recognised both in
Australia and Japan. Back in 1974, Prime Minister Whitlam noted
'There are few nations in the world whose 
fundamental interests coincide so closely 
as those of Japan and Australia. The two 
countries have a common interest in each 
other's prosperity. As great trading 
partners, we have a very high degree of 
interdependence. '**•
Many other observers speak of the mutual dependence of the
two countries in the trade area. Menadue, Australia's Ambassador
to Japan, noted how some senior members of Nippon Steel speak of
4'a husband and wife relationship' between Australia and Japan.
The Canberra Times took up this theme in an editorial^' and observed 
'whether it is called economic interdependence or complementarity, the 
post-war relationship between Japan and Australia has some of the 
connotations of a successful marriage.' The Japanese Foreign Minister 
Sonoda in mid-1978 referred to 'the unique relationship' Japan had 
with Australia.
1. Note, the value of non-ferrous minerals is for calendar year 1977.
2. Claimed by Australia's Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, in an 
address to the Australia-Japan Society, Melbourne, 27 August, 1976.
3. See E.G. Whitlam 'Japan and Australia: Pacific Partners' Pacific 
CommunityVol.6, No.1, October, 1974.
4. Graeme Atherton op.cit.
5. The Canberra Times3 9 April, 1979.
6. Quoted in Gay Davidson op.cit.
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Australia's dependence on the Japanese market is considerable, 
both overall and for many of Australia's major export items. It was 
back in the 1960s that Japan displaced the United Kingdom as Australia's 
largest market, and is now more than twice as large a market as the 
United States and the United Kingdom combined. (In 1977-78, more than 
30 per cent of Australia's total exports - in terms of value - went 
to Japan.) As noted in Table 12, Japan takes some 80 per cent of 
Australia's coking coal and iron ore, is the largest market for many 
of Australia's non-ferrous minerals, and is the biggest single importer 
of Australia's sugar, wool and fish products.
Peacock has noted
'The Japan with which we must live 
and deal is fundamental to the Aust­
ralian economy, and to the prospects 
and well-being of every Australian.
On a per capita basis our economic 
dependence on Japan is already greater 
than that of any other of the industrial­
ised decocracies.'1•
Some Australians have suggested that their country is, in fact, too
2dependent on the Japanese market.
Similar sentiments are sometimes expressed in Japan by those 
who fear that their country is too dependent on Australia for supplies3of crucial industrial raw materials. ‘For some years, Australia has
4been Japan's third largest source of imports. * More significantly, 
Australia is the single most important supplier for many of Japan's 
major imports. For example, in 1978 Australia supplied 46 per cent 
of Japan's imports of coal, 43 per cent of iron ore, 60 per cent 
of bauxite, some 80 per cent of wool, 78 per cent of beef, and 50 
per cent of its sugar imports.
Given the fact that Australia figures less prominently as a 
trading partner for Japan (in 1978, Australia accounted for 6.7 
per cent of Japan's total imports, and 2.7 per cent of exports) than 
Japan does for Australia (in 1978, Japan accounted for more than
1. Andrew Peacock, op.cit.
2. For an early example of such statements, see the editorial in 
The Australian 13 February, 1970.
3. See, for example, Kiyoshi Kojima 'The Long Term Path of the Japanese 
Economy and its Impact on the Australian Economy’ Harmonisation of 
Japanese and Australian Economic Policies 3 Japanese-Australian Project 
Report No .33 Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo, June, 1975, p.p.35-6.
4. Behind the United States and Saudi Arabia.
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30 per cent of Australia's total exports, and some 18 per cent of 
imports), one can understand Ambassador Menadue's claim that 'the 
relationship means more to Australia than it does to the Japanese ... 
we are more dependent on them in trade terms than they are dependent 
on us'.^’ This said, the Japanese are probably just as anxious as 
Australians to ensure that the trading relationship is kept stable 
and trouble-free.
Over the years, there have been several areas of dispute in
matters of trade which created serious tensions in the overall
Australia-Japan economic relationship. Problems over long-term
commodity contracts occurred during the global economic downturn
following the 1973-74 Oil Crisis. Japanese industries, operating well
below capacity, were compelled to reduce their imports of raw materials,
which meant varying the terms of long-term contracts with suppliers
such as Australia. In some cases - for example, with respect to sugar 
2and iron ore * - this led to protracted and tough negotiations at
both the official and commercial level. Other squabbles occurred over
3contract prices for coal and uranium. ' Problems also surfaced with
4.respect to Australia's sales of wool, some dairy products, and fruits 
(as well, of course, with respect to the problem of beef access onto 
the Japanese market).
These disputes - some of which emerged after 1976 - made a 
mockery of the NARA Treaty. Nevertheless, both Canberra and Tokyo 
seemed anxious not to let the disputes escalate into a general trade 
war. For the most part, these problems were handled in isolation as 
they occurred - issue by issue. Rarely did either Japan or Australia 
(with the important exception of the linkage of the beef and fish 
access issues by Canberra in 1976/77) react to problems in one issue 
area by retaliating in other issue areas.
1. Quoted in Graeme Atherton's article, op.cit.
2. See, for example, Ben Smith op.oit.
3. Ibid p.p.122-3, and Yoshio Okawara (Japanese Ambassador to Australia) 
'Resource Buying Policies - Mutual Benefits' Mining Review3 August,
1977, p.p.1-3.
4. See Eric Saxon, Ivan Roberts and Robert Bain 'Japanese Agricultural 
Policy' Quarterly Review of the Rural EconomyVol.2, No.2, May, 1980.
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Smith has  c o g e n t ly  argued why n e i t h e r  A u s t r a l i a  no r  Japan  can
a f f o r d  to  r i s k  a s e r i o u s  t r a d e  r i f t .  He has no ted  how c o n t r a c t  s a l e s
to  Jap an ese  im p o r te r s  c o n t in u e  to  p ro v id e  th e  b a s i c  s e c u r i t y  f o r
many o f  A u s t r a l i a ' s  m i n e r a l s  e x p o r t e r s .  Inves tm ents  in  new mines o r
in  l a r g e  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  o l d e r  mining o p e r a t i o n s  in  A u s t r a l i a  s t i l l
r e q u i r e  th e  back ing  o f  f i rm  c o n t r a c t s  t o  supply  t h e  J a p a n e s e . ^ ’ (The
same s i t u a t i o n  a p p l i e s  in  many o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  expor t  a r e a s . )
Smith observes  t h a t  w h i le  th e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  m i n e r a l s  t r a d e  i s  such t h a t
A u s t r a l i a  ho ld s  an enormous s h o r t - t e r m  b a r g a i n in g  advantage  over  J apan ,
any a t t e m p t s  t o  embargo c o a l ,  i r o n  o r e ,  o r  o t h e r  major e x p o r t s  would
p r e j u d i c e  A u s t r a l i a ' s  long - te rm  t r a d i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  With r e s p e c t  to
i r o n - o r e ,  f o r  example,  Japan  could v e ry  well  t u r n  to  B r a z i l  as  an
2
a l t e r n a t i v e  s u p p l i e r .  * A u s t r a l i a ,  f o r  i t s  p a r t ,  would f i n d  th e  
s w i tch ing  o f  s u p p l i e s  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  marke ts  a h igh  c o s t  e x e r c i s e .
Smith a l s o  obse rves  t h a t  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  J apanese  
p u r c h a s e r s  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  by p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same f a c t o r s .  They,  t o o ,  
would f i n d  i t  c o s t l y  t o  s h i f t  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  sou rces  o f  supp ly .  One 
o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  why Japan  has favoured  A u s t r a l i a  as  a major  source  
o f  supply  i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  geograph ic  p ro x im i ty  o f  th e  two c o u n t r i e s  
which makes f o r  lower f r e i g h t  c o s t s  - an im por tan t  f a c t o r  in  the  
economics o f  th e  t r a d e  in  m i n e r a l s  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t s .  A u s t r a l i a  
a l s o  has  t h e  advan tage ,  in  J ap an ese  eyes ,  o f  p o s s e s s i n g  a r e a s o n a b l e  
measure o f  economic and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  when compared with  p o t e n t i a l  
a l t e r n a t i v e  s u p p l i e r s .
In 1978 - t h e  y ea r  in which A u s t r a l i a  and Japan  e n t e r e d  i n t o  th e
f i s h e r i e s  acc ess  n e g o t i a t i o n s  - t h e r e  e x i s t e d  no major t r a d e  d i s p u t e s
between t h e  two c o u n t r i e s .  (Although,  as  noted above,  t h e r e  were
c o n t in u in g  problems  conce rn ing  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodit ies ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e e f ,  a cc es s  onto  th e  J a p an es e  m a rk e t . )  M in i s t e r s  in A u s t r a l i a  and
Japan took  s a t i s f i c a t i o n  from t h e  improved t r a d i n g  c l i m a t e ,  and
3
pledged  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  keep i t  t h a t  way. ' Both c o u n t r i e s
1. For example,  in h i s  add res s  to  Keidanren and t h e  J apanese  Chamber 
o f  Commerce and I n d u s t r y  in March 1978, Anthony noted  'Our i r o n  and 
coal  companies have in v e s t e d  between US$3 and 4 b i l l i o n  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  what were r ega rded  to  be f i rm  long - te rm  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r rangements  to  
develop  an e f f i c i e n t  and c o m p e t i t i v e  expor t  i n d u s t r y  to  meet th e  needs 
o f  t h e  J a p an es e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ' .
2. Thorp,  f o r  example,  c la ims  t h a t  J a p a n e s e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  'would not  
h e s i t a t e  t o  p la y  A u s t r a l i a  o f f  a g a i n s t  r i v a l  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  s u p p l i e r  
B r a z i l  when i t  s u i t s  commercial a d v a n t a g e s ' ,  David Thorp,  o p .a i t .
3. In h i s  ad d re s s  t o  Keidanren in March, 1978, Anthony noted t h a t  in 
t h e  two y e a r s  s i n c e  h i s  l a s t  v i s i t  t o  Tokyo 'There  have been some
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looked forward to a stable, trouble-free, economic relationship from 
which both stood to gain much. It was recognised that there were 
several new areas in which opportunities existed for cooperative 
effort. One of these was in the field of energy - Australia was 
rich in all the non-oil sources of energy (natural gas, uranium and 
steaming coal), and Japan was a large consumer of these products. 
Another area was that of mineral processing. Australia had announced 
its intention to take new initiatives to encourage, where economically 
feasible, increased domestic processing of Australia's basic raw 
materials. It was possible that, for reasons of pollution at home 
and the high energy costs of processing, Japan might be tempted to 
participate in processing projects in Australia. A third possible 
area of cooperation existed with respect to significantly increased 
Japanese investment^’ in Australia in such industries as steel 
production, aluminium, uranium enrichment and fisheries.
This sub-section concludes with a brief consideration of those 
actors in Australia involved in the various issue areas identified 
above. Given both the scale and range of Australia’s trading and 
other economic contacts with Japan, it should not be surprising that 
a very large number of Australians have a direct interest and involve­
ment in the bilateral relationship.
In the private sector, it would be almost impossible to list 
all those companies and workers in some way dependent on the trade 
with Japan. The major minerals exporters to Japan include both 
large multinational corporations and Australian-owned enterprises: 
Broken Hill Proprietary (which exports iron ore and liquified 
petroleum gas), Western Mining Corporation (nickel), Alcan Australia 
(aluminium), Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (iron ore, bauxite, 
alumina, aluminium, zinc, lead and uranium), Alcoa of Australia 
(alumina and bauxite), British Petroleum Australia (coal), Cliffs
isolated but nevertheless very significant areas of difference between 
us in our bilateral trade and economic relations. But overall I 
believe ... that in this period our two countries have considerably 
strengthened their relations with each other'and have come to a better, 
closer understanding'. Similarly, in June that year, Sonoda told a 
press conference after the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee 
meeting in Canberra that 'no major issues were pending at the moment' 
in the bilateral relationship -quoted in Gay Davidson, op.cit.
1. Japan was in 1978, the third largest source of foreign investment 
in Australia, behind the United States and the United Kingdom. However, 
the Japanese had hitherto felt they were unfairly disadvantaged by 
Australia's foreign investment policies. See 'Australia-Japan Relations' 
Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.51, No.4, April, 1980, p.95; the
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Western A u s t r a l i a  Mining Company ( i r o n  o r e ) ,  C lu tha  Development ( c o a l ) ,  
Comalco ( b a u x i t e ,  a lu m in a ) ,  Esso A u s t r a l i a  ( l i q u i f i e d  pe t ro leum g a s ) ,
Gove Alumina ( a l u m i n a ) , Hamersley Holdings ( i r o n  o r e ) , Houston Oil  
and M inera l s  A u s t r a l i a  ( c o a l ) , Kembla Coal and Coke (coal  and c o k e ) , 
M.I.M. Holdings (copper ,  le ad  and z i n c ) ,  Peko Wallsend ( co a l  and 
t u n g s t e n ) , Roxley Mining (uranium and c o p p e r ) , T h ie s s  Holdings ( c o a l ) , 
and Utah Mining ( c o a l ) .
Those a c t o r s  in  A u s t r a l i a  having  an i n t e r e s t  in  t h e  t r a d e  with  
Japan  in  r u r a l  commodit ies  i n c lu d e :  t h e  p roduce rs  themse lves  - 
d a i r y  f a rm e r s ,  h o r t i c u l t u r a l i s t s , c a t t l e m e n ,  g r a i n  growers,  sugar  
growers,  sheep f a rm e r s ,  wool p r o d u c e r s ,  and so on; s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
such as t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Wheat Board,  A u s t r a l i a n  B ar ley  Board,  A u s t r a l i a n  
Dairy  C o rp o ra t i o n ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Egg Board,  and t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Meat and 
L ives tock  C o rp o ra t i o n ;  and b r o k e r s  and middlemen such as t h e  N a t iona l  
Counci l  o f  Wool S e l l i n g  Brokers and Dalge ty  A u s t r a l i a .
Other  ma jor i n t e r e s t s  in  A u s t r a l i a  invo lved  in t h e  t r a d e  with  
Japan  in c lu d e :  C o lo n ia l  Sugar R e f in in g  (CSR, who expor t  sugar  and c o a l ) ;  
A ss o c i a te d  Pulp and Paper  M i l l s ,  H.C. S le ig h  and A u s t r a l i a n  Paper 
M anufac tu re rs  (who expor t  pu lp  a n d /o r  wood c h i p s ) : th e  major  im por te r s  
o f  J a p an es e  p ro d u c t s  in c lu d in g  General  Motors-Holden (GMH, who import  
c a r s  and m a c h in e r y ) ; and a l a r g e  number o f  o t h e r  A u s t r a l i a n  m anu fa c tu re r s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  N a t io n a l  Trade and I n d u s t r y  Counc i l ,  t h e  C onfed e ra t io n  
o f  A u s t r a l i a n  I n d u s t r y ,  and t h e  A u s t r a l i a - J a p a n  Bus iness  Coopera t ion  
Committee.
Those government o f f i c i a l s  and m i n i s t e r s  in  A u s t r a l i a  most 
i n t i m a t e l y  invo lved  with  the  b i l a t e r a l  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p  were,  
in  1978, t h o s e  connec ted  w i th :  Trade and Resources ,  Pr imary I n d u s t r y ,  
Fore ign  A f f a i r s ,  I n d u s t r y  and Commerce ( t h e  M i n i s t e r  be ing  P h i l l i p  
Lynch),  T rea su ry  (John Howard),  and Prime M i n i s t e r  and Cab ine t ;  w h i le  
th o s e  l e s s  i n t i m a t e l y  invo lved  were N a t io n a l  Development (Kevin 
Newman) and Finance  (E r ic  Robinson) .
j o i n t  news r e l e a s e  i s s u e d  by F r a s e r  and Ohira on 17 J a n u a ry ,  1980, a t  
th e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  o f f i c i a l  v i s i t  t o  A u s t r a l i a  o f  the  J apanese  
Prime M i n i s t e r ;  and Anthony 's  speech to  t h e  Osaka Chamber o f  Commerce 
and I n d u s t r y ,  9 October ,  1979.
1. As w i l l  be no ted  in  S e c t io n  I I ,  in 1978 the  S tand ing  Committee on 
Japan  and t h e  C o n s u l t a t i v e  Committee on R e l a t i o n s  wi th Japan  were 
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  both  o f  which inc luded  heads  o f  a l l  t h e s e  Departments 
( o t h e r  tha n  F i n a n c e ) . That  y e a r  a l so  w i tn e s s ed  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
th e  Japan  S e c r e t a r i a t  ( r e s p o n s i b l e  to  th e  M i n i s t e r  o f  Fore ign  A f f a i r s )  
which was t a sk e d  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e s e  two Committees.
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S e c t io n  I conc ludes  with  a b r i e f  summary o f  th e  major  c h a r a c t ­
e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  in t e rd e p e n d e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t i n g  between A u s t r a l i a  
and Japan  - measured both  in te rms o f  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  dependencies  in  
th e  s e p a r a t e  i s s u e  a r e a s ,  and in  te rms o f  t h e  com plex i ty  o f  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .
In t h e  p r im ary  i s s u e  a r e a ,  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  le v e ra g e  
was in  A u s t r a l i a ’s favou r .  While th e  A u s t r a l i a n s  s u f f e r e d  from th e  
d i s a d v a n ta g e  t h a t  t h e i r  f i s h i n g  zone d id  no t  c o n t a in  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  
o f  f i s h  a v a i l a b l e  (o r  a t t r a c t i v e )  to  t h e  DWFS, t o g e t h e r  with  the  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  f i s h i n g  i n d u s t r y  depended,  in some measure ,  on 
a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e  Jap an ese  f o r  i t s  f u t u r e  development,  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  
were more than  o f f s e t  by t h e  J ap an es e  l o n g l i n e r s '  c o n s i d e r a b l e  depend­
ence on con t inued  acc ess  to  A u s t r a l i a n  p o r t s .  In th e  secondary  i s s u e  
a r e a ,  t h e  r e v e r s e  s i t u a t i o n  a p p l i e d  - A u s t r a l i a  depended on acc ess  to  
t h e  Jap an ese  b e e f  market  more tha n  Japan  needed A u s t r a l i a ' s  s u p p l i e s  
o f  t h i s  commodity. In t h e  o t h e r  i s s u e  a r e a s  - and with  r e s p e c t  to  
th e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  - A u s t r a l i a  and Japan  were in  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  
mutual dependence;  b u t ,  on b a l a n c e ,  Japan  was more im por tan t  to  
A u s t r a l i a  th a n  was A u s t r a l i a  to  Japan .  F i n a l l y ,  when measured in 
terms o f  th e  numbers o f  i s s u e s  and a c t o r s  inv o lv ed ,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a - J a p a n  
economic r e l a t i o n s h i p  was marked by one o f  r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  in t e r d e p e n d ­
ence - c e r t a i n l y  so when compared w i th  t h e  much l e s s  complex New 
Zea land-Japan  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
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II. POLICY FORMULATION
This section examines the process of policy formulation in 
Australia with respect to the establishment and implementation of a 
200-nautical mile fishing zone. Emphasis will be given to determining 
what each actor (or group of actors) identified in Section I hoped 
to gain from Australia's increased bargaining leverage over foreign 
fishing access. In particular, attention is focussed on the attitude 
of the different actors towards the desirability of using this 
leverage to gain concessions from the DWFS in areas not related to 
fisheries. Also examined will be the political influence of each 
of these actors, the policy-making framework in which decisions 
concerning the establishment of the AFZ were made, and the final 
policy choice - namely, was it decided to use fishing rights as a 
'weapon' to advance Australia's broader economic interests in its 
relations with the DWFS, particularly Japan?
Ila. Primary Issue Area
First considered will be the policy objectives and political 
influence of those actors in Australia most intimately involved 
with the primary issue area - the commercial fishermen, the bureaucrats 
primarily responsible for fisheries, and the Minister for Primary 
Industry.
Like their counterparts in New Zealand, the Australian 
commercial fishermen viewed the prospect of a 200-mile fishing zone 
off their coasts with a mixture of hope and anxiety. On the one 
hand, it was hoped that the establishment of such a zone might provide 
a significant boost to the development of the local industry; on 
the other hand, there were fears that the DWFS might become further 
entrenched in Australia's offshore waters. Naturally, the fishermen 
were determined to promote the former and avoid the latter.
When the concept of a 200-mile fishing zone was first proposed 
in Australia in the early/mid-1970s some fishermen naively believed 
that such a zone would become the exclusive preserve of the Australian 
fishing industry, from which all foreign fishermen would be barred.
With the passage of time, however, most fishermen came to recognise 
that Australia would (as part of its obligations as a coastal state) 
have to permit access to foreign fishing vessels to harvest the fish 
surplus to the local industry's catching capability.*' But the
1. See the summary of the Australian fishing industry's views 
regarding the problems and issues involved in the management and 
development of an AFZ in the Working Group Report, p.p.47-65.
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domestic fishermen insisted that if the DWFS had to be allowed into
the AFZ, such participation should be subject to very tight controls
and subject to phase-out arrangements.
In particular, the Australian fishermen emphasised the need for
those fisheries already adequately exploited (or soon to be) by them
to be protected from the operations of the DWFS.^' Fowler (the
General Manager of SAFCOL) insisted that Australia should follow
New Zealand's lead by insisting that any licences granted to foreign
vessels should stipulate: 'where the boats can operate; the seasons
and times of fishing; the species, size, age and quantity to be
2caught; and the method of catching.
The Australian tuna fishermen were particularly keen to curb
the activities of the Japanese longliners operating off Australia. It
was charged that extensive Japanese longlining, albeit well offshore,
had led to a significant decline in Southern bluefin tuna stocks
available to Australian fishermen. The Tuna Boat Owners Association
urged the Government to prevent Japanese longline fishing within the
3AFZ from the 30th parallel southward. * As Michael Thomas (President 
of the Tuna Boat Owners Association of South Australia) put it in 
early 1979
'A mockery would be made of the 
proposed economic zone if other 
countries are allowed to fish 
there in competition with Australians.
We hope the Government will study 
our submissions and act on our 
request not to permit Japanese 
tuna fishing in the zone.'4.
It was not only the tuna boat operators who were concerned about 
DWFS operations off Australia. The Game Fishermen's Association - 
based in Cairns, Queensland - had voiced their fears about the number 
of marlin caught incidentally by Japanese longliners in their area.^'
1. Ibid.j p.49.
2. R.N. Fowler, op.cit.3 p.135.
3. See 'Tuna Plunder?' Professional Fisherman3 April, 1979, p.3.
4. Quoted in 'Tuna Plunder' Professional Fisherman3 March, 1979, p.l. 
See also Susan Woods 'Australia Seeks Fishing Rights Trade-Off' The 
Australian Financial Review3 14 February, 1979.
5. See Martin Bowerman 'Marlin - Big Fish, Big Money' Australian 
FisheriesOctober, 1978, p.5.
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The trawlermen operating in the Great Australian Bight and off 
southeastern Australia were worried that large Russian trawlers and 
factory ships might be allowed into their waters and 'bleed Australia's 
deepsea fishing grounds to death.
It should not be construed from all this that the Australian
fishermen were totally against the presence of foreign fishing
vessels inside the proposed 200-mile zone. So long as the worst
excesses of the DWFS - including competition with the local fishermen
for the same fish stocks, and overexploitation of these fish - could
be kept in check, there were seen to be potential advantages in a
foreign fishing presence. With respect to licensed vessels, for
example, Fowler notes that if the licence fees were substantial, they
could provide a useful source of revenue for the promotion of the local
2fishing industry and for additional fisheries research. Again with
respect to feasibility fishing projects involving foreign vessels,
considerable advantages could accrue to the local industry - the most
important of which was the collection and transfer to Australia, of 
3resource data.'’ (It should be repeated that it was this problem - 
that is, the absence of resource data - that was commonly considered 
the most serious obstacle to the development of the Australian fishing 
industry.) Yet again, in the case of joint fishing ventures involving 
foreign and Australian enterprises, there were potential benefits - 
including the development of new fisheries such as the catching of 
pelagic fish in the Great Australian Bight for fish meal, and squid 
fishing. It was believed that such ventures could also help to train 
Australians in new methods of fishing.
The Australian fishermen also hoped that the establishment of 
a 200-mile fishing zone would bring benefits to the processing and 
marketing sectors of their industry. It was suggested that if foreign 
fishermen were to be granted a licence to fish in the AFZ then they
1. See the article by Alex Greig 'Russian Fishing Venture "Folly"'
The Australian3 26 June, 1978.
2. R.N. Fowler op.ait.3 p.136.
3. See the attitude of the fishing industry towards foreign particip­
ation in the 200-mile zone reported in the Working Group R e p o r t p.56. 
It should be noted, however, that by 1978/79 there were many in the 
Australian fishing industry who believed that the disadvantages of 
feasibility fishing projects outweighed their usefulness. It was 
reported, for example, that some squid orojects were 'incredibly large 
in scale to be called studies and ... most of the fishermen regard them 
as full scale commercial operations'. See 'Squid Fishery Should Be 
Intensively Researched' Professional Fisherman_, April 1979, p.3.
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should allow part of their catch to be processed in Australia. No
less than the New Zealanders, the Australian fishermen were also very-
concerned about the problems of access onto foreign markets for their
fish exports.^’ Connell (President of AFIC) felt so strongly about
this issue that he urged
'If overseas countries are not 
prepared to accept unrestricted 
imports of Australian seafoods 
into their markets, they should 
be denied access into the 200 
mile fishing zone. It is imperative 
that the Australian fishing industry, 
fishermen and exporters be able to 
rest easy knowing that their exports 
will continue and expand to other 
species rather than ultimately finding 
an overseas party fishing in Australian 
waters and taking species and marketing 
them in direct competition to the 
Australian fishermen.'“*
It was obvious, then, that the Australian fishermen wanted the
proposed 200-mile zone to be used as an instrument for promoting the
development of their industry by placing curbs on (and winning
concessions from) the DWFS. Most importantly, in the context of
this thesis, the fishermen had frequently voiced their opposition to
proposals linking foreign fishing access with other - that is,
non-fisheries related - issue areas. Back in November 1976, AFIC was
said to be alarmed at the fact that the Federal Government was
contemplating 'trading off fishing resources for beef or other primary
3.industry and mineral markets.' A year later Fowler advised 'unless
we utilise [our fish resources] it will be for political negotiation
for other areas of Australian industry, at the expense of the
4 .Cinderella fishing industry, as has happened in the past.' Yet 
again, in late 1978, Connell is reported to have warned the Minister 
for Primary Industry that a beef trade-off for fishing access 'was 
not acceptable to the fishing industry.'-^*
1. Michael Thomas is claimed to have been most concerned about market 
access for products 'such as tuna and squid which are subject to import 
quotas in Japan.' 'Tuna Export Exclusion Feär' Professional Fisherman3 
July, 1979, p.l.
2. Fred Connell quoted in Ian Reinecke 'Fishing Industry Head Warns 
Against "Trade-offs'", The Australian Financial R e v i e w 1 December, 1978.
3. Noted in 'Sinclair Warns Fish Producers to Exploit Resources'
The Australian3 23 November, 1976.
4. From a draft version of R.N. Fowler's paper op.cit.
5. Quoted in Ian Reinecke op.cit.
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The political influence of Australia's fishermen is small.
Not only are they few in number, but they are widely scattered. (In 
fact, it is difficult to find a single electorate which is heavily 
dependent on the fishermen's vote.) Fishermen's representation is 
fragmentary to say the least and, for the most part, is organised on 
a state basis - often in a very parochial way. The closest approxi­
mation to a national organisation is the Australian Fishing Industry 
Council. But the geographic representation of this body is very 
uneven, and in some places like Tasmania is very weak. With some 
exceptions, the fishermen do not have good leaders with a broad know­
ledge of the industry. It is this factor which largely explains why 
the Government does not allow the commercial fishermen to participate 
more actively in the policy-making process with respect to fisheries 
management. For the most part, the influence of the fishermen does 
not extend beyond direct lobbying of officials in the Fisheries 
Division and the Minister for Primary Industry.
The government officials responsible for fisheries broadly 
agreed with most of the commercial fishermen's objectives with 
respect to the use of the proposed fishing zone. They supported, 
for example, the principle that the local fishing industry should be 
protected from undue competition by the foreign fishing vessels.
The Fisheries Division suggested that this could best be done by 
classifying Australia's fish stocks into three categories: fully
exploited (by Australians), underexploited, and unexploited. Foreign 
fishermen would not be permitted to exploit fisheries in the first 
category; there might be some scope for foreign participation 
(at least in the short term) for some species in the second category; 
and it was recognised that there was justification for participation by 
foreign fishermen in third category fisheries.
This said, the bureaucrats were generally more prepared than
the fishermen to permit foreign access into the zone. In contrast
with most commercial fishermen, the government officials were
acutely conscious of Australia's obligations under the ICNT concerning
foreign access to fish surplus to the coastal state's catching 
2capability. ' Further, the bureaucrats recognised that if Australia
1. See the Working Group Report3 p.p.17-18, also P.Ryan op.cit. 
p.p.10-15.
2. For example, see E.A. Purnell-Webb, September 1979 op.cit.3 
p.p.4-7; and K. Radway-Allen December 1977 op.cit.3 p.7.
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were to meet its obligations it needed first to know what resources 
it had in the AFZ. They believed that the cheapest and quickest 
method of obtaining this information was through the encouragement 
of feasibility fishing projects and joint ventures involving foreign 
enterprises.
There is reason to believe that the Fisheries Division was 
less eager than the fishermen to use Australia's bargaining leverage 
over fishing access to gain concessions from the DWFS with respect 
to market access for Australian fish products. It was noted above*' 
that A.J. Best (an officer with the Marketing Section of the 
Fisheries Division) had suggested that there were few restrictions for 
Australian fish on Japanese markets - despite evidence to the contrary. 
Further, she very optimistically assumed that as it was 'the established 
policy of the Japanese Government to increase quotas and reduce tariffs 
where possible ... this can be expected to continue in the future'.
As will be detailed in Section III, during the fisheries negotiations 
with Japan it was officials from the Department of Trade and Resources, 
rather than those from Fisheries Division, who most keenly sought more 
generous fish market access from the Japanese.
Very rarely did officials from the Fisheries Division make any
public statement concerning the advisability (or nonadvisability) of
linking fisheries access issues with other issue areas. However, in
late 1977, Patrick Ryan (Assistant Secretary - Policy - and Chairman
2of the AFC Working Group) made his views known on this subject.
He noted that there were a variety of policy instruments which 
Australia could use to obtain the goal of maximum economic benefits 
from the zone - among these were the collection of licence fees from 
DWFS, feasibility fishing projects, and joint ventures. He also 
noted that
'It has been suggested in some 
quarters that fishing rights could 
be used as one of the weapons 
in our overall armoury to advance 
our political, economic, defence and 
other relations.'^*
1. See Section la.
2. Patrick Ryan, op.ait.
3. Ibid., r>.14.
zzy
Ryan observed that, while he recognised that in drawing up any 
bilateral arrangement with a foreign government 'our overall relat­
ionships will need to be taken into account',^* he saw '[unspecified] 
substantial difficulties' in the implementation of any form of 
'resources diplomacy'. Elsewhere in his article, Ryan made it clear 
he favoured maximum 'Australianisation' in the zone. It is likely 
that his views were widely shared within the Fisheries Division, for 
few officials in the Division would have wanted to see the interests
of the local fishing industry put at risk by linkage diplomacy.
2The Minister for Primary Industry, 'we have already observed, 
had dual responsibility for agricultural and fisheries affairs. It 
was also noted (and it will be noted again in the following sub-section) 
how the Minister had several times between 1976 and 1978 advocated the 
use of Australia's fishing zone to obtain concessions from Japan with 
respect to Australia's beef (and other rural) exports. Not once did 
he explain how such linkages could be made without in some way 
sacrificing the interests of the local fishing industry. Fortunately 
for him, it does not appear that he was pressed publicly on this 
facet of linkage diplomacy. (Although AFIC had, from to time, warned 
Sinclair that they would not sanction trade-offs involving fishing 
access.)
The Minister was always careful to reassure the fishermen 
that the major objective in declaring the AFZ was to promote the local 
fishing industry. In early 1977, he had advised that 'In the event 
of jurisdiction being extended to 200 miles, Australian fishermen will
3 .get first priority.' * When introducing the Fisheries Amendment Bill
to Parliament on 13 April, 1978, Sinclair declared
'Australian fishermen need have no 
fear that the declaration of the 200-mile 
zone holds anything for them but advan­
tages ... the legislation provides the 
means of exercising an extensive and 
effective control over any foreign  ^
fishing operations within the AFZ.'
1. Ibid., p.15.
2. For all but the last week or so of the period under review in this 
case study, the Primary Industry portfolio was held by Ian Sinclair.
3. From Sinclair's address to the Rock Lobster and Prawning Assoc­
iation of Australia, Perth, 8 February, 1977.
4. Quoted in '200-Mile Bill of Major Significance to Australia, 
Minister tells Parliament' Australian Fisheries, May, 1978, p.4.
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Two months later he announced that the decision to establish the 
zone was taken in the light of: progress made in UNCLOS III; the
need to ensure rational exploitation of Australia’s fish stocks; 
the need to protect and develop Australia's fishing industry; and 
to ensure proper conservation of Australia's fish stocks."^* In 
October, 1978, E. Adermann (the Acting Minister for Primary Industry) 
assured AFIC that the Commonwealth Government was anxious that 
Australian fishermen 'gained every possible advantage from the new 
zone'. He also noted that the government was exploring the possibility 
of opening up new market outlets for Australia's fish.^‘ 
lib. Secondary Issue Area
Next considered will be the policy objectives and political 
influence of those actors in Australia most intimately involved with 
the secondary issue area: the cattlemen; the bureaucrats primarily
responsible for the trade in beef; Ian Sinclair, the Minister for 
Primary Industry and deputy leader of the National Country Party; 
and J.D. Anthony, the Minister of Trade and Resources and leader of 
the NCP.
It will be recalled from sub-section lb that the Australian beef
producers had strongly supported the concept of using their country's
bargaining leverage over fishing access to gain concessions from
Tokyo with respect to beef market access. From late 1976 through to
early/mid-1978, the cattlemen frequently urged the Minister for
Primary Industry to adopt a strategy of 'resources diplomacy' against
Japan. The fact that the overall beef export situation had improved
3somewhat by mid-1978 ’ - temporarily silencing the cattlemen's cries 
for action - did not mean that the cattlemen were any less committed 
to linkage diplomacy in this area.
It will further be recalled that the Minister had responded to 
their requests, and had frequently stated that the proposed AFZ would 
be a useful lever to open up the Japanese beef market. Sinclair's 
sympathy with the cattlemen's requests is only partially explained by
1. See 'Foreign Fishing in 200-Mile Zone' Australian Fisheries,
July, 1978, p.34.
2. E. Adermann's address to the Australian Fishing Industry Council's 
annual general meeting in Canberra, October, 1978.
3. It will be remembered that the United States had substantially 
increased its purchases of Australian beef at this time.
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the fact that he was the Minister charged with major responsibility 
for agricultural affairs. Sinclair's response to the beef producers 
was prompted more by party political considerations. As deputy leader 
of the NCP - and himself the representative of a rural electorate - 
he was particularly sensitive to farmers' complaints.
Sinclair's eagerness to placate the cattlemen may readily be 
appreciated by describing an incident which highlighted the fluid 
state of rural politics at that time. In late 1977 - shortly before 
the Federal elections - sections of the rural community announced that 
they would be challenging several sitting Government members under 
the banner of the Independent Country Party. The moves were sponsored 
by members of the beef industry, including many meat exporters, con­
cerned at the implications of the new method of carving up the Japanese 
beef quota among exporters. Several Country Party members and some 
Liberal members with rural electorates were faced with challenges from 
candidates outside the mainstream of the major political parties. 
Sinclair was claimed to be one of those expected to be so challenged in 
his northern New South Wales electorate of New England.^’
Anthony was exposed to somewhat similar pressures. First, as 
Minister of Trade and Resources, he had some responsibility for the 
trade in beef - as well, of course, responsibility for other items 
exported to Japan. Second, and more significantly, as leader of the 
NCP he was vitally concerned about the farm vote.
There seems little question that Anthony was not, in principle,
opposed to the concept of linkage diplomacy. For example, it is
reported that in his talks with EEC leaders in early 1977 he had
hinted that Australia's exports of energy would be related to Europe's
2imports of Australian rural products. * In his contacts with the 
Japanese, however, he never made the linkage between beef and fishing 
access (or other issue areas) so explicitly. Nevertheless, he left 
the Japanese in no doubt that he wanted the issues of beef and fishing 
access treated dependently. It may be noted, for instance, that, 
in his address to the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 
Keidanren, ' he concluded his remarks about Japan being given a 
'preferred position' with respect to access to the AFZ, by saying
1. A more detailed treatment of this incident is given by Stuart 
Simson 'Discontent Sparks Independent Country Party'. The Australian 
Financial Review3 9 November, 1977.
2. See the article 'Hard Line on Japan' The Age3 26 May, 1977.
3. Given on 15 March, 1978.
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'This subject leads to another And the subject he next introduced
was that of Japan's restrictive beef import regime. It is probably 
safe to assume that Anthony's more subtle and muted exercise of linkage 
diplomacy with the Japanese reflected his concern not to antagonise 
unduly Australia's most important trading partner.
The proponents of linkage diplomacy had, therefore, in Anthony 
and Sinclair, two very powerful supporters - both of whom had positions 
of influence in Cabinet.
It appears that the bureaucrats primarily responsible for the 
beef trade with Japan - those in Primary Industry's Meat and Meat 
Products Division and those in Trade and Resources' Commodity Policy 
Division - generally supported the proposal to link fishing access 
with the beef access issue. But one interviewee did suggest that one 
or two officials in Primary Industry were concerned that, by linking 
the two issues, Australia ran the risk of Japan retaliating by 
reversing the linkage - where the Japanese might say 'You (Australia) 
let us into your fishing zone, or we (Japan) will not buy your beef.' 
lie. Other Issue Areas
This sub-section considers the policy objectives and political 
influence of all those other actors in Australia significantly involved 
in the economic relationship with Japan not included in the primary 
and secondary issue areas. Before identifying the views of each 
individual actor (or group of actors), however, several paragraphs 
will be devoted to the arguments most commonly put forward: on the one
hand, by those in favour of using Australia's bargaining leverage over 
fishing access to gain concessions in other issue areas; and, on the 
other, by those against linkage. It is hoped, thereby, to avoid 
unnecessary duplication, for in the course of research it proved that 
many of the actors within each of these two broad groups had very 
similar attitudes towards linkage diplomacy.
The arguments put forward by those actors favouring linkage were 
relatively straightforward. It was charged that Australia should derive
1. Some Japanese had, in fact, occasionally warned Australia that 
the reverse linkage might be applied. For example, in early 1978, 
Keiichiro Shimada (a Deputy Director of Nokyö), when visiting Canberra, 
warned the Federal Government that talk of resources diplomacy involv­
ing fishing access 'was very much a mistaken approach.' He noted that 
a tough approach in trade negotiations with Japan could lead to a 
backlash among Japanese agricultural producers where 'This could 
lead to a tightening up on the amount of imports Japan would take.'
See 'Warning from Japanese Agricultural Lobby' Canberra Times3 7-8 
February, 1978.
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the maximum benefit from its bargaining leverage over fishing access 
to the proposed 200-mile fishing zone. These benefits need not 
necessarily apply only to the fishing industry, but could (and should) 
extend to other sections of the Australian community. It was also 
argued that, in one sense, it has been common practice - both in 
Australia and elsewhere - to link issues in negotiations. For 
example, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) extend across a 
wide range of issues - where the aim is, ideally, to negotiate an 
outcome involving a package that is satisfactory to all parties. It 
was also pointed out that the Commerce Agreement which Australia had 
negotiated with Japan had, in fact, involved a package of issues. 
Another common argument by those supporting linkage was that New 
Zealand (Australia's trans-Tasman neighbour) had used this strategy in 
its fisheries access negotiations with Japan, and appeared to have 
had at least some success.
Those actors who opposed trade-offs generally presented a 
much wider range of arguments to support their case. Their greatest 
concern was that the adoption of a linkage strategy might seriously 
damage Australia's total relationship with Japan. It was noted that 
Australia was heavily dependent on the trade with Japan. Further, the 
balance of this trade was very much in Australia's favour. * In their 
eyes, the danger was that Japan might respond to any Australian trade­
off by retaliating in one of the many other issue areas that linked the 
two countries. There was a clear recognition that linkage diplomacy 
was a 'two-edged sword'. Moreover, there appeared at this point in 
time (mid-1978), no valid reason why Australia should engage in such 
diplomacy. Australia was in nowhere near the same economic plight 
as New Zealand, and there were no major problems existing in the 
economic relationship with Japan.
Those opposed to trade-offs also had serious doubts whether 
such a strategy would bring any rewards. Australia had little to 
show from its efforts at linkage diplomacy against the EEC. Further, 
it was questioned whether New Zealand had gained anything of substance 
from its fisheries access, and related, negotiations with Japan.
1. It will be recalled that in 1977-78 Australia had a favourable 
balance of trade with Japan of $1,765 million.
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There were also seen to be technical difficulties attached to 
a linkage strategy. In the absence of more detailed knowledge of 
Australia's fish resources, it was difficult to say with any accuracy 
what bargaining leverage Australia had over Japan. Some observers 
believed that the leverage (even allowing for the port access issue) 
was not very large. It was also noted that as Japan was probably 
better informed than Australia with respect to the fish resources in 
the Australian region, the Japanese would have a considerable advantage 
in any negotiations involving trade-offs.
Various moral arguments were put forward by those actors against 
trade-offs. It was argued that under the NARA Treaty, Australia had 
promised Japan that it would be a 'reliable supplier' and would not 
adopt policies which were harmful to the trading relationship. Further, 
under the ICNT Australia had certain obligations towards foreign fishing 
nations - such as Japan - which had habitually fished in the region 
and/or which had cooperated with the coastal state in fisheries research 
and in other areas related to the fishing industry.
This sub-section now identifies the views of individual actors 
or groups of actors with respect to trade-offs involving foreign 
fishing access to the AFZ and other issue areas. Much of the following 
assessment is based on interviews conducted with numerous government 
officials both in Australia and Japan. Given the sensitive nature of 
some of this information - particularly where it treats with person­
alities and inter-bureaucratic rivalries in Australia - the sources 
can rarely be identified, either by name of by government department. 
However - as noted in the introductory pages to this case study - 
this does not pose a serious research problem, as there is sufficient 
documentary evidence available in the public realm to substantiate 
the major conclusions drawn from these interviews.
The first actor considered here is Malcolm Fraser - Prime 
Minister, leader of the Liberal Party, and Minister in charge of 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. From some of Fraser's 
public statements, it would appear that he was very much against any 
form of linkage diplomacy. Shortly before becoming Prime Minister, 
Fraser addressed the question of Australia's international respon­
sibilities as a major exporter of raw materials. He noted that
'[Our] natural wealth imposes 
obligations upon us which are 
not fully recognised. We do 
have an obligation to use our 
natural resources, not only for
our own selfish purposes, but for 
the wider good of the international 
community. Trade and foreign affairs 
need to be kept strictly apart for 
the future ... Resources diplomacy is 
one of the things that will help plunge 
the world into a major depression.'^•
He then went on to note a number of things that had occurred in the
previous two or three years in the global economic situation which
had disturbed and upset Japan. Among these were the 1973-74 Oil
Crisis, international currency decisions, and the soya bean shokku.
Fraser claimed
’To that list one must add 
the Prime Minister [Gough Whitlam] 
and the Minister for Mineral and 
Energy's [Rex Connor] use of 
resources diplomacy which caused 
Japan to write recent iron ore 
contracts with Brazil and South ^
Africa, rather than with Australia.'
Fraser’s public stance was that resources diplomacy was a discredited
instrument of foreign policy, favoured only by the Labor Party.
When Fraser visited Japan in mid-1976 to sign the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries, he reminded
his Japanese hosts that 'Australia would not be a party to holding
3consumer countries to ransom.’ * It has also been noted in the New 
Zealand case study how Fraser had, in 1977, bitterly opposed Muldoon's 
'fish diplomacy' against Japan. (It will be recalled that Fraser 
had actually written a letter to President Carter conveying his 
concern about this matter.)
But the Prime Minister's actions belied his words. Fraser 
was not, in fact, opposed to the concept of trade-offs involving 
Australia's natural resources in certain situations. It seems certain 
that he was strongly supportive of John Howard's (then Minister for 
Special Trade Negotiations) efforts in 1977 to use Australia's 
bargaining leverage over uranium supplies to extract concessions with 
respect to agricultural products from the EEC. It appears that 
Fraser might have even tried to use the uranium lever as an instrument
1. Malcolm Fraser 'National Objectives - Social, Economic and Political 
Goals' The Australian Quarterly, Vo1.47, No.1, March, 197S, p.33; 
based on a paper presented by him to the 46th ANZAAS Congress, January, 
1975.
2. Ibid., p.34.
3. Quoted in Stuart Simson, 17 November, 1976, op.eit.
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to solve the sugar dispute with Japan at this time. After Fraser's
talks with Prime Minister Fukuda in Kuala Lumpur, Australian officials
were reportedly 'at pains to emphasise there had been no trade-offs
such as uranium for sugar in the way New Zealand has sought to link
dairy exports to Japanese fishing rights.'^* But as Brenchley of
The Australian Financial Review then noted,
'While there was no suggestion 
Mr. Fraser made any [specific?] 
uranium trade-off, the relevance 
to Tokyo of stable supplies of 
Australian uranium in the context 
of Mr. Fraser's strong language 
about sanctity of sugar contracts  ^
cannot have escaped the Japanese.'
More significantly, in the context of this thesis, the evidence
suggests that Fraser was probably keen to link the fish access issue
with other issue areas in the Australia-Japan relationship. It seems
inconceivable that Sinclair would, in late 1976, have promoted the
so-called •'f ish-for-beef-deal' without the Prime Minister's consent.
In fact, Stuart Simson claims that Sinclair's exercise of resources
diplomacy at that time had 'full Government backing'. Sinclair,
himself, was supposed to have described the policy as 'a joint point
3of view expressed on behalf of the Government.'
Fraser's letter to Carter complaining about the Muldoon 
Diplomacy should not be seen as a condemnation of linkage diplomacy 
as such. Fraser's concern was less about the economic ramifications 
of the New Zealand-Japanese fisheries access negotiations, than with 
their likely political consequences. The Australian Prime Minister 
feared that New Zealand - a partner in ANZUS - might carry out its 
threat to shut out the Japanese, and be prepared to let the Russians 
into the zone in their place.
It should be emphasised that, despite the fact that Fraser and
Muldoon shared somewhat similar political philosophies, there was
strong personal rivalry between the two. More than one interviewee
insisted that it was this rivalry which provided the main motivation
for Fraser favouring the adoption of a linkage strategy in Australia's4fisheries access negotiations with Japan. * It was claimed that Fraser
1. Fred Brenchley op.cit.
2. Ibid.
3. See Stuart Simson, 17 November, 1976, op.cit.
4. A recent example of the rivalry existing between Fraser and Muldoon 
was the clash between the two Prime Ministers at the meeting of heads 
of government from Commonwealth countries in Asia and the Pacific in
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was anxious to demonstrate that he could obtain at least as good a
deal from the Japanese as had Muldoon.
There seems little doubt, therefore, that the Australian Prime
Minister supported the idea of trade-offs involving the AFZ. Given
the fact that he, like Muldoon, had a strong personality which did not
easily endure opposition to his policies, it seemed likely that he
would have a disproportionately large influence on the final choice
made in Cabinet with respect to Australia's policy position towards
Japanese fishing access. Needless to say, Fraser's influence over his
advisers in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet was even
greater. Significantly, in the Australia-Japan fisheries access
negotiations of 1978-79, it was officials from that Department who
were some of the strongest proponents of trade-offs linking the fish
access issue with other issue areas.
The next set of actors considered is Andrew Peacock (the Minister
for Foreign Affairs) and his departmental advisers. There is reason
to believe that they were far from enthusiastic about linkage diplomacy.
At the time of the earlier (1976/77)’fish-for-beef deal’, Peacock was
said to be against this kind of 'horse-trading' approach to Australia-
Japanese relations.*' It was reported elsewhere that Foreign Affairs
officials described Sinclair's threats against Japan as 'Australia
2cutting off its nose to spite its face'. * Australia's Ambassador to
Japan at this time - Keith Shann - was reported to have said that he
3regarded attempts to link beef and fishing rights as 'very silly.'
The Ambassador noted that such trade-offs have their dangers, not 
least because Australia sells Japan a great deal more than it buys 
from it.
It is unlikely that the views of this set of actors had 
changed radically by mid-1978. With their broader responsibilities, 
covering the totality of the relationship with Japan, they viewed 
with disfavour any policy that put this relationship at risk. (And 
the New Zealand example showed that such a danger existed with 
linkage diplomacy.) Another element in Foreign Affairs' opposition
New Delhi in September, 1980. See Michael Richardson 'Fraser and 
Muldoon Clash On Outlook' The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 September, 1980.
1. See Stephen Nisbet 'Japanese May Be Denied Fishing Rights' The Age3 
17 November, 1976.
2. Reported in Stuart Simson, 17 November, 1976, op.cit.
3. Quoted in Brian Toohey, 21 January, 1977, op.cit.
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to linkage diplomacy might have been the inter-bureaucratic rivalry 
existing between them and Trade and Resources over international 
economic affairs.*’ The fact that the latter generally favoured 
linkages, was an added reason why they - Foreign Affairs - should 
oppose linkages.
In conclusion, it appears that the Foreign Affairs officials 
were strongly against using Australia's bargaining leverage over 
fishing access to gain specific concessions in other issue areas 
from Japan. At most, they were prepared to accept only the vaguest 
and mildest form of linkage.
It was noted in the previous sub-section that officials in the 
Commodity Policy Division of the Department of Trade and Resources 
were strongly in favour of trade-offs. It appears, however, that not 
all officials within this Department agreed with this negotiating 
strategy. For example, it has been suggested by several sources that 
officials within the Trade Relations Division - which has prime 
responsibility for reviewing Australia's trade relations with other 
countries and which negotiates and administers trade agreements - 
were opposed to linkages for very much the same reasons as those in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. As will be noted in the next sub-section, 
they communicated their concern about the possible dangers of linkage 
diplomacy affecting the total trade relationship with Japan to their 
Minister (Anthony), but in the final event, had no choice but to supp­
ort the Minister's decision in this matter.
It is somewhat more difficult to determine what the attitude 
of the Treasurer (John Howard) might have been to trade-offs with 
Japan. It has already been noted how, in 1977, Howard - then Minister 
for Special Trade Negotiations - had tried to link Australia's uranium 
exports with that of agricultural products' imports onto the EEC 
market. When asked at that time by a reporter from the Financial 
Review why Australia did not use this form of bargaining with Japan, 
he replied
'There had been a feeling developing 
over a period of time that we 
really had been very badly treated 
by the Europeans and a major
1. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue see Andrew Farran 
'Foreign Policy and Resources: Problems Arising From A Disintegrated 
Decision-Making Process' The First Thousand Bays of Labour3 Vol.l, 
APSA Conference, Canberra, 1975.
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effort was required. You 
mentioned Japan, but our trading 
relationship over the whole range 
[author's emphasis] is more satisfactory 
than it is with the EEC.'^*
The argument that Howard used in 1977 applied with greater 
force a year later - for, in mid-1978, the Australia-Japan trading 
relationship was on a sounder, more stable, trouble-free footing than 
it had been for some years. It is doubtful, however, whether Howard 
would have been greatly opposed to the adoption of linkage diplomacy 
against Japan in 1978. First, as Treasurer he had less immediate 
concern, or responsibility, for the trade relationship with Japan. 
Second, as the political protogee of the Prime Minister it was unlikely 
that he would strongly oppose a policy option favoured by Fraser.
The last group of actors considered here is that comprising the 
very large number of private interests - including the big minerals 
exporters - who trade with Japan. What is particularly noticeable is 
that, unlike the private actors in the primary and secondary issue 
areas, very rarely did the actors in this group (either individually 
or collectively) make public statements concerning the proposed trade­
off between fishing access and beef. There are three possible explan­
ations for this comparative silence: one, they normally do not make 
public comments on government policy, but communicate their concerns 
privately and directly to the relevant bureaucrats and Ministers; two, 
they did not give much thought to this subject (for, after all, there 
had not been much coverage of the trade-off debate in the media); and, 
three, they had thought about it, but considered that there was no 
reason to fear or oppose linkage diplomacy. As the following paragraphs 
demonstrate, the first explanation is more credible than the other two. 
It can be demonstrated that at least some actors within this group did 
think about the question of linkage diplomacy and, further, that they 
had serious reservations about the wisdom of employing it against Japan.
In April, 1977, the Commonwealth Government appointed an Ad Hoc
Working Committee on Australia/Japan Relations to 'inquire into and
submit recommendations to the Prime Minister on measures which might
be taken to enhance the relationship between Australia and Japan and to
2improve the management of the relationship.' * There were eight members
1. Quoted in Richard Ackland 'Howard's Uranium Lever in Europe' The 
Australian Financial Review> 29 August, 1977.
2. Australia-Japan Relations3 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on 
Australia-Japan Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1978, p.15.
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of this Committee: S.B. Myer, the Chairman (who was also Chairman of 
Myer Emporium, traders in manufactured items with Japan); R.D.G. Agnew 
(Chairman of Agnew Clough, exporters of nickel and other non-ferrous 
metals to Japan); Sir John Crawford (Chancellor of the Australian 
National University, and Chairman of the Australia-Japan Economic 
Relations Research Project); R.G. Jackson (General Manager of CSR, 
exporters of sugar, iron ore and coal); D.H. McKay (Secretary,
Department of Overseas Trade); A.R. Parsons (Deputy Secretary 
Department of Foreign Affairs); A.J. Woods (Secretary, Department of 
National Development); and P. Nolan of the Australian Confederation of 
Trade Unions. One may safely say, therefore, that this Committee 
broadly represented the actors in the 'other issue areas' 
category.
Reflecting the nature of the bilateral relationship, the Committee 
placed greatest emphasis in its Report on economic matters. It noted, 
for example, the very high degree of economic complementarity and mutual 
economic dependence existing in the relationship. The Report noted, 
however, that
'One of the most serious
deficiencies in the relationship is
the lack of agreement about what
each side should accept with
regard to security of supply and
access to markets. Australia
should continue to seek to persuade
Japan to accept assurances of
stable supply at reasonable prices,
in return for offering Australia
access to stable and reliable markets.' *
Special attention was drawn to problems in the beef trade, where a
'particularly cumbersome and unpredictable system of import controls
has frustrated Australian efforts to penetrate a potentially large
market.'
Of particular relevance to the present study, is what the 
Committee had to say on the subject of linkage diplomacy. In fact, 
the Committee paid very close attention to this subject under the 
heading of 'Resources Bargaining'. This section of the Report will, 
therefore, be very closely examined here and will be quoted freely.
1. Ibid, j p .5.
2. Ibid. 3 p.9; see also p.p.135-8.
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In brief, the Committee was generally opposed to resources
bargaining - as it described the practice of linking disparate areas
in the economic relationship in negotiations. It was noted that the
particular instance of resources bargaining which most attracted
comment in evidence to the Committee was
'the possibility, referred to by 
Australian Ministers last November, 
that Australia may withhold 
extension of the unique port access 
concessions, currently granted to 
Japanese tuna vessels, unless the 
Japanese Government agreed to lift 
its newly-announced beef import 
quota to a level that reflected 
earlier assurances about maintaining 
reliability in the trade.'
The Report suggested that this episode was a departure from
Australia's normal negotiating strategy, where the 'preferred approach
has been to tackle problems in trade and economic relations on a
2commodity-by-commodity, issue-by-issue basis.' * The Report then 
proceeded to list the reasons why the latter approach has been pre­
ferred. It was noted that
'it is most unlikely that one 
Australian industry will be inclined 
to enter into arrangements designed 
to benefit another, the coal industry 
entering into commitments which 
secure a larger market for our ^
beef exports in Japan, for example.''
It was also claimed that there is a risk that, by linking 
problems, 'solutions are found for none of them ... In short, it can 
lead to a widening and escalation of a dispute to the detriment of all 
the individual products involved.'1 234 5* There was a danger, the Report 
believed, that the target country may seek to diversify to other 
sources of supply (or perhaps to other substitute products), and/or 
'may well retaliate if the balance of advantage in another product 
traded is in their favour.'^*
The Report stressed that resources bargaining was particularly 
risky in the Australia-Japan relationship. It was claimed that both 
Australia and Japan 'stand to lose enormously' if there is disruption 
to trade. It was also noted that the Japanese Government and people
1. Ibid., p.p.131-2.
2. Ibid., p .132.
3. Ibid. , p.p.132-3.
4. Ibid., p.133; present author's emphasis.
5. Ibid., p.133.
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are, more than most, very sensitive to pressures by foreign countries 
in areas where Japan is vulnerable - such as its dependence on access 
to foreign supplies of fuels, industrial raw materials and many food­
stuffs. The Report continued
'Of the various commodities Australia 
exports to Japan, suspension of trade 
in any one of them would be likely 
to harm Australia considerably.
Retaliation by Japan in some other 
area is also a very likely consequence.
For these reasons the Committee tends 
to the conclusion that attempts to 
engage in ”resources bargaining” with 
Japan should be regarded with great 
caution. •
This section of the Report concluded by noting the importance 
that fisheries questions are likely to assume in Australia's relations 
with Japan. The Committee observed that Australia would soon be 
establishing a 200-mile fisheries zone. It was argued that, while 
Australia 'should utilise this resource [the fishing zone and the fish 
stocks contained therein] so as to ensure the maximum benefits to 
Australia over the long term', Australia should also be careful to 
ensure that'all countries seeking access including Japan, are 
treated in a way that can be justified as even-handed and non-discrim- 
inatory.'  ^‘
The Committee, therefore, advised Prime Minister Fraser that 
they were generally not in favour of trade-offs in the forthcoming 
fisheries access negotiations with Japan. Given the fact that the 
Committee's position on this matter was probably shared by most other 
actors in the 'other issue areas' category, the Government could not 
easily ignore the views of this group - for this group had considerable 
influence, representing as it did some of the most powerful economic 
interests in. Australia.
Before considering the institutional framework in which policies 
relating to foreign fishing access were formulated in Australia, a 
brief summary is given of the attitudes of the different actors listed 
above toward linkage diplomacy involving the Australian Fishing Zone 
and its fish resources. It will be noted that the various actors 
generally had policy preferences similar to those predicted in the 
analytical framework. Those in the primary issue area (except the
1. Ibid. p.134; present author's emphasis.
2. Ibid.3 p.135.
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Minister for Primary Industry) were strongly against trade-offs; 
those in the secondary issue area were equally in favour of trade­
offs; and those in the ’other issue areas' category were, for the 
most part, against linkage diplomacy.
It would be very difficult to determine which grouping - those 
in favour of trade-offs or those against trade-offs - had the greatest 
political influence. If one measured the influence of only the various 
private (commercial) interests and of the bureaucrats, then the balance 
would be quite even - but probably favouring those against linkage 
diplomacy. However, it appears that amongst the Cabinet Ministers, 
those in favour of trade-offs (including senior Ministers such as 
Fraser, Sinclair and Anthony) were in the majority.
It will be noted in the following two sub-sections that the 
Cabinet Ministers were critically involved in the decision-making 
process concerning the policies to be adopted with respect to the 
use of the AFZ as a bargaining lever against other countries. It 
will also be noted that their views prevailed, and linkage diplomacy 
was adopted as a suitable policy instrument in the forthcoming fisheries 
negotiations with Japan. However, it will also be noted that the views 
of the many other actors - both private and bureaucratic - who opposed 
trade-offs were not ignored, and when the linkage diplomacy was 
exercised against Japan it was of a much milder variety than that 
employed by New Zealand against Japan. 
lid. Decision-Making Network
This sub-section examines the decision-making machinery 
established in Australia to formulate policies both with respect to 
the introduction and implementation of the AFZ, and with respect to 
the broader question of linkage diplomacy involving Australia's lever­
age over foreign fishing access. Emphasis will be given to identify­
ing those actors participating in the formal decision-making process - 
for the final policy choices will, in large part, be determined by 
those actors most directly involved. For the sake of convenience, the 
following analysis will be divided into two parts; the first will 
examine those bodies charged with major responsibility for formulating 
policies related most specifically with fisheries management issues; 
the second examines those decision-making bodies primarily concerned 
with the broader economic (and political) dimensions of Australia's 
fisheries access policies.
za a
Under the Commonwealth Fisheries Act, the Federal Government has 
responsibility for the regulation of fisheries outside Australia's 
territorial waters and in external matters such as international 
fisheries negotiations and export marketing. With respect to the 
formulation of fisheries management policies within the proposed 
Australian Fishing Zone and the negotiation of access agreements with 
the DWFS, therefore, the Federal Minister for Primary Industry and his 
Departmental advisers were likely to play a central role. Such proved 
to be the case, but - as will be demonstrated below - the separate 
State Governments and the commercial fishing industry, in varying 
degrees, also had roles to play in the policy-making process.
The major existing fisheries management mechanisms (most of which 
were established back in the late 1960s) were used as a vehicle for 
consultation between the Federal and State Governments on the new 
issues arising out of the 200-mile zone. At the apex of this decision­
making hierarchy stood the Australian Fisheries Council (AFC), which 
included the relevant State ministers responsible for fisheries, and 
which had as its Chairman the Minister for Primary Industry. The major 
function of the AFC is the coordination of Commonwealth and State 
fisheries management policies. The AFC is supported by a Standing 
Committee on Fisheries at the director level. There were also three 
sub-committees responsible for the management of fisheries in different 
parts of Australia: a Northern Fisheries Sub-Committee dealing with
fisheries off Queensland, the Northern Territories, and northern West 
Australia; a Western Fisheries Sub-Committee concerned with the 
remaining western waters; and a Southeastern Fisheries Sub-Committee 
responsible for waters off New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and 
South Australia. These Sub-Committees, in their turn, established 
various working groups for particular fisheries.
There were also established new bodies charged with the task of 
examining and reporting upon the issues and problems involved in the 
management and development of a 200-mile fishing zone. These provided 
additional opportunities for consultation between Federal and State 
Governments, and also gave the commercial fishermen a chance to voice 
their opinions.
One such body was the Working Group on the 200 Mile Fishing Zone 
which was established in 1976 by the AFC to examine and define the 
issues involved in managing fisheries resources within a 200-nautical 
mile fisheries zone. The six members of the Group comprised: two
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officials from the Fisheries Division (DPI), two officials from State 
departments (one from West Australia, the other from Tasmania) respon­
sible for fisheries, one scientist from the CSIRO, and Fred Connell of 
AFIC. The Working Group was specifically requested to consult with 
Governments and industry before reporting to the Standing Committee 
on Fisheries and the AFC. It had no independent power to make policy 
decisions, but acted as an advisory body to the AFC.
One of the recommendations of the Working Group Report^' was the 
establishment of an Australian Fishing Zone Committee. In recognition 
of this, the AFC in late 1978 decided to establish the Australian 
Fishing Zone Committee (AFZC) to: review and report to AFC, through 
the Standing Committee on Fisheries, from time to time, guidelines for 
foreign fishing vessels and crew participation in the Australian 
fishing industry; and to review and report to AFC through the Standing 
Committee the effect of foreign participation in Australia's 200-mile 
zone on the. Australian fishing industry. The six members of the AFZC 
comprised two representatives from the Commonwealth Government, two 
from State Governments, and two from the fishing industry (one from the 
catching sector, and one from the processing/marketing sector). The 
Committee acted as a liaison body between Governments and industry, 
and held its first meeting with fishermen and fishing companies in 
March, 1979, to discuss foreign fishing activities off Australia.
Another policy-making body was established in early 1978, with 
specific responsibility for supervising the feasibility fishing projects 
involving foreign vessels. This was the Sub-Committee on Fishing 
Proposals, and included a number of Government Departments.
From what has been said above, it would appear that the commercial 
fishermen had been given some opportunity, at least, to participate in 
the decision-making process concerning fisheries management in the 
proposed AFZ. However, the fishermen frequently complained that their 
views were insufficiently accommodated in Government fisheries policies. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Regional Sub-committees 
of the Standing Committee on Fisheries were not in favour of industry 
participating in policy-making in a formal sense, wishing to reserve 
for themselves the task of developing draft management plans and
1. Which, it will be recalled, was released in November, 1977.
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research needs for those fisheries involving foreign fishermen.
As might be expected, policy decisions concerning the broader 
economic (and political) dimensions of extended fishing zone management 
were made at only the most senior levels of government. Australia’s 
negotiating position in the forthcoming talks with Japan - particularly 
with respect to the implementation of trade-offs across different issue 
areas - was decided by Cabinet. The Cabinet received advice from a 
standing Inter-Departmental Committee on the 200-Mile Zone, which 
involved some ten Government Departments - including Foreign Affairs, 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Primary Industry, Trade and Resources, 
Defence, National Development, Treasury, and Industry and Commerce.
This Committee coordinated the various policy inputs from separate 
Departments. The Ministers also received policy recommendations 
directly from their respective Departmental advisers. It appears that 
the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on Japan was not called 
upon for policy advice in this area.
Actors from the private sector played only an indirect role in
the decision-making process involving the wider economic aspects of
fisheries negotiations with foreign countries. Apart from the Ad Hoc
Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations - which, it will be
recalled, had been given the chance to communicate its views on the
subject of resources bargaining involving the AFZ directly to the
Prime Minister - most private actors had no recourse but to make their
2policy recommendations through informal channels.
He. Policy Choice
Section II concludes by examining the various policy choices 
made by Canberra with respect to the establishment and use of a 
200-mile fishing zone. A number of questions will be addressed, 
including: did the Australian Government finally decide to establish 
an extended fishing zone; if so, for what policy objectives did 
Canberra seek to use its increased bargaining leverage over the DWFS - 
to promote the interests of the local fishing industry and/or to 
promote other economic (or political) interests; and, most importantly, 
did the Government decide to use its leverage over foreign access as an
1. See, for example, 'Fishing Zone Committee Established’ Professional 
Fisherman3 December, 1978.
2. It will be noted in sub-section Illb, however, that during the latter 
stages of the Australia-Japan fisheries negotiations the private sector 
was, through its participation in the Consultative Committee on Relations 
with Janan, able to more directly communicate its views to Government on 
the question of linkage diplomacy involving the AFZ.
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instrument to gain trade-offs in the secondary issue area in its 
impending fisheries negotiations with Japan? As in the previous sub­
section, the analysis will be divided into two parts: the first 
considers those policy decisions dealing specifically with fisheries 
matters; and the second considers those policy choices that might have 
been made with respect to trade-offs involving other issue areas.
At quite an early date, Canberra made clear its intention to 
establish an extended fishing zone. On 16 August, 1977 - some two 
weeks before the Port Moresby Declaration where, it will be recalled, 
the member nations of the South Pacific Forum each declared their 
intention to legislate to establish a 200-nautical mile fishing or 
exclusive economic zone as soon as possible - the Australian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs announced that the Commonwealth Government had taken the 
decision to extend Australia's fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. He 
also noted that appropriate amendments to the Fisheries Act 1952 and 
related legislation were being drafted.
On 13 April, 1978, the Australian Government introduced legis­
lation to Parliament providing for the extension of the country's fish­
eries jurisdiction. Following passage through the House of Represent­
atives and the Senate, the Fisheries Amendment Bill, 1978, received 
Royal Assent by the Governor General on 24 August, 1978. But no firm 
date had yet been fixed for the establishment of the Australian 
Fishing Zone.*' It had been decided that, following completion of 
certain administrative preparations then in hand in the Department of 
Primary Industry, the Minister (for Primary Industry) would recommend to 
the Governor-General in Council that he proclaim commencement of the 
Fisheries Amendment Act with effect from a particular date. When the 
Governor General had proclaimed commencement, the Minister for Primary 
Industry would announce the date from which Australia's 200-mile zone 
took effect. Throughout this preparatory period, and subsequently, it 
was expected that negotiations would take place with DWFS concerning 
the terms and conditions of foreign access to the zone.
In essence, the Act followed the format adopted by New Zealand 
in its fishing zone legislation - which in turn followed closely the 
set of generally-agreed principles laid down in the ICNT. The major 
clauses of the Act will be briefly examined. The heart of the Act
1. Although Clauses 2 and 25 of the Bill provided for the closing of 
the Gulf of Carpentaria to foreign fishermen immediately the Bill 
received Royal Assent.
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was the creation in Clause 3(a) of an Australian fishing zone which
replaced the former declared fishing zone, and by virtue of which
Australian fisheries jurisdiction was extended from the existing
12 to 200 miles. Within this zone Australia would have exclusive
jurisdiction over the fishing activities of both Australians and
foreigners. Certain waters, however, were excluded from the zone -
including those areas where the Australian zone overlapped with that
of another country. Provisions were made: for the licensing of foreign
vessels permitted to operate in the zone, with respect to access
for these vessels to Australian ports, and with respect to the conditions
under which licences would be granted.^' There was also provision in
Clause 9(c) for the making of regulations prescribing fees for the issue
of licences to fish within the AFZ. The Act also gave effect to
provisions in the ICNT regarding punishment for offences committed by
2foreigners in the 200-mile zone.
When Sinclair introduced the Bill into Parliament he noted that 
Australia had certain obligations with respect to management of its 
fish resources to ensure their proper conservation and utilisation.
(These objectives were laid down in what became Clause 5(b) of the 
Fisheries Act.) In brief Australia would - to give effect to its 
obligations - have to assess the resources of the AFZ and determine the 
amount of allowable catch that was capable of being caught by Austral­
ians, and allocate to foreign countries any available surplus.
But Sinclair was quick to point out that ’Australian fishermen 
need have no fear that the declaration of the 200-mile zone holds
3anything for them but advantages.' ' He then went on to note how the 
zone would help to promote the rapid and efficient growth of the 
Australian fishing industry. First, the legislation provided the 
means for'exercising an extensive and effective control over any 
foreign fishing activity within the zone'. This meant that the fish 
resources which the Australian industry had the capacity to exploit 
fully'would be set aside for the benefit of that industry'. Second, 
the Government by regulation could require the provision of information 
concerning the'undeveloped or unknown fisheries which may be developed 
or discovered by foreigners within the AFZ'. (No doubt, Sinclair was
1. See Fisheries Amendment Act 1978, Clause 9.
2. See Clauses 11 to 23.
3. Sinclair in the House of Representatives, 13 April, 1978, Hansard, 
p.1515.
here referring to feasibility fishing ventures.) The Minister claimed 
that 'Such information will enable Australians, if they so desire, 
to develop quickly the expertise and equipment to exploit such 
fisheries.'
Elsewhere, the Minister (and other Commonwealth officials res­
ponsible for fisheries) reassured the fishermen that the interests of 
their industry would be both protected and promoted under the new 
jurisdiction. The Acting Minister for Primary Industry advised AFIC
that new overseas market outlets for Australia's fish products might
2follow from the establishment of the 200-mile zone. The Government 
also gave assurances with respect to the policing and surveillance 
aspects of fisheries management in the AFZ. It was claimed that, with 
the introduction of the 200-mile zone, the detection and apprehension 
of illegal vessels would be made easier by the self-policing aspects 
of licensing individual foreign vessels. In addition, there would 
- it was claimed - be flag-enforcing capabilities within the provisions 
of fisheries agreements to be negotiated with other countries.
When addressing the AFC in early November, 1978, Sinclair stated
'It is the Commonwealth's intention 
to maximise for Australia and 
Australians the benefits to be 
achieved from the development 
of the 200-mile fishing zone. One 
of our main objectives will be to 
ensure Australian participation in 
that development to the greatest 
possible extent. This may necessitate 
giving some incentive to induce 
Australian industry to move into new 
areas not currently fished by Australians.
It also raises, of course, questions 
concerning the utilisation of a greater 
catch, the development of new products, 
as well as development of markets 
within and outside Australia. I have 
asked my Department to examine specific 
measures to increase Australian participation 
in the development of the zone...'3*
In fact, the Government could point to several recent initiatives 
that were designed to assist increased Australian participation in 
development of the zone. In April, 1978, the Federal Government relaxed
1. Ibid., p.1517.
2. See E. Adermann op.cit.
3. Sinclair speaking to 8th Meeting of AFC, Canberra, 10 November, 
1978. Present author's emphasis.
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its import controls on second-hand fishing boats. In July that year, 
the Minister for Transport (Peter Nixon) gave details of a major new 
programme to upgrade Australia's coastal surveillance and enforcement 
capabilities. The programme included extension of aerial surveillance 
by RAAF long-range maritime patrol aircraft to cover the AFZ, and an 
increase from seven to nine in the number of RAN patrol boats directly 
available for civil surveillance.^* Further, the Minister for Science 
(Senator Webster) announced that the 1978-79 budget had allocated a 
sum of $700,000 for CSIRO and the Department of Primary Industry to 
carry out research and support in monitoring fisheries resources in 
the AFZ.1 2*
However, the Australian Government made few public comments 
concerning the specific 'fisheries' concessions it sought to extract 
from Japan in the forthcoming fisheries negotiations. There was, for 
example, no evidence to suggest that the Government intended to act 
on the recommendations of the local fishing industry by: one, threat­
ening that if Tokyo did not relax its restrictions on imports of 
Australian fish onto the Japanese market then Japanese fishing vessels 
would be denied access to the AFZ; or, two, demanding that Japanese 
tuna longliners should no longer operate within the zone from the 30th 
parallel southward.
In fact, it appeared that rather than taking a firm line against
Japan in the impending negotiations, Australia had decided to be
relatively generous towards the Japanese fishermen. Most significantly,
the Australian Government had decided that, of the various countries
which wished to participate in the AFZ, it would negotiate first with
Japan. As one interviewee put it, Japan was to be given 'first bite
at the cherry'. Government spokesmen argued that Japan was thus
chosen because its fishing vessels had long been operating in Australian
waters. Purnell-Webb explained
'The Government has chosen to 
deal first with countries that 
already had a fishing presence 
within 200 miles of Australia.
Japan was an obvious first 
choice. Next in line are any of 
our ASEAN neighbours wishing to 
seek access for their fishing
1. See the article 'Keeping a Closer Watch On the Coast' Australian 
Fisheries3 September, 1978, p.p.26-7.
2. 'CSIRO to Study Fish Stocks in 200-Mile Zone' Australian Fisheries3 
October, 1978, p.33.
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vessels and after that we will 
meet with other countries. '1•
There was, however, reason to suspect that there were other
factors which motivated Canberra to put Japan at the head of the list.
The critical observer might have been excused, in late 1978, for
believing that the Australian Government had decided - in the upcoming
fisheries negotiations with Japan - to offer the Japanese generous
treatment in the area of fishing in return for concessions from the
Japanese in other issue areas. The local fishermen, in fact, were
convinced that this was the case. Shortly after the negotiations
between Australia and Japan got underway, Connell voiced his concern
that the interests of the Australian fishing industry might be
2.'discarded in under-the-counter deals by the Government'. He 
warned the Minister that his industry would not tolerate trade-offs 
where fishing rights were exchanged for concessions from the DWFS 
involving primary produce.
At this early stage, however, it was difficult to prove that the 
Government had decided to adopt a trade-off strategy against the 
Japanese. Since early 1978 Sinclair had been very quiet on the subject 
of linkage diplomacy. Further, no other Government official had 
indicated that Canberra would be seeking concessions outside fisheries 
in the forthcoming discussions. But the public silence on this 
matter did not, of course, necessarily mean that the Government had 
rejected this strategy. As noted above, there were several important 
reasons why the Government would not have wanted to broadcast the 
adoption of such a bargaining strategy. Most importantly, the Fraser 
Government had frequently disavowed 'resources diplomacy' as a dis­
credited device of the former Labor administration. Further, the 
Government might not have wanted to signal its intentions to the 
Japanese before the negotiations actually began. Nor might Canberra 
have wished to embarrass unduly the Japanese Government by publicly 
announcing its intention to follow Muldoon's example in the fisheries 
negotiations. Again, the Government would not have wanted needlessly 
to alienate the local fishing industry by loudly proclaiming the 
virtues of linkage diplomacy in this area.
1. E.A. Purnell-Webb, September, 1979, op.cit.3 p.5.
2. Quoted in Ian Reinecke, 1 December, 1978, op.oit.
It was not long, however, before the true nature of Australia's 
policy position with respect to linkages was revealed. As the 
negotiations progressed, a large number of leaks to the press indicated 
that the Australian Government had indeed adopted a trade-off strategy.^’ 
A small sample of these press reports follows.
In December, 1978, Brian Toohey of The Australian Financial
Review noted how the negotiations between Australia and Japan had
reached an impasse. He noted that
'According to Canberra sources, 
the Japanese are objecting to signing 
an exchange of letters in which the 
fishing rights are supposed to be 
seen as part of the overall economic 
relationship with Australia. Apparently 
Japan feels that this general clause 
could be used later by Australia to 
demand greater access for its beef in 
a similar way to New Zealand's trade­
off of its fishing rights for butter.'2.
This respected newspaper gave further credence to the Toohey article
by issuing an Editorial the same day, titled 'Locking in Your Best
Customer'. There it was observed
'In negotiating Japanese access 
Australia wants it recognised as 
part of the overall economic 
relationship. The Japanese, in turn, 
have baulked at this seemingly 
innocuous proposal, seeing it 
possibly as an attempt to screw a 
beef for fish trade-off deal in 
the same way as the New Zealanders'.
Throughout the negotiations, similar press stories emerged. In
July, 1979, the Professional Fisherman claimed 'At this stage it seems
that the Japanese are proving difficult to negotiate with on any form
of fish or other rural product trade-off of access to the Japanese 
3.market.' Again, in September that year, Susan Woods noted
'The main bone of contention 
in the talks was Japan's unwillingness 
to take part in any form of "trade-off" 
involving access on the Japanese 
market for either Australia's fishing
1. These press reports exactly corresponded with information provided 
to the author in Tokyo, October, 1978, by several senior members of 
the Japanese negotiating team, just returned from Canberra after the 
initial round of negotiations. The accuracy of these reports was also 
checked in the course of numerous interviews conducted with different 
officials in Australia involved in the negotiations.
2. Brian Toohey 'Japan Fishing Talks Impasse' The Australian Financial 
Review3 27 December, 1978.
3. 'Japanese Access Talks Bog Down' Professional Fishermans July, 1979,
2 S3
products, or any rural commodity, 
in return for Japanese access 
to Australian waters.'!•
The interviewees were unanimous in their belief that Australia 
was not seeking any specific trade-offs with Japan, as had New Zealand 
in its negotiations with that country. Australia's exercise of linkage 
diplomacy was a much more muted, subtle, low-key affair. Whilst it 
will be demonstrated in Section III that Australia had - in the initial 
rounds of the negotiations - tried to persuade Japan to make concessions 
on the beef trade issue within the MTN, this linkage was not made in 
specific terms. Australia's negotiating position in this area went 
no further than that adopted by Wellington in the earliest stages of 
New Zealand's fisheries, and related, discussions with Japan. The 
formula adopted by Australia was one of 'while Australia appreciates 
Japan's concern about fisheries access, Japan should also appreciate 
Australia's concern over beef access.'
In brief, Australia had obviously decided before entering into 
the fisheries negotiations with Japan not to push too strongly for 
specific trade-offs. There was to be no repeat of the so-called 'fish- 
for-beef deal' concluded in 1976/77. (Although, of course, the 
Japanese were not aware of this.) It has been suggested by a number of 
interviewees that Canberra's relatively moderate policy position with 
respect to the use of its bargaining leverage over fishing access 
reflected the deep divisions among Australia's decision-makers. The 
final policy choice concerning linkage diplomacy represented a 
compromise between the 'hawks' who favoured very strong, specific, 
linkages and the 'doves', who were against any form of trade-off.
It was, in late 1978, probably too early to determine whether 
Australia had, in its policy choices with respect to the establishment 
and use of the AFZ, decided to sacrifice in some way the local fishing 
industry in favour of other sectional interests. (This could only be 
completely assessed at the conclusion of the negotiations with Japan.) 
But, from what has been written above, the Australian fishermen had 
reason to view with concern the coming negotiations.
p.3. It will be noted in sub-section Illb, that by mid-1979 the 
Australians were more strongly pushing for concessions from the Japanese 
with respect to market access for Australia's fish exports.
1. Susan Woods 'Proclamation of 200-Mile Fishing Zone' The Australian 
Financial R e v i e w 24 September, 1979.
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III. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
This final section of the case study focusses on the implement­
ation stage of the policy process following Australia's decision to 
establish a 200-nautical mile fishing zone and to enter into fisheries 
negotiations with the D1VFS. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
fishing access negotiations between Australia and Japan in 1978-79.
It will be recalled that this section is divided into three sub-sections: 
Pre-Bargaining Exchange, Bargaining Exchange, and Bargain Outcome. The 
first two sub-sections present, chronologically, the background to the 
bargaining process against which those factors which might affect 
the final outcome are examined. The third sub-section treats with the 
bargain outcome itself, and determines what Australia managed to obtain 
in the way of concessions from Japan in the fisheries (cum trade) 
negotiations. Attention is focussed on two major questions: first, 
to what degree were Australia's attempts at linkage diplomacy in this 
area successful; and, second, how was the final outcome affected by 
the attitudes and roles of the various actors in the three different 
issue area categories listed in Section I?
Ilia. Pre-Bargaining Exchange
It was argued in the analytical framework that the perceptions, 
tactics, and ultimate success of some party involved in negotiations 
with another will be in part determined by its experiences (if any) 
in previous similar bargaining exchanges. These former exchanges 
will probably have given each side the chance to assess the various 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities, bargaining skills, commitment, 
will and credibility of the other. This sub-section, therefore, 
examines the past record of bilateral negotiations between Australia 
and Japan.
The substantial and complex economic relationship existing 
between the two countries has, over the years, given both Canberra and 
Tokyo ample opportunity to assess the bargaining strengths (and 
weaknesses) of the other. A number of serious trade disputes in the 
early and mid-1970s precipitated a series of protracted negotiations 
between Australia and Japan, often involving -private interests and 
Governments on both sides. These exchanges served to remind Australians 
just how tough and experienced the Japanese were at negotiating. The 
Japanese, in their turn, came to realise that the Australians were 
also developing their bargaining skills. Where once individual 
Australian exporters had allowed themselves to be 'picked off' one
Zbb
at a time by Japanese negotiators acting on behalf of an entire 
industry, by the mid/late 1970s this situation was encountered less 
frequently. In many trade areas, Australian exporters, and State and 
Commonwealth Governments had developed a system of consultation 
among themselves to formulate a bargaining strategy before the 
negotiating process got underway.
Of greater significance here, however, is what these two countries 
had learned from the negotiations of 1976-77, when Australia had 
linked the question of beef exports to Japan with the port access 
issue. In the absence of any public assessments in this area by 
either Canberra or Tokyo, the present analysis represents a personal 
appraisal by the author following a number of interviews with 
officials (both Japanese and Australian) who had been involved in this 
previous round of fisheries negotiations.
In 1976-77 the Australian Government had demonstrated that it
possessed the necessary political will, commitment, and capacity to
2.make a credible threat against Japan. While it has been suggested 
that Australia failed to obtain much in the way of concessions from 
Japan at that time, the point was that Tokyo had agreed to accept 
the linkage between the beef and port access issue areas. In exchange 
for an extension to the port access agreement, the Japanese increased 
their beef import quota for the next six months period (as well as 
providing further technical assistance to the Australian fishing 
industry).
There is little doubt that the lessons of this previous experience 
were still fresh in the minds of the Japanese when - less than two 
years later - they entered into negotiations with Australia on the 
question of fisheries access. They were probably aware that the 
principal architects of Australia’s prior exercise of linkage 
diplomacy involving fishing access still held office in Canberra. No 
doubt, Tokyo had also taken note of Sinclair's repeated threats in 
1977 and 1978 to use Australia's bargaining leverage over access to 
the zone to gain concessions from Japan in the beef issue area. The 
credibility of such threats must, in late 1978, have been particularly 
strong following Japan's recent negotiations with New Zealand, where
1. See, Tor example, the Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on 
Australia-Japan Relations, o p . o i t p.p.117-9.
2. See Susan Bambrick 'Facing Skilful Negotiators' Mining Review3 
February, 1977, p.p.1-3.
similar linkages had been made. The Japanese might, however, have 
believed that in the forthcoming round of negotiations with Australia 
they had one important advantage - namely, their experience over the 
past year or so in concluding a number of agreements with other 
countries for 200-mile zone access. Australia had no such experience 
in this area.
The Australian Government, for its part, probably perceived that 
its bargaining leverage over Japan was - in late 1978 - perhaps 
greater than it had been on the eve of the previous round of access 
negotiations. The 1976/77 negotiations, and the recent New Zealand/ 
Japan Fisheries Agreement, had demonstrated that the Japanese would - 
under certain conditions, and if very reluctantly - be prepared to 
link fishing access with other issues. Further, the establishment of 
200-mile zones in many other parts of the world over the past two years 
appeared to have increased Japan's sensitivity/vulnerability to coastal 
state pressures. Australia, for example, now had a number of DWFS 
(including the Soviet Union, South Korea, and some East European 
countries) bidding to fish in the AFZ. Canberra could, perhaps, play 
off these different DWFS against each other to obtain the best possible 
concessions in return for fishing access. It was also suggested to 
the author that Canberra had assessed that while its lack of negotiating 
experience in this area (that is, with respect to 200-mile zones) might 
be a handicap in the coming negotiations with Japan, it need not be a 
very serious handicap. To offset its lack of bargaining expertise, 
the Australian Government had decided that the negotiations with Japan 
were to proceed unhurriedly - free of any urgent time constraints.
Illb. Bargaining Exchange
The following paragraphs examine the fisheries negotiations held 
between Australia and Japan over the 13-months period September 1978 
to October 1979. The sub-section is divided into two parts. The longer 
first part traces, chronologically, the course of the negotiations, and 
focusses on the various issues that were raised. Particular emphasis 
will be given to the concessions that Australia sought to extract from 
Japan in exchange for fisheries access, and Japan's reaction to 
these proposals. The second part examines the respective roles and 
influence of the different actors in Australia directly involved in 
the negotiations. Attention will also be drawn to the part played 
by those other actors in Australia who may have sought to influence 
their country's negotiating position - particularly with respect to 
the question of linkages across different issue areas.
As indicated in sub-section lie., Australia very early in the 
negotiations made it clear that the discussions would not be confined 
to fisheries matters. The Japanese were left in no doubt that Australia 
wanted some concessions with respect to agricultural products within 
the MTN as a prior condition of access to the AFZ. It should be 
emphasised again, however, that Australia was not seeking specific 
trade-offs of the kind sought by Muldoon in New Zealand's fisheries 
negotiations with Japan (nor, indeed, of the kind sought in the 
1976/77 'port access-for-beef' negotiations), but was looking for a 
broader, less precise, package of concessions.
Probably one of the most detailed public statements on 
Australia's negotiating position in this area was made by Purnell-'Vebb 
in August 1979. In answer to a question from a participant at the 
Fishexpo '79 seminar concerning the extent to which the current 
fisheries negotiations with Japan revolved around total trade packages, 
the Director of the Fisheries Division replied (and he is quoted at 
length)
'I think the short answer to your 
question is that there is no 
element of the negotiations which 
could be characterised as a trade-off 
of fish or any other commodity.
Let me amplify that a little and 
say that when you get countries 
with trading relations and other 
relations which exist between countries 
like Japan and Australia, it would 
be idle to suggest that the negotiations 
do not take place against the total 
relationship between the two countries; 
that when you are negotiating a 
fishing agreement the negotiators on 
the Australian side of the table, 
and I am sure on the Japanese, 
are acutely conscious that in another 
■ area multilateral trade negotiations 
are going on [present author's emphasis], 
that meetings are coming up in other 
areas of the total relationship between 
us. In saying that, what I wish to make 
clear is that is the only extent to 
which there is any relationship .between 
fisheries negotiations and other trading 
relationships. Nobody has suggested 
on their side, and it would certainly 
be rejected on our side, that a certain 
quantity of fish should be made 
available in return for access for some
other agricultural, or other, products to 
the Japanese market. That is not on 
and has not occurred.'1.
It should be noted, of course, that Purnell-Webb was speaking 
as Director of the Fisheries Division (DPI) before an audience drawn 
largely from the fishing industry. It is difficult to agree with 
his concluding remarks, which were obviously intended to reassure 
the fishermen. There is little doubt that if Japan had offered Australia 
very generous concessions with respect to beef and other agricultural 
products in exchange for generous access to the AFZ, the Australian 
Government would have accepted. (And, as the following pages 
demonstrate, it appears that some trade-offs of this kind Had occurred 
in the negotiations.) Further, Purnell-Webb neglected to mention that 
some members of the Australian negotiating team had clearly indicated 
to the Japanese their desire to link the question of fishing access 
to progress within the NTTN.
Predictably, the Japanese were much opposed to, and alarmed at, 
Australia's linkage strategy. As mentioned above, the Japanese early in 
the negotiations strongly objected to signing an exchange of letters 
in which the fishing rights were supposed to be seen as part of the 
overall economic relationship with Australia. The Japanese must have 
feared that Australia intended to be as tough in its negotiations with 
them as had New Zealand, and wondered whether Australia would start to 
seek more specific concessions in the discussions.
It appears that the Japanese were determined not to repeat the 
'mistakes’ they had made in their negotiations with New Zealand. As 
one senior member of the Japanese negotiating team put it to the 
author in late 1978, there was to be 'no statement in the Australia- 
Japan Fisheries Agreement similar to that laid down in Article X(3) 
of the New Zealand-Japan Agreement'. This official noted that Japan's 
'generosity' towards New Zealand was prompted by a recognition that 
the New Zealand economy was, indeed, in trouble. This situation, he 
stressed, did not apply in the case of Australia. Further, he added, 
Australia was a 'lucky country' possessed of great mineral wealth.
He argued that Australia was merely being 'greedy' by using its 
bargaining leverage over fishing access to gain concessions outside 
fisheries from Japan. This official further observed that if Australia 
wished to make the linkage between fishing access and bilateral trade,
1. From the debate following the presentation of E.A. Purnell-Webb's 
paper to the Fishexpo '79 Seminar in Perth, 27 August, 1979.
zby
then - if this linkage were to be applied honestly and fairly - Japan 
should expect 'almost a monopoly position within the AFZ', for 
Australia had a very favourable balance of trade with his country.
Throughout the negotiations, the question of trade-offs 
involving fishing access and other issue areas provided a major 
source of contention between the two sides. However, the focus of 
this debate underwent a shift in early 1979. In April, the Tokyo 
Round of the MTN was concluded. As will be detailed in the next 
sub-section, the Japanese had there made some concessions with respect 
to the trade in agricultural products - particularly beef. These 
concessions were considered generally satisfactory by the Australian 
Government, and it was apparently decided by Canberra that Australia 
would not obtain any more from Japan on the beef issue. The Australian 
side, however, continued to pursue the linkage strategy by trying to 
pressure the Japanese into signing an exchange of letters in which 
fishing rights were viewed as part of the overall bilateral economic 
relationship. After much debate - including lengthy discussions 
concerning the meaning of certain key words - the Japanese agreed to 
an exchange of letters which became part of the final agreement. (This 
subject is taken up again in sub-section IIIc.) The relatively 
moderate terminology used in these letters indicated that Australia 
had backed down considerably on the question of trade-offs compared 
with its position early on in the negotiations.
Considerable debate also centred around some of the concessions 
Australia sought in the narrower fisheries area - particularly with 
respect to licence fees and fish market access.
The Japanese were said to have objected both to the level of
fees initially proposed by the Australian side, and to the manner of
their collection. It has not proved possible to determine the fees
originally demanded by Canberra, but apparently they were much higher
than those finally agreed upon. On the question of payment of fees,
the Australian negotiators had suggested that the Japanese Government
might pay the licence fees, and then seek reimbursement from the
Japanese fishermen licensed to fish in the AFZ. An article in
Australian Fisheries quoted a Japanese Embassy spokesman as saying
'The licence fees will be paid by 
the Japanese fishing industry, not 
by the Government, so from our 
point of view the fee should be at 
a reasonable level which the industry
is able to pay. However, the 
Australian requirement is too 
much beyond that level. I can 
say the fees requested by Australia 
are more than 10 times the amount 
we are prepared to pay.'l-
Another area of contention in the negotiations was Australia's
attempts to obtain unrestricted access for its fish products on the
Japanese market. At first glance, it might appear that Australia's
bargaining position in this area was relatively modest. First,
Australia had indicated that it was not seeking specific concessions
from Japan in this area, but was rather seeking from Japan an
agreement in principle to remove its restrictions on fish
imports. As Purnell-Webb put it
'In bilateral negotiations, especially 
with Japan, we have pressed for 
assurances of access to markets 
for Australian fish and fish 
products. This does not mean 
a guarantee that Australian product 
(or a certain quantity of it) will be 
sold on that particular country's 
markets. What we seek to ensure is 
that if Australian product meets 
a country's standards then Australian 
commercial interests will have the 
opportunity to compete commercially 
and equally with others. In short, 
we won't be shut out by barriers, ^
whether they are tariff or other barriers.'
Second, the Australian Government had decided not to take the extreme
position with respect to market access recommended by AFIC - namely,
that those DWFS which were not prepared to accept unrestricted imports
of Australian seafoods into their markets should be denied access
into the AFZ. While recognising that this strategy had been adopted
by some other coastal states, Purnell-Webb stressed 'We have not given
any thought to it as an active piece of negotiating at the present
time.'^'
It will be noted later that the Australian fishing industry was 
very critical of their Government's stand on the fish market access 
question. At the conclusion of the negotiations with Japan, it was
1. Quoted in 'Declaration of 200-Mile Zone Delayed' Australian 
Fisheriess May, 1979, p.2.
2. E.A. Purnell-Webb, September, 1979, op.cit.3 p.6.
3. E.A. Purnell-Webb, in the discussion following his paper given 
at the Fishexpo '79 seminar held in Perth, 27 August, 1979.
claimed that Canberra had 'passed over a golden opportunity to trade
off fishing rights in Australian waters in return for a lowering of
[fish] import barriers'."^' The fishermen, in fact, believed that the
Government had adopted a 'soft' line with respect to fish market access
as part of a deal with the Japanese for concessions in the beef export
2 .area.
While it can be argued that Australia could have taken a tougher 
line against Japan in this area, it proved that even what Australia 
had demanded was too much for the Japanese negotiators. The latter 
argued that there were, in fact, few market restrictions on the fish 
which Australia currently exported to Japan. (It was pointed out that 
Japan's import quotas for fish were mainly designed to regulate the 
trade with northern hemisphere fish exporters.) While it was admitted 
that there were restrictions on squid, it was noted that Australia as 
yet exported very little of this product. As in their fisheries 
negotiations with New Zealand, the Japanese negotiators claimed that 
they could not give preferential treatment to Australia in this area.
They argued that no concessions with respect to fish market access 
could be made outside the MTN.
The search for a compromise on these, and other, issues prolonged
3 .the negotiations themselves into four sessions, ’totalling 120 days, 
over a period of twelve months. There were, however, other reasons 
for the protracted nature of the negotiations. One of these was 
Australia's decision not to establish the AFZ until after it had
4concluded a fisheries agreement with Japan. ' The Japanese obviously 
felt that there was no great urgency to reach an agreement with 
Australia while their fishing vessels were still able to fish off 
that country without payment of licence fees. Another factor accounting 
for the slow progress towards an agreement was the negotiating style 
of the Australians. (This subject will be treated more fully later.)
The two sides finally reached agreement in September, 1979. All 
that remained was ratification and signing of the agreement by both 
Governments. At the last moment, however, a major row had developed in
1. See 'AFZ Entry Terms Storm "Taken to the Cleaners'" Professional 
Fisherman_, November, 1979, p.l.
2. Ibid.j p.l.
3. The four sessions covered the periods 18 September-10 October, 1978; 11 - 
15 December, 1978; 19 February-16 March, 1979; and 29 May-mid-August, 1979
4. Although one interview suggested to the author that there were limits 
to Australia's patience in this area. Had the negotiations been delayed 
much longer, Australia would (he felt) have established the AFZ even 
without agreement with Japan.
L.KJL.
Australia which placed the signing in jeopardy.
It will be recalled that in late 1978 the Game Fishermen's 
Association had voiced their concern to the Prime Minister over the 
way in which Japanese tuna longliners were allegedly harming the stocks 
of black marlin, particularly in the north Queensland grounds. Again in 
July, 1979, the game fishermen expressed strong opposition to Japanese 
longline operations, and sought a wider exclusion of Japanese tuna 
longliners than the proposed buffer zone of 12 miles seaward from the 
eastern edge of the Great Barrier Reef. The Commonwealth Government 
replied that
'it would not accord with Australia's 
international obligations to exclude the 
Japanese from any wider areas of the 
Coral Sea, given Japanese fishing 
activities in the area for over 20 
years without detriment to tuna 
and marlin stocks.'!•
The fishermen would not accept this argument, and urged the
Government to change its mind. By early October (1979) the row had
developed to the point where it threatened to damage Australian-Japanese
relations. Federal Opposition backbenchers were claimed to have
charged that 'the new agreement could cause the most bitter racial
2tensions since World War II'. * Fishermen in Cairns warned the Minister
for Primary Industry that if the Government did not back down they would
'sail into the Japanese fleet and use guns if necessary to stop them 
3fishing.' Following meetings between the Minister and the game 
fishermen, it was announced by the Government that a working committee 
was to be set up to closely monitor and collate information during the. 
proposed one-year Australia-Japan fisheries agreement. There was 
also to be a detailed study of the effects of Japanese longline fishing 
activities. The Government also promised to seek early consultations 
with the Japanese to examine the necessity or otherwise of an additional 
area off Cairns from which longline fishing vessels would be excluded 
in the future. Nixon also reminded the fishermen of the 'significance 
of having an agreement between Australia and Japan, and the positive
4gains to Australia in reaching the agreement.'' ' While these assurances 
were not enough to completely remove doubts in the minds of the game
1. Revealed by Peter Nixon (the new Minister for Primary Industry) in 
the House of Representatives, Hansard,3 14 November, 1979, p.3051.
2. See Brian Botton 'Marlin War' The Daily Telegraph, 17 October, 1979.
3. Ibid.
4. See 'Marlin Study in Long-line Areas Off Queensland'Australian
ZO.“)
fishermen, the latter withdrew their opposition to the signing of the 
fisheries agreement.
On 17 October, 1979, the Agreement on Fisheries Between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of Japan (the Head Agree­
ment) and the Subsidiary Agreement Concerning Japanese Tuna Long-Line 
Fishing were initialled in Canberra. On 1 November, 1979, the Austral­
ian Fishing Zone came into operation.
It remains now to identify the actors most significantly involved 
in the negotiations. Emphasis will be given to those actors who were 
members of the Australian negotiating team, their attitudes towards the 
use of linkage diplomacy in the negotiations with Japan, and the 
influences on them of other actors in Australia - politicians, bureaucrats, 
and those from the private sector - having an interest in the bargain 
outcome.
The roles and responsibilities of the Australian negotiators 
differed in some important respects from their Japanese counterparts.
The Japanese negotiating team comprised officials from various Government 
departments who were very much in control of the negotiations themselves. 
They were left to negotiate with Australia relatively free of interference 
from their respective political masters. (In fact, it was claimed by 
one official in the Japanese Embassy in Canberra that the Japanese 
Cabinet did not see the Fisheries Agreement until it was ready for 
signing.) The Japanese officials were, however, advised by a number 
of representatives from Japanese fishing companies who travelled to 
Canberra for the negotiations. The Australian negotiators, on the 
other hand, had much less control over the course of the negotiations. 
Reflecting the decision-making style of the Fraser Government, they 
were closely supervised by Cabinet throughout the negotiations. (As 
the official from the Japanese Embassy put it to the author 'The 
Japanese team should have been negotiating with the Australian Cabinet'.) 
Sinclair had responsibility for 'fine-tuning' of the negotiations, but 
even this Minister could make no major decisions by himself and had to 
refer back to his Cabinet colleagues. The Australian side also differed 
from the Japanese by having no observers from the fishing industry 
sitting in on the talks. The latter were merely kept informed of 
progress being made during the negotiations.^*
FisheriesDecember, 1979, p.p.13-14. •
1. It will be noted later how the Australian commercial fishermen 
were bitterly critical of their lack of participation in the negotiat­
ions .
It appears that Australia’s negotiating position was not inter­
nally coherent. A number of interviewees claimed that there was not a 
great meeting of minds either within Cabinet or among different Govern­
ment Departments over the question of pursuing a linkage strategy 
against Japan. It has been suggested that there were 'hawks' on one 
side, and 'doves' on the other, regarding how far Australia should go 
in trying to extract non-fisheries related concessions from Japan in 
the negotiations.
With respect to the Ministers, it proved impossible to determine 
accurately who were the 'hawks' and who were the 'doves' during the
negotiations.1' But from what has been said in Section II above, it 
would appear that (at least in the initial stages of the negotiations) 
Fraser, Anthony and Sinclair belonged in the former category, and 
possibly Peacock in the latter. Several interviewees, however, sugg­
ested that as the negotiations progressed the policy position of some 
Ministers - again unidentified - underwent a shift from 'hawkish' 
to 'dovish', or vice versa. (It was, for example, claimed that some 
Ministers adopted a more moderate position with respect to trade-offs 
for fear of alienating their opposite numbers in the Japanese Cabinet.)
It proved much easier to identify the bargaining stance of the 
Government officials on the Australian negotiating team. There was 
unanimous agreement among the interviewees (both Australian and Japanese) 
that it was representatives from the Departments of Trade and Resources 
and Prime Minister and Cabinet who most strongly pushed for trade-offs 
across different issue areas in the negotiations,2'and officials from 
Fisheries Division who were keenest to limit the discussions to fisheries 
matters.
In addition to those politicians and bureaucrats mentioned above, 
there were many other actors in Australia who played a less direct role 
in the negotiating process. Many of these attempted to influence the 
bargain outcome by communicating their policy preferences - including 
their attitude towards linkage diplomacy - either to Cabinet 
Ministers or to Government Departments most deeply involved in the 
negotiations with Japan.
1. This subject was clearly too sensitive for those Government officials 
interviewed by the author, for they were unprepared to identify the 
positions of different Ministers with respect to linkage diplomacy during 
the negotiations.
2. It appears, however, that some officials at least from Trade and 
Resources and Prime Minister and Cabinet (as well as from Foreign Affairs,
Throughout the negotiations the commercial fishermen made known 
what they hoped to obtain from the negotiations. Time and again^* 
they reminded Canberra that Australia's bargaining leverage over 
foreign fishing access should be used to promote the interests of the 
local fishing industry. They were strongly opposed to any sign of 
'under the counter' deals involving trade-offs linking fishing rights 
with concessions in the beef trade area. These general concerns of the 
industry were communicated by AFIC to the Minister for Primary Industry, 
to senior officials in Fisheries Division (DPI), and publicly in the 
media. The special concerns of the Tuna Boat Owners Association and 
the Game Fishermen's Association were transmitted through the same 
channels.
Those private actors in the secondary issue area - most prom­
inently, the beef producers - were (in contrast with the period from 
late 1976 through to mid*-1978) publicly silent on the question of 
trade-offs involving the AFZ during the fisheries negotiations with 
Japan. There are several possible explanations for this. First, as 
noted above, the overall beef export situation had improved consider­
ably in mid-1978, and the cattlemen probably no longer felt the need 
to push strongly for linkage diplomacy. Second, it is possible that 
Sinclair and Anthony had privately assured the farmers' representatives 
that the Government would seek concessions in the agricultural trade 
area from Japan in the fisheries access negotiations. Third, after 
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of the MTN in early 1979, the 
Australian beef producers probably decided that no further concessions 
in this area were likely to be obtained from the Japanese over the 
short-term.
It is interesting to note that those private actors in the 
'other issue area' category were also publicly silent on the question 
of linkage diplomacy during the Australia-Japan fisheries negotiations. 
There is, however, some direct evidence and a substantial weight of 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that, in fact, these actors did 
communicate their concern about trade-offs involving foreign fishing 
access and other issue areas privately to Cabinet.
and Fisheries Division, DPI) were concerned about the possible danger 
of linkage diplomacy adversely affecting the total relationship with 
Japan. Some interviewees claimed this concern was expressed in sub­
missions to Cabinet during the fisheries negotiations with Japan.
1. See, for example, Ian Reinecke, 1 December, 1978, op.ait.: and 
'Fishing Industry Wary Over 200-mile Negotiations' Australian Fisher- 
ies3 January, 1979, p.29.
c. v ; u
It will be recalled from sub-section lie. that, in 1977, an Ad 
Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations had produced a 
Report which strongly advised the Prime Minister 'that attempts to 
engage in "resources bargaining" with Japan should be regarded with 
great caution.'^' It will further be recalled that this Committee 
broadly represented the actors in the 'other issue areas' category.
In response to one of the major recommendations in this Report, 
the Government established sometime in 1978 a Consultative Committee 
on Relations with Japan (CCRJ) charged with the responsibility of 
giving advice to Cabinet on various aspects of the relationship - 
particularly on matters of trade - with Japan. The first major issue 
addressed by the CCRJ was the fisheries negotiations with Japan.
Significantly, no less than six of the eight members of the
Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations (including
Myer, Jackson and Agnew) were elected as members of the 16-strong
2CCRJ. Among the other members * was Sir Keith Shann, ex-Ambassador 
to Japan, and whose very strong opposition to resources bargaining 
had been demonstrated at the time of the 1976-77 ’port access-for- 
beef negotiations; and R.J. Madigan, Chairman of Hamersley Holdings - 
exporters of iron ore to Japan. It seems reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the CCRJ, in its advice to Cabinet, would have 
warned of the dangers of linkage diplomacy against Japan. In fact, 
one interviewee claimed that the CCRJ had so warned the politicians 
during the negotiations.
There were other actors in Australia who had a keen interest in 
the negotiations with Japan. Among these was the State Government 
of Tasmania which was anxious to see a speedy conclusion to the 
negotiations, and the continued presence of Japanese fishing vessels 
in Australian waters. It will be recalled that Tasmania - whose econ­
omy was in some difficulty - had viewed the visit of Japanese longline 
vessels to the port of Hobart as a welcome source of revenues. The 
Tasmanian Government's concern in this area was communicated to the 
Commonwealth Government both before, and during, the negotiations with 
Japan.
1. Op.ait.s p.134.
2. The 16 members of the CCRJ included: the Standing Committee, which 
comprised the Secretaries of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, 
Industry and Commerce, Trade and Resources, Treasury, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, National Development, and Primary Industry; and nine 
other members, R.G. Jackson (of CSR - Chairman of the CCRJ), Sir John
Ilie. Bargain Outcome
This sub-section examines the'final’outcome ' of the Australia- 
Japan fisheries negotiations of 1978-79. First considered will be 
the terms of the fisheries agreements signed on 17 October, 1979. 
Emphasis is given, on the one hand, to the concessions made by 
Australia with respect to Japanese fishing access to the AFZ and, on 
the other, to the ’price’ paid by Japan for these concessions. Second 
considered are those other concessions not detailed in the fisheries 
agreements themselves that Australia might have extracted from Japan in 
exchange for fisheries access. (These concessions could be related 
to fisheries or to other issue areas.) The concluding paragraphs of 
sub-section IIIc. assess the total bargain outcome. Attention is 
there focussed on the fate of Australia’s exercise of linkage diplomacy. 
Among other things, it will be determined whether Canberra’s gains - 
if any - from Japan in areas unrelated to fisheries were made at the 
expense of the domestic fishing industry.
It will be recalled that the Australia-Japan fisheries negot­
iations of 1978-79 concluded with the signing of not one, but two, 
fisheries agreements - the so-called Head Agreement and the Subsidiary 
Agreement. The former (known by its full title as the Agreement on 
Fisheries Between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Japan) provided the basis for Australia's future fisheries relations 
with Japan in the context of Australia's extended maritime jurisdiction. 
The respective rights and obligations of each party under this 
Agreement are now examined.
The preamble to the Head Agreement recognised that the Govern­
ment of Australia
'exercises, in accordance with 
international law, sovereign rights 
for the purposes of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing 
the living resources within the zone 
of 200 nautical miles off its 
coasts.'
Crawford, R.D.G. Agnew, S.B. Myer, Peter Nol.an, Sir Keith Shann, Sir 
Malcolm MacArthur (ex-chairman of the Australian Meat Board - who might 
normally be expected to favour 'fish-for beef’ diplomacy), R.J. Kirby 
(Chairman, J.M. Kirby Pty. Ltd., manufacturers), and R.J. Madigan 
(ChairmanjHamersley Holdings).
1. In a sense it could be said that there is no final outcome, for the 
bargaining process is a continuing one where fisheries access agree­
ments are re-negotiated regularly. However, as already noted in the 
New Zealand case study, this thesis has chosen to focus on the immed­
iate outcome of the initial round of negotiations involving foreign 
fishing access to Australia’s and New Zealand’s extended fishing zones.
Article III noted that, in the exercise of these sovereign rights,
the Australian Government shall determine annually: the total allowable
catch for individual stocks or complexes of stocks; the portion of
the total allowable catch for such stocks that will be taken by fishing
vessels of Australia; and allocations, as and where appropriate, for
fishing vessels of Japan of parts of surpluses of such fish stocks.
With respect to the latter provision, it was noted in the
preamble to the Agreement that
’Nationals and fishing vessels of 
Japan have been engaged, for 
a considerable period of time, 
in the utilisation of certain living 
resources off the coast of Australia 
and have also made a contribution 
to the development of and research 
into such resources.’
In recognition of ’the desire of the Government of Japan that fishing 
vessels of Japan continue to pursue their interest in the utilisation 
of these resources' the Government of Australia agreed - in Article 
II - to permit fishing vessels of Japan to engage in fishing within 
the Australian Fishing Zone 'in accordance with the provisions of 
this Agreement'.
The Government of Japan, for its part, was expected among other
things to: ensure that fishing vessels of Japan not engage in fishing
within the AFZ unless licensed under the Agreement;"^' ensure that
2vessels so licensed comply with the provisions of the Agreement;
notify the Government of Australia of details of fishing vessels of
3Japan that wish to engage in fishing within the AFZ; * cooperate with
the Government of Australia in the conduct of scientific research for
the purposes of the effective conservation and optimum utilisation
4of the living resources within the AFZ; ' and to make available to 
the Government of Australia statistical and biological information 
for the purposes of managing and conserving these resources.'’"
Article XII noted that the Agreement would enter into force on 
1 November, 1979, and would remain in force for a minimum period of 
two years. It was also noted in Article 11(2.) that the detailed
1. Article IV (a.).
2. Article TV (b.).
3. Article .VI (1.) .
4. Article VII (1.)
5. Article VII (2.)
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procedures for the conduct of fishing operations by Japanese fishing 
vessels within the AFZ and for the issuance of licences by the 
Government of Australia 'shall be provided for in subsidiary agreements 
between the two Governments'.
The first of these subsidiary agreements - the Subsidiary 
Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Japan Concerning Japanese Tuna Long-Line Fishing - was signed on the 
same day as the Mead Agreement. Under this Agreement the Australian 
Government agreed to issue licences for Japanese tuna longline vessels, 
the number of which should not exceed 350, subject to payment of a fee 
of $1.4 million. An Appendix to the Subsidiary Agreement listed the 
excepted times and areas where Japanese tuna fishing operations were 
excluded. (See Fig. 6 .) These vessels were, however, permitted to 
take within the zone 'all species of tuna and bill-fish, together with 
all other species of finfish including oceanic sharks which are 
incidentally caught'^" by the use of floating longlines, or by the 
use of hand-lines (except in certain specified areas). Article IV 
permitted the longliners continued use of the ports of Brisbane,
Sydney, Hobart and Fremantle, and the use of an additional port - 
Albany (in West Australia). This Agreement was to enter into 
force on 1 November, 1979, and was to remain in force for a period of 
one year.
There were, in addition, a number of concessions made by Japan 
in exchange for access to the AFZ not detailed either in the Head 
Agreement or in the Subsidiary Agreement. First considered will be 
those concessions related to the fisheries issue area.
As part of the overall agreement, Japan confirmed that it would 
continue to provide technical assistance to the Australian fishing 
industry. The projects offered included: training of Australian 
nationals at Japanese institutions in the culturing of prawns, use 
of lightweight purse seines for jack mackerel, and the catching of 
prawns; studies into the commercial harvesting of octopuses; survey 
of squid resources by a Japanese research vessel; and examination 
of means of improving culture techniques of Tasmanian rainbow trout 
in sea water.
1. Article II.
2. See the statement by Peter Nixon in the House of Representatives, 
Hansard3 22 November, 1979, p.3435.
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The Minister for Primary Industry also made much of the
fact that the Japanese Government had provided 'certain assurances on
the question of access to the Japanese market for Australian fish and
fish products.'^’ In an exchange of letters attached to the Agreement,
Ambassador Okawara had confirmed that it was the understanding of the
Japanese Government that the two Governments
'shalL amongst other things 
examine the possibility of further 
cooperation in the field of fisheries, 
including in particular ... the 
expansion of markets, including 
improved market access for fish 
and fish products originating 
in Australia.'
Further details of Japan's position on this subject were listed in
the Record of Discussion connected with the Head Agreement. The
Japanese Government stated that it was prepared to inform the Australian
Government of the fish and fish product items subject to quotas under
Japanese import regulations, and to hold consultations in respect of
market access for fish either through diplomatic channels or on an
ad-hoc basis. The Japanese also affirmed that
'where Australian fish and fish 
products are commercially 
competitive with the fish and 
fish products of other nations, 
market access is and will be 
available for such Australian 
fish and fish products under 
the Japanese import system.'
It will be argued later, however, that it is difficult to 
determine how the Australian Government could claim that these 
'assurances' by Japan on the question of fish market access amounted 
to meaningful concessions. The Japanese Government had made no 
effort to remove the tariff and other barriers existing in their fish 
market; even less had they considered importing specific quantities 
of fish from Australia. At most one could describe Australia’s gains 
in this area as very modest.
The analysis now turns to an examination of those other concessions 
unrelated to fisheries offered by Japan in exchange for access to the 
AFZ. It will be recalled that Australia had, very early in the 
negotiations with Japan, linked the question of fisheries access with 
progress on agricultural trade issues - particularly with respect to
1. See Sinclair's statement to the House of Representatives, Hansard. 
25 September, 1979, p.p.1463-6.
beef - within the context of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. At 
first glance it would appear that Canberra's attempts at linkage 
diplomacy in this area had met with success. In April, 1979, following 
a round of trade negotiations with Australia, the Japanese Government 
announced that it expected imports of beef into their country to 
increase steadily until the end of the Japanese fiscal year 1982. By 
that time it was expected that the global import level would be at 
least 135,000 tonnes. The Japanese Government had also given 
assurances to cooperate in efforts to exploit the demand for high 
quality beef with a view to lifting global imports by 14,000 tonnes 
by FY 1983. Moreover, the Japanese agreed to the establishment of 
new intergovernmental consultative arrangements on beef with Australia.
Anthony announced that he viewed the settlement as one 'satisfact­
ory' to Australia. He noted
'The proposed settlement contains 
guarantees as to the future import 
treatment applying to important 
Australian exports to Japan, 
particularly beef and a range of 
other foodstuffs and industrial 
items. The understanding on beef 
is of particular significance. Japan 
is Australia's second largest outlet 
for beef, but as the Australian beef 
industry knows, the trade has not 
been without its problems and 
interruptions have occurred to our 
detriment. It is my expectation 
that the settlement will put many 
of these problems behind us ...
[and] will further add to the future  ^
security of Australia's beef industry.'
Almost a year later - in February 1980 - Anthony noted with 
satisfaction the improvement in the beef trade with Japan. Japan had 
raised the total level of access for beef for FY 1979 to 134,500 
tonnes - above the FY1982 target of 132,000 tonnes, and well above 
Japan's imports of 112,000 tonnes in 1978, and 95,200 tonnes in 1977.
As Australia currently supplies about 77 per cent of Japanese imports, 
Australia's beef exports to Japan in FY 1979 were expected to reach a 
record 100,000 + tonnes. The Minister for Trade and Resources 
observed
1. Quoted in 'Conclusion of Australia-Japan Multilateral Trade Negot­
iations' Australian Foreign Affairs R e c o r d Vol.50, No.4, April, 1979, 
p.234.
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'The level of imports by Japan 
this year is already evidence of 
the important role which this 
settlement [the MTN settlement 
which he concluded with Japan in 
early 1979] has played in achieving 
stability and predictability in the 
Japanese beef import regime.'!•
It is difficult, however, to determine the degree to which 
Japanese concessions in the beef trade area resulted from Australian 
pressures in the fisheries negotiations of 1978-79. About this 
time, the Japanese Government was demonstrating greater concern for 
consumer interests in Japan. With the high cost of fish (as well as 
the changed dietary habits of the Japanese), Tokyo realised that 
future protein requirements would have to come increasingly from meat. 
As there was a limited capacity to meet the extra demand for meat 
through increased domestic production, there was bound to be an 
increase in Japan's meat imports. This was reflected in a policy 
statement released by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries in late 1979, where it was estimated that Japan's self-
sufficiency ratio for beeF would fall to 71 per cent bv 1990 - down
2.from 75 per cent in 1977 and about 80 per cent in 1975.
It appeared, therefore, that at this time - in early 1979 - 
there were powerful domestic reasons why Japan should choose to 
increase its global imports of beef. Several interviewees suggested, 
however, that Japan's relatively accommodating attitude in the MTN 
discussions with Anthony in April, 1979, might have also been motiv­
ated by a desire to facilitate the successful conclusion of the
3.fisheries negotiations in Canberra.
It will further be recalled that Canberra's attempts at linkage 
diplomacy during the fisheries negotiations with Japan did not end 
with the MTN settlement of April, 1979. Throughout the negotiations 
the Australians had attempted to persuade Japan to agree that fishing
1. J.D. Anthony quoted in 'Japanese Beef Import Quotas' Commonwealth 
R e c o r d 25 February - 2 March, 1980, p.245.
2. See Long-term Prospect Regarding demand for, and Production of3 
Agricultural Products in 1990_, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, Tokyo, November, 1979, p.p.4-6.
3. As in most cases of linkage diplomacy, it is difficult to prove 
conclusively that concessions offered in one issue area were the 
result of pressures experienced in other issue areas.
z m
rights were part of the overall bilateral economic relationship. The 
Japanese were determined not to give way on this issue, feeling they 
had made a serious mistake by allowing the inclusion of Article X (3) 
in the New Zealand/Japan Fisheries Agreement. After prolonged debate, 
a compromise was achieved. In an exchange of letters, the Japanese 
Ambassador confirmed that he ’comprehended' the position of the 
Australian Government whereby the latter, in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights under Article III of the Head Agreement, would 'take 
into consideration all relevant factors including Australian interests...
It should be emphasised that this exchange of letters differed 
from that involving fish market access. With respect to the latter, 
the Japanese Government had confirmed that it understood the Australian 
position; whereas in the former the Japanese had comprehended the 
Australian position. The Japanese attached great importance to - 
what they believed to be - differences in meaning between these two 
words. It appears that the Japanese negotiators believed that use of 
the word 'understood' implied acceptance of the Australian position, 
while use of the word 'comprehended' merely suggested that Japan had 
taken note of the Australian position. It was argued by those 
Japanese interviewees who had been involved in the negotiations, that 
they viewed the statement that Australia would 'take into consideration 
all relevant factors including Australian interests' to be a unilateral 
declaration by Canberra. They strongly emphasised that the exchange 
of letters on this subject did not indicate Japanese acceptance of 
linkage, where fishing rights were seen as part of the overall bilateral 
economic relationship.
It seems, therefore, that Canberra's attempts at linkage diplomacy 
where Australia's bargaining leverage over fishing access was used 
to extract concessions from Japan in areas unrelated to fisheries - had 
met with less than total success. This said, there was at least one 
set of gains (other than the license fees, which were to go into 
consolidated revenues) from the fisheries agreement which was likely 
to benefit interests outside the domestic fishing industry - namely, 
the income accruing to traders and local authorities in ports to 
which licensed Japanese vessels were granted entry rights.
The final paragraphs of this sub-section critically assess the 
gains made by Australia in its fisheries negotiations with Japan,
1978-79. Particular attention is drawn to the question whether 
Australia's attempts at linkage diplomacy during these negotiations
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had a negative impact 
industry.
It appears that 
generally agreed that
on the gains flowing to the domestic fishing
the Australian commercial fishermen were 
their industry could have obtained much more
from the Fisheries Agreement with Japan. Only one week after the 
Agreement was signed, Fred Connell (in his capacity as Federal 
President of AFIC) sent a telegram^-’ to the Minister for Primary 
Industry where he stated
'I am writing at the direction of 
the Federal Executive to express 
AFIC’s gross dissatisfaction with the 
Japanese-Australian Fishing Agreement 
and the Subsidiary Agreement. The 
Federal Executive considers that 
consultation between industry and 
Government has been completely 
inadequate despite the best efforts 
of AFIC, resulting in concessions to 
the Japanese which are totally unacceptable 
and against the best interests of the 
fishing industry.'^*
3Among the many complaints by fishermen, 'three were particularly 
prominent. First, it was widely believed that the negotiated fee of 
$1.4 million was totally inadequate in view of the value of the tuna 
taken by the Japanese longliners (worth some $30 million in Japan).
Dick Fowler (Chief General Manager of SAFCOL), for example, was
quoted as saying that the Department of Primary Industry had 'gone
beserk' and that Australia could have obtained 'perhaps five times
4that much in fees from the Japanese without being unreasonable.'
Second, it was noted that there was no clear-cut definition of rights 
of access for Australian fish and fish products to the Japanese 
market.^' Third, the fishermen were bitterly critical of the fact
1 A'summary of the telegram appears in the article 'AFIC Chief Blasts 
Government' Professional Fisherman, November, 1979, p.l.
2. See 'AFZ Entry Terms Storm "Taken to the Cleaners'" Professional 
Fisherman, November, 1979, p.l.
3. Among the other major objections by the fishermen were: the 
Agreement allowed not only longlining operations within the AFZ, but 
also permitted new fishing methods such as bottom handling and pole 
and line fishing by the Japanese; and the Japanese longliners were 
now allowed access into previously prohibited areas of Bass Strait.
4. Ibid., p.l.
5. See Susan Woods 'Australia Loses Out on Japanese Market in New 
Fishing Treaty' The Australian Financial Review3 18 October, 1979.
that, 'despite repeatedly expressed objections by industry', Japanese 
longliners were permitted to continue taking Southern bluefin tuna 
within the AFZ to the 'detriment of the Australian tuna industry 
which is currently fully exploiting this resource'. The Professional 
Fisherman noted that, among the many fishermen who had contacted the 
journal since the Agreement with Japan was announced, there was a 
general concensus
'that [the Agreement] was a sellout and 
the feeling of many fishermen ... is that 
the Government has made some sort of 
deal with the Japanese over beef exports 
in return for sacrificing the prices of 
and access to our fish.'l*
In order to determine whether the fishermen's charges of a 
'sellout' had any validity, two closely related questions must be 
answered: first, could Australia have reasonably been expected
to gain greater concessions in the fisheries area from Japan than 
those actually obtained; and, second, is there any evidence to 
suggest that the Japanese fishermen had been given particularly 
generous treatment by Canberra? These questions will be addressed 
to the three major problem areas identified by the fishermen - that 
is, with respect to: licence fees, Japanese longliner access to the 
AFZ, and Australian fish access into the Japanese market.
It seems reasonable to argue that Australia should have obtained 
a larger licence fee than the $1.4 million eventually extracted from 
Japan. Apparently the Australian Government had decided that the 
fees to be charged would be based on an assessment of likely catches
by the 350 licensed Japanese tuna longliners, and the expected market
2.price of these catches. ’ One may appreciate the difficulties faced 
by the negotiators in arriving at a final figure, for the value of 
the catch depended upon such uncertainties as the composition and 
quality of the fish caught and market conditions, and the volume of 
the catch which varied from year to year. The fee finally arrived at 
($1.4 million) was claimed by Canberra to 'compare favourably with 
fees collected by other countries with which-Japan has negotiated
1. 'AFZ Entry Terms Storm "Taken to the Cleaners’" Professional 
Fisherman3 November, 1979, p.l.
2. See the statement by Senator Webster (the Minister representing 
the Minister for Primary Industry) in the Senate, Hansard3 23 November, 
1979, p.3003.
similar agreements’. ' However, if one divides the total fee by 
the number of licensed longliners (350), the fee per vessel amounted 
to $4,000 - which was much less than the $9,000 charged by New 
Zealand for each vessel licensed to catch Southern bluefin tuna in 
its zone. Moreover, as noted above, the value of the AFZ to Japanese 
longliners was much more than the worth of the fish contained within 
the zone. Free access to the ports of Brisbane, Sydney, Hobart, Freman­
tle and Albany made a vital difference to the economics of Japan's 
tuna fishing operations (worth at least $150 million a year) in 
southern latitudes centred round Australia.. However, even if one 
admits that the Australian Government had been overly generous in 
the licence fee area, it is difficult to see how this amounted to a 
'sell-out' of the Australian fishing industry - for it appeared that 
the licence fees were not going to be used for the direct benefit 
of the fishing industry, but were to go into consolidated revenues.
It can also be argued that the Australian Government had been 
generous with respect to the areas within the AFZ made available 
to Japanese fishing activities. It will be recalled that the Tuna Boat 
Owners Association had called for a ban on all Japanese longlining 
within the zone south of the thirtieth parallel. (Their argument 
being that the Southern bluefin resources were already fully exploited, 
and that Australian fishermen were now planning to move into deeper 
water operations to harvest the more mature fish presently caught 
by the Japanese.) No such ban was introduced. In fact, Canberra 
had in the Agreement permitted access for Japanese vessels to pre­
viously prohibited areas in Bass Strait. Again, at the time of the 
signing of the Agreement, the Australian Government had rejected the
demands of the Game Fishermen's Association to exclude Japanese tuna
2.vessels from a wider zone off the Great Barrier Reef.
It is less certain, however, that the Australian negotiators 
had been overly generous with respect to the fish market access issue.
1. Ibid., p.3003.
2. It should be noted, however, that Nixon (Minister for Primary 
Industry) had assured the game fishermen on the eve of signing the 
Subsidiary Agreement that the Government would study the question of 
excluding Japanese longliners from a broader zone. In fact, in June 
1980 the Commonwealth Government announced that it would ban all 
Japanese longline fishing from an area of about 48,000 square miles 
additional to those areas off Queensland already prohibited under
the Subsidiary Agreement. See 'Longlining Ban Off Northern Queensland' 
Australian Fisheries, July, 1980, p.8.
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While it appears that officials from the Fisheries Division were 
not particularly anxious to pressure the Japanese on this issue (as 
noted above, they believed that Australia's current fish exports 
were not seriously affected by Japanese market restrictions), officials 
from the Department of Trade and Resources were. In fact, it was 
widely reported in the media (and by the interviewees) that argument 
over this issue between the Japanese and Australian sides accounted, 
in large part, for the prolonged nature of the negotiations. The 
Japanese argued that they could not (would not) meet all of Australia's 
demands in this area, and (as already described) in the end made only 
minor concessions.
There is, therefore, some evidence to suggest that Australia 
had in the negotiations been relatively generous towards Japan in 
certain areas connected with fisheries - particularly with respect 
to the level of licence fees, and with respect to the question of 
Japanese longliner access to various parts of the AFZ. It also 
appears that Australia's generosity in the fisheries area might 
have been prompted by a desire to extract concessions from Japan 
in areas unrelated to fisheries. It is debatable, however, whether 
Australia's 'generosity' to Japan amounted to a 'sell-out' of the 
domestic fishing industry. The license fees were, in any event, 
destined not for the fishing industry but for consolidated revenues. 
Neither did the Japanese tuna longliner access to southern areas of 
the AFZ necessarily pose a serious threat to the domestic Southern 
bluefin tuna industry. As the capacity of the local industry 
developed, Australia could - in future fisheries negotiations - 
demand reductions in the scale of Japanese fishing operations!’
1. Indeed, at the time of writing (November 1980) the Subsidiary 
Agreement on Japanese Tuna Longlining had just been re-negotiated 
for the next 12 months period. It appears that in these negotiations 
the Australian side had taken a strong stance with respect to the 
continued presence of Japanese tuna longliners in the AFZ. Under 
this Agreement (initialled on 15 October 1980) the Japanese agreed to 
the closure of both the Great Barrier Reef region and areas off the 
Northern Territory. They also agreed to further permanent and 
seasonal closures in the area south of 30 S o-ff the coasts of New 
South Wales, eastern Victoria and South Australia. Moreover, the 
Japanese agreed to pay an access fee of $1.8 million - which 
represents an increase of 28.6 per cent on the former figure of 
$1.4 million, despite the new closures which would reduce the Japanese 
potential catch in the AFZ by an estimated 20 per cent. See 'Japan- 
Austral ia: Subsidiary Agreement on Tuna Long-line Fishing' Backgrounder3 
No.257, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 October, 1980.
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IV. SUMMARY
The following paragraphs provide a summary of the principal 
features of the Australian case study. It should be noted that no 
attempt will be made here to compare Australia’s experience in the 
area of fisheries access policy formulation and implementation with 
that of New Zealand. Such comparison is reserved for the final 
chapter of the thesis, where the major conclusions drawn from the 
two case studies are related to the broader theoretical question of 
linkage diplomacy under conditions of economic interdependence.
Section I of the case study, it will be recalled, involved 
identification and description of the major issue areas in the 
economic relationship between Australia and Japan and identification 
of the actors in Australia significantly involved in these issue 
areas.
It was noted that in the primary issue area - namely fisheries - 
Australia probably had a net potential bargaining leverage over Japan. 
While the fish resources contained within its offshore zone are likely 
to be modest by world standards, Australia's geographic location 
(especially in relation to the important Southern bluefin tuna fishing 
grounds) is highly valued by those Japanese longliners having access 
to Australian ports. Canberra's leverage in fisheries, however, is 
offset somewhat by Australia's dependence on Japan in such areas as: 
the provision of fisheries research data, technical assistance to the 
local fishing industry, and access to the Japanese market for 
Australia's fish exports. Those actors in Australia having greatest 
interest in the primary issue area include the 18,000 commercial fisher­
men, and the Commonwealth and State Departments (and Ministers) 
responsible for fisheries.
Sub-Section lb. was concerned with identifying the secondary 
issue area - namely, that issue (if any) which Australia was most likely 
to link to the primary issue area in the fisheries negotiations with 
Japan, 1978-79. Our choice fell on the problem of access onto the 
Japanese market for Australia’s beef exports. There were several 
reasons why this issue area was chosen: first, it was (by 1978) one of 
the few remaining areas of significant friction in the bilateral 
economic relationship; second, Australia had once before (in 1976/77) 
linked the question of Japanese fishing access to the heef trade 
problem; and third, the Minister for Primary Industry had since that 
previous exercise of linkage diplomacy frequently warned of the
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possibility of trade-offs involving Japanese access to Australia's 
impending 200-mile zone and the beef question. Those actors having 
greatest interest in the beef issue were Australia's 100,000 
cattlemen, the Ministers for Primary Industry and for Trade and 
Resources (Sinclair and Anthony), and their respective Departments.
Sub-Section Ic. identified those other issues in the Australia- 
Japan relationship - and the actors in Australia significantly 
involved in them - not included in the primary and secondary issue 
areas. The diversified nature of Australia's trading relationship 
with Japan was there revealed. It was noted, for example, that in 
addition to a wide variety of agricultural items, Australia has 
(since the 1960s) been exporting to Japan a large range of minerals 
and energy commodities. Emphasis was also given to the vital 
importance of this trade to both economies. (It was, however, noted 
that Japan was more important to Australia as a trade partner than 
was Australia to Japan.) The sub-section concluded by identifying 
the very wide range of actors - both private and governmental - 
having a major interest, in these 'other issue areas'.
Section II examined the process of policy formulation in Aust­
ralia with respect to the establishment and implementation of a 
200-nautical mile fishing zone. Emphasis was given to determining 
what each actor (or group of actors) identified in Section I hoped 
to gain from Australia's increased bargaining leverage over foreign 
fishing access. The commercial fishermen, it was discovered, were 
determined that the access 'lever' should be used to promote the 
interests of their industry by: reducing foreign (particularly 
Japanese) competition for certain fish stocks within the AFZ; opening 
up further the Japanese fish market to Australian fish exports; and 
promoting increased levels of fisheries research within the zone by 
DWFS.' They were strongly opposed to any form of linkage, where 
fishing rights were to be traded off for concessions from foreign 
fishing countries in areas unrelated to fisheries. It appears 
that the bureaucrats with major responsibility for fisheries generally 
agreed with most of the fishermen's policy objectives. But it was 
noted that the Minister for Primary Industry, while publicly supportive 
of the fishermen, at the same time advocated linking fishing access 
with the beef trade issue in Australia's fisheries negotiations with 
Japan.
There were powerful political reasons for Sinclair's support
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of linkage diplomacy in this area. He (like Doug Anthony) was a senior 
member of the National Country Party and was very sensitive to calls 
from the Australian beef producers to use the fisheries access ’weapon' 
to gain concessions from the Japanese with respect to beef.
Sub-Section lie. identified the policy preferences of those 
actors in the 'other issue areas' category. Divisions were noted 
between those who favoured the use of linkage diplomacy in the upcoming 
fisheries negotiations with Japan, and those against. Evidence was 
presented suggesting that Prime Minister Fraser (along with his 
Departmental advisers) belonged to the former category. It appears 
that Andrew Peacock and his advisers in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs at most favoured only broad, non-specific linkages. The 
strongest public statements against the use of linkage diplomacy in 
Australia's negotiations with Japan came from the Ad Hoc Working 
Committee on Australia-Japan Relations, which numbered among its members 
representatives from the private sector - including mining interests.
The Committee warned that by linking problems Australia ran the risk 
of a widening and escalation of a dispute, and increased the danger 
of retaliation by Japan in some other area.
In brief, the actors in the three different issue area categories 
had policy preferences concerning linkage diplomacy very much as 
predicted in the analytical framework: those in the primary issue
area were strongly against linkages; those in the secondary issue 
were very much in favour; and those in the 'other issue areas' 
category were divided, but most had reservations about the wisdom 
of pursuing a linkage strategy against Japan.
Sub-section lid. examined the decision-making machinery 
established in Australia to formulate policies with respect to the 
introduction and implementation of the AFZ, and with respect to the 
broader question of linkage diplomacy involving Australia's leverage 
over foreign fishing access. The Commonwealth Government had major 
responsibility for formulating policies related to fisheries management. 
The various State Governments and, to a lesser extent, the fishing 
industry were consulted by Canberra in the drafting of these policies. 
Decisions involving the broader ramifications of the Australian Fishing 
Zone were made at the highest levels of Government. Most of the 
policy initiatives concerning linkage diplomacy emanated from Cabinet.
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Section IT concluded by examining the various policy choices made 
by Canberra with respect to the establishment and use of a 200-mile 
zone. The decision to extend Australia's fisheries jurisdiction to 
200 miles was announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
August, 1977. The Fisheries Amendment Bill 1978 was passed by both 
Houses and received Royal Assent a year later. Among other things, 
provisions were made under the Bill for the licensing of foreign 
vessels permitted to operate in the zone, with respect to access for 
these vessels to Australian ports, and with respect to the conditions 
under which these licences would be granted. It was expected that 
negotiations would commence with the DWFS concerning the terms and 
conditions of foreign access to the zone before the AFZ was established.
The Minister for Primary Industry assured the local fishermen that 
their interests would be both protected and promoted under the new 
jurisdiction. Sinclair noted that one of the Government's main 
objectives was to ensure Australian participation in development of the 
zone 'to the greatest possible extent'. In this connection, Canberra 
claimed that the fish resources which the Australian industry had the 
capacity to exploit fully 'would be set aside for the benefit of that 
industry'. Other assurances were given with respect to the policing 
and surveillance of the zone, and to the promotion of Australia's fish 
exports. There was, however, no evidence to suggest that the Government 
intended to act on the recommendations of the local fishing industry by: 
one, threatening that if Tokyo did not relax its restrictions on 
imports of Australian fish onto the Japanese market then Japanese 
fishing vessels would be denied access to the AFZ; or two, demanding 
that Japanese tuna longliners should no longer operate within the 
zone from the 30th parallel southward.
The Government had - since early 1978 - been publicly silent on 
the question of linkage diplomacy, where fishing rights were to be linked 
to other issue areas in the upcoming negotiations with Japan. But, 
with the advantage of hindsight, it is apparent that Canberra had 
decided to seek some concessions from Tokyo in the agricultural trade 
area in exchange for fisheries access. Once the negotiations got 
under way, it was revealed that the Australian Government had hoped to 
pressure the Japanese into: making concessions on the beef trade issue 
within the MTN, and to accept that fishing rights were part of the 
overall bilateral economic relationship. It was, however, also apparent 
that Canberra had decided not to push the linkage strategy against
Z8.5
Japan too forcefully. Reflecting the divisions of opinion among the 
various actors in Australia involved in the trade with Japan 
concerning the wisdom of linkage diplomacy, the Australian Government 
adopted a bargaining strategy quite different from that pursued in 
1976/77. First, it was decided that Australia would seek a broader, 
less specific, package of concessions than it had obtained from Japan 
in the so-called 'fish-for-beef' trade-offs during the previous 
implementation of linkage diplomacy. Second, this time round the 
linkage diplomacy would be a relatively ’low profile' exercise with 
very few public statements on the subject by Ministers.
The final section of the case study - Section III - focussed 
on the implementation stage of the policy process following Australia's 
decision to establish a 200-nautical mile fishing zone and to enter 
into fisheries negotiations with the DWFS. Sub-section Ilia, examined 
the past record of bilateral negotiations between Australia and Japan 
in order to.determine how these previous exchanges might have influenced 
the perceptions and tactics of each side in the present round of 
negotiations. It was noted, for example, that in 1976/77 Australia 
had demonstrated that it possessed the necessary political will, 
commitment and capacity to make a credible threat against Japan.
Sub-section Illb. traced the course of the fisheries negotiations 
between Australia and Japan from October 1978 through to October 1979. 
Emphasis was there given to the various concessions that Australia 
sought to extract from Japan in exchange for fisheries access, and 
Japan's reaction to these proposals. The Australian negotiators tried, 
throughout the negotiations, to pressure the Japanese into signing 
an exchange of letters in which fishing rights were viewed as part 
of the overall bilateral economic relationship. The Japanese were 
determined not to give way on this issue. Considerable debate also 
centred round some of the concessions Australia sought in the narrow 
fisheries area - particularly with respect to licence fees and fish 
market access. Attention was drawn to the fact that it was officials 
from the Departments of Trade and Resources and Prime Minister and 
Cabinet who most urgently pushed for linkages, and officials from 
the Fisheries Division (DPI) who opposed trade-offs. While the 
negotiations attracted nothing like the public attention of the 
New Zealand - Japan fisheries negotiations, the Australian negotiators 
and their Cabinet masters were subjected to some outside criticism.
It was noted, for example, that the commercial fishermen had voiced
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their opposition to any sign of 'under the counter deals'involving 
trade-offs linking fishing rights with concessions in the beef 
trade area. There was also evidence to suggest that the Consultative 
Committee on Relations with Japan had warned Cabinet of the dangers 
attached to a linkage strategy against Japan.
The final sub-section examined the outcome of the Australia-Japan 
fisheries negotiations of 1978-79. The terms of both the Head Agreement 
and the Subsidiary Agreement were there explored. In brief, the 
Australian Government permitted the licensing of up to 350 Japanese 
tuna longliners within the AFZ for a fee of $1.4 million. Further, 
the Japanese agreed to continue to provide technical assistance 
to the Australian fishing industry. Tokyo was, however, less forth­
coming on the question of Australian fish exports onto the Japanese 
market. It was noted that the Australian commercial fishermen were 
bitterly critical of the terms of these Agreements, particularly with 
respect to: the level of licence fees, the fish market access issue, 
and the fact that Japanese tuna longliners were permitted to continue 
operating within the zone south of the 30th parallel.
Australia's attempts at linkage diplomacy during the negotiations 
appeared to have met with mixed success. It was possible that Japan's 
relatively concilitory attitude towards the beef trade issue in 
trade negotiations with Australia in early 1979 was prompted by a 
desire to facilitate the successful conclusion of the fisheries 
negotiations with Australia. However, Japan strongly resisted any 
public recognition of the linkage between fishing rights and other 
issue areas. While the Japanese did agree to an exchange of letters 
in which the Australian Government claimed that it would 'in the 
exercise of its sovereign rights under Article III of the Head 
Agreement, take into account all relevant factors including Australian 
interests', they (the Japanese) argued that the Australian statement 
was nothing more than a unilateral declaration.
There is evidence to suggest that Australia had in the negotiations 
been relatively generous towards Japan in certain areas connected with 
fisheries - particularly with respect to the level of licence fees, 
and with respect to the question of Japanese longliner access to 
various parts of the AFZ. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
Australia's generosity in the fisheries area was prompted by a desire 
to extract concessions from Japan in areas unrelated to fisheries. It 
was concluded, however, that it appears that these trade-offs did not 
have a particularly damaging impact on the domestic fishing industry.
CONCLUSIONS
The thesis concludes by assessing what the two case studies 
examined above reveal about linkage diplomacy under conditions of 
economic interdependence. Comparisons across the case studies may 
help to determine the degree to which the decision to adopt linkage 
policies - namely, where a country uses its bargaining leverage in 
one area to extract concessions from another country in some other 
area - and the success of such policies, was influenced by the 
complexity of bilateral economic relationships. The chapter also 
examines: other conceivable explanations for the adoption of linkage 
diplomacy; possible limitations of (or necessary qualifications to) the 
working hypothesis; and suggested further areas for study in this 
field. Finally, the implications of linkage diplomacy for the future 
development and structure of the global, and more specifically the 
New Zealand and Australian, fishing industries are assessed.
It was noted in the case studies that both New Zealand and, 
Australia adopted trade-off strategies when negotiating with Japan 
access to their 200-mile zones. There were, however, significant 
differences between the two countries both with respect to the kinds of 
concessions sought from Japan, and with respect to the ways in which 
the linkage diplomacy was put into practice. The following paragraphs 
demonstrate how New Zealand’s exercise of linkage diplomacy was much 
more ambitious and forceful than Australia's.
Unlike Australia, New Zealand tried to use its bargaining 
leverage over fishing access to force a number of quite specific trade 
concessions from Japan.- These were listed in the aide memoire handed 
over to Tokyo in July, 1977, and applied to three commodity groups - 
dairy products (butter and skimmilk powder), beef, and sawn timber. 
(Later, a fourth group - fish products - was added to the list of 
demands by New Zealand.) Australia, by contrast, sought no specific 
concessions from Japan. Canberra's position in this area was similar 
to that adopted by Muldoon in early 1976, where fishing rights were 
to be seen as part of the overall bilateral economic relationship.
Even with respect to the beef trade problem, Australia's demands in 
1978-79 appeared to go no further than saying 'while Australia 
appreciates Japan's concern about fisheries access, Japan should also 
appreciate Australia's concern over beef access'.
New Zealand also took a much tougher line than Australia in 
the implementation of its linkage diplomacy. Prime Minister Muldoon
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had warned Japan on a number of occasions (most notably at the PBEC 
luncheon in May, 1977) that Japanese fishermen would not be allowed 
into New Zealand’s EEZ until Tokyo gave an assurance of regular 
access for New Zealand's farm products onto the Japanese market. 
Wellington insisted that New Zealand's trading problems with Japan 
had to be discussed before the question of fishing access was negot­
iated. New Zealand carried out its threat and, having obtained no 
agreement on agriculture trade, excluded Japanese fishermen from the 
EEZ on 1 April, 1978.
Australia's diplomatic approach was much more moderate. There 
were no clear threats to ban Japanese fishing vessels from the AFZ 
if Tokyo did not give way on agricultural commodity access; although 
it was suggested that some Australian officials had made certain 
'vague hints' in this direction during the initial rounds of negot­
iations in late 1978. Neither did Canberra insist on settlement 
of the trading problems existing with Japan before fisheries matters 
were discussed. Both issues (fishing access and rural commodities' 
access) were, it seems,- discussed at the same negotiating sessions.
Finally, New Zealand's linkage diplomacy was much more of a 
'high profile' exercise than Australia's. Some of Muldoon's most 
extreme statements critical of Japan were made in very public forums, 
and were widely covered in the New Zealand (and Japanese) media.
The Australian Government, on the other hand, made every effort to 
keep the debate on trade-offs involving the AFZ out of the public 
arena.
The central question, at least in the context of this thesis, 
is why did New Zealand adopt a much more ambitious and forceful form 
of linkage diplomacy towards Japan than Australia? In the search 
for an answer to this question, we might first consider applying the 
workihg hypothesis outlined in the Introduction - namely, the 
propensity to adopt linkage strategies involving trade-offs across 
issue areas is inversely related to the level of interdependence; 
where interdependence is measured in terms of the number and variety 
of issue areas and actors involved in the relationship.
The case studies revealed that New Zealand has a far less complex 
economic relationship with Japan than has Australia. In the trade area 
some 60 per cent of New Zealand's exports to Japan in 1977 were 
agricultural commodities. Of the top 16 items (measured in terms of 
value) exported that year, only four - unwrought aluminium, forest
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products, iron ore and fish - came from outside the rural sector. 
Australia’s trade with Japan, on the other hand, was much more varied.
Not only did Australia sell most of the agricultural items also 
exported by New Zealand (including a few extra items such as sugar and 
certain cereal grains), but also sold a wide variety of other 
commodities such as: coking coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, 
alumina, aluminium, gold, manganese, nickel and bauxite.
It will be recalled that the analytical framework suggested why 
opposition to linkage diplomacy is likely to be most pronounced in 
complex bilateral relationships. Before proceeding with the current 
analysis, it might be useful to repeat the argument presented in 
Part I of the thesis.
First considered was the case of a country having a very simple 
bilateral relationship with another State, involving only two significant 
issue areas. It was argued that if this country contemplated trade-offs 
across the two issue areas, one set of domestic actors having an 
interest in the issue being traded off would be opposed to the linkage 
concept, and the other set of actors standing to gain from the trade­
off would be in favour.
Next considered was the case of a country having a much more 
complex bilateral relationship with another State, involving a large 
number of different issue areas. There would, in this case, be 
three separate categories of actors: one, those whose interests were 
being traded off in linkage diplomacy; two, those who stood to benefit 
from such trade-offs: and, three, those actors not identified with 
any of the issues involved in the initial linkagy strategy. It was 
suggested that the latter group of actors (those in the so-called 
'other issue areas' category) would most likely be opposed to the 
linkage concept. One may assume that they would recognise the 
potential dangers attached to linkages where, for example, the initial 
target country escalates the dispute by introducing countervailing 
linkages of its own. Such retaliation might involve issue areas in 
which these actors are involved. It was concluded that, in order to 
protect their interests, the 'other issue areas' actors will probably 
try to preserve the status quo existing in the overall bilateral 
relationship, and oppose from the outset the adoption of linkage 
diplomacy.
Returning to the current analysis, the question is did the 
actors in the New Zealand and Australian case studies react to linkage 
diplomacy in the manner predicted above?
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For the most part, it appears that they did. Tn both countries 
the strongest support for linkages involving the 200-mile zone came from 
the farmers - actors in the secondary issue category, and who stood 
to benefit most from the proposed trade-offs. The most vocal opponents 
of linkages in this area in New Zealand and Australia were the 
commercial fishermen - actors from the primary issue area. (It was noted 
however, that there were some exceptions: in each country the Minister 
responsible for fisheries1* was generally supportive of trade-offs 
involving the zone, and some leading fisheries spokesmen in New 
Zealand gave qualified support to the ’Muldoon diplomacy’.) Concern 
about the linkage concept was also expressed in both countries by 
actors in the 'other issue areas' category. It is important, however, 
for our present enquiry to determine whether the opposition to linkage 
diplomacy by this third group of actors was more pronounced in 
Australia (which had a relatively complex economic relationship 
with Japan) than in New Zealand (which had a relatively simple
economic relationship with Japan).
In the New Zealand case study it was demonstrated that the 
'other issue areas' actors did not pose a serious threat to the 
adoption, or implementation, of a linkage strategy. First, they did 
not represent a very wide range of interests. They included the 
aluminium and iron ore exporters, businessmen involved in importing 
goods from Japan, and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and other Government Departments. Second, these actors did not have 
much political influence; certainly much less than those in the 
secondary issue area. Third, not all of these actors opposed the 
'Muldoon diplomacy'. In fact the evidence suggests that only a 
minority of the Japan/New Zealand Businessmen's Association, together 
with a few diplomats, strongly objected to linking fisheries access 
with trade concessions from Japan.
The situation was, however, very different in Australia.
First, those actors in Australia in the 'other issue areas' 
category represented a large number of different interests. These 
included the exporters of iron ore, liquified- petroleum gas, nickel, 
alumina, aluminium, zinc, lead, bauxite, uranium, coal, copper, gold, 
and manganese; as well as businessmen involved in importing from 
Japan, officials from various Commonwealth departments,and officials
1. Each of whom had also responsibilities in the secondary issue area.
representing the various State Governments.
Second, these actors had considerably more political influence 
than their counterparts in New Zealand. (Although it seems that 
they probably had less influence than the farmers and other secondary 
issue area actors in Australia.) The mining industry, for example, 
was able to influence Government decision-making in important areas 
despite the fact that it constituted no significant voting bloc. (This 
had been recently demonstrated when the mining companies, in 1977/78, 
successfully forced the Fraser Government to back down on the intro­
duction of a resource rent tax.)
Third, the ’other issue areas' actors in Australia - or some of 
them at least - had clearly warned the Prime Minister of the dangers 
associated with a linkage strategy against Japan. It will be recalled, 
for example, that the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia/Japan 
Relations (which counted among its members representatives from the 
mining industry) had submitted a Report to Prime Minister Fraser in 
September, 1977. The Report stressed that resources bargaining was 
’particularly risky' in the Australia-Japan relationship, not least 
because 'retaliation by Japan in some other area is ... a very likely 
consequence'. On the specific subject of foreign fishing access into 
the proposed AFZ, the Committee had advised that Canberra should ensure 
'all countries seeking access, including Japan, are treated in a way 
that can be justified as even-handed and non-discriminatory'. There is 
also evidence to suggest that similar warnings against the use of 
linkage diplomacy were made by a somewhat wider range of actors (again 
mostly from the 'other issue areas' category) within the Consultative 
Committee on Relations with Japan during the Australia-Japan fisheries 
negotiations of 1978-79.
It is difficult to determine with certainty the degree to 
which these 'other issue areas' actors had influenced the Australian 
Government's decision to adopt a relatively moderate form of linkage 
diplomacy towards Japan. Almost every Australian official interviewed 
by the author insisted that the bureaucrats and politicians in Canberra 
including those favouring a trade-off strategy - were well aware that 
certain dangers attended resources bargaining; especially in cases 
where Australia has a complex economic relationship with a target 
country such as Japan. It is reasonable to assume that this awareness 
was not solely the result of the decision-makers’ own independent analy­
sis of the situation, but was also the result of pressures from
290
those actors most opposed to linkage diplomacy.
There are, however, other possible explanations why, on the one 
hand, Canberra chose to adopt a moderate form of linkage diplomacy 
towards Japan and, on the other, why Wellington embraced a more 
forceful and ambitious diplomatic strategy.
First, New Zealand’s perception of the bargaining leverage 
it exercised over Japan with respect to the resources of the EEZ might 
have been greater than Australia's estimates of its leverage in this 
area. An objective assessment suggests that both New Zealand and 
Australia had approximately the same potential bargaining leverage 
over Japan in terms of the fish resources, and other qualities, of 
their 200-mile zones. While New Zealand probably has larger stocks 
of high quality fish available to the DWFS than has Australia, the 
latter country has the advantages of its geographic location astride 
the Southern bluefin tuna migration routes and as a convenient 
base for Southern Ocean fishing activities. It appears, however, that 
some New Zealanders (see sub-section Ilia, of the New Zealand case study) 
had an exaggerated sense of the value of New Zealand's fish resources 
to Japan, and believed that the Japanese who were being 'squeezed out' 
of some of the northern hemisphere fisheries could be forced into 
making 'panic' deals with southern hemisphere coastal states. Australia, 
by contrast, seems to have had a more realistic appreciation of the 
value of the AFZ and of the fish resources contained therein.
Second, New Zealand might have believed itself more vulnerable 
in the secondary issue area(s) than did Australia. A casual glance 
at the export statistics in agricultural commodities by these two 
countries to Japan suggests that New Zealand would have had little 
reason to believe itself any more vulnerable than Australia. For 
many farm products Australia was historically just as dependent on 
the Japanese market as New Zealand. However, the trading climate 
for some of the secondary issue area commodities had improved between 
1977 (when Wellington commenced its fisheries and trade negotiations 
with Tokyo) and 1978 (when Canberra began its negotiations with 
Tokyo). For example, the global beef trade situation had improved 
sufficiently by mid-1978 that Australia's cattlemen no longer pressured 
the Australian Government to seek 'beef-for-trade' deals from Japan.
It was suggested to the author by several officials in Canberra that, 
if the beef situation had been as serious in 1978 as it was in late 
1976, (when Australia had engaged in 'fish-for-trade' deals) then the
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Australian Government might well have adopted a tougher trade-off 
strategy against Japan.
A third possible explanation for New Zealand adopting a more 
forceful linkage diplomacy against Japan might be related to the 
fact that New Zealand’s overall trading performance with Japan was 
worse than Australia's. For example, New Zealand's balance of 
trade with Japan had, in the four years preceding the negotiations of 
1977-78, fallen from a slight surplus in 1973/74 to a substantial 
deficit in each of the succeeding years. Australia, however, had a 
much better trading record with Japan. Historically Australia has 
had a very favourable balance of trade with that country, and this 
continued to be the case in the years preceding the fisheries/trade 
negotiations of 1978/79.^"
A fourth possible explanation relates to the respective levels 
of vulnerability dependence existing in the total two-way trading 
relationship between New Zealand and Japan on the one hand, and 
Australia and Japan on the other. The New Zealand/Japan case will be 
examined first.
It was widely recognised in New Zealand that Japan is far more 
important to the New Zealand economy, than is New Zealand to Japan.
In FY1976-77, Japan was New Zealand's second largest export market 
(taking 11 per cent of total exports), and its third largest 
supplier (accounting for 13 per cent of total imports). That year, 
however, New Zealand supplied only one per cent of Japan's imports 
and ranked as Japan's 20th supplier; and as a market for Japanese 
exports New Zealand ranked only 30th taking 0.7 per cent of Japan's 
total exports. Given these respective trade flows, and allowing for 
the types of goods traded between the two countries, it is obviously 
far more difficult for New Zealand to find alternative market 
outlets and sources of supply than it is for Japan.
In the Australia/Japan case the situation was somewhat different. 
In 1978, Japan was Australia's largest export market (taking more than 
30 per cent of total exports), and its second largest supplier 
(accounting for some 18 per cent of total imports). That year 
Australia ranked as Japan's third most important source of imports
1. Australia's balance of trade with Japan in 1972/73 was a positive 
$1,200 million. This surplus continued to rise until in 1977/78 it 
had reached $1,766 million.
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(supplying 6.7 per cent of Japan's total imports), and was Japan's 
ninth most important export customer (taking 2.8 per cent of Japan’s 
total exports).
These crude statistics reveal that, while Japan is probably more 
important to Australia as a trading partner than is Australia to 
Japan, Australia is more important to Japan as a source of supply 
and as a customer for exports than is New Zealand. Moreover, when one 
examines the types of commodities exported by Australia to Japan and 
their importance to the Japanese economy,1* it is recognised that the 
Australian/Japanese trading relationship is more nearly in a position 
of mutual dependence than is the New Zealand/Japanese relationship.
In the overall trade area, therefore, it appears that New Zealand 
has less bargaining leverage over Japan than has Australia. This 
may help to explain why New Zealand was more inclined than Australia 
to use whatever bargaining leverage it possessed to resolve its 
economic problems with Japan.
Fifth, New Zealand might have felt forced to take very strong 
action because its overall economic situation had sharply worsened.
It was noted in sub-section lb. of the New Zealand case study how 
that country had suffered severely from the impact of the worldwide 
decline in economic activity following the Oil Crisis of 1973-74. The 
terms of trade had shifted against many of the products New Zealand 
exported, and there were signs of increasing agricultural protectionism 
in the industrialised countries. New Zealand's visible balance of 
trade, which was normally in surplus, registered a massive deficit of some 
$1,140 million for the year ended June, 1975. For many New Zealanders, 
including some of the commercial fishermen, the economic situation 
was sufficiently desperate to justify Muldoon's diplomatic 'gamble' 
against Japan. Australia's overall economic position was not nearly 
so serious. While it, too, had a substantial export trade in agric­
ultural products, it was fortunate in having a more highly diversified 
range of exports - including minerals. Australia's overall balance of 
trade continued to register a substantial surplus throughout the 
mid/late 1970s.2' There are other possible explanations, - not directly
1 See Ben Smith op.cit. and Peter Drysdale Economic Interdependence 
with Japan: Issues and Policy Problems, unpublished seminar paper, 
Department of Economics, The Australian National University, 4 November,
1975.  ^ ^2. A senior official in Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, who had been involved in the fisheries negotiations with both
New Zealand and Australia, informed the author in late 1978 that his
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related to economic leverage, sensitivity, vulnerability and dependency - 
why New Zealand chose to adopt a more ambitious and forceful form of 
linkage diplomacy than Australia.
The crucial role played by the New Zealand Prime Minister,
Muldoon, in the formulation and implementation of his country's trade­
off policies cannot be ignored. It was noted how Muldoon was determined 
to portray the image of a strong and resolute leader. The tough and 
aggressive policies he adopted against Japan appeared as an extension 
of his political performance and style in the domestic arena. But 
neither can the personality of the Australian Prime Minister, Fraser, 
be ignored. His strong dislike of Muldoon may account for the reason 
why he favoured some type of trade-off in the fisheries negotiations 
with Japan. It appears that he wanted to do at least as well in the 
upcoming negotiations with Japan as his trans-Tasman rival.
A seventh possible alternative explanation is related to the 
timing of the respective fisheries access negotiations in New Zealand 
and Australia. When, in 1977, Wellington was busy formulating its 
fisheries management policies and its broader diplomatic strategy to­
wards Japan, the Japanese fishermen appeared particularly vulnerable 
to coastal state pressures. (Tokyo had just emerged from tough, and 
generally disappointing, fisheries access negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and the United States.) As noted above, the New Zealand Govern­
ment calculated that the time was right to extract maximum concessions 
from Japan. However, a year later - when Australia was about to enter 
into fisheries negotiations with Japan - the Japanese appeared somewhat 
less vulnerable in the fisheries area. The Japanese fish market was 
then (mid/late 1978) in a position of over-supply; and the Japanese 
Government and fishing industry were developing a series of policy 
measures to adjust to the new era of 200-mile zones.
There was another aspect of the timing of the respective negot­
iations. Australia did not commence its fisheries access negotiations 
with Japan until after New Zealand had concluded its fisheries and 
trade agreements with Tokyo. The demonstration effect on Canberra
Government had made allowances in the negotiations for the different 
economic situations existing in these two countries. He claimed that 
Tokyo had given New Zealand 'generous' treatment in the negotiations 
of 1978 in recognition of that country's serious economic difficulties. 
He also observed that Tokyo had been less prepared to be generous to 
Australia 'which was a lucky, minerals-rich, country'.
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of the apparently limited success of the 'Muldoon diplomacy' must 
have influenced, to some degree, the Australian Government's decisions 
concerning linkage diplomacy.
There is yet another factor which may explain in part why 
Australia decided not to employ the tough linkage strategy towards 
Japan adopted by New Zealand. Unlike the latter - which is a unitary 
State - Australia has a federal system of government. It was noted in 
the Australian case study how the various states of Australia used 
their influence to protect their separate interests when fisheries 
management policies were being formulated. For example, Tasmania 
had repeatedly argued for a Japanese fishing presence in the AFZ which 
would permit Japanese vessels continued use of the port of Hobart.
In summary, the New Zealand and Australian case studies 
suggest that there is a wide range of possible explanations why one 
country is more likely than another to adopt an ambitious and forceful 
form of linkage diplomacy under conditions of economic interdependence. 
Further, the evidence implies that one of these possible explanations 
concerns the number of issues and actors involved in a bilateral 
economic relationship.
This thesis has chosen to focus more on the policy formulation 
stage of the diplomatic process - explaining why States adopt linkage 
strategies - rather than on policy implementation. However, it 
appears from the case studies that, just as the number of issues and 
actors involved in bilateral economic relationships may affect a 
State's decision to adopt (or reject) linkage diplomacy, so also may 
it affect the successful implementation of a trade-off strategy. In 
the New Zealand example it was noted how a number of 'other issue 
areas' actors (members of the Japan/New Zealand Businessmen's Assoc­
iation) had, during the course of the negotiations with Japan, apparent­
ly become aware of the dangers attached to the 'Muldoon diplomacy'. It 
seems that sometime in early 1978 they warned the Prime Minister of 
these dangers. It is possible that their meeting with Muldoon was 
one element in the Prime Minister's decision to moderate somewhat 
his diplomatic approach towards Japan in April/May that year. The 
argument can, therefore, be made that they contributed to the 
'success' of New Zealand's trade-off strategy; for if Muldoon had 
not adopted a slightly more conciliatory attitude it is possible that 
the negotiating deadlock with Japan would not have been broken.
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Likewise, in the Australian case study, the 'other issue areas' 
actors might well have contributed to the 'successful' conclusion of 
the fisheries (cum trade) negotiations of 1978-79. It was noted 
how the Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan, or at least 
some members of this Committee opposed to 'fish-for-beef' trade-offs, 
had warned the Government of the risks attached to linkage diplomacy.
It is likely that their advice had served as an extra check on Canberra 
from seeking larger - and, perhaps, unattainable - concessions from 
Tokyo.
At this point, a broader consideration of the approach adopted 
in the thesis is in order. This will involve a critical analysis of 
the working hypothesis, drawing attention to its possible limitations. 
Suggestions are also given for further research in the field of linkage 
diplomacy.
The first question that will be asked is how widely may the 
working hypothesis be applied and validated?
The thesis has chosen to focus on two countries having 
similar domestic policy networks linking State and society. Both 
New Zealand and Australia occupy almost the same point on the political 
spectrum; neither being authoritarian States characterised by highly 
centralised policy networks and strong public bureaucracies as found 
commonly in the Second and Third Worlds, nor having the extreme form of 
pluralist society characterised by decentralised policy networks and 
strong private bureaucracies found in the United States. New Zealand 
and Australia do, however, more closely resemble the American model - 
having a relatively 'weak State' and a 'strong society' (using 
Katzenstein’s terminology).
The question is will the working hypothesis be validated when 
applied to States at the authoritarian end of the political spectrum?
It might be argued that the stronger the State the greater the chance 
of trade-offs, for private actors will have little or no opportunity 
to influence policy choices and governments will then be free to make 
'rational' decisions concerning linkage diplomacy. But it was suggested 
in the analytical framework that the strength-of-State factor need not 
necessarily undermine the working hypothesis. Even very authoritarian 
States will probably have various sets of actors possessing a vested 
interest in each of the issue areas existing with other States. It 
may be expected that within each set of actors there will be some 
individuals - including, perhaps, members of the ruling elite -
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in positions of power and authority. These actors will not wish to 
see their interests directly traded off or indirectly threatened 
through the 'spillover* (or 'chain reaction') effects of linkage 
diplomacy, and will most probably use their influence to prevent the 
use of this form of bargaining strategy. Again it might be discovered 
that the greater the number and variety of issues and actors involved 
in bilateral economic relationships, the greater the opposition to 
linkage diplomacy. This could prove a useful area for further 
research. Comparisons might be made, for example, between a 'weak'
State and a 'strong' State each having similarly complex bilateral 
economic relations with a third State; or between two 'strong' States 
having very different respective degrees of complexity in their bilateral 
economic relations with a third State.
The case studies revealed another area where the working hypothesis 
might have to be qualified. This concerns the nature of the relationship 
between private actors and the government in States contemplating linkage 
diplomacy. There may be occasions when private actors normally 
expected to oppose linkage diplomacy are constrained from doing so 
because of their dependence on the government in some way. It was 
noted in the New Zealand case study, for example, that even if the 
private exporters of iron ore had been concerned about the possibility 
of the 'Muldoon diplomacy' damaging their trade with Japan it would 
have been difficult for them to voice such concern - for they were 
vitally dependent on the good-will of the Government for the continued 
extension of their export licences.
Further research in the field of linkage diplomacy might also 
focus on the roles and attitudes of multinational corporations(MNC) to 
trade-off strategies. The foreign-owned corporation is likely to 
be placed in a very delicate situation if the host government threatens 
to engage in this form of diplomacy. On the one hand, it (the MNC) 
might feel the need to protect its interests if there were dangers of 
a widening trade war with the target country; yet, on the other, it 
might feel constrained from interfering in the broader foreign economic 
affairs of the host nation. This problem is likely to be particularly 
acute for foreign corporations whose head offices are located in the 
target country.
Another area suggested for further research relates to the ways 
in which countries contemplating, or practising, linkage diplomacy 
assess the potential benefits and costs associated with trade-offs
297
across different issue areas. In neither the New Zealand nor the 
Australian case study does it appear that the decision-makers had 
carefully calculated the potential net economic (as well as social, 
and political) advantages or disadvantages attached to linkage 
diplomacy. The analyst might determine how the technical difficulty 
of measuring gains and losses across very different issues in bargain­
ing lead countries either to reject linkage diplomacy altogether, or 
to seek concessions from the target country not commensurate with 
their bargaining leverage in the primary issue area.
The thesis has chosen to focus on the problem of linkage 
diplomacy largely from the viewpoint of countries which first initiate 
this form of diplomacy. This study might usefully be complemented by 
examining linkage diplomacy from the perspective of the target country.
In the present case, the different ways in which Tokyo responded to 
the trade-off strategies adopted respectively by Wellington and Canberra 
might be critically analysed.
It is also suggested that the working hypothesis can be applied 
to other forms of linkage diplomacy - namely those not narrowly 
confined to bilateral economic interdependent relationships. One 
might consider, for example, using the working hypothesis in studies 
involving trade-offs across security and economic issue areas (what are
commonly termed exercises in 'resources diplomacy'); or, perhaps, to 
studies involving multilateral economic relationships.
There is one aspect of the New Zealand and Australian case 
studies which might, after further empirical work in this area, prove 
to be a common or essential feature of linkage diplomacy. This relates 
to the secrecy attached to the bargaining process and, most particularly, 
to the terms of the negotiated outcome. It is argued that such secrecy 
should not be unexpected, for governments involved in bargaining 
across different issue areas will probably not wish to alienate various 
domestic actors whose interests are being traded off by revealing this 
fact publicly.
These, and other possible, areas of research should contribute 
further to our understanding of linkage diplomacy. More broadly, however, 
studies in this field may alert the student of international politics 
(and economics) to the broader dimensions and implications of inter­
dependence. This thesis has, for example, suggested that in addition 
to measuring interdependence in terms of the volume of transactions
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between societies, or in terms of the sensitivity or vulnerability 
of States to costly external effects, interdependence may also be 
measured in terms of the number and variety of issue areas and actors 
involved in inter-State relationships. Further, a deeper knowledge 
of linkage diplomacy may help to determine whether or not high levels 
of interdependence in the international system provokes crises among 
States.
The study of linkage diplomacy may also contribute to our knowledge 
of the foreign policy process; particularly with regard to the respect­
ive roles of private interest groups, the bureaucracy, and politicians 
in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies. The case 
studies revealed, for example, the special problems experienced by 
government ministers - such as a Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries 
- having responsibilities in more than one broad economic issue area.
The thesis concludes by briefly considering the practical 
implications of linkage diplomacy for the future development and 
structure of the fishing industries of New Zealand and Australia and, 
more broadly, that of the world.
In both case studies it was concluded that neither the New 
Zealand nor the Australian fishing industries will necessarily suffer 
any lasting damage from the trade-offs negotiated in the fisheries 
agreements with Japan. The New Zealand-Japan Fisheries Agreement of 
September, 1978, and the Australia-Japan Fisheries Agreement of 
October, 1979, are only the first of a series of agreements that will 
be concluded covering Japanese fishing access to the 200-mile zones 
of these two countries. When these agreements are re-negotiated, and 
when Wellington and Canberra announce the annual fishing quotas for 
foreign fishermen, opportunities will arise to negotiate better terms 
from Tokyo in such areas as: improved market access for fish exports, 
increased domestic processing of fish caught within the zone, the 
training of local fishermen, and other areas that were not fully 
promoted in the initial access agreements.
Of course, much depends on how the New Zealand and Australian 
Governments intend to use their bargaining leverage over foreign 
fishing access. Should they continue to link fishing access with 
broader economic issues in their relations with Japan (and/or with 
other DWFS), then the local fishing industries might never attain 
their maximum potential. Much also depends on the attitude of the 
foreign fishing States. The precedent of linkage diplomacy has now
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been set. There is always the risk that the DWFS might initiate 
linkages of their own, where they tell New Zealand and Australia 'Give 
us favoured fishing access, or we will not buy your agricultural or 
other exports'.
It is suggested, however, that the fishing industries of New 
Zealand and Australia may be able to do something to reduce the 
likelihood of further trade-offs between fisheries and broader 
economic issues. They might, for example, adopt a more positive 
attitude towards joint fishing ventures with foreign fishermen. The 
argument follows: the larger the number of joint ventures, the smaller 
the amount of surplus fish available for licensed foreign fishing 
vessels; and the smaller the amount of licensed foreign fishing 
participation in the zone, the less scope there is for linkage 
diplomacy. It may be noted that there is diminished risk of trade­
offs with joint ventures, as the terms of operation for these 
enterprises are usually negotiated between the government of the 
host country and private foreign fishing companies. The latter will 
rarely be able to offer concessions to the coastal state in areas 
outside fisheries. Also the New Zealand and Australian fishermen might 
consider further lobbying for Ministers of Fisheries who have no 
responsibilities outside fisheries - particularly in the agricultural 
area.
At this early stage it is difficult to predict how the 
widespread establishment of 200-mile fishing (or exclusive economic) 
zones will affect the future development and structure of the global 
fishing industry. However, the New Zealand and Australian examples 
suggest that there is unlikely to be a sudden and dramatic increase 
in coastal state fishing activity at the expense of the DWFS. First, 
many of the coastal states have relatively backward fishing industries 
and wijl, for some time, be dependent on assistance from the DWFS for 
the development of their fishing capability. Second, there is also 
the possibility that the growth of coastal state fisheries will be 
inhibited by further exercises of linkage diplomacy elsewhere in the 
world. Such trade-offs may follow the New Zea-land and Australian 
examples, and be initiated by coastal states seeking broader economic 
(or political) concessions from the DWFS. But the initiative could 
come from the DWFS. The latter - some of which, like Japan, are 
advanced industrialised countries - may use their overall economic 
(and/or political) leverage to obtain privileged access to coastal
state zones.
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LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
Listed below are those persons interviewed by the author over 
the period 1977 to 1980. The list is divided into four sections 
according to the nationality of the person, and/or the Government 
for which he/she works. (In the ’others' category a number of 
Australian, New Zealand, and American expatriates were employed by 
various South Pacific island governments.)
1. New Zealanders
2. Australians
3. Japanese
4. • Others
It should be noted that this list does not include a number 
of minor government officials and fishermen - New Zealanders, Austral­
ians, Japanese, and others - interviewed by the author, nor a number 
of Japanese officials (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Fisheries Agency and elsewhere) who appeared reluctant to be listed.
Each entry gives the interviewee's name, his/her position at the 
time of the interviewthe government department or company for which 
he/she works, the place at which the interview took place, and the 
month and year of the interview. It should also be noted that some 
of those listed were interviewed on a number of occasions by the author.
1. NEW ZEALANDERS
Armstrong, W.M.V., First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy, Tokyo,
October 1978.
Ashenden, Philip, marketing consultant, Ashenden Associates, Canberra - 
May 1978, and Wellington - July and August 1978.
Blackstone, D.J., Second Secretary, Asian Affair's Division, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, July 1978.
Brittenden, Wayne, Far Eastern correspondent, New Zealand Broadcasting 
Commission, Tokyo, Japan, October 1978.
Burns, J., Press Secretary to J.B. Bolger (Minister of Fisheries), 
Wellington, July 1978.
Campbell, J.S., fisheries consultant, (ex-General Manager of the Fishing 
Industry Board), Wellington, August 1977 and August 1978.
Cooper, R., Senior Fisheries Management Officer, Fisheries Management 
Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington,
August 1978.
Cotton, P.C., Head of South Pacific Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Wellington, August 1978.
Eide, E.S., Commander RNZN, Deputy Director Policy, Defence Department, 
Wellington, August 1977.
Francis, Bob, Fisheries Biologist, Fisheries Research Division,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington August 1978.
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Grant, R.S., Assistant Head, Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Wellington, September 1977.
Hamilton, Ian, Secretary, New Zealand Seafood Processors Inc., 
Wellington, August 1978.
Hayden, T.H., Assistant Advisory Officer, Trade Policy Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry, Wellington, July 1978 and 
August 1978.
Hinds, V.T., Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Division,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, August 1978.
Insall, Rodney L., Third Secretary, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Wellington, August 1978.
Jarman, Nick, General Manager, Fishing Industry Board, Wellington,
July 1978.
Kennedy, I.F., Second Secretary, New Zealand Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, 
October 1978.
Lineham, B.T., Assistant Head, Asian Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Wellington, August 1978.
Mansfield, M., High Commissioner, New Zealand High Commission, Port 
Moresby, Papua New Guinea, August 1978.
Middleton, B.W., Assistant Head of Asian Division, later Assistant 
Head of South Pacific Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Wellington, September 1977 and August 1978.
Miller, R.M., Ambassador, New Zealand Embassy, Tokyo, October 1978.
Price, M.R., Second Secretary, Australia and Americas Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, July 1978.
Rowe, D.J., First Secretary, New Zealand High Commission, Suva, Fiji, 
August 1978.
Stevens, Peter, Wellington representative of New Zealand Federation 
of Commercial Fishermen, Wellington, August 1978.
Thompson, D.E., Advisory Officer, Trade Policy Division, Department 
of Trade and Industry, Wellington, July 1978.
2. AUSTRALIANS
Broinowski, R.P., Executive Director, Japan Secretariat, Canberra,
July 1980.
Cameron, Baden, Executive Officer, Australian National Cattlemen's 
Council, Canberra, November 1977 and July 1980.
Campbell, John, OECD/EEC/Energy Branch, Economic Division, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, August 1980.
Connell, Fred, President, Australian Fishing Industry Council, Canberra, 
March 1980 and August 1980.
Craft, Hugh Deputy High Commissioner, Australian High Commission,
Suva, Fiji, August 1978.
Eyres, John, Senior Finance Officer, Overseas Economic Relations 
Division, Treasury Department, Canberra, July 1980.
Hayman, Alan, Assistant Secretary, Meat and Meat Products Division, 
Department of Primary Industry, Canberra, November 1977.
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Jenkins, Peter, Trade Commissioner, Australian Embassy, Tokyo, October 
1978.
Lilburn, Bruce, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Policy 
Branch, Fisheries Division, Department of Primary Industry, 
Canberra, September 1979 and July 1980.
Macintosh, Ian, Far Eastern correspondent, Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, Tokyo, October 1978.
McKay, D.H., former Secretary, Department of Primary Industry, Canberra, 
July 1980.
Mackay-Sim, Rob, Department of Transport, Canberra, July 1980.
Martin, Barry, Senior Advisor to Deputy Leader of Opposition in House 
of Representatives, Canberra, July 1980.
Muir, Errol, Principal Executive Officer, Grains/Wheat/Wool Branch, 
Department of Overseas Trade, Canberra, November 1977.
Nolan,Perry, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canberra,
June 1978.
Pownall, Peter, Editor of Australian Fisheries, Fisheries Division, 
Department of Primary Industry, Canberra, December 1978 and 
January 1980.
Rowe, Alan, Principal Executive Officer, External Relations, Fisheries
Division, Department of Primary Industry, Canberra, November 1977.
Ryan, Pat, Assistant Secretary, Policy, Fisheries Division, Department 
of Primary Industry, Canberra, November 1977.
Saxon, Eric, former Japan Economic Analyst, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, Department of Trade and Industry, Canberra, August 1980.
Stanford, Peter, Maritime Resources Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Canberra, July 1980.
Sturman, Miles, Principal Executive Officer, Multilateral Fisheries
Relations, Fisheries Division, Department of Primary Industry, 
Canberra, July 1980.
Sullivan, John, First Secretary, Australian High Commission, Port 
Moresby, Papua New Guinea, September 1978.
Wood, G.S.R., Assistant Secretary, Department of the Special Trade 
Representative, Canberra, June 1980.
3. JAPANESE
Hamada, Koichi, Counsellor, Japanese Embassy, Canberra, January 1980.
Ishida, S., Deputy Director, International Fisheries Division,
Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
Tokyo, October 1978.
Isozaki, H., Research Fellow (International Law), Tokyo Metropolitan 
University - Tokyo, Canberra, May 1978.
Iwama, T., Doctoral student (International Law), Hitotsubashi University 
- Tokyo, Canberra, May 1978.
Kanai, Toshio, First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Wellington, Septem­
ber 1977.
Morisawa, M., Chairman, Fishermen’s Mutual Relief Fund, Tokyo, October 
1978.
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Nakamura, S., Deputy Director, Oceania Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Tokyo, October 1978.
Yonezawa, K., Counsellor, Oceanic Fisheries Department, Fisheries Agency, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo, October 
1978.
Yoshimura, Toshio, journalist, Oriental Press Service Ltd., Tokyo,
October 1978.
4. OTHERS
Chow, Robin, Assistant Secretary, Department of Primary Industry,
Port Moresby, August 1978.
Dabb, Geoff, Assistant Secretary (International), Department of Law,
Port Moresby, September 1978.
Fakahau, Semisi, Acting Chief Fisheries Officer, Nuku'alofa, Tonga,
August 1977.
Farapo, Tony, Ambassador, Embassy of Papua New Guinea, Tokyo,
October 1978.
Field, Mike, Press Secretary to Prime Minister, Apia, Western Samoa, 
August 1977.
Goggan, Terry, Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Apia, Western 
Samoa, August 1977.
Kearney, Bob, Skipjack Programme Coordinator, South Pacific Commission, 
Noumea, New Caledonia, August 1978.
Kotobalavu, Jioji, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Suva,
Fiji, August 1978.
Lavender, Pat, Principal Legal Officer, International Branch, Depart­
ment of Law, Port Moresby, September 1978.
Marsden, Rosalind, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Tokyo, October 
1978.
Philip, Alphonso L., Chief Fisheries Officer, Apia, Western Samoa,
August 1977.
Shaw, Barry, First Assistant Secretary, Advisory and Policy, Department 
of Primary Industry, Port Moresby, August 1978.
Simms, Rod, Assistant Secretary, General Financial Policy Division, 
Department of Finance, Port Moresby, September 1978.
Slade,fNarone, Attorney General, Apia, Western Samoa, August 1977.
Sperling, Harry, Fisheries Advisor, United Nations Development 
Project, Suva, Fiji, August 1978.
Thomas, Davidson, Fisheries Advisor, United Nations Development 
Project, Nuku'alofa, Tonga, August 1977.
Tabogani, Mary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Port Moresby, 
August 1978.
Tufui, Taniela, Secretary to Government, Nuku'alofa, Tonga, August 1977.
Vala, Araha, Deputy Director, Fisheries Division, Department of 
Primary Industry, Port Moresby, September 1978.
Wilkinson, Alan, Assistant Secretary, Aid and Development Assistance 
Section, Trade and Economic Relations Division, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Port Moresby, September 1978.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following bibliography includes only those books, monographs, 
articles in journals and newspapers, government documents, official 
public statements, and other items to which specific reference has been 
made in the thesis. For the reader's convenience, the bibliography has 
been divided under seven subject headings.
1. Interdependence
2. Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation
3. Global Fisheries and Fisheries Management
4. Law of the Sea
5. Japan and the Era of 200-mile Zones
6. New Zealand's Fisheries/Trade Negotiations with Japan
7. Australia's Fisheries/Trade Negotiations with Japan
The items listed under the seven subject headings correspond, for 
the most part, with the works referred to respectively in: the 
Introduction; the Analytical Framework; Part II, the Global Fishing 
Industry; Part II, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea; the 
remainder of Part II, referring to Japan's sensitivity and likely 
vulnerability to extended fishing zones; the New Zealand case study; and 
the Australian case study. However, some works which appear elsewhere in 
the thesis are here listed under their appropriate subject headings.
Given the much larger number and wider range of works referred to under 
the New Zealand and Australian headings, sections 6 and 7 have been sub­
divided according to the type of material listed. It will also be noted 
that the very large number of anonymously sourced articles in journals 
and newspapers which were fully referenced in the thesis are referred to 
in the bibliography only by the title of the journal or newspaper 
concerned.
1. INTERDEPENDENCE
Bergsten, C. Fred, Keohane, Robert 0. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr.,
'International Economics and International Politics: A Framework 
for Analysis', International Organisation, Vol.29, No.l, 1975.
Brown, Lester R., World Without Borders, Vintage Books, New York, 1972.
Cooper, R.N. The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the 
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